Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Legal Ethics
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Sharon and Kieran Cunningham were married in 1994 and divorced in 2021. They entered into a marital settlement agreement (MSA) that was incorporated but not merged into the final divorce decree. The MSA included provisions about the use and sale of their home in Middletown, Rhode Island, which were modified twice by mutual agreement. In January 2024, Kieran's counsel offered to purchase the home, leading to a dispute over whether the Family Court could modify the MSA to allow an appraisal of the property.Kieran filed a motion in the Family Court to have the home appraised, which Sharon opposed, arguing that the MSA did not provide for such an appraisal. Kieran amended his motion to request an inspection and appraisal, citing Rule 34 of the Family Court Rules of Domestic Relations Procedure. The Family Court held a hearing and ultimately ruled that Kieran had no right to purchase the property under the MSA and sanctioned him for filing an improper motion, awarding Sharon $6,125 in attorneys' fees.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Family Court's decision. The Court held that Kieran's motion was not well-grounded in fact or law and that he sought relief not permitted by the MSA. The Court found that the Family Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees, as the fees were reasonable and supported by an affidavit from a Rhode Island Bar member. The Supreme Court concluded that the sanctions and attorneys' fees were appropriate given the circumstances. View "Cunningham v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

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ELG Utica Alloys, Inc. ("ELG") sued a group of its former customers in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, asserting claims under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). ELG had remediated contamination at one portion of a 23-acre facility in 2007 and continued to remediate contamination at a different portion of the facility pursuant to a 2015 consent order with the New York State government. ELG sought contribution for the costs of the 2015 cleanup from the defendants, alleging they were also responsible for the contamination.The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the six-year statute of limitations for certain CERCLA claims had elapsed. The District Court granted the motion, reasoning that the remediation began in 2007, and the 2015 work was a subsequent step in the work that commenced in 2007. Therefore, the statute of limitations started to run in 2007 and elapsed in 2013, before ELG sued. The District Court also imposed spoliation sanctions on ELG for shredding over 23,000 pounds of potentially relevant documents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the District Court that the statute of limitations on ELG’s claims commenced once on-site physical remediation began in 2007. The court also found no error in the District Court’s imposition of spoliation sanctions. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court and remanded to the District Court to order the agreed-upon spoliation sanction. View "ELG Utica Alloys, Inc. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp." on Justia Law

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Kevin Keith Bell was convicted of rape, witness intimidation, and felony domestic battery. He filed a pro-se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging prosecutorial misconduct, actual innocence, and ineffective assistance of counsel. Bell later filed an amended petition through counsel, focusing on three specific instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. The State moved for summary dismissal of the amended petition, which the district court granted. Bell then filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing the district court erred in dismissing his amended petition on grounds not raised by the State. The district court denied the motion.The district court of the Fifth Judicial District of Idaho initially handled Bell's case. After the State moved for summary dismissal, the district court granted the motion, finding Bell had not provided sufficient legal argument to support his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Bell's motion for reconsideration was also denied, as the district court concluded that the State had indeed argued the grounds for dismissal and that Bell had failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. The court held that Bell failed to preserve his argument regarding the lack of notice for the dismissal of his original claims because he did not raise this issue in his motion for reconsideration. The court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of Bell's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inquire into an allegedly biased juror, as Bell did not provide sufficient evidence of actual bias or resulting prejudice. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment dismissing Bell's petition for post-conviction relief. View "Bell v. State" on Justia Law

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William Chalmers filed for legal separation from his wife, which was later converted to a dissolution proceeding. During the proceedings, Chalmers' attorney requested the appointment of a guardian ad litem due to concerns about Chalmers' capacity. The court appointed Brian Theut as guardian ad litem, who then requested the appointment of East Valley Fiduciary Services, Inc. (EVFS) as temporary guardian and conservator. EVFS retained Ryan Scharber and John McKindles to represent them and Chalmers, respectively. The professionals did not file the required statement under A.R.S. § 14-5109(A) explaining their compensation arrangement.The professionals filed numerous applications for fees and costs, which were initially approved by the court. However, when a new judge took over, Chalmers objected to the fee applications, including those already approved. The court denied the outstanding fee applications, citing the professionals' failure to comply with § 14-5109(A) and noting that they had already received substantial compensation. The court of appeals held that the prior fee approvals were not final and remanded the case to determine if the approvals were manifestly erroneous or unjust due to non-compliance with § 14-5109(A).The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that failure to comply with § 14-5109(A) does not automatically preclude recovery of fees. The court found that the statute is directory, not mandatory, and that the trial court has discretion to rectify non-compliance. The court vacated the court of appeals' opinion, affirmed the denial of fees to which Chalmers timely objected, but reversed the ruling requiring the professionals to disgorge previously awarded fees. The case was remanded to reinstate the initial fee awards. View "In the matter of CHALMERS" on Justia Law

