Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Steven Kellam was convicted in the Superior Court of Delaware for racketeering, two counts of first-degree felony murder, and other crimes, resulting in two life sentences plus 770 years in prison. Kellam sought postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, arguing that his convictions were unjust. The Superior Court rejected all but one of his claims, agreeing that the felony-murder jury instruction misstated the law, leading to the vacatur of his felony-murder convictions and life sentences.Kellam appealed the Superior Court's rejection of two grounds for postconviction relief. He argued that the amendment of his indictment was so substantive that it resulted in his conviction for racketeering without proper indictment, undermining the court's jurisdiction. He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for his trial lawyer's failure to request a jury instruction on accomplice liability.The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the case. It found that Kellam's challenge to the indictment amendment was procedurally barred because he did not object during the trial and failed to show cause and prejudice. The court also determined that the alleged defect in the indictment was curable and did not divest the Superior Court of jurisdiction.Regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court concluded that Kellam's trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision not to request a Section 274 instruction, as it would not have benefited Kellam and could have undermined the defense's credibility.The State cross-appealed, arguing that the Superior Court erred in vacating Kellam's felony-murder convictions due to the flawed jury instruction. The Delaware Supreme Court agreed, distinguishing this case from Ray v. State, and found that the faulty instruction did not prejudice Kellam's defense. The court reversed the Superior Court's vacatur of Kellam's felony-murder convictions and remanded for reinstatement of those convictions and sentences. View "Kellam v. State" on Justia Law

Jaquan Dontae Weston was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of his father, Leroy Weston. The crimes occurred between March 5-6, 2018. A Terrell County grand jury indicted Weston in June 2018, and he was found guilty on all counts in an October 2019 jury trial. Weston was sentenced to life in prison without parole for malice murder, five years consecutive for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and twelve months concurrent for cruelty to children in the third degree. Weston filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. His appeal was initially stricken due to his appellate counsel's failure to file a brief, but it was later re-docketed after new counsel was appointed.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. Weston argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his malice murder conviction and claimed ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The court found that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, showed that Weston formed the intent and malice necessary for a malice murder conviction. The jury was entitled to find Weston guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on his actions and statements following his daughter's outcry about her grandfather.Weston also argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his competency to stand trial, request a competency hearing, and object to certain evidence. However, these claims were not preserved for appellate review as they were not raised in his motion for a new trial. The court also found that Weston failed to show that his trial counsel was ineffective for not obtaining an expert evaluation of his sanity at the time of the crimes, as there was no evidence presented to support this claim.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding no merit in Weston's arguments. View "WESTON v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Antonio Ingram pleaded guilty to five felony counts, including armed robbery, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery, on September 30, 2016. The court found his plea was freely and voluntarily entered and entered a judgment of conviction on March 3, 2017, nunc pro tunc to September 30, 2016. Ingram was sentenced to concurrent 20-year prison terms, with 15 years to serve for each conviction. Ingram retained attorney David Jones to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was timely filed on October 27, 2016. However, there is no evidence that the trial court ruled on the motion, and Jones testified that the motion was dismissed without a hearing on March 3, 2017.The Superior Court of Richmond County granted in part Ingram’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, allowing him to pursue an out-of-time direct appeal. The court found that Jones rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to inform Ingram of his right to appeal the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Ingram cross-appealed, arguing that the habeas court erred in denying him the remedy of setting aside his guilty plea and judgment of conviction.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the habeas court erred in treating the March 3 "Order to Enter Sentence" as an order denying Ingram’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The record did not demonstrate that Ingram’s judgment of conviction was final for purposes of habeas review. The court vacated the habeas court’s order and remanded the case with directions to allow the parties to supplement the record and demonstrate whether Ingram’s judgment of conviction is final. If the motion to withdraw the guilty plea remains pending, the habeas petition should be dismissed as premature. If the judgment is final, the habeas court may reenter its previous order with that determination. The cross-appeal claims were deemed moot. View "JOSEPH v. INGRAM" on Justia Law

