Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Montana Supreme Court
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Duane Burchill was convicted of two counts of robbery, one count of conspiracy to commit deceptive practices, and one count of possession of dangerous drugs in 2017. Following his conviction, Burchill filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the prosecutor’s misconduct during his trial. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the denial of Burchill's petition for postconviction relief.Burchill's claim of ineffective assistance centered on two main arguments. First, he argued that the prosecutor repeatedly asked him to comment on the credibility of other witnesses by asking "were they lying" questions. Second, he alleged that the prosecutor posed questions suggesting his personal opinion that Burchill's testimony was not truthful.The court, however, found that the "were they lying" questions were not improper because they had probative value in evaluating the credibility of a defendant who is claiming that everyone else is lying. The court also disagreed that the prosecutor had expressed personal opinions on Burchill's credibility. The court concluded that the prosecutor's questions were within the scope of permissible questions allowed on cross-examination. Therefore, the court found that Burchill's counsel's failure to object did not constitute ineffective assistance.The court did not find it necessary to address Burchill's claim of prejudice due to the failure of his counsel to object, as it had already determined that his counsel's performance was not deficient. Thus, Burchill's petition for postconviction relief was denied. View "Burchill v. State" on Justia Law

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David Abraham Lorenz was convicted in 2003 for operating an illegal drug lab and possessing illegal drugs in the state of Montana. His initial sentence was partially suspended, but multiple violations led to the suspension being lifted and further sentencing in 2005 and 2014. In 2020, the State sought to revoke his suspended sentences again. Lorenz, who initially represented himself, requested counsel in July 2021. However, prior to the dispositional hearing in August 2021, his attorney, Michael Haase, filed a motion to withdraw. Lorenz consented to this but then indicated he did not want to proceed without a lawyer. Despite a perceived conflict, Haase continued to represent Lorenz in the hearing, and Lorenz was resentenced after his suspended sentences were revoked.Lorenz appealed, arguing that the District Court had not adequately investigated his complaint about his lawyer. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana disagreed, ruling that Lorenz had not directly raised any issues about Haase's effectiveness or requested a substitution of counsel. The court further noted that Lorenz had agreed to Haase's motion to withdraw, then reaffirmed his desire for Haase's representation during the dispositional hearing. The Supreme Court thus affirmed the District Court's decision. View "State v. Lorenz" on Justia Law

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In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana upheld the decision of the Montana First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, committing the appellant, C.M., a youth, to the custody of the Department of Corrections for placement in a state youth correctional facility until the age of 18. The appellant was charged with sex offenses against three of his high school classmates and he appealed the decision on the grounds that he was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to make objections to the admission of various hearsay statements.The court concluded that the appellant's counsel's failure to object to the admission of hearsay statements did not result in substantial prejudice. The court noted that the state presented sufficient admissible evidence to the jury that proved the same facts as the prior consistent statements and bus records. Furthermore, the court found that the appellant's counsel vigorously challenged the complaining witnesses' testimony by highlighting inconsistencies and gaps in their testimony, as well as aspects of the investigation. As a result, the court found that the appellant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficient performance by his counsel and affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Matter of C.M" on Justia Law

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In this case, Lindsay Burns Barbier contested the validity of the 2016 will of her father, Horatio Burns, alleging that her brother Cameron and his wife Alison exerted undue influence over Horatio. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana upheld the validity of the will and the awarding of attorney fees to Horatio’s Estate, but reversed the awarding of attorney fees to Alison and the calculation of interest on the attorney fees. The court found that the lower court did not err in allowing Alison to file a response to Lindsay's petition contesting the will, despite Lindsay's objection that it was untimely and that Alison's interests were fully represented by the Estate. The court also found that Lindsay was not entitled to a new trial based on juror misconduct. In terms of attorney fees, the court determined that Alison was not entitled to an award of fees under state law as she was defending her own interest in the will and her participation was not required to defend the validity of the will. Finally, the court found that the lower court incorrectly calculated the applicable interest rate on the attorney fees awarded to the Estate. View "In re Burns" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the order issued by the district court denying Montana Opticom, LLC's motion to disqualify counsel for Scott Rysewyk, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to disqualify Rysewyk's counsel.Rysewyk, represented by Rabb Law Firm (RLF), filed a complaint alleging trespass, ejectment, negligent civil conspiracy, and inverse condemnation by Opticom and Jim Dolan, Jr., a partial owner of Opticom. Opticom filed a motion to disqualify Rysewyk's counsel, arguing that Rysewyk's counsel of record was disqualified from representing him because of the firm's earlier representation of Dolan. The district court denied the motion on the grounds that Opticom offered "no proof of any actual prejudice flowing from the alleged conflict of interest." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the district court was presented with no evidence that Opticom was actually prejudiced, the court did not act arbitrarily or exceed the bounds of reason by denying Opticom's motion to disqualify. View "Rysewyk v. Mont. Opticom, LLC" on Justia Law

