General Motors (GM), represented by the Mayer Brown law firm, entered into secured transactions in which JP Morgan acted as agent for two different groups of lenders. The first loan (structured as a secured lease) was made in 2001 and the second in 2006. In 2008, the 2001 secured lease was paid off, which required the lenders to release their security interests in the collateral securing the transaction. The closing papers for that payoff accidentally also terminated the lenders’ security interests in the collateral securing the 2006 loan. No one noticed—not Mayer Brown and not JP Morgan’s counsel. When GM filed for bankruptcy protection in 2009, GM and JP Morgan noticed the error. Plaintiffs, members of the consortium of lenders on the 2006 loan, were not informed until years later. Plaintiffs sued GM’s law firm, Mayer Brown. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, holding that Mayer Brown did not owe plaintiffs a duty. The court rejected arguments that JP Morgan was a client of Mayer Brown in unrelated matters and thus not a third‐party non‐client; even if JP Morgan was a third‐party non‐client, Mayer Brown assumed a duty to JP Morgan by drafting the closing documents; and the primary purpose of the GM‐Mayer Brown relationship was to influence JP Morgan. View "Oakland Police & Fire Retirement System v. Mayer Brown, LLP" on Justia Law

Richard Culbertson was counsel for the four plaintiffs in these consolidated Social Security disability benefits cases. At issue in this appeal was the attorney's fees for Culbertson under 42 U.S.C. 406 and the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412(d). The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not err in its interpretation and application of Dawson v. Finch, 425 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1970) and by imposing a 24% cap on section 406 fees; it was necessary for the district court to add the requested section 406(b) fee together with his EAJA award; and the district court did not abuse its discretion and did not exceed its authority. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Wood v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law

In 2001, Dr. Klingemann filed a patent application directed to a method of treating cancer by administering natural killer cells. After years of examination, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) rejected the application on obviousness grounds. The Patent and Trial Appeal Board affirmed that rejection. Nantkwest, as assignee of the application, appealed to the district court under 35 U.S.C. 145, in lieu of an immediate appeal to the Federal Circuit 35 U.S.C. 145. The statute provides that the applicant must pay “[a]ll of the expenses of the proceeding,” “regardless of the outcome.” After prevailing in the district court, the USPTO sought to recover $111,696.39 in fees under section 145. Although the district court granted the USPTO’s expert fees, it denied its requested attorneys’ fees, citing the “American Rule,” under which litigants pay their own attorneys’ fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides otherwise. The district court concluded that the “[a]ll expenses” provision of the statute was neither sufficiently specific nor explicit enough for the authorization of attorneys’ fees. The Federal Circuit reversed. Section 145 entitles the USPTO to compensation for the diversion of its resources in the defense of section 145 appeals. View "Nantkwest, Inc. v. Matal" on Justia Law

Leonard was appointed to defend Ogoke, who was charged with wire fraud. Ogoke’s codefendant, Okusanya entered into a cooperation plea agreement. Based on the government's motion in limine, Judge Guzmán entered an order that “unless there is a showing that the missing witness is peculiarly within the government’s control, either physically or in a pragmatic sense, Defendant is precluded from commenting on the government’s failure to call any witness.” It was the government’s theory that Ogoke and Okusanya were coconspirators in the fraud. Okusanya appeared on the government’s witness list, but the government did not call him during trial. During his closing argument, Leonard made several references to Okusanya’s failure to testify. Judge Guzmán sustained an objection and struck that portion of the argument. Before the jury returned a verdict, Judge Guzmán issued an order to show cause as to why Leonard should not be held in contempt. The jury found Ogoke not guilty. The government declined to participate in the contempt proceeding, Leonard was represented by counsel, but no prosecutor was appointed. Leonard stated that he had not realized he violated the ruling, but later acknowledged his “huge mistake.” Judge Guzmán issued an order holding Leonard in contempt, 18 U.S.C. 401, and ordering him to pay a fine, finding Leonard’s explanation “incredible” given his extensive experience as a defense attorney. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction as supported by sufficient evidence, rejecting procedural and due process arguments. View "United States v. Ogoke" on Justia Law

