Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Legal Ethics
GOODWIN v. THE STATE
In September 2019, the appellant was involved in a shooting that resulted in the death of Cameron Johnson. The appellant was romantically involved with Andrea Stanek, who had an on-again, off-again relationship with Johnson. On the night of the incident, after a walk to resolve tensions, the appellant shot Johnson in the chest. The appellant was charged with malice murder, two counts of felony murder, aggravated assault, and firearm-related offenses. He pleaded guilty to malice murder in October 2021 and was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole after 30 years. The remaining charges were dismissed.The Glynn County Superior Court accepted the guilty plea and sentenced the appellant accordingly. The appellant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically that his counsel failed to inform him about the 30-year parole eligibility requirement. The trial court denied this motion in July 2022, finding no deficiency in counsel’s performance. The appellant's subsequent motion to vacate the order was granted for procedural reasons, allowing him to file a timely appeal.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court found that the appellant's counsel had adequately informed him about the parole consequences of his plea. The court noted that the trial court was entitled to credit the testimony of the appellant’s counsel over the appellant’s claims. The Supreme Court held that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, as the appellant failed to demonstrate that his counsel’s performance was deficient. View "GOODWIN v. THE STATE" on Justia Law
Ross v. Administrator East Jersey State Prison
A criminal defendant, convicted of aggravated manslaughter and sentenced to thirty years in prison, twice instructed his attorney to file a plenary appeal. However, his intake appellate counsel designated the appeal for the expedited sentence-review track (ESOA). The ESOA panel did not transfer the case to the plenary calendar and affirmed the sentence. The defendant's subsequent post-conviction relief applications in state court, which included claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, were unsuccessful.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied the defendant's habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which included claims related to the ESOA designation. The court also denied his Rule 60(b) motion, which specifically challenged the intake appellate counsel's decision to place the appeal on the ESOA calendar.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Rule 60(b) motion was not a second or successive habeas application because it was filed within 28 days of the underlying judgment. However, the court found that the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was procedurally defaulted because it was not exhausted in state court and he could not show the requisite prejudice to overcome the default. The court applied the Strickland standard for prejudice, requiring a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different but for counsel's errors, rather than the Flores-Ortega standard, which applies when the entirety of direct appellate review is rendered unavailable. The court affirmed the denial of the habeas petition and the Rule 60(b) motion. View "Ross v. Administrator East Jersey State Prison" on Justia Law
United States v. Crittenden
Federal agents received a tip about methamphetamine being stored at a house in El Paso, Texas. An informant arranged a controlled buy with Carla Dominguez, who confirmed she had methamphetamine for sale. Dominguez and her husband, Samuel Crittenden, were observed by agents; Crittenden retrieved a bag from the house and handed it to Dominguez, who was later intercepted by police with ten pounds of methamphetamine. Crittenden admitted to storing items at the house and giving a bag to Dominguez, claiming he thought it contained marijuana. Additional drugs were found in the attic of the house.Crittenden and Dominguez were charged with conspiracy to possess and distribute methamphetamine and marijuana. The government raised a potential conflict of interest with Crittenden’s attorney, Leonard Morales, who also represented another individual involved in drug activities. The district court held a Garcia hearing, where Crittenden waived his right to conflict-free counsel. The court accepted the waiver, and the trial proceeded. Crittenden was convicted on all counts, but the district court later granted a new trial due to insufficient evidence. The Fifth Circuit reinstated the conviction for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and remanded for sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Crittenden’s appeal, where he argued that the district court erred in accepting his waiver of conflict-free counsel and in denying a lesser-included-offense instruction for simple possession. The Fifth Circuit found that Crittenden’s waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, and that the district court did not err in accepting it. The court also held that the evidence overwhelmingly indicated intent to distribute, making a lesser-included-offense instruction for simple possession inappropriate. The court affirmed the district court’s decisions and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Crittenden" on Justia Law
Holsum de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. ITW Food Equipment Group LLC
