Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Keiland Construction, L.L.C. entered into a construction subcontract with Weeks Marine, Inc. for a project in Louisiana. Weeks terminated the contract for convenience, leading to a dispute over compensation. Keiland submitted pay applications and demobilization costs, which Weeks partially paid. The disagreement centered on whether the contract required lump-sum payments for work completed before termination or if it converted to a cost-plus basis upon termination.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana held a bench trial and found the contract ambiguous. It construed the ambiguity against Keiland, the drafter, and ruled in favor of Weeks. The court awarded Keiland damages based on Weeks’s interpretation of the contract but denied Keiland’s claims for direct employee and demobilization costs. The court also awarded Weeks attorneys’ fees and costs, though less than requested, and denied Weeks’s motion for post-offer-of-judgment fees and costs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s findings, agreeing that the contract was ambiguous and that the ambiguity should be construed against Keiland. The appellate court upheld the district court’s rulings on damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs, including the denial of post-offer-of-judgment fees and costs. The court also affirmed the award of prejudgment interest to Keiland, finding no abuse of discretion.In summary, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects, including the interpretation of the contract, the award of damages, attorneys’ fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. View "Keiland Construction v. Weeks Marine" on Justia Law

The State of South Dakota charged Ronald Lee Neels with multiple sex-related offenses, including rape, sexual contact, and incest, for the sexual abuse of his adopted daughter over a 14-year period. During the trial, the prosecutor made an opening statement that asked the jury to imagine themselves in the victim's position, which is considered a "Golden Rule" argument and is generally condemned. Neels did not object to this statement at the time. Following his conviction, Neels filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting to the prosecutor's opening statement.The South Dakota Supreme Court summarily affirmed Neels's conviction on direct appeal, stating that the issues raised were without merit. Neels then filed a state habeas corpus petition, which was denied on the grounds of res judicata, as the court found that the issue of prejudice had already been decided on direct appeal. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed this decision, holding that the same standard of prejudice applied in both plain error review and ineffective assistance of counsel claims.Neels subsequently filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court granted the petition, concluding that Neels suffered prejudice from his attorneys' failure to object to the prosecutor's opening statement, despite acknowledging the overwhelming evidence of Neels's guilt. The court reasoned that the magnitude of the prosecutorial misconduct required vacating the conviction to ensure a fair trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Neels did not suffer Strickland prejudice from his counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's opening statement, given the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. The court emphasized that the jury instructions and the strength of the evidence against Neels mitigated any potential prejudice from the prosecutor's improper remarks. View "Neels v. Fluke" on Justia Law

Shane Clark Johnson was charged with deliberate homicide in 2013 for the death of his brother, Travis. The jury could not reach a verdict on deliberate homicide but convicted Johnson of negligent homicide with a dangerous weapon. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. The State again charged Johnson with deliberate homicide but amended the charge to negligent homicide after Johnson filed a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. The second jury found Johnson guilty of felony negligent homicide and that he used a weapon in the commission of the offense.In the first trial, Judge Daniel Boucher allowed Johnson to present a defense of justifiable use of force, but limited evidence about Travis’s violent behavior and other specific acts. Johnson testified that Travis attacked him, leading to a struggle over a gun, which resulted in Travis’s death. The jury convicted Johnson of negligent homicide. On remand, Judge Matthew J. Cuffe presided over the second trial. Johnson did not present a self-defense theory but argued the shooting was accidental. The prosecutor’s closing arguments included comments on the State’s charging decisions and the lack of evidence that Travis was suicidal, which Johnson’s counsel did not object to at trial.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the conviction. The court found that the prosecutor’s comments were permissible and did not warrant a mistrial. The court also declined to exercise plain-error review for the unobjected comments about the State’s charging decisions. Johnson’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims were deemed not record-based and more appropriate for postconviction relief. The court held that the District Court legally imposed a consecutive weapon enhancement sentence in addition to the persistent felony offender sentence. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the control of a nonprofit corporation, which was dissolved by the State due to the executive director’s failure to pay taxes and fees and renew corporate registration. Despite the dissolution, the directors and members continued the corporation’s activities, unaware of the loss of corporate status. When the issue was discovered, some individuals filed paperwork to incorporate a new entity with the same name, offices, and bank account. A national affiliate proposed elections to resolve the leadership, but the new incorporators denied affiliation with the old corporation. Elections were held, and new directors were chosen, leading to litigation over who had authority to act on behalf of the new corporation.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, ruled that the new corporation was essentially the same entity as the old one, with the same members. The court concluded that the disputed election was valid and that the newly elected individuals had authority to act on behalf of the corporation. The court ousted the individuals who had filed the incorporation paperwork and awarded attorney’s fees to the prevailing parties but exempted individual litigants from liability for these fees.The Alaska Supreme Court largely affirmed the Superior Court’s rulings but vacated and remanded the dismissal of one third-party claim for a more detailed explanation. The court also vacated and remanded the Superior Court’s decision to excuse individual litigants from liability for attorney’s fees, finding the reason for this ruling invalid. The main holding was that the new corporation was the same entity as the old one, and the election of new directors was valid, giving them authority to act on behalf of the corporation. View "Aiken v. Alaska Addiction Professionals Association" on Justia Law

