Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries
Elizalde Castillo v Blanche
A Mexican national and her two sons entered the United States without proper documentation after receiving threatening phone calls in their home country. The threats, directed to her and her sister, referenced the family’s remittances from the United States and implied a risk of kidnapping or harm to the children. The family did not report these threats to Mexican authorities and relocated within Mexico temporarily before seeking asylum at the U.S. border in 2014. Removal proceedings were initiated because they lacked valid entry documents.During the immigration proceedings, the Immigration Judge (IJ) found the mother credible but denied asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The IJ determined that the threatening calls did not constitute persecution, that her proposed social group was not cognizable, and that there was no evidence the harm was based on a protected ground. The IJ also found the Mexican government was not shown to be unable or unwilling to protect her, and she failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision without opinion in March 2025, making that decision final. The mother then filed a motion to reconsider and reopen, which the BIA denied, finding no error of law or fact and concluding she had not established a prima facie case for relief or a material change in country conditions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed only the BIA’s November 2025 denial of the motions to reconsider and reopen. The court held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions, as the petitioner failed to identify any error of law or fact and did not present new evidence that would change the outcome. Accordingly, the petition for review was denied. The court also ordered counsel to show cause regarding potential misuse of generative artificial intelligence in the submitted briefs. View "Elizalde Castillo v Blanche" on Justia Law
State ex rel. Hilgers v. Herman
A criminal case was initiated in Sarpy County, Nebraska, against an individual accused of first degree sexual assault of a child. At the preliminary hearing in county court, a deputy county attorney prosecuted the case, and the judge found probable cause to bind it over to district court. Defense counsel did not raise any issues about ex parte communications or conflicts of interest at this stage. After the case moved to district court, a different deputy county attorney was assigned, and the original prosecutor was no longer involved. Defense counsel later alleged, for the first time in district court, that the deputy county attorney had engaged in improper ex parte communications with the county court judge during the preliminary hearing. She sought to call the deputy county attorney as a witness, but ultimately did not do so.The district court, on its own initiative, considered these allegations and the purported appearance of impropriety, and appointed a special prosecutor from the Attorney General’s office, disqualifying the Sarpy County Attorney’s office from further participation. The Sarpy County Attorney’s office objected, arguing there was no evidence supporting a conflict of interest or improper conduct. The court denied motions to reconsider, and the defense never presented evidence of misconduct or called the deputy county attorney to testify. The district court eventually found the motion to quash the subpoena moot.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the district court's actions in an original quo warranto proceeding brought by the Attorney General and Sarpy County Attorney. The Court held that the district court abused its discretion in appointing a special prosecutor because no evidence was presented supporting a disqualifying conflict of interest under the relevant statute. The appearance of impropriety alone was insufficient, and the conflict was not shown to affect the entire county attorney’s office. The Court ordered judgment of ouster, reinstating the Sarpy County Attorney’s office to the prosecution and removing the Attorney General’s office as special prosecutor. View "State ex rel. Hilgers v. Herman" on Justia Law
Jacobson v. First Community Credit Union
A trustee filed a lawsuit against a credit union, claiming that the credit union failed to accept negotiable instruments totaling $8,500,000, refused to open a trust account, and did not provide a written explanation for its refusal. The trustee sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, on behalf of the trust. The trustee, who is not an attorney, filed complaints with similar allegations and included documents characteristic of the sovereign citizen movement.The District Court of McIntosh County, Southeast Judicial District, presided by Judge Daniel D. Narum, reviewed the case. The court determined that the trustee was not a licensed attorney and therefore could not represent the trust or its beneficiaries in legal proceedings. Despite this, the court considered the merits of the claims and found that the credit union was not obligated to accept the instruments, which were not legal tender. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice.On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the trustee, as a non-attorney, was not authorized to provide legal representation for the trust beneficiaries. The court held that all filings made by the trustee, including the notice of appeal, were void due to the unauthorized practice of law. It further determined that the lawsuit was void from inception and that dismissal should have been without prejudice, as there was no adjudication on the merits. The Supreme Court imposed sanctions against the trustee individually for pervasive inaccuracies and frivolous arguments, awarded attorney’s fees and double costs to the credit union, denied all motions filed by the trustee as void, and dismissed the appeal. View "Jacobson v. First Community Credit Union" on Justia Law
Luna v. Top Dawg Entertainment
