Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Nevada
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The Supreme Court of Nevada ruled on a motion for disqualification of a supreme court justice in a medical malpractice action appeal. The appellant argued that Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct 2.11(A)(6)(d) required disqualification of Justice Douglas Herndon, who had been assigned the case when he was a district judge, but had not heard or decided any matters in the case before it was reassigned. The appellant argued that the rule required disqualification whenever a judge previously presided over a matter, regardless of the level of involvement.Justice Herndon and the respondents countered that he had seen no documents and performed no work on the case at the district court level, and therefore his impartiality could not be questioned. They argued that the Code of Judicial Conduct does not require disqualification in such circumstances, and that a judge has a general duty to hear and decide cases where disqualification is not required.After considering the language and context of the Code of Judicial Conduct, along with similar cases from other jurisdictions, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that to "preside" over a matter within the meaning of the disqualification rule, a judge must have exercised some control or authority over the matter in the lower court. Given that Justice Herndon had simply been administratively assigned the case and took no action during his assignment, he did not "preside" over the case in a way that mandated disqualification. The court therefore denied the motion for disqualification. View "Taylor v. Brill" on Justia Law

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This case involves an appeal from a judgment of conviction for second-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon. The appellant, Jamel Gibbs, was convicted following a trial during which a recorded phone call between him and a defense investigator was admitted as evidence. Gibbs was in pretrial detention at the time of the call, which was made on a recorded line using another inmate's phone access code and a three-way calling system.Gibbs argued that the recorded phone call was protected by attorney-client privilege and should not have been admitted into evidence. The district court ruled against him, reasoning that the conversation was not privileged because Gibbs violated jail policy by using another inmate's phone access code and making a three-way call.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada disagreed with the district court's ruling. The court held that a defendant’s call to a defense investigator, even if made through a three-way call, does not, on its own, amount to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege unless it can be shown that the third party remained present during the conversation. The court also found that violating jail telephone policies does not automatically result in a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. As such, the district court erred in admitting the recorded phone call into evidence.Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded that this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the recorded phone call directly undermined Gibbs's planned defense strategy and necessitated a change in strategy at the start of trial. Therefore, the judgment of conviction was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial. View "Gibbs v. State" on Justia Law

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In a contentious guardianship case involving Kathleen June Jones, the court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL), attorney Elizabeth Brickfield, to aid in determining Jones's best interests. The GAL filed a notice of intent to seek fees and costs at her standard hourly rate. The court awarded her those fees over Jones's objection. Jones appealed, arguing that the GAL had no right to fees when the district court order appointing her did not specify the rate, that the court improperly appointed an attorney as the GAL, and that the rate of compensation to which the GAL is entitled should be that of a fiduciary, not an attorney.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada held that Jones waived any argument pertaining to the form of the district court’s order by failing to raise the issue below. The court also held that the district court erred in interpreting NRS 159.0455(3) as requiring the court to appoint an attorney where there is no court-approved volunteer program, but this error was harmless because the district court expressly appointed an experienced attorney as the GAL due to the complexity of this matter. Lastly, the court held that the record contains substantial evidence supporting the GAL’s fee request and the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the GAL the full amount of her requested fees. The court affirmed the district court’s order awarding the GAL fees. View "In re Guardianship of Jones" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that, under the Nevada Constitution, both the governor and the Chief Justice may designate temporary substitutes for disqualified justices on the Supreme Court, thus rejecting Appellant's argument that only the governor has authority to temporarily replace a disqualified justice on the Supreme Court.At issue was Nev. Const. art. VI, 19(1)(c), under which the Chief Justice "may assigned [the recalled senior justice or judge] to appropriate temporary duty within the court system." In the forty-five years since the effective date of the amendment, article 6 section 19(1)(c), successive chief justices had assigned senior justices to temporary duty when a Supreme Court sitting justice is disqualified. In this action, Appellant objected to the chief justice's orders assigning senior justices to participate in disqualified justices' places, arguing that replacement justices must be designated in accordance with Nev. Const. art. VI, 4(2), thus authorizing the governor to designate court of appeals or district judges to sit in the place of the disqualified Supreme Court justices. The Supreme Court overruled Appellant's objection, holding that the senior justice assignments in this case were constitutionally permissible. View "Valley Health System, LLC v. Murray" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court denied Petitioner Jane Nelson's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district court order denying her motion to disqualify McBride Hall from representing real parties in interest Dr. Muhammad Said Sabir and Pioneer Health Care, LLC (collectively, Sabir) in her medical malpractice action, holding that Nelson failed to establish that she was entitled to the writ.Nelson's attorney, Adam Breeden, owned a solo practice and employed Kristy Johnson as his paralegal. While Johnson was employed at Breeden's practice Breeden represented Plaintiffs in two cases for which McBride Hall acted as defense counsel. Nelson moved to disqualify McBride Hall from representing Sabir due to Johnson's purported knowledge of Breeden's legal conclusions on Nelson's case. The district court denied the motion to disqualify. Nelson then sought a writ of mandamus instructing the district court to vacate its ruling. