Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
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ELG Utica Alloys, Inc. ("ELG") sued a group of its former customers in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, asserting claims under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). ELG had remediated contamination at one portion of a 23-acre facility in 2007 and continued to remediate contamination at a different portion of the facility pursuant to a 2015 consent order with the New York State government. ELG sought contribution for the costs of the 2015 cleanup from the defendants, alleging they were also responsible for the contamination.The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the six-year statute of limitations for certain CERCLA claims had elapsed. The District Court granted the motion, reasoning that the remediation began in 2007, and the 2015 work was a subsequent step in the work that commenced in 2007. Therefore, the statute of limitations started to run in 2007 and elapsed in 2013, before ELG sued. The District Court also imposed spoliation sanctions on ELG for shredding over 23,000 pounds of potentially relevant documents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the District Court that the statute of limitations on ELG’s claims commenced once on-site physical remediation began in 2007. The court also found no error in the District Court’s imposition of spoliation sanctions. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court and remanded to the District Court to order the agreed-upon spoliation sanction. View "ELG Utica Alloys, Inc. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp." on Justia Law

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In 2021, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York implemented a policy requiring all employees to be vaccinated against Covid-19, with exemptions for religious or medical reasons. Lori Gardner-Alfred and Jeanette Diaz, employees of the Federal Reserve, applied for religious exemptions, claiming that the vaccine conflicted with their religious beliefs. The Federal Reserve denied their requests and subsequently terminated their employment for non-compliance with the vaccination policy. Gardner-Alfred and Diaz filed a lawsuit, alleging that the Federal Reserve's actions violated their religious liberties under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and various federal statutes.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the Federal Reserve on all federal claims. The court found no genuine dispute of fact regarding the sincerity of Gardner-Alfred's religious objections and concluded that the vaccination policy did not conflict with Diaz's professed religious beliefs. Additionally, the district court imposed discovery sanctions on Gardner-Alfred and Diaz for repeatedly neglecting their discovery obligations, withholding relevant documents, and violating court orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment on Gardner-Alfred's claims, agreeing that she failed to provide sufficient evidence of sincerely held religious beliefs. However, the court vacated the summary judgment on Diaz's claims, finding that there were disputed issues of material fact regarding the sincerity of her religious beliefs and whether the vaccination policy burdened those beliefs. The court also upheld the district court's imposition of discovery sanctions, finding no abuse of discretion. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Gardner-Alfred v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York" on Justia Law

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Robert Sylvester Kelly, also known as R. Kelly, was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York of racketeering and Mann Act violations. The evidence presented at trial showed that Kelly, with the help of his associates, exploited his fame to lure and abuse young girls and women over a period of twenty-five years. Kelly isolated his victims, controlled their lives, and subjected them to verbal, physical, and sexual abuse.The district court sentenced Kelly to 360 months' imprisonment for racketeering and additional concurrent sentences for the Mann Act violations. Kelly was also fined and ordered to pay restitution to two victims. Kelly appealed his convictions, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the constitutionality of the state laws underlying his federal convictions, the empaneling of certain jurors, ineffective assistance of counsel, and the district court's evidentiary rulings and restitution orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed Kelly's appeal. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support Kelly's convictions, including the underlying state and federal violations. The court also held that the New York state law was constitutional as applied to Kelly and that Kelly's challenges to the California state law were untimely. The court found no evidence of juror bias or ineffective assistance of counsel during voir dire. The court also upheld the district court's evidentiary rulings and restitution orders, finding no abuse of discretion.The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that Kelly's arguments on appeal were without merit. View "United States v. Kelly" on Justia Law

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Sealed Appellant 1, the former CEO of a publicly traded company, and Sealed Appellants 2 and 3, a lawyer and law firm that represented him and the company, appealed an order from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The district court compelled Sealed Appellants 2 and 3 to produce documents withheld under attorney-client privilege in response to grand jury subpoenas. The court found that the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege applied, as there was probable cause to believe that communications between Sealed Appellants 1 and 2 were made to criminally circumvent the company’s internal controls.The district court concluded that the company had an internal control requiring its legal department to review all significant contracts. It found that Sealed Appellant 1 and Sealed Appellant 2 concealed settlement agreements with two former employees who had accused Sealed Appellant 1 of sexual misconduct. These agreements were not disclosed to the company’s legal department or auditors, violating internal controls and resulting in false statements to auditors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It first determined that it had jurisdiction under the Perlman exception, which allows for immediate appeal when privileged information is in the hands of a third party likely to disclose it rather than face contempt. On the merits, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s application of the crime-fraud exception. It held that there was probable cause to believe that the communications were made to circumvent internal controls, thus facilitating or concealing criminal activity. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order compelling the production of the documents. View "In Re: Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated September 13, 2023" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of a collection of New York regulations and laws that together prevent for‐profit law firms from accepting capital investment from non‐lawyers. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to allege the infringement of any cognizable constitutional right. On de novo review, the court concluded that neither as a for-profit partnership nor as a professional limited liability company do plaintiffs have the associational or petition rights that they claim. Even if the court were to assume, given the evolving nature of commercial speech protections, that they possess First Amendment interests, the regulations at issue here were adequately supported by state interests and have too little effect on the attorney‐client relationship to be viewed as imposing an unlawful burden on plaintiffs' constitutional interests. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Jacoby & Meyers v. The Presiding Justices of the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Departments" on Justia Law