In this case, a law firm (HFM) appealed a trial court's judgment denying its third-party claim to $585,000 held in its client trust account. The funds were received from HFM's client, Mann, under a flat fee agreement for future legal services. Mann's judgment creditor, Dickson, served HFM with a notice of levy, asserting that the funds belonged to Mann. HFM contended that the funds belonged to it under the flat fee agreement.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied HFM's third-party claim, concluding that the funds belonged to Mann because HFM had not yet earned the fee by providing legal services. The court also denied HFM's motion for reconsideration, which sought to retain $53,457.95 of the funds based on a prior agreement with Mann. The court found that HFM failed to present this evidence initially and did not act with reasonable diligence.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court held that under the Rules of Professional Conduct, a flat fee is not earned until legal services are provided, and HFM presented no evidence that it had performed any services under the agreement. The court also found that the location of the funds in the client trust account was not dispositive of ownership. Additionally, the appellate court upheld the trial court's denial of the motion for reconsideration, noting that HFM failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for not presenting the evidence earlier.The main holding is that a flat fee paid in advance for legal services is not earned until the services are provided, and funds in a client trust account are presumed to belong to the client unless the law firm can prove otherwise. The judgment denying HFM's third-party claim was affirmed. View "Dickson v. Mann" on Justia Law

In September 2021, the San Diego Unified School District (District) proposed a "Vaccination Roadmap" requiring students to be vaccinated against COVID-19 to attend in-person classes and participate in extracurricular activities. Plaintiffs, including an organization and an individual parent, challenged the District's authority to impose this requirement, arguing that such decisions must be made at the state level. The trial court agreed, ruling that the Roadmap was preempted by state law, and judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiffs.The District appealed, and the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the local vaccination requirement conflicted with state law and that the state had fully occupied the field of school vaccination mandates. Following this decision, the plaintiffs sought attorney’s fees under California's private attorney general statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The trial court denied the motions, reasoning that the litigation did not enforce an important right affecting the public and that the District's actions were commendable and did not adversely affect the public interest.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reversed the trial court's denial of attorney’s fees. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs' lawsuit enforced an important public right by ensuring that the District complied with state law regarding school vaccination requirements. The court emphasized that the litigation conferred a significant benefit on the general public by upholding the state's comprehensive immunization policy. The court also rejected the trial court's rationale that the District's good intentions precluded an award of attorney’s fees, clarifying that the focus should be on the enforcement of public rights, not the subjective merits of the District's actions. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the appropriate amount of attorney’s fees. View "Let Them Choose v. San Diego Unified School District" on Justia Law

