Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

McKenzie Electric Cooperative, Inc. ("McKenzie Electric") petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court for a supervisory writ to direct the district court to vacate its order of recusal, deny the motion for recusal, and reassign the case back to Judge El-Dweek. The case began in November 2019, and in July 2020, Judge El-Dweek disclosed his membership in McKenzie Electric. Discovery continued through 2023, and McKenzie Electric disclosed it was seeking significant damages. In May 2024, the respondents filed a motion for a change of venue due to potential juror bias. Following a hearing, the respondents filed a motion for recusal, which Judge El-Dweek granted, citing the appearance of impropriety.The district court's decision to recuse was based on the judge's membership in McKenzie Electric and the potential financial interest he might have in the case's outcome. The respondents argued that the judge's financial interest created a reasonable question regarding his impartiality. The district court agreed and granted the motion for recusal, despite acknowledging the timing of the motion was suspect.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the petition for a supervisory writ. The court emphasized that supervisory writs are issued rarely and cautiously, only to rectify errors and prevent injustice in extraordinary cases when no adequate alternative remedy exists. The court concluded that the claimed injustice, primarily stemming from delay, could not be remedied by granting the writ. The court also noted that any error in granting or denying recusal could be addressed on appeal. Consequently, the North Dakota Supreme Court denied McKenzie Electric's petition for a supervisory writ, finding that this case did not warrant the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction. View "McKenzie Electric Coop., Inc. v. El-Dweek" on Justia Law

Mitchell S. Sanderson filed a civil lawsuit against Judge Kari Agotness, seeking $200 million in damages and demanding an investigation into alleged criminal conduct by Agotness. Sanderson served the summons and complaint on Agotness and the Office of Attorney General. Agotness responded with a motion to dismiss under N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and requested attorney’s fees. Sanderson did not respond to these motions. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, found Sanderson’s claims frivolous, and awarded attorney’s fees to Agotness. Sanderson then filed a motion for relief from judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b), which was denied. Sanderson appealed.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. Sanderson argued that the district court erred in dismissing his claims based on judicial immunity, asserting that Agotness lacked personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reviewed the dismissal de novo and found that Sanderson’s complaint lacked factual context and support, making it frivolous. The court held that judicial immunity protected Agotness from civil claims arising from her judicial duties, as she acted within her jurisdiction.The Supreme Court also reviewed the award of attorney’s fees under the abuse of discretion standard and found no error in the district court’s decision. However, the amount awarded was incorrect due to a computational error. The Supreme Court modified the attorney’s fees from $3,213.80 to $2,787.45.Sanderson’s appeal also included a challenge to the denial of his N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion for relief from judgment. The Supreme Court declined to consider this issue further, as Sanderson failed to adequately brief it.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Sanderson’s case based on judicial immunity, modified the attorney’s fees awarded, and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "Sanderson v. Agotness" on Justia Law

Three petitioners sought to quiet title in mineral rights for parcels of land in McKenzie and Williams Counties, North Dakota. They argued that the state relinquished any claim to these mineral rights when a specific chapter of the North Dakota Century Code became effective in 2017. The petitioners claimed that the state abandoned the minerals, making them available for claim, and that they had claimed them by filing the lawsuit.In the McKenzie County case, the petitioners attempted service by publication on unknown persons. Wesley and Barbara Lindvig answered, claiming ownership of the mineral rights. The petitioners' motions to strike the Lindvigs' answer and for default judgment were denied. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim and awarded attorney’s fees to the Lindvigs, concluding the action was frivolous. The petitioners appealed.In the Williams County case, the petitioners made similar claims. Wesley and Barbara Lindvig, along with Kenneth and Mary Schmidt, answered and moved to dismiss on several grounds, including improper service and lack of ownership by the petitioners. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and awarded attorney’s fees, finding the petition frivolous. The petitioners appealed.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the cases and affirmed the dismissals, holding that the petitioners had no interest in the disputed minerals and could not maintain a quiet title action. The court also affirmed the award of attorney’s fees to the Schmidts in the Williams County case. However, it reversed the award of attorney’s fees to the Lindvigs in both cases, remanding for further findings on whether the Lindvigs had a connection to the disputed mineral interests. View "Nelson v. Persons Unknown" on Justia Law

