Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Idaho Supreme Court - Civil
ISB v. John Doe
The case involves an individual, referred to as "John Doe," who repeatedly applied for admission to the Idaho State Bar. Doe's applications were denied due to concerns about his character and fitness, including his honesty, judgment, and respect for the rights of others. Doe challenged these denials, arguing that his federal lawsuits against the Idaho State Bar were a necessary defense of his rights and that his conduct was protected by the First Amendment.The Idaho State Bar filed a petition with the Idaho Supreme Court, seeking permission to reject Doe's third application and to prohibit him from filing future applications for a specified period. Doe cross-petitioned, seeking immediate admission to the Idaho State Bar.The Idaho Supreme Court denied Doe's cross-petition, finding that he had not demonstrated that he met the essential eligibility requirements to practice law. The court granted the Idaho State Bar's petition in part, allowing it to reject Doe's third application and prohibiting Doe from filing a new application for two years. The court found that Doe had not shown a significant change in his circumstances that would render him eligible to practice law. The court also ordered the Idaho State Bar to refund Doe's application fee. View "ISB v. John Doe" on Justia Law
Davis v. George and Jesse’s Les Schwab Tire Store, Inc.
In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho upheld a lower court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants, George and Jesse’s Les Schwab Tire Store, Inc., and two of its owners, Bruce and Richard Byram. The plaintiff, Adam Davis, had been employed as an assistant manager at Les Schwab from April 2016 till June 2019. In March 2019, there was a shortage in the cash deposits and surveillance footage showed Davis bending down out of camera view in the area where the cash deposits were kept while he was alone in the store. This led to Davis being arrested and charged with grand theft, and his employment was terminated. Although the charges against Davis were later dropped, he sued the defendants for breach of his employment contract, false arrest, defamation per se, and for knowingly giving a false report to the police. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all of Davis’s claims. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no genuine issue of material fact that could support Davis’s claims. The court found that Davis was an at-will employee who could be terminated without cause and that there was no evidence to show that the defendants had acted with malice. The court also found that the plaintiff's attorney had violated Rule 11.2 by submitting arguments that were not well grounded in fact, and awarded a portion of the defendants' attorney fees to be paid by the plaintiff's counsel. View "Davis v. George and Jesse's Les Schwab Tire Store, Inc." on Justia Law
SAPD v. Fourth Judicial District
The Idaho Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD) in a case involving the SAPD's statutory duty to arrange for substitute counsel for indigent defendants when a conflict of interest arises. The SAPD filed a direct action against the Fourth Judicial District Court, alleging that the court infringed on the SAPD’s statutory duty to arrange a new attorney for a defendant named Azad Abdullah. The SAPD had identified a conflict of interest in its own office and tried to substitute an attorney from Pennsylvania, but the district court refused the substitution and appointed a new attorney of its own choosing. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court had obstructed the SAPD's statutory duty and authority under Idaho Code section 19-5906. The Court ordered the district court's decisions to be vacated, restored the SAPD as attorney of record for the limited purpose of arranging for substitute counsel, and ordered the appointment of a new district judge to preside over Abdullah’s post-conviction proceeding. View "SAPD v. Fourth Judicial District" on Justia Law
Rich v. Hepworth Holzer
Holly Rich brought a legal malpractice action against her attorneys, Hepworth Holzer, LLP, and E. Craig Daue and Daue Buxbaum, PLLC (“Daue Buxbaum”) (collectively, “Respondents”), regarding their legal representation of Rich in an underlying medical malpractice action against Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center (“EIRMC”), Dr. John Lassetter (a cardiologist), and Dr. Charles Phillips (an intensivist) (collectively, “EIRMC providers”). In that action, Rich's claims against the EIRMC providers failed because they were filed after the statute of limitations expired. Rich alleged in this action that those claims were not filed on time because of Respondents’ legal malpractice. Both sides filed substantive motions for summary judgment and the district court found that Rich could not prevail because she had “not disclosed any expert [medical] testimony which complies with the requirements of Idaho law for admissibility.” The district court concluded that, lacking evidence to “set out a prima facie case of medical malpractice,” in the underlying case, Rich’s claim against Respondents for legal malpractice failed. Rich appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Rich v. Hepworth Holzer" on Justia Law
BrunoBuilt, Inc. v. Erstad Architects, PA
