Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Travaris T. Guy was convicted of attempted first degree murder and second degree murder for the shooting of David Woods Sr. and Sheena Woods. The jury found that Guy acted with the intent to kill but also believed his actions were lawfully justified, which led to an inconsistent verdict. Guy did not raise this issue on direct appeal or in his initial postconviction petition but later filed a successive postconviction petition claiming inconsistent verdicts and ineffective assistance of counsel.The Will County circuit court denied relief on the inconsistent verdict claim but granted a new trial on a separate claim. The appellate court reversed Guy’s attempted first degree murder conviction, holding that the jury instruction misstated the law, the conviction was inconsistent with the second degree murder conviction, and the jury’s finding of self-defense precluded a guilty verdict for attempted first degree murder.The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court’s judgment in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the circuit court to sentence Guy on the lesser-included offense of aggravated battery with a firearm. The court held that a conviction for attempted first degree murder requires proof of intent to kill without lawful justification. The jury instruction was erroneous as it only required intent to kill. The jury’s finding that Guy believed in the need for self-defense was incompatible with the intent required for attempted first degree murder. The court also found that Guy’s attorneys were ineffective for failing to properly raise these issues. View "People v. Guy" on Justia Law

Ronald Vines and his two adult sons attempted to rob a bank at gunpoint. They gathered weapons and other equipment, set up a tarp outside the bank, and waited for the tellers to arrive. One of Vines's sons, wearing a mask and armed with a revolver, forced a teller inside at gunpoint. However, another employee saw them and raised the alarm, causing Vines to signal his son to flee. They were apprehended by the police shortly after.Vines pleaded guilty to attempted armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(d) & 2 and brandishing a gun while committing a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) & 2. He did not initially challenge his § 924(c) charge, so he had to do so collaterally under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied his motion but granted a certificate of appealability. On appeal, Vines was allowed to argue that his plea lawyer was ineffective for not asserting that attempted armed bank robbery is not a crime of violence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that attempted armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) is a crime of violence because it requires the use of force, violence, or intimidation. The court also found that adding a dangerous weapon to the attempted bank robbery does not make the crime less violent. Therefore, Vines's conviction under § 924(c) was upheld. The court also concluded that Vines's counsel was not ineffective, as the argument that attempted armed bank robbery is not a crime of violence would have been meritless. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's order denying Vines's collateral attack. View "USA v. Vines" on Justia Law

In 1987, Fred Marion Cain III was charged with the kidnapping, sexual assault, and murder of a six-year-old child. The Solano County Public Defender’s Office was appointed to represent him. The People moved to recuse the Public Defender’s Office, citing a conflict of interest due to its previous representation of Shawn Melton, who was tried twice for the same murder, resulting in mistrials and eventual dismissal. DNA evidence later excluded Melton and implicated Cain. The Public Defender’s Office asserted no conflict existed as they had no connection to Melton’s case files or personnel involved in his defense.The trial court granted the People’s motion to recuse the Public Defender’s Office, expressing concerns about potential conflicts and public perception. The court focused on whether the attorney-client privilege survived Melton’s death and whether the Public Defender’s Office could ethically seek testimony from Melton’s former attorney, Peter Foor. Despite the Public Defender’s Office’s assurances and lack of evidence of any conflict, the court disqualified them based on their stance on the attorney-client privilege and duty of confidentiality.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that no actual or potential conflict of interest existed. It found no substantial evidence that the Public Defender’s Office possessed confidential information from Melton’s case or that Cain’s defense would be compromised. The court held that the Public Defender’s Office’s ethical stance on not seeking Foor’s testimony did not constitute a conflict of interest. Consequently, the court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order disqualifying the Public Defender’s Office and to deny the motion to recuse. View "Cain v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