In May 2020, Daniel Samaniego was charged with gross sexual imposition, a class AA felony. During his trial in May 2021, a detective testified about attempting to interview Samaniego, leading to an objection from Samaniego’s counsel, which was sustained. The jury found Samaniego guilty. Post-trial, a juror indicated that the jury discussed Samaniego’s decision not to testify. Samaniego’s counsel did not move for a new trial based on this potential jury misconduct.Samaniego appealed the criminal judgment in September 2021, arguing insufficient evidence and prosecutorial misconduct. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, noting the prosecutorial misconduct claim was not preserved for appeal. In May 2023, Samaniego filed for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for not preserving the prosecutorial misconduct issue and not moving for a new trial based on jury misconduct. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the application in February 2024.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Samaniego did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the trial outcome would have been different but for his counsel’s alleged errors. The court found no prosecutorial misconduct in the detective’s testimony and noted that the jury’s discussion about Samaniego not testifying did not constitute juror misconduct under the law. The court concluded that Samaniego’s trial counsel’s actions did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and that Samaniego was not prejudiced by these actions. View "Samaniego v. State" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Robert V. Bolinske, Sr., filed a defamation claim against Dale V. Sandstrom and Gail Hagerty, alleging that defamatory statements were made and published online on October 18, 2016. Bolinske served a demand for retraction on January 14, 2017, but Sandstrom did not respond. Bolinske commenced the action on February 26, 2019, beyond the two-year statute of limitations for defamation claims.The District Court of Burleigh County initially dismissed Bolinske’s defamation claim, citing the statute of limitations. However, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed this decision in part, noting that the statute of limitations defense was not specifically pled by answer, and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, Sandstrom answered the amended complaint, including the statute of limitations defense, and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court granted, finding the defamation claim time-barred. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to Sandstrom, deeming Bolinske’s claims frivolous.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the defamation claim was indeed barred by the statute of limitations, as the action was commenced more than two years and 45 days after the publication of the alleged defamatory statements. The court also upheld the award of attorney’s fees, agreeing with the lower court’s assessment that Bolinske’s claims were frivolous and that the fees requested were reasonable. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decisions. View "Bolinske v. Sandstrom" on Justia Law

The case involves East Central Water District ("East Central") and the City of Grand Forks ("City"). East Central alleged that the City unlawfully curtailed its water service area, violating federal and state laws. East Central sought to declare a water supply and service agreement with the City void from the beginning under a specific North Dakota statute. The agreement, entered into in 2000, was designed to avoid conflict in providing potable water as the City annexed territory in East Central's service area. The agreement was subject to a North Dakota statute that required the public lending authority to be a party to the agreement. However, the Bank of North Dakota, the public lending authority, was not a party to the agreement.The case was initially brought before the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota. The City answered East Central’s complaint and counterclaimed, and brought a third-party complaint against William Brudvik and Ohnstad Twichell, P.C. for legal malpractice in their representation of the City during negotiations and execution of the Agreement. The City then moved the federal district court to certify questions to the Supreme Court of North Dakota on the interpretation of the North Dakota statute.The Supreme Court of North Dakota was asked to answer two certified questions of law: whether the language “invalid and unenforceable” in the North Dakota statute means an agreement made without the public lending authority as a party is (1) void from the beginning or (2) voidable and capable of ratification. The court concluded that the language “invalid and unenforceable” means void from the beginning, and does not mean voidable and capable of ratification. The court reasoned that the statute speaks to the authority to contract on this subject matter, as opposed to the manner or means of exercising one’s power to contract. Therefore, none of the parties were authorized to contract for water services without the public lending authority being a party to the agreement. View "East Central Water District v. City of Grand Forks" on Justia Law

This case involves a legal malpractice claim brought by Anne Fahey, Timothy Fife, and Richard Fife (Plaintiffs) against their former attorneys, Andrew Cook, Lukas Andrud, and Ohnstad Twichell, P.C. (Defendants). The claim stems from Defendants' representation of Plaintiffs in a previous case concerning the distribution of their mother's estate. The mother, Marianne Fife, owned a mineral interest in North Dakota and was a resident of Idaho when she died intestate. She had conveyed her mineral interest to her husband, Richard Fife, shortly before her death. Plaintiffs sued their father's estate, claiming their mother lacked capacity to execute the deed due to medication and undue influence from their father. The district court rescinded the deed but held that the mineral interest still passed to Richard Fife under North Dakota's intestate succession laws.The district court's decision was affirmed on appeal. Plaintiffs then initiated a malpractice action against Defendants, alleging negligence in the underlying litigation by failing to contest the validity of a quitclaim deed for their mother's interest in an Idaho home and failing to argue that their mother's estate had a cause of action against their father's estate. Plaintiffs claimed that if Defendants had taken these actions, the value of their mother's estate would have increased, and they would have received some of the minerals under intestate succession laws.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that they did not breach their duty to Plaintiffs and that Plaintiffs did not suffer damages caused by the alleged breach of duty. The court reasoned that even if Plaintiffs had successfully taken the suggested actions, they still would not have received their mother's mineral interests.On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on their legal malpractice claims. They contended that the court erred in concluding that their mother's estate, for valuation and distribution purposes, did not include real or personal property outside of North Dakota. They also argued that Defendants were collaterally estopped from arguing that their mother's interest in the Idaho home and personal property would never be part of the estate.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's judgment. The court concluded that the district court did not err in holding that collateral estoppel does not apply in this case. The court also held that the district court correctly concluded that the Idaho home would not have been part of the mother's North Dakota intestate estate because it was community property and would have passed to the father as a matter of law. Therefore, the court found that Defendants' alleged failure to challenge the Idaho quitclaim deed's validity and argue that the mother's estate had a cause of action against the father's estate did not proximately cause Plaintiffs any damages. View "Fahey v. Cook" on Justia Law

