Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Attorney Stephen Eberhardt filed a 102-page, 19-count complaint against 11 defendants, including the Village of Tinley Park, its officials, attorneys, and residents, alleging a scheme to prevent him from making public comments at Village board meetings and on Village-related Facebook pages, violating his constitutional rights. He also brought claims against the Village’s outside counsel, Patrick Walsh, under the Illinois Open Meetings Act. The district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice for being too lengthy and jumbled. Eberhardt then filed an amended complaint, which was also dismissed, and the court entered final judgment.Following the judgment, Walsh’s attorney filed a motion for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that Eberhardt’s claims were frivolous and filed in bad faith to harass Walsh. The district court granted the motion, ordering Eberhardt to pay $26,951.22 in attorneys’ fees, finding that his claims were frivolous and brought with inadequate investigation into the relevant law and facts. The court noted Eberhardt’s history of filing numerous lawsuits and motions, which indicated bad faith.Eberhardt appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, challenging the district court’s decision to sanction him and its denial of his motion to reconsider. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decisions. The court affirmed the sanctions order, agreeing that Eberhardt’s claims were frivolous and brought in bad faith, and that a hearing was not necessary as the record was adequate to determine the need for sanctions. The court also affirmed the denial of the motion to reconsider, finding no manifest errors of law or fact. View "Eberhardt v. Walsh" on Justia Law

In 2001, Alphonse Fletcher, Jr. acquired property associated with two apartment units in a residential cooperative corporation controlled by The Dakota, Inc. In 2008, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. approved a loan to Fletcher, secured by his rights in the property. Fletcher, Chase, and The Dakota entered into an agreement recognizing The Dakota's priority to proceeds from any sale or subletting of Fletcher's apartments. In 2011, Fletcher sued The Dakota for racial discrimination, and The Dakota counterclaimed for legal fees and costs based on Fletcher's proprietary lease.The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to The Dakota in the Fletcher action and awarded attorneys' fees and costs. While this action was pending, Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman, LLP initiated a CPLR 5225 proceeding against Chase, The Dakota, and Fletcher to seize and sell Fletcher's apartments to satisfy a judgment for unpaid legal fees. The Dakota claimed a superior interest in Fletcher's property based on the fee judgment, while Chase argued that The Dakota's lien was not superior and that the lease provision authorizing attorneys' fees was either inapplicable or unconscionable.The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to The Dakota, and the Appellate Division affirmed, stating that Chase's contentions were an impermissible collateral attack on The Dakota's judgment. Chase moved for leave to appeal and to intervene and vacate the judgment in the Fletcher action. The Supreme Court denied Chase's motion, but the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.The New York Court of Appeals held that Chase, as a nonparty to the original action, was not barred from challenging the fee award in a separate proceeding. The court concluded that Chase was not required to intervene in the Fletcher action to protect its interests and that doing so would violate Chase's due process rights. The order of the Appellate Division was reversed, and the matter was remitted for further proceedings. View "Matter of Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman, LLP v JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

In July 2020, the plaintiff used Uber's app to request a ride. Upon being dropped off in the middle of a roadway, she was struck by another vehicle and sustained injuries. She filed a personal injury lawsuit against Uber in November 2020, serving the complaint via the New York Secretary of State. Uber did not respond within the required 30 days, allegedly due to mail processing delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.In January 2021, Uber updated its terms of use, including an arbitration agreement, and notified users via email. The plaintiff received and opened this email. When she next logged into the Uber app, she was presented with a pop-up screen requiring her to agree to the updated terms to continue using the service. She checked a box and clicked "Confirm," thereby agreeing to the terms, which included a clause delegating the authority to resolve disputes about the agreement's applicability and enforceability to an arbitrator.The plaintiff moved for a default judgment in March 2021, and Uber responded by asserting that she had agreed to arbitrate her claims. Uber then sent a Notice of Intent to Arbitrate. The plaintiff moved to stay Uber's arbitration demand, arguing that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and violated ethical rules. Uber cross-moved to compel arbitration.The Supreme Court granted Uber's motion to compel arbitration, finding that the plaintiff was on inquiry notice of the arbitration agreement and had assented to it. The Appellate Division affirmed, stating that the plaintiff's challenges to the agreement's validity must be decided by an arbitrator due to the delegation provision.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, holding that the clickwrap process used by Uber resulted in a valid agreement to arbitrate. The court also held that the delegation provision was valid and that the plaintiff's challenges to the arbitration agreement's enforceability should be resolved by an arbitrator. The court found no abuse of discretion in the lower court's decision not to sanction Uber for the alleged ethical violation. View "Wu v. Uber Tech., Inc." on Justia Law