The issue this case presented for the Idaho Supreme Court's review centered on a residence in the Boise foothills that was damaged by a landslide, which ultimately prevented the builder from obtaining a certificate of occupancy. BrunoBuilt, Inc., the general contractor of the project, sued multiple parties, including Erstad Architects, PA, the architectural firm for the project, Andrew Erstad, the principal architect, and Cheryl Pearse, the project manager from Erstad Architects, PA (collectively, Defendants), for professional negligence in connection with work completed for construction of the residence. Defendants successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that the two-year statute of limitations in Idaho Code section 5-219(4) barred BrunoBuilt’s claim. Two years after the district court issued its memorandum decision and order granting summary judgment, BrunoBuilt moved the district court for reconsideration, citing new evidence and arguments. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration, concluding it was “untimely, lacking in diligence, and improper.” BrunoBuilt then appealed, challenging the decision of the district court on summary judgment and additionally asserting that the court erred in an earlier order deconsolidating the cases with other defendants. Prior to oral argument, Defendants moved the Supreme Court to sanction counsel for BrunoBuilt pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2 for non-disclosure of material procedural facts in its opening brief. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision granting summary judgment against BrunoBuilt, and agreed that the conduct of BrunoBuilt’s attorney on appeal ran afoul of Rule 11.2, and imposed sanctions. View "BrunoBuilt, Inc. v. Erstad Architects, PA" on Justia Law
Gilbert v. Radnovich
This appeal arose from a district court’s decision denying a motion for sanctions and attorney fees against Roy Gilbert’s former attorney, William Mitchell. The underlying litigation giving rise to the sanctions request stemmed from a dispute over a medical transport business and the business relationship between Gilbert and Richard Radnovich. Gilbert was the sole member of two LLCs: Resilient Transportation Leasing, LLC, and Resilient Transport LLC. According to Gilbert’s complaint, Radnovich was allegedly the owner of two business entities: Injury Care Emergency Medical Services (ICEMS) LLC and “Injury Care EMS,” as well as other entities not at issue in this appeal. In 2017, Gilbert executed an agreement purporting to sell Resilient Transport, LLC, to Injury Care EMS, LLC. According to Gilbert, Injury Care EMS, LLC, was never formed. Gilbert alleged that this “fictitious” LLC was an alter ego of Radnovich. The parties signed a supplement to the agreement which amended the business name for ICEMS, LLC to ICEMS, P.C, and clarified that Resilient Transport, LLC, would be subsumed by ICEMS, P.C. into another fictitious business called “Resilient Transport Operated by Injury Care EMS,” and that Resilient Transport, LLC would later be dissolved. Following a breakdown in both the agreement and the relationship, Gilbert sued Radnovich and the business entities. Mitchell filed the initial and amended complaint on behalf of Gilbert against Radnovich. Later in the proceedings, a second attorney substituted for Mitchell and soon after, both sides stipulated to dismiss the case with prejudice. A few weeks later, Radnovich filed a motion for sanctions and attorney fees against Mitchell. The district court denied the motion. Radnovich appealed, arguing the district court abused its discretion in denying sanctions and attorney fees against Mitchell. Finding no reversible error or abuse of discretion, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. View "Gilbert v. Radnovich" on Justia Law
Erickson v. Erickson
This issue this appeal raised for the Idaho Supreme Court's review centered on the proper legal standards for assessing discovery sanctions against trial counsel, and for proving the character of property during divorce proceedings. Appellant Josh Erickson argued the magistrate court erred by applying the community property presumption to three retirement accounts he owned prior to marriage. Josh argued he failed to produce documents during discovery that could have established these accounts were his separate property because the Respondent Amy Erickson, did not give timely notice that she was seeking an interest in the retirement accounts. Josh argued the magistrate court then imposed inequitable sanctions at trial for his alleged discovery violations by preventing him from presenting evidence relevant to the claims Amy was permitted to make outside the discovery window. Josh appealed the magistrate court’s decision to the district court, which affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s determination that Josh failed to establish that the retirement accounts were his separate property. The Court reversed the district court’s denial of Amy’s request for attorney fees and remanded for consideration on the merits. View "Erickson v. Erickson" on Justia Law
Litster Frost v. Idaho Injury Law Group
