Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

FMC and OSS own patents that cover structures for subsea oil and gas recovery. OSS sued, alleging that FMC’s Enhanced Vertical Deepwater Tree equipped with FMC’s Retrievable Choke and Flow Module infringed 95 claims across 10 OSS patents. The infringement question in the suit boiled down to whether fluid flows through FMC’s accused device as required by the OSS Patents. Finding that OSS failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether FMC’s accused devices met the “divert” limitations of the OSS Patents, the district court granted FMC summary judgment.FMC sought Attorneys’ Fees and Non-Taxable Costs under 35 U.S.C. 285, which applies to “exceptional cases.” FMC argued that the Markman Order foreclosed any legitimate diverter infringement claims going forward, making OSS’s litigation position on infringement objectively baseless and that the substantive weakness of OSS’s infringement claims is shown by OSS’s failure to produce any admissible evidence. FMC alleged litigation misconduct by OSS as unreasonably prolonging the case.Applying the Supreme Court's “Octane Fitness” test the district court denied FMC’s motion. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting FMC’s arguments that OSS’s case was objectively baseless after the claim construction order and that rejection of OSS’s evidence demonstrated the substantive weakness of OSS’s case. OSS that it had no obligation to revise its litigation strategy just because the Patent Board had invalidated diverter claims in different patents. View "OneSubsea IP UK Ltd. v. FMC Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the district court denying Winstead PC's motion to dismiss USA Lending Group, Inc.'s malpractice claim brought under the Texas Citizens Participation Act in this legal malpractice case, holding that Winstead presented prima facie evidence sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.USA Lending hired Winstead PC to sue USA Lending's former employee. Later, USA Lending sued Winstead and its attorney seeking more than $1 million in damages, alleging that Winstead's malpractice caused USA Lending to forfeit its claim for monetary damages. Winstead filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the lawsuit was based on its exercise of the right to petition. The district court denied the motion, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that USA Lending adduced prima facie evidence to support its claim for legal malpractice. View "USA Lending Group, Inc. v. Winstead PC" on Justia Law

Amanda Bryant filed suit against State Farm Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) and its attorneys, Henley, Lotterhos & Henley, PLLC (HLH), claiming negligence, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on HLH’s actions in a prior subrogation claim. HLH argued in a Motion to Dismiss or, In the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment that it was not a proper party to this lawsuit because it was the legal representative of the adverse party in the prior subrogation matter. For this reason, HLH argued it did not owe a duty to Bryant that could give rise to tort liability. The trial court disagreed with HLH and denied its motion. The Mississippi Supreme Court granted HLH’s petition for interlocutory appeal. Based on caselaw, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order and rendered judgment in favor of HLH. Because State Farm was still party to the action, the case was remanded to the trial court for continuation of the proceedings. View "Henley, Lotterhos & Henley, PLLC v. Bryant" on Justia Law

The Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (“the Commission”) recommended public censure and thirty-day unpaid suspension of former district court Judge Mark Thompson of the Fifth Judicial District. These sanctions stemmed from former Judge Thompson’s guilty plea to a reduced charge of disorderly conduct in Summit County District Court. Former Judge Thompson’s plea reflected his admission to having “recklessly” displayed an AR-15 style assault rifle during a dispute with his adult stepson. View "In the Matter of: Former Judge Mark D. Thompson" on Justia Law

UCANN sued Hemp for infringing its patent, entitled “Cannabis Extracts and Methods of Preparing and Using the Same.” UCANN filed for bankruptcy, which automatically stayed the litigation. After the bankruptcy petition was dismissed, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the patent case. UCANN’s infringement claims were dismissed with prejudice; Hemp’s invalidity and inequitable conduct counterclaims were dismissed without prejudice.Hemp sought attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. 285, 28 U.S.C. 1927, and the court’s inherent authority, claiming that UCANN’s prosecution counsel had committed inequitable conduct by copying text from a piece of prior art into the specification of the patent and not disclosing it to the Patent and Trademark Office as prior art and UCANN’s litigation counsel purportedly took conflicting positions in its representation of UCANN and another client (the owner of the prior art). Hemp expressly notified the court that it did not seek any further proceedings, including a trial or evidentiary hearing, in connection with its motion. The district court denied the motion based on the existing record.The Federal Circuit affirmed upholding findings that Hemp failed to establish that it is the prevailing party under section 285, that this is an “exceptional” case warranting an attorney’s fee award, or that UCANN’s counsel acted in a vexatious or otherwise unreasonable manner. While Hemp’s position was extremely weak, it was neither “frivolous as filed” nor “frivolous as argued.” View "United Cannabis Corp. v. Pure Hemp Collective Inc." on Justia Law