Gary Everett Martin obtained a home-equity line of credit (HELOC) from BBVA USA Bancshares, Inc. (BBVA) in May 2008, secured by a mortgage on his residential property. In June 2008, Martin hired Joseph T. Scarborough, Jr., and Scarborough & Griggs, LLC (S&G) for legal representation in a divorce action. In June 2012, Martin executed a promissory note in favor of S&G for legal fees, secured by a second mortgage on the property. The attorney-client relationship ended in June 2013, and the promissory note and mortgage were later assigned to Scarborough. In June 2019, BBVA foreclosed on the property, and Scarborough purchased it at the foreclosure sale.The Lee Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Scarborough, S&G, and BBVA, dismissing Martin's counterclaims and awarding possession of the property to Scarborough. The court found Martin's claims against the Scarborough parties time-barred under the Alabama Legal Services Liability Act (ALSLA) and dismissed his claims against BBVA as time-barred or unsupported by substantial evidence.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It found a genuine issue of material fact regarding the validity of the foreclosure sale, as the sale price was significantly lower than the property's fair market value, potentially indicating fraud or unfairness. Consequently, the court reversed the summary judgment in favor of Scarborough on his ejectment claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the Scarborough parties and BBVA regarding Martin's counterclaims, finding them time-barred or unsupported by substantial evidence. View "Martin v. Scarborough" on Justia Law

Clarence Bonds, serving a 71-month sentence for transporting a firearm in interstate commerce as a felon, sought a reduced sentence based on Amendment 821 to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. This amendment, which applies retroactively, reduced Bonds's criminal history category from IV to III, thereby lowering his advisory Guidelines range from 57–71 months to 46–57 months. Bonds requested the district court to reduce his sentence accordingly. The district court acknowledged the amendment's impact but declined to reduce his sentence, citing the need for deterrence, incapacitation, public protection, and Bonds's extensive criminal history, which included numerous violent crimes with firearms.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana denied Bonds's motion for a sentence reduction. The court recognized the amendment's effect on Bonds's criminal history category and advisory range but exercised its discretion to maintain the original sentence. The court emphasized Bonds's long criminal history and the serious nature of his offenses as reasons for not reducing the sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion in denying Bonds's motion for a sentence reduction. The appellate court agreed that the district court had adequately considered the relevant factors under 28 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and provided a sufficient explanation for its decision. Additionally, the appellate court addressed whether the Criminal Justice Act authorized the appointment of appellate counsel for Bonds in his effort to challenge the district court's ruling. The panel was divided on this issue, with each judge providing a separate opinion. Ultimately, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Bonds's motion on the merits. View "United States v. Bonds" on Justia Law

Three petitioners sought to quiet title in mineral rights for parcels of land in McKenzie and Williams Counties, North Dakota. They argued that the state relinquished any claim to these mineral rights when a specific chapter of the North Dakota Century Code became effective in 2017. The petitioners claimed that the state abandoned the minerals, making them available for claim, and that they had claimed them by filing the lawsuit.In the McKenzie County case, the petitioners attempted service by publication on unknown persons. Wesley and Barbara Lindvig answered, claiming ownership of the mineral rights. The petitioners' motions to strike the Lindvigs' answer and for default judgment were denied. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim and awarded attorney’s fees to the Lindvigs, concluding the action was frivolous. The petitioners appealed.In the Williams County case, the petitioners made similar claims. Wesley and Barbara Lindvig, along with Kenneth and Mary Schmidt, answered and moved to dismiss on several grounds, including improper service and lack of ownership by the petitioners. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and awarded attorney’s fees, finding the petition frivolous. The petitioners appealed.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the cases and affirmed the dismissals, holding that the petitioners had no interest in the disputed minerals and could not maintain a quiet title action. The court also affirmed the award of attorney’s fees to the Schmidts in the Williams County case. However, it reversed the award of attorney’s fees to the Lindvigs in both cases, remanding for further findings on whether the Lindvigs had a connection to the disputed mineral interests. View "Nelson v. Persons Unknown" on Justia Law

