Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Daniel’la Deering, an in-house lawyer for Lockheed Martin, was terminated and subsequently sued the company for discrimination and retaliation. While her discrimination claim was dismissed at the summary judgment stage, her retaliation claim was set to go to trial. However, during the litigation, Deering misled Lockheed Martin and the district court about her employment status and income. She falsely claimed to be employed by nVent and did not disclose her higher-paying job elsewhere, even submitting false information in a deposition, declaration, and settlement letters.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, presided over by Judge David S. Doty, found that Deering’s actions constituted intentional, willful, and bad-faith misconduct. Lockheed Martin discovered the deception shortly before the trial, leading to an emergency motion for sanctions. The district court dismissed Deering’s case with prejudice and awarded Lockheed Martin $93,193 in attorney fees. Deering’s motions for a continuance and reconsideration were also denied by the district court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case due to Deering’s prolonged and intentional deception. The court emphasized that dismissal was appropriate given the severity and duration of the misconduct. Additionally, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Deering’s motions for a continuance and reconsideration. However, the appellate court dismissed Deering’s appeal regarding the attorney fee award due to a premature notice of appeal. View "Deering v. Lockheed Martin Corp." on Justia Law

The State of South Dakota charged Ronald Lee Neels with multiple sex-related offenses, including rape, sexual contact, and incest, for the sexual abuse of his adopted daughter over a 14-year period. During the trial, the prosecutor made an opening statement that asked the jury to imagine themselves in the victim's position, which is considered a "Golden Rule" argument and is generally condemned. Neels did not object to this statement at the time. Following his conviction, Neels filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting to the prosecutor's opening statement.The South Dakota Supreme Court summarily affirmed Neels's conviction on direct appeal, stating that the issues raised were without merit. Neels then filed a state habeas corpus petition, which was denied on the grounds of res judicata, as the court found that the issue of prejudice had already been decided on direct appeal. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed this decision, holding that the same standard of prejudice applied in both plain error review and ineffective assistance of counsel claims.Neels subsequently filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court granted the petition, concluding that Neels suffered prejudice from his attorneys' failure to object to the prosecutor's opening statement, despite acknowledging the overwhelming evidence of Neels's guilt. The court reasoned that the magnitude of the prosecutorial misconduct required vacating the conviction to ensure a fair trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Neels did not suffer Strickland prejudice from his counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's opening statement, given the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. The court emphasized that the jury instructions and the strength of the evidence against Neels mitigated any potential prejudice from the prosecutor's improper remarks. View "Neels v. Fluke" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Roads was convicted of transporting and accessing child pornography, and received a 324-month prison sentence. He appealed, alleging conflicts of interest among his defense counsel and the presiding judge. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit previously vacated Roads's sentence and ordered a lower court to determine whether a conflict of interest among Roads's defense counsel may have affected his substantial rights. After re-assignment of the case to a different judge and changes in counsel, Roads's motions for disclosure of information and recusal were denied. His motion to withdraw his guilty plea was also denied, and he was re-sentenced to the same term of imprisonment.On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, Roads argued that the district court erred in denying his motions and in applying a two-level obstruction enhancement during sentencing. He claimed that a reasonable person may question the impartiality of the court due to perceived personal relationships with federal officials or court employees who had been threatened by another individual, Justin Fletcher.However, the Appeals Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Roads's motions. It found that Roads had failed to provide any information suggesting the court could not be impartial. The court also found that Roads's reasons for recusal were based on inaccurate "facts" and mere speculation. The court denied Roads's motion to withdraw his guilty plea as he failed to show a fair and just reason for withdrawal. It concluded that the district court was correct in applying the obstruction enhancement, as Roads had attempted to destroy evidence. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding Roads's sentence. View "United States v. Roads" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed a district court's decision to impose sanctions on attorney Gregory Leyh and his law firm under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 55.03 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 for filing frivolous claims. The sanctions were requested by Martin Leigh, P.C., a party that Leyh had included in a series of lawsuits filed on behalf of Gwen Caranchini, who had defaulted on her home loan and was seeking to stop foreclosure proceedings.The district court had imposed sanctions after Leyh failed to respond to a warning letter and motion for sanctions served by Martin Leigh. On appeal, Leyh argued that the sanctions imposed were inappropriate because Martin Leigh had not complied with Rule 11(c)(2)'s safe harbor provision, which requires that a party be given an opportunity to withdraw or correct the offending document before a motion for sanctions is filed.The appellate court agreed with Leyh, finding that Martin Leigh had not adhered to the strict procedural requirements of Rule 11(c)(2). The court also noted that while Leyh's legal tactics were an abuse of the system, Martin Leigh had not pursued other possible avenues for sanctions, such as Rule 11(c)(3), 28 U.S.C. § 1927, or the court's inherent powers. The court thus reversed the sanctions and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to vacate the award. View "Martin Leigh PC v. Leyh" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld a conviction against Richard Lee David Brown for possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. Law enforcement found Brown in an apartment during the execution of a search warrant, along with drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a cell phone that Brown admitted was his. Brown appealed his conviction, alleging multiple pre-trial and trial-related errors. However, the court affirmed the conviction, rejecting Brown's claims that he was improperly denied a jury instruction regarding "mere presence," that the court erred in admitting evidence of his prior convictions, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, among other issues. The court held that the instructions given to the jury were adequate and that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. The court also found that Brown's claims of ineffective assistance were best left for a post-conviction relief proceeding, such as a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The court concluded that none of the alleged errors either individually or cumulatively warranted reversal of the conviction. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Appellant Attorney Kezhaya represented The Satanic Temple, Inc., in its lawsuits against the City of Belle Plaine, Minnesota. The Temple sued the City, claiming that the City opened a limited public forum for a Christian monument, but closed the forum to exclude a Satanic monument. The City sought $33,886.80 in attorney’s fees incurred by responding to the complaint in the second lawsuit and preparing the motion for sanctions. The court determined that the rates charged by the City’s counsel were reasonable but observed that a portion of the work was duplicative of the first lawsuit and that the issues unique to the second lawsuit were not complex, novel, or difficult. The court thus reduced the requested amount by fifty percent and ordered the Temple’s counsel to pay the City $16,943.40 under Rule 11(c). Kezhaya appealed the sanctions order. He argues that the district court abused its discretion by (i) imposing sanctions, (ii) failing to consider non-monetary sanctions, and (iii) granting an arbitrary amount of sanctions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that under the circumstances, it disagreed with Kezhaya’s contention about the righteousness of a second lawsuit. For the claims dismissed “without prejudice” in the first lawsuit, Kezhaya and the Temple made a strategic choice to seek leave to amend the complaint to correct the deficiencies identified in the dismissal order. Further, the court found that even if the City’s insurance carrier ultimately paid the fees, the fees were “incurred” for the motion and could be awarded under Rule 11(c)(2). View "Matthew Kezhaya v. City of Belle Plaine" on Justia Law

