Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

In a civil action for underinsured motorist benefits, a law firm representing the plaintiff engaged in ex parte communications with an orthopedic surgeon disclosed by the defendant insurance company as an expert witness. The firm scheduled an appointment for the expert to examine the plaintiff and subsequently disclosed the expert as their own witness, indicating that the expert would testify that the plaintiff's shoulder injury was related to the accident. The expert's report, following the examination, supported this causation.The trial court disqualified the expert from testifying and imposed sanctions on the law firm, requiring it to pay the defendant for the expenses incurred in retaining the expert. The court concluded that the law firm's conduct violated Practice Book § 13-4, which it interpreted as implicitly prohibiting ex parte communications with an opposing party's disclosed expert witness. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's order, finding that Practice Book § 13-4 did not clearly prohibit such ex parte communications.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court's decision, agreeing that Practice Book § 13-4 was not reasonably clear in prohibiting ex parte communications with an opposing party's disclosed expert witness. The court emphasized that the rule's current version lacks explicit limiting language and that the difference in treatment between disclosed expert witnesses and nontestifying experts in the rule supports this conclusion. The court declined to exercise its supervisory authority to create a new rule prohibiting such conduct, noting that the issue did not rise to a level warranting such an extraordinary remedy. View "Epright v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a developer and manufacturer of resinous flooring systems, sued several individual and corporate defendants for misappropriation of trade secrets, among other claims. The key individual defendant, S, was a former employee who developed a product called Poly-Crete for the plaintiff. After resigning, S started his own business and developed similar products, allegedly using the plaintiff’s trade secrets. The plaintiff claimed that S and other defendants, including companies that tested and used S’s products, misappropriated its trade secrets.The trial court conducted a bench trial in three phases. In the first phase, the court found that the plaintiff’s formulas for Poly-Crete and other products were trade secrets but ruled that the noncompete agreement S signed was unenforceable due to lack of consideration. The court also found that the plaintiff’s common-law confidentiality claim was preempted by the Connecticut Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA).In the second phase, the court found that S and some defendants misappropriated the plaintiff’s trade secrets to create products like ProKrete and ProSpartic. However, it ruled that other defendants, including Indue, Krone, ECI, and Merrifield, did not misappropriate the trade secrets as they did not know or have reason to know about the misappropriation. The court also granted attorney’s fees to Krone and ECI, finding the plaintiff’s claims against them were made in bad faith.In the third phase, the court ordered the defendants who misappropriated the trade secrets to disgorge profits and enjoined them from using the trade secrets. The court also sanctioned the plaintiff for attempted spoliation of evidence by its president, F, who tried to remove incriminating photos from the company’s Facebook page during the trial.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s rulings on most issues but reversed the judgment regarding the enforceability of the noncompete agreement and the standard for determining misappropriation. The case was remanded for further proceedings on these issues. View "Dur-A-Flex, Inc. v. Dy" on Justia Law

A man convicted of murder sued his former attorney and law firm for legal malpractice and fraud, alleging they failed to properly represent him in a federal civil rights action and a state habeas action. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's claims related to the habeas action, concluding they were not ripe for adjudication because the plaintiff's underlying criminal conviction had not been invalidated. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment regarding the legal malpractice claim but reversed with respect to the fraud claim.The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's legal malpractice claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Appellate Court's reliance on a previous case that a criminally convicted plaintiff's failure to obtain appellate or postconviction relief from his conviction prior to commencing a criminal malpractice action renders the action unripe and presents an issue of justiciability that implicates a court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Instead, the Supreme Court determined that the question was whether a criminally convicted plaintiff who had not obtained appellate or postconviction relief from his conviction has alleged facts sufficient to state a valid cause of action for criminal malpractice. The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff's claim of criminal malpractice should have been the subject of a motion to strike rather than a motion to dismiss. The judgment of the Appellate Court was reversed with respect to the plaintiff's claim of criminal malpractice and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Cooke v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Plaintiffs, complainants in attorney disciplinary proceedings, were neither statutorily nor classically aggrieved by certain decisions of the Fairfield Grievance Panel and the Stamford-Norwalk Grievance Panel dismissing Plaintiffs’ grievance complaints against five attorneys and by other actions of the Statewide Grievance Committee with respect to proceedings against two other attorneys.While the grievance proceedings were pending, Plaintiffs brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus and injunctive relief claiming that Defendants improperly handled Plaintiffs’ grievance complaints against the seven attorneys. The trial court dismissed this action for lack of standing. The Supreme Court adopted the trial court’s “concise and well reasoned decision” as a statement of the facts and the applicable law on the issues and affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in concluding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to seek court intervention in the attorney disciplinary proceedings. View "D'Attilo v. Statewide Grievance Committee" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s collateral attack on Sowell v. DiCara, 127 A.3d 356 (Conn. App. Ct. 2015), cert. denied, 128 A.3d 953 (Conn. 2015), in this declaratory judgment action was nonjusticiable under Valvo v. Freedom of Information Commission, 985 A.2d 1052 (Conn. 2010).Plaintiff filed a writ error (first writ) claiming that a judge had improperly found clear and convincing evidence that he had violated Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The Appellate Court found that Plaintiff had violated Rule 4.2 and dismissed the first writ. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a writ of error in the Supreme Court challenging the Appellate Court’s actions (second writ). The Appellate Court dismissed the second writ. Plaintiff then filed the present action against a law firm and the Appellate Court claiming that the Appellate Court’s construction of Rule 4.2 was a due process violation. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the claims against the Appellate Court were barred by sovereign immunity. On appeal, Plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred in concluding that Plaintiff’s challenge to the Appellate Court’s interpretation of Rule 4.2 in Sowell was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed on the alternative ground that Plaintiff’s collateral attack on Sowell was nonjusticiable under Vavlo. View "Mendillo v. Tinley, Renehan & Dost, LLP" on Justia Law