In September 2017, Attorney Karolyn Kovtun held a meeting with Jennifer Shenefield and her client Mark Shenefield, despite a criminal protective order prohibiting Mark from contacting Jennifer. During the meeting, Mark and Kovtun verbally and emotionally abused Jennifer, and Kovtun threatened to remove their daughter from Jennifer’s custody if she did not sign a custody agreement. Jennifer signed the agreement under duress and contacted the police. Kovtun continued to represent Mark, who was later convicted of violating the protective order. Kovtun then sued Jennifer for recording the meeting without consent, prompting Jennifer to file a cross-complaint against Kovtun.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Kovtun’s two anti-SLAPP motions and sustained her demurrer to two of Jennifer’s six causes of action. After a bench trial, the court found Kovtun liable for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation, awarding Jennifer $50,000 in damages. Kovtun appealed, arguing that Jennifer’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations and the litigation privilege.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Kovtun waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to timely and properly plead it. Additionally, the court determined that the litigation privilege did not apply to Kovtun’s communications during the meeting, as they were not made in good faith contemplation of litigation. The court affirmed the judgment against Kovtun, upholding the $50,000 damages award to Jennifer. View "Shenefield v. Kovtun" on Justia Law

Allison Littlefield filed a verified petition against her brothers, Scott and David Littlefield, and her aunt, Denise Sobel, who are co-trustees of The Pony Tracks Ranch Trust. The petition sought their removal as co-trustees, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty and the Trust, and requested declaratory and injunctive relief. Allison claimed that the appellants misused Trust funds, concealed information, converted her personal property, restricted her use of the Ranch, and failed to address misconduct by an employee, Stacey Limbada, who allegedly harassed Allison and her husband.The San Mateo County Superior Court denied the appellants' special motion to strike the petition under California's anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that the appellants failed to show that Allison's petition arose from protected activity. The court also denied Allison's request for attorney's fees, finding that the motion was not frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the anti-SLAPP motion, agreeing that the appellants did not meet their burden of showing that the petition was based on protected activity. The court noted that the appellants' motion failed to identify specific allegations of protected activity and improperly sought to strike the entire petition or all causes of action without distinguishing between protected and unprotected conduct.However, the appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of Allison's request for attorney's fees, finding that the anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous. The court held that any reasonable attorney would agree that the motion was totally devoid of merit, as it did not demonstrate that the petition sought to impose liability based on protected activity. The case was remanded for a determination of the appropriate award of attorney's fees for Allison. View "Littlefield v. Littlefield" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner, Aaron W., appealed an order from the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia (ICA) that dismissed his appeal of a family court order. The family court had disqualified Aaron W.'s attorney from representing him in a divorce proceeding due to a conflict of interest, as the attorney had previously represented both parties in a related personal injury case. The family court's order included language indicating it was a final, appealable order.Initially, Aaron W. sought a writ of prohibition from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County to prevent the family court from ruling on the disqualification motion, arguing that the family court lacked jurisdiction. The circuit court denied the writ, and the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed, holding that family courts have the authority to disqualify attorneys in cases of conflict of interest.Aaron W. then appealed the family court's disqualification order to the ICA, which dismissed the appeal, concluding that the order was interlocutory and that it lacked jurisdiction over such appeals. Aaron W. subsequently appealed the ICA's dismissal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the ICA's dismissal, holding that the family court's disqualification order was not a final order because it did not terminate the litigation on the merits. The court explained that the ICA generally does not have appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals, as specified by West Virginia Code § 51-11-4(d)(8). The court also noted that the family court's inclusion of finality language in its order did not transform the interlocutory order into a final, appealable order. Consequently, the ICA correctly dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Aaron W. v. Evelyn W." on Justia Law

GEICO, a group of insurance companies, presented evidence that the defendants, collectively known as the Mayzenberg Defendants, paid third parties for referring patients eligible for no-fault insurance benefits to Mingmen Acupuncture, P.C. GEICO argued that this constituted an illegal kickback scheme, violating New York's rules of professional misconduct, and thus, under the Eligibility Regulation (11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 65-3.16(a)(12)), Mingmen was ineligible to receive no-fault payments. The Mayzenberg Defendants contended that paying for patient referrals might be professional misconduct but did not violate a "licensing requirement" under the Eligibility Regulation.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of GEICO, agreeing that the Mayzenberg Defendants paid for patient referrals and that this conduct rendered Mingmen ineligible for no-fault benefits. The court also granted GEICO summary judgment on its common law fraud and RICO claims, based on the same conclusions about Mingmen’s ineligibility.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that while the facts established that the Mayzenberg Defendants paid for patient referrals, the legal question of whether this conduct violated a "licensing requirement" under the Eligibility Regulation was unsettled. Given the lack of clear precedent from the New York Court of Appeals and the significant policy implications, the Second Circuit certified the question to the New York Court of Appeals to determine if paying for patient referrals in violation of New York Education Law § 6530(18) and 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 29.1(b)(3) disqualifies a provider from receiving no-fault payments under the Eligibility Regulation. View "GEICO v. Mayzenberg" on Justia Law