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that automatic disqualification was not necessary. View "Nelson v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court denied Appellant's motion to disqualify Justice Douglas Herndon after Justice Herndon filed a notice of voluntary disclosure informing the parties that he had inherited the underlying matter while serving as a district judge and that he had retained it until he left the bench, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief.While Justice Herndon's disclosure stated that the underlying matter never appeared on his calendar and that he had no knowledge of the case before the instant appeal, Appellant sought disqualification, arguing that N.C.J.C. 2.11(A)(6)(d) is a mechanical rule that requires disqualification whenever a judge previously presided over a matter. The Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that because Judge Herndon did not "preside" over this matter in the district court within the meaning of the disqualification rule, his disqualification was not required. View "Taylor v. Brill" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellant's last remaining claim in this action with prejudice without conducting the required analysis for imposing case-concluding sanctions, holding that the district court erred.At issue in this case was the extent to which a non-lawyer agent who is granted authority over claims and litigation under a power of attorney may litigate a claim belonging to the principal. The Supreme Court held (1) a non-lawyer agent operating under a power of attorney pursuant to Nevada's Uniform Power of Attorney Act concerning claims and litigation may not litigate an action in pro se in place of the principal or otherwise engage in the practice of law on the principal's behalf; (2) the trial court properly held that Appellant's non-lawyer agent under a power of attorney was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law; and (3) the trial court's decision to dismiss the action with prejudice after Appellant failed timely to file a proper amended complaint amounted to a case-concluding sanction for Appellant's failure to comply with a court order. View "Eby v. Johnston Law Office, P.C." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that the district court erred by disqualifying a district court judge because her impartiality could reasonably be questioned after she reviewed notes, produced in discovery, that the Supreme Court later determined to be privileged, holding that the district court erred by disqualifying Judge Sturman.Lawrence and Heidi Canarelli, along with attorney Edward Lubbers, served as former trustees of an irrevocable trust. Lubbers, who later became sole trustee, entered into a purchase agreement to sell the trust's ownership in the former trustees' business entities. Scott Canarelli petitioned to compel Lubbers to provide an accounting related to the purchase agreement. Lubbers died before Scott could depose Lubbers. Because the former trustees had disclosed documents containing Lubbers' notes, they attempted to claw back the documents. Judge Sturman allowed Scott to retain portions of the notes, but the Supreme Court held that the notes were privileged and undiscoverable. The former trustees moved to disqualify Judge Sturman as biased because she reviewed the privileged notes. The motion was denied. The Supreme Court granted writ relief, holding that the district court improperly disqualified Judge Sturman where the record did not show that Judge Sturman's review of the notes created bias or prejudice against the former trustees that would prevent fair judgment. View "Canarelli v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the order of the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline that imposed a public reprimand on a family court judge, holding that the the Commission misapplied the statutes governing judicial discipline and, accordingly, erred in imposing a public reprimand.The Commission imposed a public reprimand on Clark County Family Court Judge Rena Hughes after Hughes entered an order holding a mother in contempt and changing custody of a minor child from the mother to the father. The Commission concluded that Judge Hughes had violated canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct because the change in custody was purportedly entered as a contempt sanction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the Commission found neither a knowing or deliberate violation of a canon of the Code of Judicial Conduct nor aggravating factors the Commission imposed discipline contrary to the statutes governing judicial discipline; (2) the Commission erred in instituting disciplinary proceedings where relief could be found in the appeals process; and (3) the Commission erred in interpreting Judge Hughes' orders and relying inappropriately on court minutes. View "In re Honorable Rena G. Hughes" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate its order disqualifying the Legislative Counsel Bureau Legal Division (LCB Legal) on conflict of interest grounds, holding that the district court erred in applying Nevada Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 1.7 to disqualify LCB Legal.The district court granted a motion to disqualify LCB Legal from representing two defendants in the underlying action - Senate Majority Leader Nicole Cannizzaro and Senate Secretary Claire Clift (together, Defendants) - on the grounds that LCB Legal's representation of those defendants was directly adverse to another of its clients - the eight Nevada State Senators (collectively, Plaintiffs) who sued Defendants in their official capacities for actions taken on behalf of the Legislature related to the passage of two bills. The Supreme Court held that Plaintiffs lacked standing to move to disqualify LCB Legal because (1) LCB Legal's defense of Defendants was ancillary to its defense of the bills themselves; (2) because Plaintiffs were not similarly acting on the Legislature's behalf in challenging the legislation they were not considered LCB Legal's client; and (3) therefore, Plaintiffs did not have an attorney-client relationship with LCB Legal other than in their roles as members of the Legislature acting on the Legislature's behalf. View "State ex rel. Cannizzaro v. First Judicial District Court" on Justia Law