Holsum de Puerto Rico, Inc. ("Holsum") contracted with Peerless Food Equipment ("Peerless") to manufacture a machine for sandwiching cookies and with Compass Industrial Group, LLC ("Compass") for a tray-loader machine. The machines malfunctioned, leading Holsum to sue both companies for breach of contract and negligence. The jury found in favor of Holsum against Compass but ruled in favor of Peerless. Peerless then sought attorney fees from Holsum, citing a fee-shifting provision in their contract and a Puerto Rico court rule.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico denied Peerless's motion for attorney fees. The court found that the fee-shifting provision was not clearly incorporated into the contract through a hyperlink and that Holsum did not act obstinately or frivolously in bringing its claims against Peerless. Peerless appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the contract did not clearly communicate the incorporation of the fee-shifting provision via the hyperlink. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's determination that Holsum's claims were not frivolous and that Holsum did not act obstinately in refusing to settle before trial. The appellate court emphasized that exercising the right to a jury trial in good faith does not constitute obstinacy. View "Holsum de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. ITW Food Equipment Group LLC" on Justia Law
State v. Cardona
In this case, the defendant was involved in an altercation in Waikiki that resulted in the death of another individual. The defendant, who claimed to have poor vision, was called to the scene by a friend who was being harassed by two men. The situation escalated into a physical fight, during which the defendant stabbed one of the men, who later died from his injuries. The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder by a jury.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit convicted the defendant of second-degree murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. The defendant appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), arguing prosecutorial misconduct and instructional errors. The ICA affirmed the conviction, concluding that the prosecutorial misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and that the jury instructions were appropriate.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the case on certiorari. The court found that the Deputy Prosecuting Attorney (DPA) committed prosecutorial misconduct by characterizing the defendant as a liar and an "enforcer" during closing arguments, which denied the defendant a fair trial. The court also noted that the DPA improperly inserted personal opinions and new evidence regarding the defendant's eyesight. The court held that this misconduct was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and vacated the ICA's judgment, as well as the Circuit Court's judgment of conviction and sentence. The case was remanded to the Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "State v. Cardona" on Justia Law
State v. Peters
On the evening of February 11, 2018, Deizmond C. Peters and three accomplices allegedly committed a series of crimes at a Wichita home, resulting in the death of Donte Devore. The group, armed with handguns, entered the home after assaulting Devore on the porch. During an altercation inside, Devore was shot and killed. Peters was later charged with first-degree felony murder, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, criminal possession of a weapon, and four counts of aggravated assault.The Sedgwick District Court held a jury trial where Peters was convicted on all charges. Peters filed a motion for a new trial, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, which the court denied. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 618 months plus an additional 332 months. Peters appealed his convictions, raising several claims of trial and sentencing errors.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and found merit in two of Peters' arguments. First, the court agreed that the evidence did not support his conviction for criminal possession of a weapon due to an error in the stipulation used to prove this charge. Second, the court noted that the sentencing journal entry of judgment improperly omitted Peters' jail credit award of 1,437 days. The court affirmed the remaining convictions, finding no error in the jury selection process, prosecutorial conduct, jury instructions, or the cumulative error doctrine. The court also upheld the method of determining Peters' criminal history under the Kansas Criminal Sentencing Guidelines, rejecting his constitutional challenge.The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case with directions to vacate Peters' sentence for criminal possession of a weapon, resentence him without the reversed conviction, and issue a nunc pro tunc order correcting the sentencing journal entry to include the jail credit award. View "State v. Peters" on Justia Law
MCNEIL-LEWIS v. STATE OF ARKANSAS
Sir Jeffery McNeil-Lewis was convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree battery, eight counts of terroristic threatening, and firearm enhancements, resulting in a life sentence plus fifteen years. The convictions stemmed from a shooting at an abandoned house in West Memphis, where McNeil-Lewis and an accomplice fired at Jarvis Moore and Stacy Abram. Moore died, and Abram survived, identifying McNeil-Lewis as a shooter. Additional evidence, including eyewitness testimony and gunshot residue, linked McNeil-Lewis to the crime.The Crittenden County Circuit Court denied McNeil-Lewis's petition for postconviction relief under Rule 37, which claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found that McNeil-Lewis failed to prove both deficient performance by his counsel and resulting prejudice. Specific claims included strategic decisions not to object to 911 calls on hearsay grounds, not to pursue self-defense, and not to object during sentencing. The court also found no prejudice from the failure to suppress evidence or from juror misconduct, as no actual bias was shown. Additionally, the court ruled that a Batson challenge would have been meritless and that not calling witnesses during sentencing was a strategic decision. Lastly, the court credited defense counsel's testimony that McNeil-Lewis was informed of and rejected a plea offer.The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment, finding no clear error in its conclusions. The court held that McNeil-Lewis's arguments on appeal did not adequately address the circuit court's findings, particularly regarding strategic decisions and lack of prejudice. The court also upheld the circuit court's credibility determinations and strategic decisions made by defense counsel, concluding that McNeil-Lewis failed to meet the burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel. View "MCNEIL-LEWIS v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law
