Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

After the estate of a former resident sued a nursing home for negligent care, the primary insurance carrier hired lawyers to defend the suit. Because the lawyers failed to timely designate an expert witness, the settlement value of the case greatly increased, causing the nursing home's primary carrier to pay its policy limits, and its excess insurance carrier to step in, defend the nursing home, and ultimately settle the suit. The excess carrier sued the law firm for professional negligence, both directly and under a theory of equitable subrogation. The trial court, finding the excess carrier and the lawyers had no direct attorney-client relationship, granted the law firm's motion to dismiss. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that under the facts of this case, the doctrine of equitable subrogation applied, and the excess carrier could, to the extent of its losses, pursue a claim against the lawyers to the same extent as the insured. Furthermore, the Court held that the excess carrier failed to allege a sufficient factual basis for a direct claim of professional negligence against the law firm. View "Great American E&S Ins. Co. v. Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer, P.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action against a district court judge, seeking damages for the judge's acts or omissions while presiding over a telephone pretrial conference in a civil action then pending before him. At all relevant times the judge was acting in his official capacity as a district court judge with regard to that case and the pretrial conference. The district court granted the judge's motion to dismiss on the grounds of judicial immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the acts of which Plaintiff complained occurred while the judge was conducting the pretrial conference and were clearly within the authority and responsibility of a district court judge, the judge was immune from suit, and the district court properly dismissed Plaintiff's complaint. View "Hartsoe v. McNeil" on Justia Law

In this action under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651, and the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 2283, the court considered whether, following the approval of a federal class action settlement, the district court properly enjoined a state court action for legal malpractice directed at counsel for the plaintiff class. The court held that the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act could not form the basis for the district court's injunction of the state court action, as the limited circumstances in which the injunction of an in personam action could be appropriate "in aid of" the court's jurisdiction were not present in this case. The court also concluded that where, as here, the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the reasonableness of counsel's representation, a subsequent malpractice action could be enjoined under the relitigation exception. View "Barroway v. Computer Assoc., et. al." on Justia Law

The Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission recommended that the Supreme Court suspend Circuit Judge Sam Pope from his duties for thirty days without pay, basing its recommendation on its conclusions that Judge Pope willfully violated Rules 1.1 and 1.2 of Canon 1 of the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct. The matter arose from allegations regarding Judge Pope's involvement in a confrontation between the judge and his estranged wife and her male companion at a Walmart. The Supreme Court accepted the Commission's unanimous recommendation of Judge Pope's suspension without pay for thirty days and further concluded that the suspension with its agreed conditions was an appropriate sanction for the judge's conduct. View "Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm'n v. Pope" on Justia Law

Defendants Robert Christy, Christy & Tessier, P.A., Debra Johnson, and Kathy Tremblay, appealed a superior court decision that rescinded a professional liability policy issued by Plaintiff Great American Insurance Company (GAIC), to the law firm of Christy & Tessier, P.A. Robert Christy (Christy) and Thomas Tessier (Tessier) were partners in the firm, practicing together for over forty-five years. In 1987, Frederick Jakobiec, M.D. (Jakobiec) retained Tessier to draft a will for him. In 2001, Jakobiec's mother, Beatrice Jakobiec (Beatrice), died intestate. Her two heirs were Jakobiec and his brother, Thaddeus Jakobiec (Thaddeus). Jakobiec asked Tessier, who was Beatrice's nephew, to handle the probate administration for his mother's estate. From 2002 through 2005, Tessier created false affidavits and powers of attorney, which he used to gain unauthorized access to estate accounts and assets belonging to Jakobiec and Thaddeus. Litigation ensued; two months after Tessier and Jakobiec entered into the settlement agreement, Christy executed a renewal application for professional liability coverage on behalf of the law firm. Question 6(a) on the renewal application asked: "After inquiry, is any lawyer aware of any claim, incident, act, error or omission in the last year that could result in a professional liability claim against any attorney of the Firm or a predecessor firm?" Christy's answer on behalf of the firm was "No." The trial court found that Christy's negative answer to the question in the renewal application was false "since Tessier at least knew of Dr. Jakobiec's claim against him in 2006." On appeal, the defendants argued that rescission was improper because: (1) Christy's answer to question 6(a) on the renewal application was objectively true; (2) rescission of the policy or denial of coverage would be substantially unfair to Christy and the other innocent insureds who neither knew nor could have known of Tessier's fraud; and (3) the alleged misrepresentation was made on a renewal application as opposed to an initial policy application. GAIC argued that rescission as to all insureds is the sole appropriate remedy given the material misrepresentations in the law firm's renewal application. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that Tessier's knowledge is imputed to Christy and the other defendants thereby voiding the policy ab initio. The Court made no ruling, however, as to whether any of the defendants' conduct would result in non-coverage under the policy and remanded for further proceedings. View "Great American Insurance Company v. Christy" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Court of Judicial Discipline ("CJD") erred in permanently removing Lehigh County Magisterial District Judge MaryEsther S. Merlo ("Appellant") from judicial office. After careful consideration, the Court found the CJD's sanction was lawful under the circumstances of this case. With regard to Appellant's work habits, the CJD concluded her practice of repeatedly calling off and consistently arriving late constituted a violation of MDJ Rule 4C, and that her conduct was "so extreme as to bring the judicial office into disrepute," constituting a violation of Pa. Const. art. V, sec. 18(d)(1). The CJD further determined Appellant's repeated absences, repeated continuances, and failure to dispose of truancy cases and sign paperwork in a timely manner demonstrated that she did not devote the time necessary for the prompt and proper disposition of the business of her office, in violation of MDJ Rule 3A, and that she neglected and failed to perform the duties of her office, again in violation of Pa. Const. art. V, sec. 18(d)(1). Finally, the CJD concluded Appellant's conduct violated the mandate of MDJ Rule 5A that a magisterial district judge diligently discharge her administrative duties and facilitate the performance of the administrative responsibilities of her staff, noting that Appellant's conduct actually interfered with, rather than facilitated, her staff's performance of their responsibilities: "[i]t is beyond hypocritical for a judge who repeatedly fails to appear, or consistently appears late, for scheduled court proceedings to lecture and impose sanctions upon a juvenile who is appearing before the judge due to truancy issues. Such conduct undermines the very purpose of the proceedings and makes a mockery of the judicial system." The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CJD removing Appellant from judicial office and precluding her from holding judicial office in the future. View "In Re: Maryesther S. Merlo, Magisterial District Judge" on Justia Law

