Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Professional Malpractice & Ethics
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An attorney, Morris S. Getzels, challenged the constitutional validity of State Bar Rule 2.30, which prevents inactive licensees from acting as private arbitrators and mediators. Getzels argued that this rule violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the federal and California Constitutions by treating inactive licensees differently from others. He claimed that the rule impinges on the fundamental liberty of "freedom of contract" and that there is no rational basis for the rule.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the State Bar's demurrer without leave to amend, leading to a judgment of dismissal. The court found that rational basis review was the appropriate standard for evaluating Getzels's equal protection claim. It concluded that funding the State Bar’s regulatory functions was a legitimate government purpose and that requiring licensees to pay the active membership fee was related to this purpose. The court determined that the State Bar had sufficiently articulated a rational basis for the disparate treatment of inactive licensees.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that rational basis review was the correct standard, as the rule did not involve a suspect class or a fundamental right. The court found that the State Bar had a legitimate interest in maintaining a competent bar and ensuring the professional conduct of its licensees. It concluded that Rule 2.30’s distinction between active and inactive licensees was rationally related to this goal, as inactive licensees acting as private arbitrators and mediators could burden the State Bar’s regulatory system. The court affirmed the judgment of dismissal, upholding the constitutionality of Rule 2.30. View "Getzels v. The State Bar of California" on Justia Law

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Tenants Michael Gogal and Hildy Baumgartner-Gogal, a married couple, prevailed on a retaliatory eviction claim against their former landlords, Xinhui Deng and Jianhua Wu. Michael, a licensed attorney, represented the tenants for most of the lawsuit. Post-judgment, the tenants sought to recover half of Michael’s attorney’s fees, attributing them to his representation of Hildy. Despite declarations from the tenants indicating that Hildy believed she had retained Michael as her attorney, the trial court denied the request, applying the precedent set in Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp., which held that fees are not awardable when spouses’ interests are joint and indivisible.The Superior Court of San Diego County ruled in favor of the tenants on their retaliatory eviction claim, awarding them compensatory and punitive damages. The court also ruled in their favor on most other claims and on the landlords’ cross-claims, resulting in a total judgment against the landlords. Subsequently, the tenants filed a motion to recover attorney’s fees under Civil Code section 1942.5, which mandates an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in retaliatory eviction cases. The trial court granted the motion for fees billed by another attorney but denied it for Michael’s fees, citing the Gorman case.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court agreed with the trial court’s application of Gorman but emphasized the need for a nuanced analysis to determine whether a true attorney-client relationship existed between Hildy and Michael. The court concluded that the tenants failed to present sufficient evidence to establish such a relationship, as the record did not demonstrate that Hildy played a significant substantive role in the litigation or that her consultations with Michael were for the purpose of obtaining legal advice in his professional capacity. View "Gogal v. Deng" on Justia Law

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Kristopher Birtcher, experiencing a mental health crisis, was reported to law enforcement by a Hobby Lobby manager. Birtcher, unarmed and not threatening anyone, was detained by sheriff’s deputies. During the detention, Birtcher attempted to flee but was subdued by multiple deputies who restrained him in a prone position, applying bodyweight pressure to his back. Despite Birtcher’s pleas that he could not breathe, the deputies maintained the restraint, and Birtcher eventually stopped moving and died from asphyxiation and sudden cardiac arrest.In the Superior Court of San Diego County, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding no triable issues of material fact regarding the excessive force claim. The court concluded that the deputies’ actions were in accordance with their training and that Birtcher’s restraint was proper. The court also ruled that plaintiff failed to establish a legal basis for the negligent training claim against Sheriff William D. Gore.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that there were indeed triable issues of material fact regarding the excessive force used by the deputies. The appellate court found that the evidence, including expert testimony, suggested that the deputies’ use of bodyweight pressure on Birtcher while he was restrained in a prone position could be considered excessive force. The court also held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the negligent training claim against Sheriff Gore, as there was a statutory basis for the claim and evidence suggesting his involvement in the training policies.The appellate court reversed the judgment in favor of all defendants and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "A.B. v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

