Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Kristopher Birtcher, experiencing a mental health crisis, was reported to law enforcement by a Hobby Lobby manager. Birtcher, unarmed and not threatening anyone, was detained by sheriff’s deputies. During the detention, Birtcher attempted to flee but was subdued by multiple deputies who restrained him in a prone position, applying bodyweight pressure to his back. Despite Birtcher’s pleas that he could not breathe, the deputies maintained the restraint, and Birtcher eventually stopped moving and died from asphyxiation and sudden cardiac arrest.In the Superior Court of San Diego County, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding no triable issues of material fact regarding the excessive force claim. The court concluded that the deputies’ actions were in accordance with their training and that Birtcher’s restraint was proper. The court also ruled that plaintiff failed to establish a legal basis for the negligent training claim against Sheriff William D. Gore.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that there were indeed triable issues of material fact regarding the excessive force used by the deputies. The appellate court found that the evidence, including expert testimony, suggested that the deputies’ use of bodyweight pressure on Birtcher while he was restrained in a prone position could be considered excessive force. The court also held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the negligent training claim against Sheriff Gore, as there was a statutory basis for the claim and evidence suggesting his involvement in the training policies.The appellate court reversed the judgment in favor of all defendants and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "A.B. v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

Kevin Keith Bell was convicted of rape, witness intimidation, and felony domestic battery. He filed a pro-se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging prosecutorial misconduct, actual innocence, and ineffective assistance of counsel. Bell later filed an amended petition through counsel, focusing on three specific instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. The State moved for summary dismissal of the amended petition, which the district court granted. Bell then filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing the district court erred in dismissing his amended petition on grounds not raised by the State. The district court denied the motion.The district court of the Fifth Judicial District of Idaho initially handled Bell's case. After the State moved for summary dismissal, the district court granted the motion, finding Bell had not provided sufficient legal argument to support his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Bell's motion for reconsideration was also denied, as the district court concluded that the State had indeed argued the grounds for dismissal and that Bell had failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. The court held that Bell failed to preserve his argument regarding the lack of notice for the dismissal of his original claims because he did not raise this issue in his motion for reconsideration. The court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of Bell's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inquire into an allegedly biased juror, as Bell did not provide sufficient evidence of actual bias or resulting prejudice. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment dismissing Bell's petition for post-conviction relief. View "Bell v. State" on Justia Law

Shelby Ragner was charged with aggravated sexual intercourse without consent, alleging he had sexual intercourse with C.M. while she was severely intoxicated. Ragner's attorney, Alexander Jacobi, did not interview or present Max Weimer as a witness, who later testified that he saw minor injuries on Ragner the morning after the incident. Ragner was found not guilty of aggravated sexual intercourse without consent but was convicted of sexual intercourse without consent (SIWOC). He was sentenced to ten years in prison, with four years suspended. Ragner's direct appeal was denied.Ragner filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel due to Jacobi's failure to interview and call exculpatory witnesses, including Weimer. The District Court found that Jacobi's failure to investigate Weimer's potential testimony fell below the standard of care and granted Ragner's petition, concluding that Jacobi's performance prejudiced Ragner.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that even if Jacobi's performance was deficient, Ragner did not demonstrate prejudice as required under the second prong of the Strickland test. The court found that Weimer's limited observation of Ragner's injuries did not significantly alter the evidentiary picture presented to the jury, which included overwhelming evidence of C.M.'s severe intoxication, extensive documented injuries, and Ragner's own admissions. The court concluded that Weimer's testimony would not have reasonably affected the jury's verdict.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court's decision, holding that Ragner failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, and remanded the case for amendment of the order consistent with its opinion. View "Ragner v. State" on Justia Law

Michael Lairy petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that he did not qualify for the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (ACCA) mandatory 15-year sentence and that his counsel was ineffective for not raising this issue. The government did not address the merits of Lairy’s claims but argued that they were raised after the statute of limitations had expired. The district court denied his petition, rejecting Lairy’s arguments that the government forfeited the statute of limitations defense, that he was actually innocent of ACCA, and that he was entitled to equitable tolling.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana held that Lairy’s petition was untimely and that the government did not forfeit the statute of limitations defense. The court also found that Lairy’s claim of actual innocence did not apply because it was a legal, not factual, argument. Additionally, the court denied Lairy’s request for equitable tolling without conducting an evidentiary hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the district court’s evaluation of forfeiture and actual innocence. However, the appellate court found that the district court abused its discretion by rejecting equitable tolling without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. The Seventh Circuit vacated the denial of the petition and remanded the case to the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on equitable tolling. The court affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "Lairy v. United States" on Justia Law