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Hermitage challenges the district court's denial of its motion to disqualify counsel for Prevezon. The underlying litigation arises out of a 2013 civil forfeiture action brought by the United States alleging that Prevezon received the proceeds of a complex, sweeping scheme that defrauded the Russian treasury of roughly $230 million. The government alleges Prevezon laundered portions of the fraud proceeds in New York by buying various real estate holdings in Manhattan. Hermitage, an investment advisory firm, is a victim of the Russian Treasury Fraud. The court concluded that this case presents the “extraordinary circumstances” necessary to grant a writ of mandamus, as Hermitage is without other viable avenues for relief and the district court misapplied well‐settled law. The court explained that it is rare that a nonparty, nonwitness will face the risk of prosecution by a foreign government based on the potential disclosure of confidential information obtained during a prior representation. That real risk, however, coupled with the misapplication of the law by the district court, outweighs the delay and inconvenience to Prevezon of obtaining new counsel. The court found the remaining arguments raised by the parties to be without merit. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus and instructed the district court to enter an order disqualifying Moscow and BakerHostetler from representing Prevezon in this litigation. Prevezon’s motion for clarification is denied as moot. View "United States v. Prevezon Holdings, Ltd." on Justia Law

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FBK moved to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction SHW's appeal from the district court's ruling on motions by SHW relating to its entitlement to attorneys' fees as former counsel to certain plaintiffs in the underlying action. FBK contends that because SHW did not consent, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(c), for all proceedings to be conducted before a magistrate judge, the magistrate judge's orders must be treated merely as recommendations to be reviewed by the district court, and that appeal directly to this court from the orders of the magistrate judge is unauthorized. The court denied the motion, concluding that the consent of SHW as counsel or former counsel was not required because section 636(c)'s consent requirement applies to parties (and to persons who move to become parties, see New York Chinese TV Programs, Inc. v. U.E. Enterprises, Inc., 996 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1993)), and the parties in this case had given the requisite consent. View "In re McCray, Richardson, Santana, Wise, and Salaam Litigation" on Justia Law

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Binder, a law firm representing claimants before the SSA, appealed from summary judgment in two related cases where Binder seeks past attorney's fees. When Binder sought to hold the SSA liable for the fees, the district courts granted summary judgment to the SSA on the basis of sovereign immunity. The court affirmed the judgments and held that, regardless of the SSA’s statutory duties to withhold attorney’s fees from payments to successful claimants, there is no waiver of sovereign immunity in 42 U.S.C. 406(a) that would permit Binder’s lawsuits for money damages. View "Binder & Binder v. Colvin" on Justia Law

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Flanagan appealed the district court's denial of the law firm's request for attorneys' fees drawn from a settlement fund in a consolidated securities class action. The court held that the standard set forth in In re Cendant Corp. Litig. (Cendant II) applies to fee applications from non‐lead counsel for work completed after the appointment of lead plaintiff and lead counsel where the fee to non‐lead counsel is one part of a capped percentage of a common fund. In this case, the district court should have afforded a rebuttable presumption of correctness to Lead Plaintiffs’ proposed allocation of fees to Flanagan. Because the district court analyzed Flanagan's request under an incorrect standard, the court vacated the order and remanded for further proceedings. View "In Re: Bank of America Corp." on Justia Law

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This appeal stemmed from a dispute regarding a contract the parties entered into, which gave Lewmar the exclusive right to manufacture and sell Steinerʹs patented sailboat winch handle, a device used to control the lines and sails of a sailboat. The parties resolved the dispute when Lewmar made, and Steiner accepted, an offer of judgment under Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After judgment was entered, Steiner moved for attorneysʹ fees of $383,804 and costs of $41,470. The district court denied attorneysʹ fees but awarded costs of $2,926. The court concluded that Steiner was precluded from seeking fees pursuant to the Agreement in addition to the $175,000 settlement amount because claims under the Agreement were unambiguously included in the Offer; Steiner was not precluded from seeking attorneysʹ fees under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), Conn. Gen. Stat. 42‐110g(d), because the Offer did not unambiguously encompass claims for attorneysʹ fees under CUTPA; and the court remanded for the district court to clarify whether it considered the claim for attorneys' fees under CUTPA on the merits and if not, to do so. Finally, the court concluded that the district court correctly added costs under the ʺcosts then accruedʺ provision of Rule 68. View "Steiner v. Lewmar, Inc." on Justia Law