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Shayna Hubbard appealed a district court judgment convicting her of driving with a suspended license and for failing to show proof of liability insurance. Hubbard went to a Montana casino to gamble. She was 19 and could legally gamble, but only patrons who were 21 years old and older were eligible to receive a gambling coupon. She provided another person’s identification to a casino employee to get the coupon. An employee who recognized Hubbard and knew she was using another person’s identification called the police. Police learned that Hubbard’s Oregon driver’s license was suspended, and informed Hubbard that it was illegal to use another person’s identification. Police decided not to cite her for the offense, and left the casino. The same responding officer at the casino observed Hubbard a short while later driving on the suspended license, and pulled her over. Hubbard was arrested for driving with a suspended license (and failing to provide proof of insurance). Hubbard appeared in Libby City Court, pled not guilty to the charges, and asked for appointment of a public defender. Counsel was appointed, and Hubbard was tried in absentia. Counsel thereafter filed a Notice of Appeal; a jury trial in district court was scheduled for later that year. Counsel and Hubbard conversed by email, wherein Hubbard explained her belief that the arresting officer entrapped her by allegedly telling her to drive from the casino, with knowledge her license was suspended, because her companion had been drinking. Counsel ultimately moved to withdraw from Hubbard’s representation, arguing that a new trial in District Court “would be frivolous or wholly without merit.” Counsel filed a supporting memorandum and attached several documents, including the email Hubbard had sent to him explaining why she believed she was entrapped. The District Court denied Counsel’s motion to withdraw. Hubbard argued on appeal that Counsel violated his duties of loyalty and confidentiality to her by attaching the email explaining her view on trial strategy, violating attorney-client privilege, and revealing inculpatory information that was not previously in the city court record, which the prosecution used to file a motion in limine to prevent the entrapment defense. She also argued the improperly disclosed information prejudiced her during trial, because it gave the prosecution the idea to inquire into where she lived and how she arrived in Libby, prior to the incident at the casino. The District Court denied the motion and, further, gave an instruction regarding the entrapment defense to the jury. Hubbard presented an entrapment defense and the jury considered whether entrapment applied. The Montana Supreme Court concluded Counsel’s disclosure did not render the trial result “fundamentally unfair” or “unreliable,” and that Hubbard could not show that there was a reasonable probability that, but for her counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. View "City of Libby v. Hubbard" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court ordered that Appellees’ joint motion to declare John Stokes a vexatious litigant is granted in part and ordered that, before Stokes could file any pleading pro se in a Montana district court or the Montana Supreme Court, he was required to obtain pre-filing approval from the court in which he sought to file. The court ordered that any such filing may be prohibited upon a determination that the claims asserted are harassing, frivolous, or legally not cognizable. The pre-filing requirement applies to pro se filings by Stokes in cases where his counsel has withdrawn from representation. View "Stokes v. First American Title Co. of Montana, Inc." on Justia Law

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This contempt proceeding arose from the failure of Petitioner, the birth father’s counsel in a youth in need of care proceeding, to appear at a termination of parental rights hearing before the Honorable Gregory G. Pinski. After Judge Pinski issued the order of contempt, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of review, arguing that the contempt hearing was criminal in nature and that she was not afforded due process. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for a writ of review, holding (1) the district court had jurisdiction of these contempt proceedings pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 3-1-511; and (2) substantial evidence supported the order of contempt. View "Cross Guns v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

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Roger and Carrie Peters and Draggin’ Y Cattle Company (collectively, Peters) entered into a stipulated settlement with Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. and Larry Addink (collectively, Junkermier). Judge George Huss, the presiding judge, determined that the stipulated settlement was reasonable and entered judgment against New York Marine and General Insurance Company, Junkermier’s insurer. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Judge Huss improperly failed to disclose a potential conflict of interest. On remand, the district court determined that Judge Huss was required to recuse himself and should have been disqualified and vacated Judge Huss’s orders issued after he should have been disqualified. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) correctly held that Judge Huss was required to disqualify himself pursuant to Montana Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.12(A); and (2) did not err in vacating Judge Huss’s orders issued after he should have disqualified himself. View "Draggin Cattle Co. v. New York Marine & General Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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O.F. Mossberg & Sons, Inc., and Burns Auction & Appraisal, LLC (collectively “Mossberg”), appealed a District Court order granting Luke and Stephanie Keuffers’ motion to disqualify Mossberg’s counsel. The District Court disqualified Mossberg’s out-of-state counsel, Renzulli Law Firm, and its local counsel, Tarlow & Stonecipher, pursuant to Rule 1.20(c) of the Montana Rules of Professional Conduct. The basis for the court’s disqualification order was a prospective client consultation that Luke Keuffer had with an attorney from Tarlow & Stonecipher, which was later used in a deposition of Stephanie Keuffer by John Renzulli of the Renzulli Law Firm. The court found that the continued involvement in the case by Mossberg’s counsel gave the Keuffers reason to question whether their case could proceed fairly and cause to question what they may have disclosed in the consultation to Tarlow & Stonecipher that may later be used against them in the current litigation. The court also found that Mossberg’s counsel’s actions undermine the public’s trust in the legal profession. Finding no reversible error in the District Court's disqualification order, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed. View "Keuffers v. O.F. Mossberg & Sons" on Justia Law