Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Travaris T. Guy was convicted of attempted first degree murder and second degree murder for the shooting of David Woods Sr. and Sheena Woods. The jury found that Guy acted with the intent to kill but also believed his actions were lawfully justified, which led to an inconsistent verdict. Guy did not raise this issue on direct appeal or in his initial postconviction petition but later filed a successive postconviction petition claiming inconsistent verdicts and ineffective assistance of counsel.The Will County circuit court denied relief on the inconsistent verdict claim but granted a new trial on a separate claim. The appellate court reversed Guy’s attempted first degree murder conviction, holding that the jury instruction misstated the law, the conviction was inconsistent with the second degree murder conviction, and the jury’s finding of self-defense precluded a guilty verdict for attempted first degree murder.The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court’s judgment in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the circuit court to sentence Guy on the lesser-included offense of aggravated battery with a firearm. The court held that a conviction for attempted first degree murder requires proof of intent to kill without lawful justification. The jury instruction was erroneous as it only required intent to kill. The jury’s finding that Guy believed in the need for self-defense was incompatible with the intent required for attempted first degree murder. The court also found that Guy’s attorneys were ineffective for failing to properly raise these issues. View "People v. Guy" on Justia Law

Ronald Vines and his two adult sons attempted to rob a bank at gunpoint. They gathered weapons and other equipment, set up a tarp outside the bank, and waited for the tellers to arrive. One of Vines's sons, wearing a mask and armed with a revolver, forced a teller inside at gunpoint. However, another employee saw them and raised the alarm, causing Vines to signal his son to flee. They were apprehended by the police shortly after.Vines pleaded guilty to attempted armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(d) & 2 and brandishing a gun while committing a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) & 2. He did not initially challenge his § 924(c) charge, so he had to do so collaterally under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied his motion but granted a certificate of appealability. On appeal, Vines was allowed to argue that his plea lawyer was ineffective for not asserting that attempted armed bank robbery is not a crime of violence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that attempted armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) is a crime of violence because it requires the use of force, violence, or intimidation. The court also found that adding a dangerous weapon to the attempted bank robbery does not make the crime less violent. Therefore, Vines's conviction under § 924(c) was upheld. The court also concluded that Vines's counsel was not ineffective, as the argument that attempted armed bank robbery is not a crime of violence would have been meritless. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's order denying Vines's collateral attack. View "USA v. Vines" on Justia Law

Jason Meredith was charged with two counts of capital murder for the shooting deaths of Eric Ogden and Lance Kelloms. The State agreed to waive the death penalty and reduce the charges to first-degree murder in exchange for Meredith's testimony against his co-defendant. Meredith pleaded guilty and received two concurrent life sentences. In 1998, he filed a pro se Rule 37 petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and new evidence. He later filed motions to amend his petition, which were denied by the circuit court.The Saline County Circuit Court denied Meredith's motions to amend his petition and ultimately dismissed his Rule 37 petition. The court found that Meredith failed to act with due diligence in seeking relief and that his petition did not comply with the length and formatting requirements. Additionally, the court concluded that the files and records showed Meredith was not entitled to relief, as he failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel was ineffective.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Meredith's motions to amend his petition, as the extreme passage of time and lack of diligence were considered. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the petition based on noncompliance with formatting requirements and the merits of the petition. The court found that Meredith did not sufficiently allege prejudice from his counsel's advice regarding parole eligibility, as he did not claim he would have insisted on going to trial but for the erroneous advice. View "Meredith v. State" on Justia Law