After (Decedent) died, two of his three adult children brought a pro se diversity action in the District of Minnesota against Defendant, Decedent’s second wife. They asserted multiple claims arising from Defendant’s alleged use of her power as Decedent’s attorney-in-fact to close two Certificates of Deposit and keep funds that Decedent intended would benefit his children. Defendant moved to dismiss, alleging lack of diversity jurisdiction because Decedent’s third child, like Defendant, is a resident of California and is an indispensable, non-diverse party. Defendant filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiffs’ incomplete assignment did not establish diversity jurisdiction. The district court determined it has diversity subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the FAC claims with prejudice because they fail to state a claim and Plaintiffs are not real parties in interest. Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s dismissal.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court found that the district court properly granted Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion because Plaintiffs’ FAC failed to state plausible claims of fraudulent misrepresentation and civil theft. Therefore, the court wrote it need not separately consider the district court’s alternative ruling that Plaintiffs are not “real parties in interest” under Rule 17(a). Further, the court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing with prejudice the claims asserted in the FAC. The court explained it does not agree that additional claims regarding Defendant’s use of the CD proceeds after she was done acting as Attorney-in-Fact would necessarily have been futile. But without a proposed amended complaint to consider, the district court did not abuse its discretion by assuming they would be. View "Eric Sorenson v. Joanne Sorenson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually and as special administrator of the Estate of her father (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), appealed following the district court’s dismissal of her claims for legal malpractice, fraud, and deceit against attorneys (collectively, “the law firm”).   The Eighth Circuit granted Plaintiff’s motion to supplement the record. However, the court affirmed, reasoning that the court predicts the South Dakota Supreme Court would prohibit the assignment of legal malpractice claims and the district court did not err in dismissing the remaining claims. The court explained that Plaintiff asserts the district court erred when it dismissed her fraud and deceit claims against the law firm. To the extent Plaintiff intended to state a claim for fraud or deceit claim, no such claim actually appears in the amended complaint— especially in light of South Dakota’s requirement that fraud and deceit be pled with particularity. While the original complaint contained an allegation of fraud and deceit, the failure to retain that allegation in the amended complaint is dispositive. The only remaining allegations pertain to punitive damages, but an assertion of punitive damages is not a free-standing cause of action under South Dakota law. View "Teresa Thompson v. William Harrie" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an attorney, sued the Minnesota Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility, the Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board, associated government officials, and lawyers and other private defendants alleging, among other claims, they violated his constitutional rights by pursuing an ethics complaint against him. The district court granted the state defendants' motion to dismiss under Younger v. Harris and found that Plaintiff waived his abuse-of-process claim against the private defendants. The court also held that Plaintiff lacked standing to seek sanctions based on the private defendants' alleged violations of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct.Finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in any of its determinations, the Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Herbert Igbanugo v. Minnesota OLPR" on Justia Law

Wagstaff & Cartmell, LLP (Wagstaff) filed a declaratory-judgment action against the Defendant-Attorney, seeking a declaration that Wagstaff owed nothing to Defendant for any work on a wrongful death lawsuit or, in the alternative, a determination of the amount it owed to Defendant.   Defendant filed counterclaims against Wagstaff, including a counterclaim under the theory of quantum meruit. The district court entered judgment in Wagstaff’s favor. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in (1) denying his motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (2) denying his motion for leave to dismiss counterclaims without prejudice and motions for leave to file his second amended answer (3) denying his motion to dismiss the declaratory-judgment action without prejudice under the abstention doctrine and motion to reconsider the denial of that dismissal motion and (4) denying, in part, his motion to alter or amend the judgment or, in the alternative, relief from judgment.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling in Plaintiff’s favor. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to alter or amend the judgment or, in the alternative, relief from judgment. The court held that the district court reasonably interpreted Defendant’s response to Wagstaff’s third summary judgment motion as an abandonment of his quantum meruit claim. In addition, Defendant had not sustained his burden of proving that Wagstaff has engaged in misconduct that prevented him from fully and fairly presenting his case. View "Wagstaff & Cartmell, LLP v. Neal Lewis" on Justia Law