Defendant was an attorney who represented clients in contingency fee matters that originated while he was a member of a two-person law firm with Plaintiff. After the dissolution of that firm, Defendant continued to represent those clients, and those fees were not paid until after the dissolution. Plaintiff brought this action claiming that Defendant’s failure to pay him those fees constituted, inter alia, breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The trial court concluded that Plaintiff was entitled to recover on his claim of unjust enrichment with respect to the contingency fee cases and found that Defendant owed Plaintiff $116,298.89. Defendant appealed, arguing that the award violated the fee splitting provisions of Rule 1.5(e) of the Rules of Professional Conduct because the clients had not consented to the fee sharing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly awarded Plaintiff a portion of the contingency fees that Defendant collected subsequent to the firm’s dissolution. View "Horner v. Bagnell" on Justia Law

After being sanctioned, Plaintiff, an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Connecticut, was suspended from practice before the Appellate Court for a period of six months. Plaintiff filed a writ of error, asserting that the Appellate Court abused its discretion in suspending her from practice because the conduct for which she was sanctioned did not violate rule 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of error, holding (1) the Appellate Court did not abuse its discretion in suspending Plaintiff from the practice of law before the Appellate Court on the basis of her repeated failure to comply with Appellate Court rules and deadlines, and for filing a frivolous appeal; and (2) Plaintiff’s argument that rule 8.4 provides an exclusive list of misconduct for which an attorney may be sanctioned is patently frivolous. View "Miller v. Appellate Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Spouse divorced in 1979. In postdissolution proceedings during which Plaintiff sought modification of the alimony award, Spouse was represented by several different attorneys (Defendants). All defendants failed to disclose the true financial circumstances of Spouse. In 2008, the trial court ruled that information concerning Spouse's inheritance had been concealed from Plaintiff, causing Plaintiff to incur more than $400,000 in legal expenses and other costs. Plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint against Defendants for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The superior court rendered judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that such claims against attorneys for conduct that occurred during judicial proceedings were barred as a matter of law by the doctrine of absolute immunity. The appellate court affirmed, determining that the claims were precluded by the litigation privilege. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the appellate court properly determined that attorneys are protected by the litigation privilege against claims of fraud for their conduct during judicial proceedings; and (2) therefore, Plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, which was derivative of his claim of fraud, was also properly rejected. View "Simms v. Seaman" on Justia Law

The primary issue in this case was whether a nonparty attorney may bring a writ of error from a trial court's order requiring the attorney to comply with a clear and definite discovery request. The plaintiff in error, Finn, Dixon & Herling, LLP (Finn Dixon) brought this writ of error from an order of the trial court requiring it to comply with a subpoena duces tecum issued by the defendants in error, Shipman & Goodwin, LLP, and Carolyn Cavolo (Defendants), who were also the defendants in the underlying case. Finn Dixon contended that the trial court improperly denied its motion to quash, in which it claimed that Defendants sought materials protected by the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product doctrine. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) the trial court's order was an appealable final judgment; and (2) the trial court improperly denied Finn Dixon's motion to quash the subpoena. Remanded. View "Woodbury Knoll, LLC v. Shipman & Goodwin, LLP" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Jonathan Keller and a group of business entities, filed a vexatious litigation claim against Defendant, executrix of the estate of Robert Beckenstein. The trial court concluded it lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' complaint because the claim had yet to ripen into a cognizable claim. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court improperly determined that the trial court correctly had concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' complaint at the time it was filed, as Conn. Gen. Stat. 45a-363 provides the superior court a limited grant of jurisdiction over a complaint filed pursuant to that statute, even if the claim is not ripe when filed. View "Keller v. Beckenstein" on Justia Law