Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Petitioner here was Gaddy Engineering Company, and Respondents were an individual lawyer, Thomas Lane, and a law firm in which Lane was a partner (Bowles Rice). Petitioner contended that the Lane agreed to pay Petitioner one-third of all sums Bowles Rice received in connection with its legal representation of a group of land companies in a case to be filed against a company for alleged underpayment of gas royalties. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Respondents as to all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that the trial court (1) correctly applied the doctrine of impracticability as to Petitioner's breach of contract claims; (2) did not err in ruling that no attorney-client relationship existed between Petitioner and Respondents, and thus the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on Petitioner's professional negligence claim; (3) correctly granted summary judgment on Petitioner's claim of fraud; and (4) did not err in granting summary judgment on Petitioner's claim seeking relief in quantum meruit. View "Gaddy Eng'g Co. v. Bowles Rice McDavid Graff & Love, LLP" on Justia Law

Respondent Magistrate Judge James Naranjo placed a phone call on behalf of his stepson Albert Hernandez who was a party in a child-support enforcement proceeding assigned to another judge. After Mr. Hernandez was jailed for nonpayment of support, respondent called the judge presiding over Hernandez's case stating Hernandez was not a flight risk, and requested that Hernandez's bond be reduced, or that he be released from custody. As a result, the judge in Hernandez's case recused himself. The Judicial Standards Commission filed charges against respondent for willful misconduct, and recommended the imposition of discipline. The Supreme Court granted the Commission's petition and imposed a ninety-day suspension (60 days deferred), and a public censure. View "In the Matter of Naranjo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Dana Medlock's petition for certiorari to determine whether a non-attorney who files a claim in probate court for a business entity engages in the unauthorized practice of law. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that a non-attorney may present claims against an estate on behalf of a business without unduly engaging in the practice of law. View "Medlock v. University Health Services" on Justia Law

Defendant, a lawyer, deposited lucre in his law firm's bank accounts after he was convicted of criminal activity, where it was commingled with the firm's receipts from legitimate clients. At issue was whether the money in the bank accounts at the time defendant was charged was subject to forfeiture. The sheer volume of financial information available and required to separate tainted from untainted monies in this case lead the court to apply the Third Circuit's rule in United States v. Voigt; in this case, the district court erred in ordering forfeiture of the funds as proceeds; consequently, all proceedings the court held subsequent to the imposition of defendant's sentence must be vacated; the court's conclusion did not foreclose the Government's attempt to forfeit a property interest held by defendant individually; and, after addressing the parties' remaining arguments, the court reversed and remanded the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Rothstein" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were two limited liability companies that made loans to Goldan, LLC. Goldan failed to repay the loans. Plaintiffs later discovered that their mortgages had not been recorded as agreed upon. Plaintiffs sued Goldan and its two principals, Mark Goldman and Jeffrey Daniels, alleging a number of claims. One claim was asserted against Daniels, a lawyer, for legal malpractice for failing to record the mortgages. Daniels' malpractice carrier, American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company (American) refused to provide defense or indemnity coverage. Daniels defaulted in Plaintiffs' action against him. Daniels assigned to Plaintiffs his rights against American. Plaintiffs subsequently brought an action against American for breach of contract and bad faith failure to settle the underlying lawsuit. Supreme Court granted Plaintiffs' motions as to the breach of contract claims and dismissed the bad faith claims. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) by breaching its duty to defend Daniels, American lost its right to rely on policy exclusions to escape its duty to indemnify; and (2) the lower courts properly dismissed Plaintiffs' bad faith claims. View "K2 Inv. Group, LLC v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellees Carl and Pamela Morton filed a petition for guardianship against Defendant-Appellant Terry Hanson. An in-house attorney who did not carry malpractice insurance was appointed by the Family Court to represent Defendant. The Family Court certified a question to the Supreme Court concerning in-house attorneys appointed to represent indigent parties. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that in-house counsel appointed by the Family Court had qualified immunity under the Delaware Tort Claims Act. Furthermore, lack of malpractice insurance is not "good cause" for an attorney to withdraw from court-appointed representation. View "Hanson v. Morton" on Justia Law

K.F.'s (a juvenile) father appealed the termination of his parental rights. On appeal to the Supreme Court, he argued the trial court erred in denying his motion for new counsel since his previous lawyer had a conflict of interest. As justification, father argued that his trial counsel failed to pursue certain strategies he suggested, and that she would not introduce or object to what he felt was important evidence at trial because she had been a foster parent and was therefore sympathetic to the Department for Children and Families (DCF). The trial court did not find these arguments persuasive and denied father's motion to remove father's trial counsel. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that father did not demonstrate that his lawyer rendered ineffective counsel, and accordingly affirmed the trial court's decision. View "In re K.F." on Justia Law

After Sarah West was involved in a motor vehicle accident, West made a claim against her insurer, State Farm, for underinsured motorist benefits of $75,000. State Farm paid only $20,000 in benefits. Attorney Tracey Morin subsequently filed a complaint against State Farm on behalf of Sarah and her parents, Ausra and James West, for breach of contract, violation of the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. At the conclusion of the action, the district court imposed sanctions on Morin individually under Mont. R. Civ. P. 11. Morin appealed, contending that the depth and breadth of the sanctions constituted an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the level of sanctions imposed in this case. View "Morin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This matter involved two consolidated writs of prohibition filed under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Petitioners sought a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of circuit court orders that denied their motions to disqualify private attorneys from representing the State as special assistant attorneys general, contending that the fee arrangements of the special assistant attorneys general violated the West Virginia Governmental Ethics Act and the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct and that the attorney general lacked the authority to appoint special assistant attorneys general. The Supreme Court denied the writs, holding (1) Petitioners failed to establish that the special assistant attorneys general actually engaged in any improper conduct that caused an injury; (2) the Court improperly held in Manchin v. Browning, which was heretofore overruled, that the office of attorney general did not retain inherent common law powers; and (3) while the circuit courts relied on the wrong reasons for rejecting the motions to disqualify the special assistant attorneys general, those courts nevertheless were correct in denying the motions. View "State ex rel. Discover Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

From 1895 to 1954 the Jersey City chrome manufacturing plant deposited 1.5 million tons of industrial waste into wetlands along the Hackensack River. In 1954, Honeywell’s predecessor purchased the plant and ended the dumping. The contaminated area was not cleaned up. In 1995, ICO, represented by the Terris law firm, filed a citizen suit under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. 6901. The district court entered judgment for ICO in 2003, awarded more than $4.5 million in fees and expenses, and required Honeywell to pay future fees and costs for monitoring cleanup. The Third Circuit vacated the fee award. In 2005, Terris sued Honeywell based on the same contamination but relating to different areas, on behalf of Riverkeeper. The parties entered into consent decrees; Honeywell agreed to pay $5 million for fees and costs already incurred and to pay “reasonable” fees and expenses for monitoring. In 2009, the parties failed to agree on monitoring fees. The district court substantially upheld the fee requests, allowing Terris to be paid Washington, D.C. rates, rejecting challenges to the reasonableness of the hours expended, and holding that Rule 68 offers of judgment cannot be made in RCRA citizen suits. The Third Circuit vacated with respect to Rule 68 offers, upheld with respect to the hourly rates, and remanded with respect to the number of hours claimed. View "Interfaith Cmty. Org, v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc, " on Justia Law