On the evening of May 2, 2021, and into the early hours of May 3, 2021, an incident occurred at the home of Judy Foster involving her adoptive son, Donald Edward Foster, and M.W., an 18-year-old acquaintance. Foster, armed with a knife and later a handgun, threatened both women, restrained and bound them, and moved them to the basement. He isolated Judy in a bathroom and then committed multiple distinct acts of sexual assault against M.W., including oral, anal, and attempted vaginal penetration, each separated by time, location, and intervening events. After several hours, M.W. convinced Foster to leave the house, and he was apprehended by law enforcement.The State charged Foster with multiple counts, including aggravated sexual intercourse without consent, attempted sexual intercourse without consent, and aggravated kidnapping. During jury selection, the State disclosed newly discovered evidence from Foster’s cellmate, leading to an in-chambers discussion from which Foster was absent due to safety concerns. Foster’s counsel moved for a continuance, which the District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County, granted. Foster later ratified this decision. At trial, the State did not use the cellmate’s evidence, and the jury convicted Foster on all counts.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed Foster’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, statutory violations regarding multiple charges from the same transaction, and due process violations for his absence from a critical stage. The court held that counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to multiple charges, as each offense was based on distinct acts. The court also found that Foster’s absence from the in-chambers discussion was harmless error, as he was promptly informed and ratified the decision, and the evidence in question was not used at trial. The court affirmed Foster’s convictions. View "State v. Foster" on Justia Law

In January 2013, Stanislav “Steven” Yelizarov robbed a jewelry store after a series of serious events, including home burglaries and kidnapping. He received a thirty-year sentence for kidnapping and conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act robbery. Over eight years, Yelizarov agreed to two plea deals, filed two motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, was sentenced twice, and had three judges decide parts of his cases. He appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations and that his sentence was unreasonable.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland initially sentenced Yelizarov to 360 months based on a plea agreement. After learning of a potential murder charge, Yelizarov renegotiated a plea deal, which included a waiver of appeal. He later filed a § 2255 motion, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing his attorney failed to advise him properly about the murder charge and its implications. The district court denied the motion, finding no prejudice from the attorney’s actions, as Yelizarov was aware of the potential murder charge and chose to plead guilty.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, agreeing that Yelizarov was not prejudiced by his counsel’s performance. The court found that Yelizarov knowingly waived his right to appeal his sentence, including claims of procedural and substantive unreasonableness. The court dismissed his appeal regarding the reasonableness of his sentence, enforcing the waiver of appeal in his plea agreement. The court emphasized that a failure to mention specific sentencing factors does not constitute procedural unreasonableness. The decision was affirmed in part and dismissed in part. View "US v. Yelizarov" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with first-degree manslaughter after fatally stabbing her boyfriend during a violent altercation. She claimed that she acted in self-defense, citing a history of severe physical abuse by the victim, including multiple incidents of strangulation and a recent sexual assault immediately preceding the stabbing. Several witnesses corroborated the defendant’s account of ongoing abuse, and an order of protection had previously been issued against the victim.The case was tried in Supreme Court, Erie County, where the defendant’s counsel pursued a justification defense under Penal Law § 35.15. During summation, the prosecutor misrepresented the defendant’s testimony by stating that she had never claimed to fear for her life, despite clear testimony to the contrary. The prosecutor also repeatedly accused the defendant of lying, using the term “lies” numerous times. Defense counsel did not object to these remarks. The jury convicted the defendant. On appeal, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed the conviction, holding that the issue was unpreserved and that counsel’s failure to object did not constitute ineffective assistance. However, the Appellate Division did grant sentencing relief under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the defendant was denied meaningful representation due to her counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s improper summation remarks. The Court found that the prosecutor’s misstatement of the evidence and repeated personal attacks on the defendant’s credibility exceeded permissible advocacy and undermined the fairness of the trial. The Court concluded that, in the absence of any strategic justification for counsel’s silence, the defendant was deprived of a fair trial. The order of the Appellate Division was reversed, and a new trial was ordered. View "People v T.P." on Justia Law