Andrew W. Levenfeld & Associates, Ltd. v. O’Brien
Plaintiffs, two law firms, provided legal services to defendants regarding the estate of Daniel P. O’Brien Sr. and Mary D. O’Brien. The attorney-client agreement stipulated a contingency fee structure, but defendants terminated the agreement without cause after 19 months. Plaintiffs sought compensation for their services based on quantum meruit, claiming their efforts significantly contributed to a favorable settlement for defendants.The Cook County Circuit Court found that plaintiffs had proven the elements of a quantum meruit claim, including the benefit conferred upon defendants. The court determined the reasonable value of plaintiffs’ services using the contingency fee structure from the attorney-client agreement, awarding plaintiffs $1,692,390.60 after deducting fees paid to subsequent attorneys.The Appellate Court affirmed the entitlement to quantum meruit recovery but reversed the amount awarded, ruling that the attorney-client agreement was void due to a violation of Rule 1.5(e) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, which requires a written fee-splitting agreement and client consent. The appellate court remanded the case for a new determination of the reasonable value of services.The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed that plaintiffs were entitled to quantum meruit recovery. However, it found that the appellate court erred in reversing the circuit court’s judgment on the reasonable value of services. The Supreme Court held that the attorney-client agreement was not void ab initio and that the circuit court did not commit reversible error in using the contingency fee structure as evidence of value. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, awarding plaintiffs $1,692,390.60. View "Andrew W. Levenfeld & Associates, Ltd. v. O'Brien" on Justia Law
Keck v. Mix Creative Learning Center
In 2020, Mix Creative Learning Center, an art studio offering children's art lessons, began selling online art kits during the pandemic. These kits included reproductions of artworks from Michel Keck's Dog Art series. Keck sued Mix Creative and its proprietor for copyright and trademark infringement, seeking enhanced statutory damages for willful infringement.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas found that the fair use defense applied to the copyright claim and granted summary judgment to Mix Creative. The court also granted summary judgment on the trademark claim, even though Mix Creative had not sought it. Following this, the district court awarded fees and costs to Mix Creative under 17 U.S.C. § 505 but declined to hold Keck’s trial counsel jointly and severally liable for the fee award under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that the fair use defense applied because Mix Creative’s use was transformative and unlikely to harm the market for Keck’s works. The court also found that any error in the district court’s sua sponte grant of summary judgment on the trademark claim was harmless, given the parties' concession that the arguments for the copyright claim applied to the trademark claim. Lastly, the appellate court ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees to Mix Creative or in refusing to hold Keck’s attorneys jointly and severally liable for the fee award. View "Keck v. Mix Creative Learning Center" on Justia Law
Epright v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.
In a civil action for underinsured motorist benefits, a law firm representing the plaintiff engaged in ex parte communications with an orthopedic surgeon disclosed by the defendant insurance company as an expert witness. The firm scheduled an appointment for the expert to examine the plaintiff and subsequently disclosed the expert as their own witness, indicating that the expert would testify that the plaintiff's shoulder injury was related to the accident. The expert's report, following the examination, supported this causation.The trial court disqualified the expert from testifying and imposed sanctions on the law firm, requiring it to pay the defendant for the expenses incurred in retaining the expert. The court concluded that the law firm's conduct violated Practice Book § 13-4, which it interpreted as implicitly prohibiting ex parte communications with an opposing party's disclosed expert witness. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's order, finding that Practice Book § 13-4 did not clearly prohibit such ex parte communications.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court's decision, agreeing that Practice Book § 13-4 was not reasonably clear in prohibiting ex parte communications with an opposing party's disclosed expert witness. The court emphasized that the rule's current version lacks explicit limiting language and that the difference in treatment between disclosed expert witnesses and nontestifying experts in the rule supports this conclusion. The court declined to exercise its supervisory authority to create a new rule prohibiting such conduct, noting that the issue did not rise to a level warranting such an extraordinary remedy. View "Epright v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law