Two Texas lawyers, Michael A. Pohl and Robert Ammons, represented out-of-state clients in personal injury cases filed outside Texas. The clients, from Louisiana and Arkansas, alleged that they were solicited by individuals on behalf of the lawyers, which led to the signing of legal-services contracts. The clients later sued the lawyers in Texas, seeking to void the contracts under Texas Government Code Section 82.0651(a), which allows clients to void contracts procured through barratry, and to recover fees and penalties.The trial court dismissed all claims, granting summary judgment in favor of the lawyers. The clients appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that Section 82.0651(a) applied because part of the lawyers' conduct occurred in Texas. The court also rejected the lawyers' arguments regarding limitations and res judicata and allowed Reese's intervention in the case.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that Section 82.0651(a) does not extend to the nonresident clients' claims because the core conduct targeted by the statute—solicitation of a legal-services contract through barratry—occurred outside Texas. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment to the extent it allowed the clients to proceed with their claims under Section 82.0651(a) and rendered judgment that they take nothing on those claims. However, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment regarding the breach of fiduciary duty claims and remanded those claims to the trial court for further proceedings. View "POHL v. CHEATHAM" on Justia Law

Debra Tucker applied for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act in 2018. After multiple denials at the administrative level, she appealed to the federal district court. In 2023, the district court reversed the final administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, remanding Tucker’s claim for further administrative proceedings. The district court awarded Tucker’s attorney $7,500 in attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), along with $402 in costs. Tucker’s attorney had a contingency-fee agreement for twenty-five percent of any past-due benefits awarded. In August 2024, an administrative law judge found Tucker disabled and granted her monthly disability benefits retroactive to February 2018, totaling $124,821.70 in past-due benefits.The district court granted in part and denied in part the attorney’s motion for $31,205.43 in fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), awarding $17,400 instead. The court found the requested fee excessive, amounting to a windfall, and set an imputed hourly rate of $500. The attorney’s motion for reconsideration, reducing the fee request to $22,620, was denied. The attorney appealed, seeking the full $31,205.43.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court found that the district court properly started with the contingency-fee agreement and then tested it for reasonableness, considering the effective hourly rate and other factors. The district court did not misapply the law by comparing the effective hourly rate to the EAJA rate and the attorney’s ordinary rate. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that it acted within its discretion in reducing the fee to avoid a windfall. View "Tucker v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law

Patrick Bolduc and Savannah Getchius were married in 2011 and have three minor children. Bolduc filed for divorce in 2021. After two unsuccessful mediations, a final divorce hearing was held in June 2023. The District Court awarded Bolduc sole parental rights and responsibilities and divided the marital property. The court found that Bolduc's property, purchased before the marriage, appreciated in value during the marriage due to both market forces and marital improvements.The District Court determined that the entire appreciation of the property during the marriage was marital property. The court also ordered Getchius to pay $325 weekly in child support and $10,000 of Bolduc's attorney fees. Bolduc filed motions for further findings and to alter the judgment, which the court mostly denied, except for making limited additional findings.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the lower court's decision on the classification of the real property, agreeing that Bolduc did not meet his burden to prove that the appreciation was solely due to market forces. The court also upheld the child support order, finding no error in the calculation or the decision not to order Getchius to pay $1,800 for uninsured medical expenses. However, the court found that the attorney fee award was based on an affidavit that included fees unrelated to the divorce proceedings. The court vacated the attorney fee award and remanded for recalculation of the fees properly subject to an award in the divorce action. View "Bolduc v. Getchius" on Justia Law