The Judicial Conduct Commission recommended a reprimand against the Honorable Keith L. Stoney due to the issuance of an excessive warrant. Judge Stoney argued before the Supreme Court that the excessive amount of the warrant was a mistake not amounting to misconduct. The court agreed and declined to discipline Judge Stoney, holding (1) the record evidence did not support the Commission's conclusion that Judge Stoney issued a warrant with improper intent; (2) Judge Stoney's mistake did not violate the Code of Judicial Conduct; and (3) because parties to a judicial discipline proceeding are not required to marshal evidence, the Court did not need to dismiss Judge Stoney's brief for failure to marshal the evidence supporting the Commission's order. View "In re J. Stoney" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with sex offenses against his wife’s daughter in Henry County. While still married, he had moved in with another woman in Rock Island County and was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse against her nine-year-old daughter. In the Henry County case, the state introduced testimony about the Rock Island crime and the conviction. Defendant was again convicted. In both prosecutions, defendant was represented by the same attorney. On appeal of his Henry County conviction, he alleged that his lawyer had a per se conflict of interest because the Rock Island victim, who also testified at the Henry County trial, had been represented by this attorney in the capacity of guardian ad litem in an unrelated matter. The appellate court remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the conviction. A per se conflict of interest, requiring automatic reversal, does not require proof of impact on the attorney’s performance. The guardian ad litem involvement with the witness was long over when defendant was tried and the witness, as person, could not be considered an “entity” assisting the prosecution.View "People v. Fields" on Justia Law

Rodgetta Colvin Jett n/k/a Octavia R. Cantelow-Jett ("Jett") appealed the grant of summary judgment entered against her in a legal-malpractice action against attorney James M. Wooten and his law firm, the Law Offices of James M. Wooten, P.C. ("Wooten P.C."). Jett was injured when she fell down the stairs while leaving a YMCA facility in Birmingham. Jett filed a legal-malpractice action against the Wooten defendants as a result of their failure to initiate legal actions on her behalf against the YMCA before the limitations period expired on those claims. The trial court thereafter entered a summary judgment in favor of the Wooten defendants, holding that Jett's claims against them were themselves barred by the two-year statute of limitations that applied to Alabama Legal Services Act (ALSA) claims because Jett did not initiate her action until December 30, 2010, more than two years after the two YMCA incidents. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ALSA tolled the statute of limitations and that the two-year period in which Jett could initiate an action against the Wooten defendants based on Wooten's failure to file actions against the YMCA did not begin to run until Jett discovered that Wooten had not filed the legal actions she alleged he told her he had filed. Accordingly, her lawsuit against the Wooten defendants was timely filed. The judgment of the trial court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Jett v. Wooten" on Justia Law

Todd attempted to purchase claims against a collection agency (Franklin) from Fletcher. He then sued Franklin. The district court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the assignment was void because Todd was using it merely to attempt to practice law without a license and that Todd failed to state a claim for relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The assignment was void as against public policy. Illinois public policy forbids the assignment of legal claims to non-attorneys in order to litigate without a license. Undisputed evidence showed that Todd created a business providing legal advice and repeatedly agreed to purchase claims in order to litigate. Even if the assignment was not void, Todd failed to state a claim. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act preempts state-law claims, 15 U.S.C. 1681t(b)(1)(F). Todd did not attempt could not bring a claim directly under the FCRA because the section Franklin allegedly violated does not create a private right of action. View "Todd v. Franklin Collection Serv., Inc." on Justia Law