Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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White. convicted of four counts of aggravated murder, two counts of attempted murder, two counts of felonious assault, one count of aggravated burglary, three counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of having a weapon while under disability, was sentenced to life in prison without parole. On appeal, White argued that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney, Armengau, was under indictment in Franklin County, Ohio, for serious criminal offenses and “would have been conflicted over whether to devote time to preparing his own defense or that of his client”; “would have been reluctant to vigorously represent White" for fear of angering the prosecutor; and might have failed to engage in plea-bargaining in White’s case out of a desire to gain a victory over the prosecutor. The Ohio Court of Appeals declined to consider White’s claim because the record lacked necessary facts.In White's federal habeas proceedings, the district court found that Armengau had told White about Armengau’s indictment but White had decided to retain Armengau anyway. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Because White’s claim depends on facts outside the state court record, the Supreme Court’s 2022 "Shinn" decision likely precludes relief. Even considering the new facts introduced in federal habeas court, White’s claim fails. White failed to show that the alleged conflict adversely affected counsel’s performance. White and Armengau’s cases were handled by different judges and were prosecuted by different authorities. View "White v. Phillips" on Justia Law

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Addison was convicted, in absentia, of unlawful possession of a motor vehicle, unlawful possession of a converted motor vehicle, forgery, and two counts of theft, arising out of his alleged use of counterfeit money to purchase a motorcycle, and was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. Having failed to appear for trial, he was subsequently arrested.Addison’s appellate counsel did not file a brief and determined that there are no meritorious issues, except concerning credit that should be applied toward the prison sentences. Addison filed a postconviction petition, contending that trial and appellate counsel were deficient. Appointed postconviction counsel filed an amended petition, alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress based on improper Miranda warnings, for failing to object to expert testimony regarding counterfeit currency when no expert was disclosed, and for failing to argue sufficiency of the evidence where there were discrepancies; and that the court erred in giving an accountability instruction. The petition did not assert ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The trial court dismissed the petition.Addison appealed, arguing that postconviction counsel rendered unreasonable assistance in failing to argue ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. Addison did not forfeit collateral review of his conviction by failing to appear at trial. While any postconviction claims that could have been raised on direct appeal are generally forfeited that forfeiture could have been overcome by framing the issues as ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the issues on direct appeal. The appellate court properly remanded for compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) without considering the merits. View "People v. Addison" on Justia Law

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In 2020, three individuals opposed the Kentucky Governor’s COVID-19 restrictions on religious gatherings and on interstate travel. They obtained preliminary injunctions against the orders. The case was eventually dismissed as moot. The district court awarded them $272,142.50 in attorney’s fees as prevailing parties, 42 U.S.C. 1988(b). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the fees award.A preliminary injunction may suffice to establish “prevailing party” status if it mainly turns on the likelihood-of-success inquiry and changes the parties’ relationship in a material and enduring way. These injunctions measure up favorably in terms of the nature of the injunctions, the longevity of the relief, and the irrevocability of the relief. The court also rejected challenges to the amount of the award. View "Roberts v. Neace" on Justia Law

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In 2019, Morgan began employment as Disciplinary Counsel for the Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee. During a disciplinary proceeding, Manookian, whose law license had been suspended, moved to disqualify Morgan as the Board’s counsel, claiming that Morgan was “an anti-Muslim bigot.” Manookian’s filing attached tweets posted by Morgan from 2015-2016 that allegedly demonstrated Morgan’s bias toward Muslims. Manookian is not Muslim but claimed that his wife was Muslim and that his children were being raised in a Muslim household. Morgan responded that the tweets were political in nature and related to the 2015–2016 presidential campaign; he disavowed any knowledge of the religious faith and practices of Manookian’s family. The Board moved for Morgan to withdraw as Board counsel in the appeal, which the court allowed. A week later, Garrett, the Board’s Chief Disciplinary Counsel, told Morgan that his employment would be terminated. Several months later, Garrett notified Morgan that the Board had opened a disciplinary file against him. The matter was later dismissed.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Morgan’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the Board for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity but reversed the dismissal of the claim for damages against Garrett based on absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Extending judicial immunity here would extend its reach to areas previously denied— administrative acts like hiring and firing employees. View "Morgan v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee" on Justia Law

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Moss purchased cocaine from a DEA informant and was charged with possession with intent to deliver 1,000 or more grams of cocaine and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Moss’s first attorney moved for an entrapment hearing. Steingold then began representing Moss. At the entrapment hearing, 10 days later, Steingold attested to minimal pre-trial preparation. Moss was the only witness he presented. Steingold requested a continuance to contact witnesses he learned about during Moss’s direct and cross-examination. The court permitted Steingold to contact one witness but denied a continuance. The prosecution presented five witnesses and multiple exhibits. The court denied Moss’s motion to dismiss based on entrapment.At trial, Steingold waived his opening argument, presented no witnesses, and stipulated to the admission of the transcript from the entrapment hearing as substantive evidence. For one of the government’s two witnesses, Steingold did not object during his testimony or conduct any cross-examination. Steingold waived his closing argument. On appeal, Moss unsuccessfully argued that Steingold provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by waiving Moss’s right to a jury trial and stipulating to the admission of the evidence from the entrapment hearing.The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s order of habeas relief. The state court’s denial of Moss’s ineffective assistance claims under Strickland was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. View "Moss v. Miniard" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Appellant's complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief and petition for writ of mandamus seeking to direct Appellees to allow Appellant to carry a firearm inside the district court, holding that there was no error.Appellant, an attorney, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief seeking a declaration that Act 1087 of 2017, codified at Ark. Code Ann. 5-73-122(b), authorizes attorneys as "officers of the court" to carry a firearm in any of the state's courts or courthouses and a declaration that Appellees' conduct in refusing to allow Appellant to enter the Pulaski County District Courthouse with a firearm violated Arkansas law. Appellant further sought mandamus relief asking that the court direct Defendants to permit attorneys in court with a firearm. The circuit court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Appellant's mandamus petition. View "Corbitt v. Pulaski County Jail" on Justia Law