Deangelo Deshawn Morgan was convicted in 2023 for the fatal shooting of Sabron Mosby and the aggravated assault of Donoven King. The crimes occurred on October 15, 2018, and Morgan was indicted along with Cleavanta Jerrideau and Glenn Darius Smith. Morgan's trial was severed due to a conflict of interest with his counsel, and Jerrideau and Smith were acquitted in their joint trial. Morgan was later found guilty by a jury and sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole for malice murder and an additional twenty years for aggravated assault.Morgan's motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court after an evidentiary hearing. He appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence that the shooting was drug-related and implicating other potential suspects. He also claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for not properly arguing for the admission of this evidence and advising him not to testify.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence. The court held that the excluded evidence did not raise a reasonable inference of Morgan's innocence and was speculative. Additionally, the court found that Morgan's trial counsel's performance was not deficient, as the advice given was a strategic decision and not patently unreasonable.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decision, upholding Morgan's convictions and sentences. View "MORGAN v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Alfred Jermaine Arnold was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the death of Loretta Goolsby, who was beaten to death between April 5 and 6, 2019. Arnold was indicted on multiple counts, including malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, arson, and theft by taking. The jury found him guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to life without parole for malice murder, plus additional concurrent sentences for arson and theft. Arnold's motion for a new trial was denied, leading to his appeal.Arnold argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts, his discovery rights were violated, his trial counsel was ineffective, and the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony. The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. The court found that the evidence, including cell phone location data, fingerprint evidence, and Arnold's inconsistent statements, was sufficient to support the convictions. The court also determined that there were no discovery violations, as Arnold had been provided with the expert's reports and was aware of the expert's conclusions.Regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court concluded that Arnold's trial counsel's performance was not deficient, as they employed a reasonable strategy in handling the fingerprint evidence and cross-examining the expert. Additionally, Arnold failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his counsel's performance, as he did not provide evidence that he would have accepted a plea offer or that an independent expert would have provided different testimony.The court also upheld the trial court's decision to admit the expert testimony under the Daubert standard and OCGA § 24-7-702 (b), finding that the expert was qualified and her methods were reliable. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Arnold's convictions. View "ARNOLD v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Ashton Denny, Jr. was convicted of malice murder and other charges after shooting his half-brother, Kevin Rowe, in the back, resulting in Rowe's death. The incident occurred on May 28, 2020, following an argument between Denny and Rowe at their family home in Conyers, Georgia. After the argument, Rowe and other family members left but returned later that night. Rowe stepped outside, followed by Denny, and shortly after, a gunshot was heard. Rowe was found injured, claiming Denny shot him, and Denny fled the scene in his Jeep. Denny was later apprehended when he returned to the scene.A Rockdale County grand jury indicted Denny on charges including malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. The jury found Denny guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to life in prison without parole for malice murder, with additional consecutive sentences for other charges. Denny's motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case, where Denny argued ineffective assistance of counsel. He claimed his trial counsel failed to object to the admission of the murder weapon and other evidence from his Jeep, failed to object to the admission of a door with a bullet hole, and failed to tender a gunshot residue report. The court found that Denny's counsel was not deficient, as objections to the evidence would have been fruitless and the strategic decisions made by counsel were reasonable. The court also determined that Denny did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the trial outcome would have been different had the gunshot residue report been admitted. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "DENNY v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Lucianna Nicole Fox was convicted of felony murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Leroy Midyette. On November 5, 2016, Fox encountered Midyette at a MARTA station. After a confrontation where Midyette did not move his cart out of the way, Fox hit the cart with her vehicle. Midyette followed her car and hit it, prompting Fox to exit her vehicle and shoot him, claiming she felt threatened. Fox was arrested and, during a police interview, stated she shot Midyette because she feared he had a weapon.Fox was indicted by a Fulton County grand jury and found guilty of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. She was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole for felony murder and an additional five years for the firearm charge. Her motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. Fox argued that her trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a jury charge on the defense of accident and that the trial court committed plain error in its jury instructions. The court found that her counsel’s decision to focus solely on self-defense was not unreasonable and did not constitute ineffective assistance. The court also determined that any error in the jury instructions did not likely affect the trial's outcome. Consequently, the court affirmed Fox’s convictions, finding no cumulative error that denied her a fair trial. View "FOX v. THE STATE" on Justia Law