Linzi Labrum, the petitioner, sought a waiver of rules 14-704(c)(2) and 14-704(c)(3) of the Utah Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice. These rules require graduates of non-ABA-accredited law schools to practice law in another state for ten years before becoming eligible to take the Utah bar exam. Labrum graduated from Concord Law School, an online, non-ABA-accredited institution, and was admitted to practice law in California in 2021. She has since worked in Utah as a law clerk, mediator, and supervised pro bono attorney.The Utah State Bar denied Labrum's application to take the Utah bar exam, citing her insufficient years of practice. Labrum petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for a waiver, arguing that her education and experience met the rules' purposes and that her circumstances were extraordinary.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that Labrum satisfied the burden of proof established in Kelly v. Utah State Bar. The court found that Concord's education, while not on par with ABA-accredited schools, was sufficient when combined with Labrum's practical experience. Her work in Utah, including her roles as a law clerk, mediator, and pro bono attorney, demonstrated her competence and ethical standards. The court also noted the significant changes in the accreditation of online law schools and the strong recommendations from Utah legal practitioners who supervised her work.The court concluded that Labrum's case was extraordinary due to the unique challenges she faced, her commitment to serving an underserved area in Utah, and the substantial support from the legal community. The Utah Supreme Court granted her petition for waiver, allowing her to take the Utah bar exam. View "Labrum v. Utah State Bar" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury in the Allegan Circuit Court of multiple counts of criminal sexual conduct. During the trial, the presiding judge exchanged emails with the county prosecutor, expressing concerns about the police investigation. The defendant later discovered these communications and moved for a new trial, alleging judicial and prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The case was reassigned to a different judge, who granted the motion for a new trial due to the appearance of impropriety created by the emails. The prosecution appealed this decision.The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in granting a new trial. The appellate court concluded that the trial judge's ex parte communications were permissible for administrative purposes under the judicial conduct code and did not influence the jury's verdict. The defendant then sought leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the trial judge's ex parte communications violated the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct. The court found that these communications were not for administrative purposes and created an appearance of impropriety. However, the court concluded that the communications did not show actual bias or a high probability of bias that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights. The court also determined that the trial judge's failure to recuse herself did not result in a miscarriage of justice, as the jury was unaware of the communications and the trial prosecutor did not alter her strategy in response to them. Therefore, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the trial court had no legal basis to grant a new trial. View "People of Michigan v. Loew" on Justia Law

Backertop Licensing LLC and Lori LaPray appealed the U.S. District Court of Delaware’s orders requiring LaPray to appear in-person for testimony regarding potential fraud and imposing monetary sanctions for her failure to appear. The District Court identified potential misconduct in numerous related patent cases involving IP Edge and Mavexar, which allegedly created shell LLCs, assigned patents for little consideration, and directed litigation without disclosing their ongoing rights. The court was concerned that this arrangement concealed the real parties in interest and potentially perpetrated fraud on the court.The District Court ordered LaPray, the sole owner of Backertop, to produce documents and appear in-person to address these concerns. LaPray moved to set aside the order, citing travel difficulties and requesting to appear telephonically, which the court denied. The court rescheduled the hearing to accommodate her schedule but maintained the requirement for in-person testimony to assess her credibility. LaPray did not attend the rescheduled hearing, leading the court to hold her in civil contempt and impose a daily fine until she appeared.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the District Court’s orders were within its inherent authority and not an abuse of discretion. The court found that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45, which limits the geographic range of subpoenas, did not apply to the court’s sua sponte orders. The court affirmed the District Court’s orders, emphasizing the necessity of in-person testimony to investigate potential misconduct and assess credibility. The monetary sanctions for LaPray’s failure to appear were also upheld. View "BACKERTOP LICENSING LLC v. CANARY CONNECT, INC. " on Justia Law

Marcellus Williams was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death following a jury trial. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Supreme Court of Missouri, and his postconviction relief was denied. Williams sought additional DNA testing through a habeas corpus petition, which led to a temporary stay of execution and the appointment of a special master to oversee the testing. The results did not demonstrate his innocence, and his habeas petition was denied. Subsequent petitions for writs of habeas corpus and declaratory judgment were also denied.The St. Louis County prosecutor filed a motion to vacate Williams' conviction and death sentence, citing potential actual innocence based on DNA evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, and racial discrimination in jury selection. This motion remains pending in the circuit court. Despite this, the Supreme Court of Missouri issued a warrant of execution for Williams, setting a new execution date.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed Williams' motion to withdraw the warrant of execution, arguing that the prosecutor's motion constituted a state postconviction motion, which should bar setting an execution date. The court found that Rule 30.30(c) only refers to postconviction motions filed by the defendant, not the prosecutor. Since Williams had already exhausted his state postconviction remedies, the court held that the execution date was properly set. The court also noted that the pending prosecutor's motion did not automatically warrant a stay of execution and that Williams had not demonstrated the necessary factors for equitable relief. Consequently, the court overruled Williams' motion to withdraw the warrant of execution. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law