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Petitioners Robert Ayerst and Justin Lewis were represented at their criminal trials by Robert Van Idour. Though a licensed attorney in Idaho, Van Idour was never admitted to practice in Washington. Accordingly, Van Idour was not authorized to practice law when he represented the petitioners, along with 100 other indigent defendants in Asotin County. Th Washington Supreme Court found Van Idour’s failure to gain admittance to the Washington bar was not just shockingly unprofessional, it was "unethical and indefensible." The issue presented here was whether a lawyer who is licensed in Idaho but not in Washington was nevertheless a lawyer for purposes of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Ayerst and Lewis contended this failure resulted in a complete denial of counsel, which constituted structural error and demanded reversal of their convictions. While the Washington Supreme Court agreed Van Idour’s actions violated state licensure rules, it disagreed that they amounted to a constitutional denial of counsel. Therefore, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ denial of Ayerst’s and Lewis’s personal restraint petitions. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Lewis" on Justia Law

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An attorney appealed from orders of the Committee on Grievances of the Board of Judges of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (the “Committee”) finding her liable for violating various provisions of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct and imposing sanctions for these violations, including a six-month suspension from practicing law in the Eastern District. On appeal, the attorney argued that the Committee (1) deprived her of due process by failing to afford her with reasonable notice of the charges and an adequate opportunity to defend against the charges, (2) failed to substantiate each element of the charges by clear and convincing evidence, and (3) imposed a punishment that was excessive in light of the putative lack of harm to the public. She has also requested that we maintain her appeal under seal, arguing that public disclosure of her identity would cause her reputational harm.   The Second Circuit affirmed the orders of the Committee and ordered that the docket in this appeal, and all its contents, be unsealed. The court explained that the attorney violated her most basic duty to the vulnerable clients who depended on her: to provide them with diligent, competent representation. Along the way, her neglectful and discourteous conduct harmed the administration of justice itself. The Committee’s evidence establishing as much was unassailable. Further, the court wrote that to the extent that the attorney’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge relies on her contention that it was improper for the Committee to consider filings and transcripts from her non-disciplinary matters in the Eastern District, it fails. View "In re Demetriades" on Justia Law

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Jail personnel search inmate mail for contraband. To preserve confidentiality, mail from an inmate to an attorney is opened in front of the inmate; the contents are visually inspected but not read. An officer noticed an envelope from Cortez addressed to his attorney; with a “bulk in the center.” It smelled of feces. Suspecting the envelope contained contraband, he opened it but not in front of Cortez. The envelope contained another envelope fashioned from the lined yellow paper, marked “do not read.” The officer opened it and found multiple "kites," each made from different colored paper and with different writing. Kites are clandestine notes, written by inmates on small pieces of paper in very small print, then rolled up to minimize their size and facilitate concealment. The officer informed his supervisor.A magistrate conducted an in-camera examination and concluded: The messages have “the teeny tiny writing ... indicative of a gang-related kite…. I did not read the substance … none of them were addressed to [Cortez’s attorney]. None of them ... appeared to even be written by Cortez…. I do not find the attorney-client privilege applies.” The court of appeal agreed. The magistrate’s findings were supported by substantial evidence. Even if the jail violated the regulation requiring legal mail to be opened in the inmate’s presence, the remedy would not automatically render everything inside the envelope—including communications intended for people other than an attorney—subject to attorney-client privilege. View "People v. Superior Court of Santa Cruz County" on Justia Law

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The primary issue, in this case, is whether Respondent Whittier Union High School District (hereinafter Respondent or the District) is required to reimburse Appellant Law Office (hereinafter Appellant or Firm) for the “cost of work product” under California Elections Code section, 10010. Appellant had sent Respondent a demand letter that resulted in Respondent changing its at-large voting system to district-based voting. This case turns on whether the trial court’s determination that Appellant did not represent a “prospective plaintiff” under section 10010 requires evidence limited to identifying a person who has formally retained the lawyer, or whether it also encompasses a law firm working on behalf of one or more persons the law firm avers it will be able to name as a plaintiff if the demand letter is unsuccessful.   The Second Appellate District reversed and remanded so that the trial court may determine the “cost of work product” recoverable by Appellant. The court concluded that the trial court’s finding that Appellant did not represent a prospective plaintiff is based on an overly restrictive interpretation of the statute. The court further concluded that the “cost of work product” for which a prospective plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement is not limited to out-of-pocket expenditures by the prospective plaintiff, but also includes costs advanced by their lawyer. View "Law Office of Carlos R. Perez v. Whittier Union High School Dist." on Justia Law