April Sponsel, a prosecutor at the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office (MCAO), was disciplined for her conduct in several cases. She was found to have violated multiple Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct, including competence, diligence, good faith, and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The violations stemmed from her handling of cases related to an October 2020 protest, as well as other cases involving defendants Charles Walker and Richard Villa. Sponsel was accused of filing charges without sufficient evidence, failing to review available evidence, and making unsupported allegations.The disciplinary panel concluded that Sponsel violated ethical rules by not thoroughly investigating the cases before filing charges and by pursuing charges that were not supported by the evidence. The panel found that her actions caused significant harm to the defendants, including wrongful incarceration and damage to their reputations. The panel also noted that her conduct negatively impacted the integrity and morale of the MCAO.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the panel’s findings and the two-year suspension from the practice of law. The Court agreed that Sponsel’s conduct violated the ethical rules and caused harm to the defendants and the justice system. The Court emphasized the importance of a prosecutor’s duty to seek justice rather than merely secure convictions. The Court also noted that the suspension was necessary to protect the public, deter similar misconduct, and maintain confidence in the integrity of the legal system. View "In re Sponsel" on Justia Law

Jason Meredith was charged with two counts of capital murder for the shooting deaths of Eric Ogden and Lance Kelloms. The State agreed to waive the death penalty and reduce the charges to first-degree murder in exchange for Meredith's testimony against his co-defendant. Meredith pleaded guilty and received two concurrent life sentences. In 1998, he filed a pro se Rule 37 petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and new evidence. He later filed motions to amend his petition, which were denied by the circuit court.The Saline County Circuit Court denied Meredith's motions to amend his petition and ultimately dismissed his Rule 37 petition. The court found that Meredith failed to act with due diligence in seeking relief and that his petition did not comply with the length and formatting requirements. Additionally, the court concluded that the files and records showed Meredith was not entitled to relief, as he failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel was ineffective.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Meredith's motions to amend his petition, as the extreme passage of time and lack of diligence were considered. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the petition based on noncompliance with formatting requirements and the merits of the petition. The court found that Meredith did not sufficiently allege prejudice from his counsel's advice regarding parole eligibility, as he did not claim he would have insisted on going to trial but for the erroneous advice. View "Meredith v. State" on Justia Law

Michael Williams was convicted of malice murder and other offenses for the fatal shooting of Tomas Gooden at a house party on December 8, 2017. Williams and Gooden argued over a gambling game, leading to Gooden pushing Williams to the floor. Williams then shot Gooden in the head and fled the scene. Gooden's body was found in the garage, and the medical examiner determined the bullet traveled in a downward trajectory. Williams was later found walking along the road and eventually admitted to shooting Gooden, claiming self-defense.A Coweta County grand jury indicted Williams on multiple charges, including malice murder and aggravated assault. Williams was found guilty on all counts by a jury and sentenced to life in prison for malice murder, with additional concurrent and consecutive sentences for other charges. Williams filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. He then appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, specifying that he was not appealing his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed Williams's claims of plain error in the jury instructions and ineffective assistance of counsel. Williams argued that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that the State bore the burden to disprove his justification defense and that his counsel failed to investigate and introduce evidence of Gooden's violent reputation. The court concluded that although the trial court erred in its jury instructions, Williams did not demonstrate that this error affected the trial's outcome. Additionally, the court found that Williams was not prejudiced by his counsel's performance, as substantial evidence of Gooden's violent character was already presented at trial. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Williams's convictions. View "WILLIAMS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Christian L. Johnson sued his employer, the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), for claims related to his employment. During the litigation, Paul Brown, an attorney for Caltrans, sent an email to Johnson’s supervisor, Nicolas Duncan, which Duncan then shared with Johnson. Johnson and his attorney, John Shepardson, further disseminated the email to several experts and individuals. Caltrans claimed the email was protected by attorney-client privilege and sought a protective order, which the trial court granted. Subsequently, Caltrans filed motions to enforce the order and to disqualify Shepardson and three experts, which the trial court also granted.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County initially ruled in favor of Caltrans, finding the email was privileged and issuing a protective order. The court later disqualified Shepardson and the experts due to their continued use and dissemination of the privileged email, despite the protective order. Johnson appealed the disqualification order, arguing the email was not privileged, Caltrans waived the privilege, and the trial court abused its discretion.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the email was indeed protected by attorney-client privilege, as it was sent by Caltrans’s attorney to a Caltrans employee for the purpose of legal defense. The court found no waiver of the privilege by Caltrans and determined that Shepardson breached his ethical obligations by using and disseminating the email. The court concluded that disqualification was appropriate to preserve the integrity of the judicial process and prevent unfair advantage. The appellate court’s decision emphasized the importance of maintaining ethical standards and the confidentiality of privileged communications. View "Johnson v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