Two plaintiffs brought suit against a prominent music record label and several executives, alleging sexual battery, harassment, assault, and unpaid wages. One plaintiff claimed that while performing services for the label, she was sexually battered and harassed by executives and not paid for her work. The other plaintiff alleged assault and harassment by an employee while residing in a label-owned home to support an artist. The lawsuit was initially filed under pseudonyms, but the plaintiffs did not seek court approval to proceed anonymously.After the lawsuit was filed, plaintiffs’ counsel issued a press release using the pseudonyms to publicize the allegations. The defendants then issued their own press release, which publicly disclosed the plaintiffs’ real names. Plaintiffs amended their complaint to add a claim for doxing under Civil Code section 1708.89, asserting that the disclosure of their names constituted doxing. Defendants responded with a special motion to strike this cause of action under California's anti-SLAPP statute, arguing the press release was protected activity. Plaintiffs conceded the activity was protected but argued they could show a probability of prevailing. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the anti-SLAPP motion, reasoning that the disclosure was not necessary and referencing the Rules of Professional Conduct to find potential prejudice to judicial proceedings.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two reviewed the denial. The court held that the defendants' press release was protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute and that the disclosure of plaintiffs’ names was protected by the fair report privilege, since plaintiffs had not sought court authorization to proceed anonymously. The court reversed the trial court’s order, directed it to grant the anti-SLAPP motion, and strike the doxing cause of action. Defendants were awarded costs on appeal. View "Luna v. Top Dawg Entertainment" on Justia Law
Shannon v. Shannon
The parties in this case are former spouses who have been engaged in litigation over their divorce for several years. After the Sarpy County District Court entered a divorce decree in 2023, including a parenting plan, the party awarded sole physical custody sought enforcement of several provisions, alleging that the other party had failed to pay a court-ordered equalization payment, attorney fees, and his share of medical expenses for their children. She also alleged violations of the parenting plan, such as improper transportation arrangements, preventing communication with children, failure to administer medication, unauthorized travel, and exceeding allotted parenting time. The other party claimed inability to pay, disputed some allegations, and asserted misunderstandings regarding the parenting plan.The Sarpy County District Court held an evidentiary hearing, found the party in violation of its orders, and determined his testimony was not credible, particularly regarding his financial situation and explanations for his conduct. As a result, the court found him in willful contempt, ordered a 90-day incarceration which could be avoided by compliance ("purge" conditions), temporarily reduced his summer parenting time, and awarded attorney fees to the opposing party. The party appealed, but his brief contained numerous fictitious case citations and misstatements of law, leading the Nebraska Supreme Court to strike the brief and review only for plain error.The Nebraska Supreme Court found no plain error in the district court’s findings or sanctions. It clarified that self-represented litigants must adhere to the same standards as attorneys and that submission of briefs with fabricated citations is sanctionable. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s contempt order, the imposition of attorney fees, denial of in forma pauperis status, and the other sanctions. The district court’s order was affirmed. View "Shannon v. Shannon" on Justia Law
People v. Nibbelin
The defendant was charged in multiple cases in McLean County, Illinois, primarily involving possession of child pornography and violations of the Sex Offender Registration Act. He pleaded guilty to several charges and was sentenced to probation, jail time, and ordered to pay significant assessments, fines, and fees. Throughout several subsequent probation violation proceedings and new charges, the defendant remained represented by an assistant public defender. Despite this representation, he was assessed various court costs and fees without a waiver being requested or granted under the provisions applicable to indigent defendants represented by public defenders.After sentencing, the defendant appealed. The Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District, consolidated his appeals and considered, among other issues, his claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to seek an assessment waiver under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 404(e). The defendant argued that, as he was represented by a public defender, he was entitled to an automatic waiver of certain assessments, and his counsel’s failure to file the required certificate constituted ineffective assistance. The State responded that claims regarding assessment errors must first be raised in the circuit court via a motion under Rule 472, which governs corrections of certain sentencing errors. The appellate court agreed with the State and remanded the case to the circuit court for the defendant to pursue his claim through a Rule 472 motion.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court’s judgment. The Court held that when a defendant alleges being improperly assessed costs despite being entitled to a waiver under Rule 404(e), the claim must be first raised in the trial court with a motion under Rule 472. Such claims cannot be raised for the first time on appeal by asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court clarified that Rule 472’s broad remedial purpose encompasses such errors and allows correction at any time following judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "People v. Nibbelin" on Justia Law
I F G Port v. Lake Charles Harbor
A dispute arose between a company and a port authority over responsibility for securing permits to dredge a ship channel in Lake Charles, Louisiana. The company had leased the channel to develop a grain terminal, but the lease did not specify which party was responsible for obtaining the dredging permit. After the terminal was built but could not be fully used without dredging, the company and the port disagreed over who bore this responsibility. The company sued in federal court, and, by consent of both parties, a U.S. Magistrate Judge presided over a bench trial and awarded the company nearly $125 million.After the trial and the entry of judgment, the port discovered that the magistrate judge and the company’s lead trial counsel had been close family friends for four decades—a relationship that was not fully disclosed. The only disclosure had been that the lead counsel’s daughter was the judge’s law clerk, who would be screened from the case. Upon learning about the undisclosed relationship, the port moved to vacate the magistrate judge referral. The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana held an evidentiary hearing and found that the port’s consent to the referral had not been knowing, as it had lacked crucial information about the judge’s conflict, and vacated the referral.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. The Fifth Circuit held that a party’s consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction waives a fundamental constitutional right and, therefore, must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The court rejected the argument that constructive knowledge by the party’s counsel—rather than actual knowledge—could suffice to establish valid consent. Because the district court applied the correct standard and found no actual knowledge, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the vacation of the referral. View "I F G Port v. Lake Charles Harbor" on Justia Law