Nelson, an attorney specializing in asbestos defense, was employed by Tucker Ellis. In 2009, Nelson became a “non-capital partner.” Gradient was retained by Tucker Ellis to assist in litigation. Nelson exchanged emails with Gradient consultants about medical research articles relating to smoking and/or radiation (rather than asbestos) as causes of mesothelioma. After Nelson left Tucker Ellis in 2011, the law firm was served with a subpoena, seeking the production of all communications between Tucker, Ellis and Gradient regarding the research. Tucker Ellis produced the attorney work product emails authored by Nelson. After Nelson was subpoenaed for deposition, he wrote a “clawback” letter to Tucker Ellis, asserting the emails contained his privileged attorney work product and demanding they be sequestered and returned to him. Nelson sought a determination that Tucker Ellis had a legal duty to protect his attorney work product from improper disclosure to third parties Code of Civil Procedure section 2018.030. The court of appeal reversed the trial court, concluding that the holder of the attorney work product privilege is the employer law firm, Tucker Ellis, not Nelson, and had no legal duty to secure Nelson’s permission before it disclosed documents he created in the scope of his employment. View "Tucker Ellis LLP v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, conservator and guardian for his son Vincent Jones, and Plaintiff’s counsel (Attorney) appealed from two orders issued by the probate court that (1) dissolved and replaced a supplemental needs trust that had been created for Vincent’s estate, and (2) directed the Attorney, who created the original trust, to disgorge legal fees paid to her by Vincent and conditionally to pay additional amounts. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the probate court’s order creating a new supplemental needs trust for Vincent was not void for lack of statutory authority; and (2) the payment order against the Attorney deprived the Attorney of due process. View "In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court ordered that former York County Probate Judge Robert M.A. Nadeau forfeit $5,000 and be suspended from the practice of law in Maine for two years for violations of Canons 2(A), 2(B), and 3()(4) of the 1993 Maine Code of Judicial Conduct and for violation of Rule 4.2(C)(1) of the 2015 Maine Code of Judicial Conduct. The court based its sanctions based on two reports filed by the Committee on Judicial Responsibility and Disability alleging a total of six violations of the Maine Code of Judicial Conduct by Nadeau arising from Nadeau’s actions while he was a judge-elect, a sitting judge, and a candidate for reelection as probate judge. View "In re Robert M.A. Nadeau" on Justia Law

In 2010, Walton sued Rossdale. Walton, a California attorney, maintained a “litigation factory” by placing dozens of email addresses on the Internet, collecting spam messages sent to those addresses, and then demanding compensation for supposed violations of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Civil Code 1750. Walton‘s lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice in 2012. The same day, Rossdale sued Walton, alleging malicious prosecution. Rossdale was a fictitious business name registered in Florida to a Florida limited liability company, Miami Legal. In 2016, Walton argued that the lawsuit should be dismissed because Rossdale was "a fictitious business name registered by a company that has now dissolved.” Miami Legal argued that all of its assets and liabilities had been transferred to Rossdale Delaware, which Miami Legal called its “successor in interest to the causes of action.” The trial court dismissed for lack of standing. The court of appeals reversed. Rossdale was only a fictitious business name; no legitimate standing or jurisdictional issue was raised. This case does not involve an individual seeking to sue under a fictitious name to protect his identity, does not invoke serious privacy concerns, and did not raise any supposed violation of any fictitious name statute. View "Rossdale Group, LLC v. Walton" on Justia Law

Nelson, and her codefendants, Hall, Cox, and Ball, were tried simultaneously but in severed bench trials for the armed robbery and stabbing death of Wilson. The prosecution produced five eyewitnesses, who gave generally consistent testimony. Police had followed a blood trail to the four defendants. There was DNA evidence linking defendants to the crime. All were found guilty. The appellate court rejected Nelson's argument that she was denied her sixth amendment right to conflict-free counsel where attorneys from the same law firm represented her and codefendant Hall and that the attorneys, in making their choice of defenses, decided to forgo asserting an innocence defense in favor of pursuing a joint defense of self-defense. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding that Nelson had not demonstrated an actual conflict. In light of the evidence, Nelson could not show that an innocence defense based on a lack of accountability was a plausible alternative defense. View "People v. Nelson" on Justia Law

This contempt proceeding arose from the failure of Petitioner, the birth father’s counsel in a youth in need of care proceeding, to appear at a termination of parental rights hearing before the Honorable Gregory G. Pinski. After Judge Pinski issued the order of contempt, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of review, arguing that the contempt hearing was criminal in nature and that she was not afforded due process. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for a writ of review, holding (1) the district court had jurisdiction of these contempt proceedings pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 3-1-511; and (2) substantial evidence supported the order of contempt. View "Cross Guns v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law