Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Government Law
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On February 14, 2013, the Attorney General received an ethics complaint, alleging possible violations of the Ethics Act by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Robert W. Harrell, Jr. The complaint was originally submitted by a private citizen to the House Legislative Ethics Committee. That same day, the Attorney General forwarded the complaint to South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED), and SLED carried out a 10-month criminal investigation into the matter. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Chief of SLED and the Attorney General petitioned the presiding judge of the state grand jury to impanel the state grand jury on January 13, 2014. Acting presiding judge of the state grand jury, the Honorable L. Casey Manning, subsequently impaneled the state grand jury. On February 24, 2014, the Speaker filed a motion to disqualify the Attorney General from participating in the grand jury investigation. On March 21, 2014, a hearing was held on the motion after which the court sua sponte raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Another hearing was held, and the court found, as presiding judge of the state grand jury, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear any matter arising from the Ethics Act, and refused to reach the issue of disqualification. The court discharged the grand jury and ordered the Attorney General to cease his criminal investigation. The Attorney General appealed that order to the Supreme Court. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court erred in concluding that the House Ethics Committee had exclusive jurisdiction over the original complaint. While the crime of public corruption could include violations of the Ethics Act, the state grand jury's jurisdiction is confined to the purposes set forth in the constitution and the state grand jury statute, as circumscribed by the impaneling order. While the Court reversed the circuit court's order, it "in no way suggest[ed] that it was error for the presiding judge to inquire whether the state grand jury was 'conducting investigative activity within its jurisdiction or proper investigative activity.'" The case was remanded for a decision on whether the Attorney General should have been disqualified from participating in the state grand jury proceedings. View "Harrell v. Attorney General of South Carolina" on Justia Law

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The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) filed a formal complaint against Wayne Circuit Court Judge Bruce Morrow, alleging 10 counts of judicial misconduct that arose out of criminal cases over which he had presided. After hearing argument on objections to the master’s report, a majority of the JTC concluded that the evidence established judicial misconduct in eight of the ten allegations and recommended that respondent be suspended for 90 days without pay. After review of the entire record and due consideration of the parties’ arguments, the Supreme Court agreed with the JTC’s conclusion that respondent committed judicial misconduct, but the Court was not persuaded that the recommended sanction was appropriate in this case. Instead, the Court held that a 60-day suspension without pay was proportionate to the body of judicial misconduct established by the record. View "In re Hon. Bruce Morrow" on Justia Law

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On May 15, 2012, Karl Lewies won the primary election for the position of Fremont County Prosecuting Attorney. Because he had no opponent in the November general election, he knew he would be elected as the prosecuting attorney. He was scheduled to be sworn into office on January 14, 2013. On November 23, 2012, he filed two petitions for review against the county commissioners of Fremont County. One petition for review was on behalf of Flying “A” Ranch, Inc., and the other petition was on behalf of E. C. Gwaltney, III. The petitions sought to overturn the designation by the county commissioners of certain roads as being public roads rather than private roads. On January 7, 2013, the county commissioners, represented by Blake Hall, the deputy prosecutor hired by the prosecutor that Lewies had defeated in the primary, filed motions in both cases seeking to have Lewies disqualified from representing the petitioners in those cases. On the same day, Lewies filed motions in both cases to withdraw as counsel for the petitioners. In his supporting affidavit, Lewies stated that he would be sworn in as prosecuting attorney on January 14, 2013, at which time he would have a conflict of interest in continuing to represent the petitioners. In each of the cases, Lewies had named two of the commissioners in both their official and individual capacities. The commissioners filed motions in both cases to dismiss the actions against them. The court made preliminary rulings that Lewies could not represent any parties in the two cases; that the county would be awarded attorney fees against him personally for having to file the motion to disqualify; that an action against the two commissioners in their individual capacities could not be joined with a petition for judicial review; and that attorney fees would not be awarded against Lewies for having named them in their individual capacities. At another hearing, the issue of attorney fees against Lewies was discussed. After the parties argued that issue, the court entered a final decision in both cases awarding the county attorney fees against Lewies personally pursuant to Rule 11(a)(1). Lewies timely appealed. Because there was no legal basis for the award, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Flying "A" Ranch v. Bd. of Cty. Comm. of Fremont" on Justia Law