Michael Williams was convicted of malice murder and other offenses for the fatal shooting of Tomas Gooden at a house party on December 8, 2017. Williams and Gooden argued over a gambling game, leading to Gooden pushing Williams to the floor. Williams then shot Gooden in the head and fled the scene. Gooden's body was found in the garage, and the medical examiner determined the bullet traveled in a downward trajectory. Williams was later found walking along the road and eventually admitted to shooting Gooden, claiming self-defense.A Coweta County grand jury indicted Williams on multiple charges, including malice murder and aggravated assault. Williams was found guilty on all counts by a jury and sentenced to life in prison for malice murder, with additional concurrent and consecutive sentences for other charges. Williams filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. He then appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, specifying that he was not appealing his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed Williams's claims of plain error in the jury instructions and ineffective assistance of counsel. Williams argued that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that the State bore the burden to disprove his justification defense and that his counsel failed to investigate and introduce evidence of Gooden's violent reputation. The court concluded that although the trial court erred in its jury instructions, Williams did not demonstrate that this error affected the trial's outcome. Additionally, the court found that Williams was not prejudiced by his counsel's performance, as substantial evidence of Gooden's violent character was already presented at trial. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Williams's convictions. View "WILLIAMS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Ronald Norweathers was convicted by a jury and sentenced to 250 months’ imprisonment for possessing and distributing child pornography. He claimed that he was acting under the direction of an FBI agent, Joseph Bonsuk, who misled him into collecting and forwarding child pornography as part of a nonexistent undercover operation. The jury rejected his defense, and his post-trial motions and direct appeal were unsuccessful. Norweathers then moved to vacate his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request certain jury instructions and for not calling a computer forensics expert as a witness. The district court denied his motion without a hearing.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied Norweathers’s § 2255 motion, finding that his claims lacked merit. The court concluded that the failure to request an apparent authority or entrapment by estoppel jury instruction was immaterial because Norweathers’s testimony did not establish reasonable reliance on a government agent’s authority. The court also dismissed his claim regarding the computer forensics expert, deeming it insufficiently cogent to suggest constitutional error.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Norweathers’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims were without merit. It found that his testimony did not support a reasonable reliance on Bonsuk’s authority, making the jury instructions irrelevant. Additionally, the court determined that the decision not to call the computer forensics expert was a strategic choice within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. The court concluded that Norweathers failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of a different result had the expert testified, and thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion without an evidentiary hearing. View "Norweathers v USA" on Justia Law

Gary Jordan, the defendant, pled guilty to armed bank robbery and other crimes, receiving a thirty-year prison sentence. After his plea, he discovered that prosecutors had recorded his attorney-client meetings before he entered his plea. Although the prosecutors claimed they did not watch the recordings, Jordan moved to vacate his guilty plea, arguing that the prosecutors' actions rendered his plea unconstitutionally unknowing and involuntary.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas denied Jordan's motion, stating that he could only challenge his guilty plea through an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as the alleged unconstitutional conduct occurred before the plea. Jordan did not raise a claim of prejudice or ineffective assistance of counsel, relying solely on the structural-error theory from Shillinger v. Haworth. The district court concluded that Jordan could not prevail on this basis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that under Tollett v. Henderson, a defendant who has pled guilty cannot raise independent claims of constitutional violations that occurred before the plea. Instead, the defendant must show that the plea was not knowing and voluntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel, unless the plea was induced by threats, misrepresentations, or improper prosecutorial promises. The court found that Jordan's challenge failed because he did not pursue an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and relied solely on the now-overruled structural-error rule from Shillinger. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Jordan's motion to vacate his guilty plea. View "United States v. Jordan" on Justia Law

Anthony Brookins was found guilty by a jury in May 2009 of a firearm offense and a drug trafficking charge. He was sentenced to 120 months and 240 months, respectively, to be served concurrently, along with three- and ten-year periods of supervised release. The District Court later reduced his drug trafficking sentence to 180 months. After his release from prison in December 2019, Brookins began his supervised release. In May 2023, his probation officer filed a petition alleging five violations of his supervised release, including charges of simple assault and harassment, positive drug tests for cocaine, and failure to participate in a substance abuse program. A supplemental petition added a sixth violation related to another domestic incident.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania held a revocation hearing where Brookins admitted to failing to comply with the substance abuse treatment program (violation number 5). The government withdrew the other five alleged violations. The District Court found Brookins guilty of the Grade C violation and sentenced him to 14 months of imprisonment, followed by supervised release with conditions including participation in an intensive drug treatment program and no contact with the alleged victim of the domestic incidents.Brookins filed a pro se notice of appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. Brookins's appellate counsel filed an inadequate Anders brief, failing to provide a thorough examination of the record or address the specific issues raised by Brookins. The Third Circuit discharged the counsel and directed the Clerk of Court to appoint new counsel for Brookins, emphasizing the need for diligent and thorough representation in compliance with Anders v. California. View "USA v. Brookins" on Justia Law