Mark Andrew Belyeu was charged with five offenses related to sexual exploitation of a minor. He initially pled guilty to two of the charges, but later withdrew his pleas. After a change of counsel, Belyeu again pled guilty to the same two charges. The court found his guilty pleas were knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently given. Belyeu was subsequently sentenced and judgment was entered.Belyeu filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that his guilty pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently given due to ineffective assistance of his trial counsel and the existence of newly discovered evidence. The district court dismissed Belyeu’s claims of actual innocence and his sentence not being authorized by law, and limited the evidentiary hearing to the remaining two claims. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Belyeu’s petition for postconviction relief.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Belyeu failed to show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The court also found that Belyeu failed to show that but for his counsel's alleged errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Furthermore, the court found that Belyeu did not meet his burden to show newly discovered evidence. Therefore, the court concluded that Belyeu could not show a manifest injustice based on the advice of his counsel or the existence of newly discovered evidence. View "Belyeu v. State" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Justin Lee Camperud, who was accused of sexually abusing a child in 2016. The child's mother reported the incident to the Fargo police department in July 2021. The child was later interviewed by the Red River Children's Advocacy Center, a non-governmental organization. In October 2021, Dr. Anna Schimmelpfennig, the director of mental health services at the Center, participated in a mental health assessment for the child. The State notified Camperud in November 2022 that it intended to call Schimmelpfennig as an expert witness. However, the State failed to disclose that Schimmelpfennig was married to a Cass County Assistant State’s Attorney and that she had participated in the child's mental health assessment.The case was initially heard in the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District. On the day before the trial was to start, Camperud learned about Schimmelpfennig's marriage and her participation in the child's assessment. He moved to exclude Schimmelpfennig’s testimony due to the State's failure to provide him with this information. The district court allowed Camperud to question Schimmelpfennig about her relationship with the Assistant State’s Attorney and her involvement in the child's assessment. The court also delayed the start of the trial by a day. Despite Camperud's attempts to impeach Schimmelpfennig over her marriage, a jury found him guilty of gross sexual imposition.The case was then reviewed by the Supreme Court of North Dakota. Camperud argued that the district court abused its discretion by not granting a continuance after he and the court learned about the undisclosed evidence. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the State had committed discovery violations. However, it ruled that the district court had chosen the least severe sanctions to rectify the non-disclosure, including requiring the production of the assessment, limiting the expert’s testimony, permitting two voir dire sessions of the expert, and delaying the start of trial. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that it did not abuse its discretion by denying Camperud’s motion for a continuance. View "State v. Camperud" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Alvin Brown, who pleaded guilty to two counts of endangerment of a child. After serving his sentence, he was put on probation. However, the State filed a petition to revoke his probation after he violated its terms. The court ordered Brown to wear an alcohol SCRAM bracelet and remain in custody at the Lake Region Law Enforcement Center until a spot was available at a halfway house. Brown was warned that leaving the halfway house would be considered an escape, which would result in additional charges. Despite these warnings, Brown absconded from the Center and was subsequently charged with escape, to which he pleaded guilty.Brown later filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that his conviction was invalid and his trial attorney was ineffective. He claimed that he was not in official detention when he left the Center, and therefore, the State could not charge him with escape. The district court denied his petition, finding that Brown was indeed in official detention and that he failed to establish the second prong of the Strickland test, which requires showing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision. The court found no error in the lower court's determination that Brown was in official detention when he left the Center. It also agreed with the lower court's finding that Brown did not meet the second prong of the Strickland test. The court concluded that Brown's arguments were either unnecessary for the decision or without merit. View "Brown v. State" on Justia Law