Elena Gaston was indicted on charges of trafficking persons for sexual servitude, conspiracy, deriving support from prostitution, and money laundering. The Commonwealth alleged that she ran an escort service where her employees provided sexual services for money. On the day of her trial, a plea agreement was proposed, but during the plea colloquy, Gaston denied key elements of the charges, leading the judge to proceed to trial. During the trial, defense counsel made improper opening statements, conceding Gaston's guilt and inviting the jury to consider irrelevant factors, which led the Commonwealth to move for a mistrial.The trial judge initially opted for a curative instruction instead of a mistrial but later declared a mistrial after concluding that defense counsel's actions constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The judge noted that defense counsel's failure to consult with Gaston on his opening statement and the detrimental impact of his strategy on her defense warranted a mistrial. Gaston, represented by new counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the indictments on double jeopardy grounds, which the trial judge denied.Gaston then filed a petition in the county court seeking relief from the denial of her motion to dismiss. The petition was denied by a single justice, and she appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the single justice's decision, holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in declaring a mistrial due to manifest necessity. The court found that the trial judge carefully considered alternatives and provided both parties with opportunities to be heard before declaring a mistrial. The court concluded that defense counsel's conduct was manifestly unreasonable and deprived Gaston of a substantial ground of defense, justifying the mistrial. View "Gaston v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder for the fatal stabbing of a 20-year-old in August 2007, when he was 16 years old. The prosecution presented police-arranged single photo identifications made the day after the crime. The defendant moved to suppress these identifications, arguing they were conducted in a suggestive manner. The Supreme Court ordered a Rodriguez/Wade hearing to determine the admissibility of the identifications, but the hearing was never held. During the trial, the prosecution called an eyewitness who identified the defendant as the perpetrator, despite earlier stating they would not call this witness. The defense counsel did not object to the witness being called or request a Rodriguez/Wade hearing.The Supreme Court convicted the defendant, and he appealed, arguing that the missing transcript of jury deliberation proceedings constituted a mode of proceedings error and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The Supreme Court summarily denied the defendant's CPL 440.10 motion without an evidentiary hearing and denied his motion for a reconstruction hearing. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by reducing the defendant's sentence but affirmed the order denying the CPL 440.10 motion, rejecting the defendant's claims.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and rejected the defendant's mode of proceedings claim, holding that a missing transcript alone does not entitle a defendant to vacatur of their conviction. The court stated that the proper remedy for a missing transcript is a reconstruction hearing, provided the defendant's conduct shows a good faith effort to obtain prompt and effective reconstruction. The court also held that the Supreme Court abused its discretion by summarily denying the CPL 440.10 motion without an evidentiary hearing, as the defendant's ineffective assistance claim could not be resolved without resolving questions of fact. The case was remitted to the Supreme Court for an evidentiary hearing on the CPL 440.10 motion. View "People v Salas" on Justia Law

Shawn Russell Sorensen was convicted of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment based on prior state convictions for drug offenses. He filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for not contesting the qualification of his prior convictions as "felony drug offenses" under 21 U.S.C. § 841’s sentencing enhancement scheme.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota dismissed Sorensen's motion. The court found that his counsel's performance was not deficient, as the argument regarding the categorical approach to his prior convictions was considered novel at the time of sentencing. Sorensen appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that even if counsel's performance was deficient, Sorensen failed to demonstrate prejudice. The court applied the categorical and modified categorical approaches to determine that Sorensen's prior convictions under Arizona and South Dakota statutes qualified as felony drug offenses. The Arizona statute was found to be divisible, and Sorensen's conviction for possession of methamphetamine matched the federal definition of a felony drug offense. Similarly, the South Dakota statute was also deemed divisible, and Sorensen's conviction for possession of methamphetamine under this statute qualified as a felony drug offense. Therefore, Sorensen's sentence was upheld, and the district court's judgment was affirmed. View "Sorensen v. United States" on Justia Law