On January 12, 2020, Harold Walker Jr. was involved in a shooting incident at the intersection of Colonial Circle and Old Canton Road in Jackson, Mississippi. Witnesses saw a white car swerve to block a van, and the driver of the white car, identified as Walker, fired multiple shots into the van, killing Bryant Robinson. Walker fled the scene but was pursued by police and later apprehended. Evidence included eyewitness testimonies, security footage, and physical evidence linking Walker to the crime.The Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County convicted Walker of first-degree murder, shooting into an occupied vehicle, and felony fleeing from law enforcement. Walker appealed, raising five issues: the trial court's refusal to give a lesser-included-offense instruction for heat of passion manslaughter, the sufficiency and weight of the evidence for the first-degree murder conviction, the admission of his statement to law enforcement, the failure to transcribe the jury instructions conference, and ineffective assistance of counsel.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and found no reversible error. The court held that there was no evidentiary basis for a heat of passion manslaughter instruction, the evidence was sufficient to support the first-degree murder conviction, and the trial court did not err in admitting Walker's statement. The court also found that the failure to transcribe the jury instructions conference did not prejudice Walker, and his counsel was not ineffective. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment. View "Walker v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

Misael Padron, a Cuban citizen granted asylum in the United States, appealed the denial of his motion to vacate his conviction for carjacking, which he had entered pursuant to a no-contest plea. Padron argued that he did not understand the immigration consequences of his plea, which included mandatory detention, denial of naturalization, and near-certain termination of asylum and deportation. He provided evidence of his mental health challenges related to persecution in Cuba and claimed his defense counsel did not adequately inform him of the immigration consequences.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Padron’s motion, partly because he did not provide a declaration from his defense counsel and had signed a plea form acknowledging potential deportation. The court also noted that there was no alternative, immigration-neutral plea available to Padron.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Padron demonstrated error affecting his ability to understand the immigration consequences of his plea. The court found that Padron’s defense counsel did not adequately advise him of the mandatory immigration consequences, and Padron’s mental health challenges further impaired his understanding. The court also determined that Padron established a reasonable probability he would have rejected the plea had he understood the consequences, given his strong ties to the United States and the severe impact on his asylum status.The Court of Appeal reversed the denial of Padron’s motion and remanded the case with instructions to vacate Padron’s conviction and permit him to withdraw his plea and enter a different plea. View "People v. Padron" on Justia Law

James Ervin pleaded guilty to possessing a semi-automatic rifle as a convicted felon, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He later sought to withdraw his guilty plea through a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and that the government provided false inculpatory information about the rifle. Ervin's arguments centered on the interpretation of the phrase “in or affecting commerce” in § 922(g).The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied Ervin's motion to vacate his plea. The court found that the rifle had traveled in interstate commerce, thus meeting the statutory requirement. Ervin's ineffective assistance claim failed because he could not establish prejudice, as the firearm's interstate travel was sufficient to satisfy the commerce element of § 922(g). The court also denied his motion for reconsideration and his request for a certificate of appealability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the phrase “in or affecting commerce” in § 922(g) should be interpreted broadly, consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Scarborough v. United States. The court found that the rifle, which traveled from North Carolina to Louisiana, Georgia, and back to North Carolina, met the interstate commerce requirement. Consequently, Ervin's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and due process violations were rejected. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Ervin's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, concluding that his interpretation of the statute was incorrect and that his defense would have been meritless. View "United States v. Ervin" on Justia Law