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Tarlochan Singh, a Sikh man from India, fled to the United States in 2010 after suffering repeated violence due to his political affiliations. The Department of Homeland Security charged him with inadmissibility, and Singh applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. An immigration judge denied his applications in 2017, finding his claims credible but insufficient to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed this decision in 2018.Singh attempted to file a petition for review with the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, but his attorney failed to meet the statutory deadline. Singh then filed a motion to reopen and reissue the BIA's decision, citing ineffective assistance of counsel. The BIA denied this motion, stating that Singh did not meet the procedural requirements. Singh filed another motion to reconsider, which was also denied by the BIA for being untimely and number barred, among other reasons. The Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the BIA to consider the merits of Singh's ineffective assistance claim, but the BIA again denied the motion, citing failure to meet procedural requirements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Singh's petition and upheld the BIA's decision. The court found that Singh failed to comply with the procedural requirements for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim as outlined in Matter of Lozada. Specifically, Singh did not provide a detailed account of his agreement with his attorney, did not notify his attorney of the allegations, and did not provide proof of filing a disciplinary complaint. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit denied Singh's petition for review. View "Singh v. Bondi" on Justia Law

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Sharon and Kieran Cunningham were married in 1994 and divorced in 2021. They entered into a marital settlement agreement (MSA) that was incorporated but not merged into the final divorce decree. The MSA included provisions about the use and sale of their home in Middletown, Rhode Island, which were modified twice by mutual agreement. In January 2024, Kieran's counsel offered to purchase the home, leading to a dispute over whether the Family Court could modify the MSA to allow an appraisal of the property.Kieran filed a motion in the Family Court to have the home appraised, which Sharon opposed, arguing that the MSA did not provide for such an appraisal. Kieran amended his motion to request an inspection and appraisal, citing Rule 34 of the Family Court Rules of Domestic Relations Procedure. The Family Court held a hearing and ultimately ruled that Kieran had no right to purchase the property under the MSA and sanctioned him for filing an improper motion, awarding Sharon $6,125 in attorneys' fees.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Family Court's decision. The Court held that Kieran's motion was not well-grounded in fact or law and that he sought relief not permitted by the MSA. The Court found that the Family Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees, as the fees were reasonable and supported by an affidavit from a Rhode Island Bar member. The Supreme Court concluded that the sanctions and attorneys' fees were appropriate given the circumstances. View "Cunningham v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

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ELG Utica Alloys, Inc. ("ELG") sued a group of its former customers in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, asserting claims under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). ELG had remediated contamination at one portion of a 23-acre facility in 2007 and continued to remediate contamination at a different portion of the facility pursuant to a 2015 consent order with the New York State government. ELG sought contribution for the costs of the 2015 cleanup from the defendants, alleging they were also responsible for the contamination.The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the six-year statute of limitations for certain CERCLA claims had elapsed. The District Court granted the motion, reasoning that the remediation began in 2007, and the 2015 work was a subsequent step in the work that commenced in 2007. Therefore, the statute of limitations started to run in 2007 and elapsed in 2013, before ELG sued. The District Court also imposed spoliation sanctions on ELG for shredding over 23,000 pounds of potentially relevant documents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the District Court that the statute of limitations on ELG’s claims commenced once on-site physical remediation began in 2007. The court also found no error in the District Court’s imposition of spoliation sanctions. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court and remanded to the District Court to order the agreed-upon spoliation sanction. View "ELG Utica Alloys, Inc. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp." on Justia Law

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Kevin Keith Bell was convicted of rape, witness intimidation, and felony domestic battery. He filed a pro-se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging prosecutorial misconduct, actual innocence, and ineffective assistance of counsel. Bell later filed an amended petition through counsel, focusing on three specific instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. The State moved for summary dismissal of the amended petition, which the district court granted. Bell then filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing the district court erred in dismissing his amended petition on grounds not raised by the State. The district court denied the motion.The district court of the Fifth Judicial District of Idaho initially handled Bell's case. After the State moved for summary dismissal, the district court granted the motion, finding Bell had not provided sufficient legal argument to support his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Bell's motion for reconsideration was also denied, as the district court concluded that the State had indeed argued the grounds for dismissal and that Bell had failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. The court held that Bell failed to preserve his argument regarding the lack of notice for the dismissal of his original claims because he did not raise this issue in his motion for reconsideration. The court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of Bell's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inquire into an allegedly biased juror, as Bell did not provide sufficient evidence of actual bias or resulting prejudice. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment dismissing Bell's petition for post-conviction relief. View "Bell v. State" on Justia Law