Pomeroy v. Utah State Bar
An attorney licensed in Utah challenged the state’s requirement that lawyers join the Utah State Bar and pay annual dues as a condition of practicing law. She argued that the Bar engaged in activities—such as lobbying, publishing a journal, and posting on social media—that were not sufficiently related to regulating the legal profession or improving legal services. She also objected to the procedures used by the Bar for handling members’ mandatory dues, claiming they were inadequate to protect her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the District of Utah first dismissed the plaintiff’s claim that mandatory dues violated her rights, relying on precedent from the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Schell v. Chief Justice & Justices of Oklahoma Supreme Court. The district court then reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment on the remaining claims. It ruled for the defendants, finding that most challenged Bar activities were germane under the standard set in Keller v. State Bar of California, and that the Bar’s procedures for handling objections to expenditures and providing refunds were constitutionally sufficient.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that, under existing Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent, mandatory bar dues are constitutional when used for activities germane to regulating the legal profession or improving legal services. The court also held that the correct legal standard for evaluating the Bar’s activities is the “germaneness” test from Keller, not a heightened “exacting scrutiny” standard. Because the plaintiff did not adequately challenge the district court’s germaneness findings or show that the Bar’s procedures were constitutionally deficient, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal and summary judgment rulings. View "Pomeroy v. Utah State Bar" on Justia Law
Rokhvand & Barmada v. Herzfeld
Two activists participated in demonstrations outside the Israeli embassy in Washington, D.C., protesting Israel's military actions in Gaza. Over several months, three incidents occurred involving Rabbi Herzfeld, a local rabbi and community leader, and the activists. During these incidents, the activists alleged that Rabbi Herzfeld and his companions made provocative and upsetting remarks, engaged in intimidating behavior, and, in one instance, initiated a federal lawsuit and media coverage that the activists felt endangered them. The activists felt harassed and took steps to increase their personal security after these events.Following the third incident, the activists filed petitions for anti-stalking orders in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, alleging that Rabbi Herzfeld’s conduct constituted stalking under D.C. law. Rabbi Herzfeld moved to dismiss the petitions, arguing that his actions were protected by the First Amendment and did not meet the statutory definition of stalking, citing precedent from Mashaud v. Boone. The trial court held a summary trial and ultimately denied the petitions, finding that the conduct did not amount to threats or surveillance within the meaning of the statute and was constitutionally protected speech. Rabbi Herzfeld later sought attorney’s fees under the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act and, alternatively, for alleged bad faith.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It affirmed the denial of the anti-stalking petitions, holding that Rabbi Herzfeld’s conduct did not constitute “true threats” and was protected political speech, not actionable as stalking. The court vacated the award of attorney’s fees, finding the trial court had applied the wrong legal standard under the Anti-SLAPP Act and had not given proper notice for a bad-faith fee award. The matter was remanded for further proceedings regarding attorney’s fees. View "Rokhvand & Barmada v. Herzfeld" on Justia Law
In re Recall of O’Neil
Three commissioners of the Port of Benton—Scott Keller, William O’Neil, and Lori Stevens—were the subject of recall petitions filed by Benton County voters. The petitions alleged thirteen counts of misconduct for each commissioner, largely focusing on actions attributed to Keller, some of which occurred before he was elected commissioner. The essential allegations that occurred during their terms as commissioners were that the three retaliated against the Port’s executive director, Diahann Howard, by suspending her after she raised complaints leading to an investigation of Keller, and that they retaliated against the Port’s finance director, Alicia Myers, by terminating her after she released the investigation report. Additionally, Keller alone was accused of failing to disclose his ownership interest in an LLC with a lease from the Port, as required by state law.A Benton County Superior Court judge reviewed the recall petitions, dismissing most of the thirteen charges against each commissioner as legally or factually insufficient. However, the court found two charges—retaliation against Howard and Myers—factually and legally sufficient against all three commissioners, and found the failure to disclose financial information charge factually and legally sufficient against Keller alone. The recall proponents did not appeal the dismissal of other charges, and the commissioners appealed the sufficiency findings to the Washington Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington affirmed the trial court’s rulings in all respects. The court held that the charges of retaliation for whistleblowing and failure to disclose material financial interests stated factually and legally sufficient grounds for recall under the Washington Constitution and statutes. Specifically, the court found that actual or threatened retaliation constitutes misfeasance, malfeasance, or a violation of the oath of office, and that intentional nondisclosure of required financial information by an elected official is legally sufficient to support recall. The court’s disposition allows these charges to proceed to the voters. View "In re Recall of O'Neil" on Justia Law