This appeal involved a dispute over the division of a personal injury settlement between a predecessor law firm, a successor law firm, and a client who was subjected to unfair and deceptive trade practices. Litster Frost Injury Lawyers (“Litster”) represented Melissa Gryder for approximately three years before Idaho Injury Law Group (“IILG”) took over representation and settled Gryder’s case roughly two months later for $120,000. Gryder had followed her attorney, Seth Diviney, from Litster to his newly formed firm, IILG. After the personal injury claim was settled, Litster sued IILG and Gryder, claiming a portion of the settlement for attorney’s fees and costs it incurred. Gryder, through Diviney as her attorney, counterclaimed that Litster violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (“ICPA”) and could not recover against the settlement fund. The district court ruled on a motion for partial summary judgment that Litster committed an unfair and deceptive trade practice in violation of the ICPA. However, by the time of the bench trial, the district court understood, based on representations by Diviney, that only Litster and IILG had a stake in the disputed portion of the fund—not Gryder. From this, the district court divided the disputed portion of the fund between Litster and IILG. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded this case for further proceedings so the district court could balance the equities between Litster, IILG, and Gryder. View "Litster Frost v. Idaho Injury Law Group" on Justia Law
Hepworth Holzer, LLP v. Fourth Judicial District
The law firm Hepworth Holzer, LLP (“Hepworth Holzer” or “the firm”), petitioned the Idaho Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus or prohibition, seeking relief from a district court order disqualifying it as counsel for Dr. Gary Tubbs in a personal injury lawsuit against Bogus Basin Recreational Association, Inc. (“Bogus Basin”). Bogus Basin was represented by Elam & Burke in the proceedings. Elam & Burke moved to disqualify Hepworth Holzer after an associate attorney who worked at Elam & Burke when Tubbs initiated his lawsuit went to work for Hepworth Holzer and assisted the firm on a memorandum in support of a motion to reconsider filed in the case. The district court granted Elam & Burke’s motion. The district court ordered that “[a]ny attorney associated with Hepworth Holzer, LLP, including [the associate attorney], are disqualified from any further representation of [Dr.] Gary Tubbs in this matter and from providing any information from its files after January 21, 2021, and cannot relay any information discussed or received about this case after January 21, 2021[,] to Tubbs or any new attorney/firm representing Tubbs.” Hepworth Holzer contended the district court’s disqualification and gag order was clearly erroneous and unconstitutional. Finding the district court erred in issuing its disqualification order, the Supreme Court granted Hepworth Holzer's request for mandamus relief. The disqualification and gag order were vacated; and a new judge was ordered to preside over further proceedings. View "Hepworth Holzer, LLP v. Fourth Judicial District" on Justia Law
Cook v. Wiebe
Holly Cook appealed an administrative order entered by an Administrative District Judge (“ADJ”) declaring her to be a vexatious litigant pursuant to Idaho Court Administrative Rule 59. The order prohibited Cook from filing any new litigation pro se in Idaho without first obtaining leave of the court where the litigation was proposed to be filed. Ms. Cook petitioned for a divorce from her husband (“Mr. Cook”) in 2015. During the lengthy and contentious divorce proceedings, Ms. Cook had assistance of counsel for portions of the proceedings, but represented herself pro se when she did not. Some aspects of the divorce proceedings were appealed to the district court. Mr. Cook filed a moved that Ms. Cook declared a vexatious litigant. Neither party requested a hearing on Mr. Cook’s motion. The district judge presiding over the appeal referred the matter to the ADJ. The ADJ found that Ms. Cook largely failed to appear at dates set in scheduling orders that she (with and without counsel) agreed to. She failed at obtaining continuances, at having the trial judge disqualified, and to move the court for reconsideration of many intermediate decisions. She attempted to collaterally attack the default judgment of divorce, and at some point, was held in contempt for failing to respond to court orders during the divorce proceedings. Separate from the divorce proceedings, the ADJ noted Ms. Cook had filed nine pro se civil protection orders, all of which had been dismissed in favor of the parties from whom she sought protection. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the ADJ abused its discretion in declaring Ms. Cook a vexatious litigant; the ADJ did not review the merits and reason for dismissal in the nine civil protection actions, causing the ADJ to conclude incorrectly the final determinations were adverse to her. Furthermore, with respect to the divorce proceedings, the Court determined the ADJ abused its discretion by failing to make factual findings that Ms. Cook repeatedly attempted to relitigate issues already finally decided by the magistrate court. The Supreme Court concluded the ADJ did not make sufficient findings to support the conclusion that Ms. Cook’s filings were frivolous, unmeritorious, or filed with the intent to cause unnecessary delay. Accordingly, the Court reversed the prefiling order and remanded to allow the ADJ the opportunity to reconsider this matter. View "Cook v. Wiebe" on Justia Law