Effie Mae Autry had three children, Steve, Michael, and Melvin. Michael and Melvin predeceased their mother, leaving behind children. In 2014, Effie and her husband Eugene executed wills that distributed their assets equally among their children and grandchildren. Eugene passed away in 2017, and his assets were transferred to Effie. In 2019, Effie executed a new will and several warranty deeds, leaving all assets to Steve and disinheriting her grandchildren. This new will was drafted by attorney Anna Kate Robbins after their long-time attorney, Sidra Winter, refused due to concerns about Effie's mental capacity and potential undue influence by Steve.The Pontotoc County Chancery Court invalidated the 2019 will and the warranty deeds, citing undue influence by Steve and failure to properly authenticate the will. The court found that the affidavits of the attesting witnesses did not include their addresses, as required by Mississippi Code Section 91-7-7. The court also found that Steve had a confidential relationship with Effie and did not rebut the presumption of undue influence.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the chancery court's decision. The court held that the 2019 will was not duly authenticated due to the missing addresses on the affidavits. The court also agreed with the chancery court's finding of undue influence, noting that Steve's actions and Effie's declining mental capacity supported this conclusion. The case was remanded to the chancery court for further proceedings regarding the probate of the 2014 will. View "In Re The Matter of the Estate of Autry" on Justia Law

Ronald Rubin filed a lawsuit naming Kimberly Grippa as part of a criminal enterprise. His lawyer sent allegedly defamatory letters to state officials, asking them to investigate the alleged criminal enterprise and included copies of the complaint. Grippa sued Rubin for defamation, claiming the letters harmed her reputation and professional standing. Rubin moved for summary judgment, arguing the letters were protected by Florida’s absolute and qualified litigation privileges and that he could not be held vicariously liable for his lawyer’s actions.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida denied Rubin’s motion for summary judgment on all grounds. The court found that the letters were not protected by the absolute litigation privilege because they were sent outside the litigation process and included additional statements beyond those in the complaint. The court also determined that there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the statements were made with express malice, precluding the qualified litigation privilege. Lastly, the court rejected Rubin’s vicarious liability argument, suggesting that Rubin directed his lawyer’s actions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the denial of Florida’s absolute litigation privilege is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine but lacked jurisdiction to consider the denial of the qualified litigation privilege or the vicarious liability issue. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the absolute litigation privilege, concluding that the letters were sent outside the judicial process and included additional defamatory statements. The court dismissed the appeal regarding the qualified litigation privilege and vicarious liability for lack of jurisdiction. View "Grippa v. Rubin" on Justia Law

Ronald Norweathers was convicted by a jury and sentenced to 250 months’ imprisonment for possessing and distributing child pornography. He claimed that he was acting under the direction of an FBI agent, Joseph Bonsuk, who misled him into collecting and forwarding child pornography as part of a nonexistent undercover operation. The jury rejected his defense, and his post-trial motions and direct appeal were unsuccessful. Norweathers then moved to vacate his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request certain jury instructions and for not calling a computer forensics expert as a witness. The district court denied his motion without a hearing.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied Norweathers’s § 2255 motion, finding that his claims lacked merit. The court concluded that the failure to request an apparent authority or entrapment by estoppel jury instruction was immaterial because Norweathers’s testimony did not establish reasonable reliance on a government agent’s authority. The court also dismissed his claim regarding the computer forensics expert, deeming it insufficiently cogent to suggest constitutional error.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Norweathers’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims were without merit. It found that his testimony did not support a reasonable reliance on Bonsuk’s authority, making the jury instructions irrelevant. Additionally, the court determined that the decision not to call the computer forensics expert was a strategic choice within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. The court concluded that Norweathers failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of a different result had the expert testified, and thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion without an evidentiary hearing. View "Norweathers v USA" on Justia Law