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William Chalmers filed for legal separation from his wife, which was later converted to a dissolution proceeding. During the proceedings, Chalmers' attorney requested the appointment of a guardian ad litem due to concerns about Chalmers' capacity. The court appointed Brian Theut as guardian ad litem, who then requested the appointment of East Valley Fiduciary Services, Inc. (EVFS) as temporary guardian and conservator. EVFS retained Ryan Scharber and John McKindles to represent them and Chalmers, respectively. The professionals did not file the required statement under A.R.S. § 14-5109(A) explaining their compensation arrangement.The professionals filed numerous applications for fees and costs, which were initially approved by the court. However, when a new judge took over, Chalmers objected to the fee applications, including those already approved. The court denied the outstanding fee applications, citing the professionals' failure to comply with § 14-5109(A) and noting that they had already received substantial compensation. The court of appeals held that the prior fee approvals were not final and remanded the case to determine if the approvals were manifestly erroneous or unjust due to non-compliance with § 14-5109(A).The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that failure to comply with § 14-5109(A) does not automatically preclude recovery of fees. The court found that the statute is directory, not mandatory, and that the trial court has discretion to rectify non-compliance. The court vacated the court of appeals' opinion, affirmed the denial of fees to which Chalmers timely objected, but reversed the ruling requiring the professionals to disgorge previously awarded fees. The case was remanded to reinstate the initial fee awards. View "In the matter of CHALMERS" on Justia Law

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Marc B. Hankin appealed a probate court order that dismissed his petition for the appointment of a probate conservator for Anne S. and imposed $5,577 in sanctions against him. Hankin, who had only met Anne once and lived nearby, filed the petition along with attorney G. Scott Sobel, who had known Anne for many years. The petition alleged that Anne was being unduly influenced and possibly mistreated by her housemate. Anne, through her attorney, objected to the conservatorship. Sobel later withdrew from the petition, leaving Hankin to maintain it on his own. Anne and other parties involved reached a settlement agreement, which Hankin opposed, arguing Anne lacked the capacity to sign it.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Anne's motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that Hankin lacked standing to petition for conservatorship under Probate Code section 1820. The court also imposed sanctions on Hankin, finding his petition legally frivolous. Hankin appealed both decisions.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that Hankin did not qualify as an "interested person" or "friend" under section 1820. The court noted that Hankin's brief interaction with Anne did not establish a close or intimate relationship necessary to be considered a friend. Additionally, the court found that Hankin's arguments for standing were unsupported by existing law and did not present a good faith argument for extending the law. The court also upheld the sanctions, determining that Hankin's petition was legally frivolous and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding them. View "Conservatorship of Anne S." on Justia Law

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Shelby Ragner was charged with aggravated sexual intercourse without consent, alleging he had sexual intercourse with C.M. while she was severely intoxicated. Ragner's attorney, Alexander Jacobi, did not interview or present Max Weimer as a witness, who later testified that he saw minor injuries on Ragner the morning after the incident. Ragner was found not guilty of aggravated sexual intercourse without consent but was convicted of sexual intercourse without consent (SIWOC). He was sentenced to ten years in prison, with four years suspended. Ragner's direct appeal was denied.Ragner filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel due to Jacobi's failure to interview and call exculpatory witnesses, including Weimer. The District Court found that Jacobi's failure to investigate Weimer's potential testimony fell below the standard of care and granted Ragner's petition, concluding that Jacobi's performance prejudiced Ragner.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that even if Jacobi's performance was deficient, Ragner did not demonstrate prejudice as required under the second prong of the Strickland test. The court found that Weimer's limited observation of Ragner's injuries did not significantly alter the evidentiary picture presented to the jury, which included overwhelming evidence of C.M.'s severe intoxication, extensive documented injuries, and Ragner's own admissions. The court concluded that Weimer's testimony would not have reasonably affected the jury's verdict.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court's decision, holding that Ragner failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, and remanded the case for amendment of the order consistent with its opinion. View "Ragner v. State" on Justia Law