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Appellant-attorney was criminally prosecuted along with Judge Doe on violations of the campaign finance law. The criminal proceeding was eventually terminated, and the records were sealed. The State Commission on Judicial Conduct subsequently began an investigation into possible judicial misconduct by Judge Doe in the underlying criminal proceeding. Supreme Court granted the Commission’s motion to release the sealed records from the underlying criminal proceeding for use in the investigation. Appellant filed an application to vacate the release order, which Supreme Court denied. Appellant appealed. Meanwhile, the Commission censured Judge Doe for misconduct arising from her judicial election campaign. The Appellate Division dismissed Appellant’s appeal as moot and ordered that the records be resealed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the order dismissing the appeal as moot and upheld the Commission’s authority to request and receive Appellant’s sealed records, holding that the Commission is authorized to request and receive records sealed under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 160.50 for its use in investigations.View "State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct v. Rubenstein" on Justia Law

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Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in his underlying criminal case because his lawyers induced him to reject a plea bargain for a much lower sentence "by misrepresenting the potential maximum sentencing exposure petitioner was facing at trial." The superior court appointed a lawyer from the Prisoners’ Rights Office of the Defender General to represent petitioner in that court. The appointed public defender accepted representation and proceeded to represent petitioner throughout the trial court proceeding. The State moved to dismiss the petition under 13 V.S.A. 7134 because it was "a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner." The public defender answered that the case did not fit within the statute because the theory on which this petition was based had not been raised in earlier PCR petitions because it was not available at the time of the earlier petitions. The superior court granted summary judgment for the State. Shortly thereafter, the public defender filed a notice of appeal on petitioner’s behalf. In a letter to petitioner, the public defender said she initially thought there were no grounds for appeal, but then said "I changed my opinion and filed a notice of appeal for you." She added, however, that since filing the notice of appeal she discovered the Defender General’s office had a conflict of interest so the case had been assigned to conflict counsel. The first assigned conflict counsel withdrew because her firm had done a merits review for the Defender General on petitioner’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in connection with a prior PCR action. Counsel concluded that the firm’s prior negative merits review created a conflict of interest. The case was then assigned to attorney Michael Rose. Attorney Rose filed a motion for leave to withdraw, citing Vermont Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1 and case law. Because it became clear during the argument on that motion that the Defender General had not gone through the procedure it typically goes through before seeking leave to withdraw on the basis cited by Attorney Rose, the Supreme Court invited the Defender General to present its position on the motion. Upon further review, the Supreme Court granted Attorney Rose’s motion for leave to withdraw, and it did not appoint new publicly funded counsel. View "In re Bruyette." on Justia Law

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This case involves the payment of attorney's fees and expenses to attorneys, Appellant Tara Dawn Shurling and co-counsel, who were court-appointed to represent an indigent charged with multiple criminal offenses. Shurling was appointed to represent an indigent defendant in a criminal prosecution for murder, assault with intent to kill, criminal conspiracy, possession of a weapon during a violent crime, and possession of marijuana. Shurling sought approval for her fees and expenses to exceed the statutory caps provided by the South Carolina Indigent Defense Act. The trial court determined that the initial funding order precluded an award for the fees and expenses sought by appointed counsel, which total $46,388.66. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "South Carolina v. Hackshaw" on Justia Law

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Richard L. Hagar, judge of the district court for the North Central Judicial District, filed exceptions to the Judicial Conduct Commission's recommended findings that he violated provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct by failing to diligently and promptly decide judicial matters assigned to him. He also objected to the Commission's recommended sanctions. The Supreme Court adopted the Commission's findings of fact and ordered that Judge Hagar be suspended from his position as district judge for one month without pay commencing April 1, 2014. Moreover, the Court assessed $3,710.49 for the costs and attorney fees necessary for the prosecution of these proceedings. View "Judicial Conduct Commission v. Hagar" on Justia Law

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The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance filed a formal complaint against Municipal Court Judge Robert Fowlkes following a verbal altercation he had with a probation officer outside the courtroom. The Commission and Judge Fowlkes filed a joint motion asking the Court to approve agreed-upon sanctions of a public reprimand and costs of $200. The Supreme Court agreed that Judge Fowlkes should be publicly reprimanded and assessed $200 for the costs of proceedings, and the Court found he also should be fined $1,000.View "Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Fowlkes" on Justia Law