Kinney, an adjudicated vexatious litigant and disbarred former attorney, obtained leave to pursue an appeal from the final judgment in this probate proceeding. Leave was granted not because Kinney made the necessary threshold showing of merit and absence of intent to harass or delay under Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7, but because the vexatious litigant statute has no application to a party who files an appeal in a proceeding he did not initiate.Kinney appealed the Final Distribution and Allowance of Fees Order, apparently claiming that the probate court erred in approving the Special Administrator’s decision not to pay him his $1,000 statutory fee, cancellation of an agreement with a prior administrator of the estate to manage and perform various services relating to a house owned by the estate, and approval of a distribution of $329,684.82 out of the sales proceeds of that house to satisfy indebtedness pursuant to certain judgment liens against that property.The court of appeal affirmed, describing Kinney’s arguments as “incoherent” and a “hodgepodge.” On all but one of the issues presented, Kinney either has no standing to appeal or is barred under the doctrine of claim preclusion; on the remaining claim of error, the probate court acted within its discretion. View "Estate of Kempton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court imposed sanctions upon Respondent, the Honorable C. Carter Williams, for his violations of multiple provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of Professional Conduct, holding that a six-month suspension without pay and other sanctions were warranted.Judicial disciplinary proceedings against Respondent, a circuit judge in the Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit, were initiated after he was stopped for a traffic violation by a police officer, identified himself as a a judge, contacted the officer's supervisors and made retaliatory and coercive comments. The West Virginia Judicial Hearing Board (JHB) concluded that a three-month suspension without pay and other sanctions was warranted, but the Judicial Disciplinary Counsel argued that the sanction was too lenient. The Supreme Court concluded that a six-month suspension without pay was appropriate to address Respondent's conduct and imposed the JHB's recommendation that Respondent comply with monitoring for two years, be censured and fined $5000 in addition to be required to pay certain costs. View "In re Honorable Williams" on Justia Law

White. convicted of four counts of aggravated murder, two counts of attempted murder, two counts of felonious assault, one count of aggravated burglary, three counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of having a weapon while under disability, was sentenced to life in prison without parole. On appeal, White argued that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney, Armengau, was under indictment in Franklin County, Ohio, for serious criminal offenses and “would have been conflicted over whether to devote time to preparing his own defense or that of his client”; “would have been reluctant to vigorously represent White" for fear of angering the prosecutor; and might have failed to engage in plea-bargaining in White’s case out of a desire to gain a victory over the prosecutor. The Ohio Court of Appeals declined to consider White’s claim because the record lacked necessary facts.In White's federal habeas proceedings, the district court found that Armengau had told White about Armengau’s indictment but White had decided to retain Armengau anyway. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Because White’s claim depends on facts outside the state court record, the Supreme Court’s 2022 "Shinn" decision likely precludes relief. Even considering the new facts introduced in federal habeas court, White’s claim fails. White failed to show that the alleged conflict adversely affected counsel’s performance. White and Armengau’s cases were handled by different judges and were prosecuted by different authorities. View "White v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Askew formed Vantage to trade securities. He recruited investors, including the plaintiffs. Vantage filed a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Form D to sell unregistered securities in a 2016 SEC Rule 506(b) stock offering. The plaintiffs became concerned because Askew was not providing sufficient information but they had no right, based on their stock agreements, to rescind those investments. They decided to threaten litigation and to report Vantage to the SEC to pressure Askew and Vantage to return their investments. Before filing suit, the plaintiffs engaged an independent accountant who reviewed some of Vantage’s financial documents and concluded that he could not say “whether anything nefarious is going" on but that the “‘smell factor’ is definitely present.”The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants in subsequent litigation. The district court then conducted an inquiry mandated by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) and determined that the plaintiffs violated FRCP 11 but chose not to impose any sanctions. The Third Circuit affirmed that the plaintiffs violated Rule 11 in bringing their federal securities claims for an improper purpose (to force a settlement). The plaintiffs’ Unregistered Securities and Misrepresentation Claims lacked factual support. Askew was not entitled to attorney’s fees because the violations were not substantial. The PSLRA, however, mandates the imposition of some form of sanctions when parties violate Rule 11 so the court remanded for the imposition of “some form of Rule 11 sanctions.” View "Scott v. Vantage Corp" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the interlocutory order of the circuit court granting a preliminary injunction enjoining Kristina Gulley from exercising any powers as a justice of the peace or participating in the Pulaski County Quorum Court or its committees as a justice of the peace, holding that there was no error. Gulley was elected justice of the peace for District 10 in Pulaski County in 2020 and filed for reelection in 2022. Thereafter, voters filed a petition for writ of mandamus and declaratory judgment alleging that Gulley was ineligible to be a candidate for reelection because she had twice been convicted of hot-check charges. The circuit court granted the petition and ordered the board of election commissioners not to certify Gulley as a candidate. Appellees later brought this petition pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 16-118-105 seeking Gulley's removal from office and the return of salary and benefits. The motion was converted to a motion for a preliminary injunction, which the circuit court granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) res judicata did not bar Appellees' motion to remove Gulley from office; and (2) the circuit court did not clearly err in granting a preliminary injunction. View "Gulley v. State ex rel. Jegley" on Justia Law