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Marc B. Hankin appealed a probate court order that dismissed his petition for the appointment of a probate conservator for Anne S. and imposed $5,577 in sanctions against him. Hankin, who had only met Anne once and lived nearby, filed the petition along with attorney G. Scott Sobel, who had known Anne for many years. The petition alleged that Anne was being unduly influenced and possibly mistreated by her housemate. Anne, through her attorney, objected to the conservatorship. Sobel later withdrew from the petition, leaving Hankin to maintain it on his own. Anne and other parties involved reached a settlement agreement, which Hankin opposed, arguing Anne lacked the capacity to sign it.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Anne's motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that Hankin lacked standing to petition for conservatorship under Probate Code section 1820. The court also imposed sanctions on Hankin, finding his petition legally frivolous. Hankin appealed both decisions.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that Hankin did not qualify as an "interested person" or "friend" under section 1820. The court noted that Hankin's brief interaction with Anne did not establish a close or intimate relationship necessary to be considered a friend. Additionally, the court found that Hankin's arguments for standing were unsupported by existing law and did not present a good faith argument for extending the law. The court also upheld the sanctions, determining that Hankin's petition was legally frivolous and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding them. View "Conservatorship of Anne S." on Justia Law

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Shelby Ragner was charged with aggravated sexual intercourse without consent, alleging he had sexual intercourse with C.M. while she was severely intoxicated. Ragner's attorney, Alexander Jacobi, did not interview or present Max Weimer as a witness, who later testified that he saw minor injuries on Ragner the morning after the incident. Ragner was found not guilty of aggravated sexual intercourse without consent but was convicted of sexual intercourse without consent (SIWOC). He was sentenced to ten years in prison, with four years suspended. Ragner's direct appeal was denied.Ragner filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel due to Jacobi's failure to interview and call exculpatory witnesses, including Weimer. The District Court found that Jacobi's failure to investigate Weimer's potential testimony fell below the standard of care and granted Ragner's petition, concluding that Jacobi's performance prejudiced Ragner.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that even if Jacobi's performance was deficient, Ragner did not demonstrate prejudice as required under the second prong of the Strickland test. The court found that Weimer's limited observation of Ragner's injuries did not significantly alter the evidentiary picture presented to the jury, which included overwhelming evidence of C.M.'s severe intoxication, extensive documented injuries, and Ragner's own admissions. The court concluded that Weimer's testimony would not have reasonably affected the jury's verdict.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court's decision, holding that Ragner failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, and remanded the case for amendment of the order consistent with its opinion. View "Ragner v. State" on Justia Law

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Michael Lairy petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that he did not qualify for the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (ACCA) mandatory 15-year sentence and that his counsel was ineffective for not raising this issue. The government did not address the merits of Lairy’s claims but argued that they were raised after the statute of limitations had expired. The district court denied his petition, rejecting Lairy’s arguments that the government forfeited the statute of limitations defense, that he was actually innocent of ACCA, and that he was entitled to equitable tolling.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana held that Lairy’s petition was untimely and that the government did not forfeit the statute of limitations defense. The court also found that Lairy’s claim of actual innocence did not apply because it was a legal, not factual, argument. Additionally, the court denied Lairy’s request for equitable tolling without conducting an evidentiary hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the district court’s evaluation of forfeiture and actual innocence. However, the appellate court found that the district court abused its discretion by rejecting equitable tolling without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. The Seventh Circuit vacated the denial of the petition and remanded the case to the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on equitable tolling. The court affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "Lairy v. United States" on Justia Law

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Ruben Santoyo, proceeding without counsel, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Chicago and two police officers, challenging the constitutionality of his arrest. Over three years, Santoyo repeatedly filed frivolous motions, many of which attacked the competence and integrity of the district judge. Despite numerous warnings from the judge that further frivolous filings would result in sanctions, Santoyo continued his behavior.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and denied Santoyo's motions to vacate the judgment. While Santoyo's appeal of the denial was pending, the defendants moved to recover their costs. Instead of addressing the merits of this motion, Santoyo accused the defendants of bad faith and requested disciplinary action against their counsel. The district judge, having lost patience, granted the defendants' motion for costs, imposed a $1,500 sanction on Santoyo, and referred him to the district's Executive Committee, which barred future filings until the sanction was paid.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Santoyo argued that the district judge violated his due process rights by not notifying him of the sanction or giving him an opportunity to respond. The appellate court disagreed, noting that Santoyo had been warned multiple times about the consequences of further frivolous filings. The court held that the district judge provided sufficient notice and opportunity for Santoyo to respond, satisfying due process requirements. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's imposition of sanctions. View "Santoyo v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

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An attorney, admitted to practice law in 2002, served as a Deputy District Attorney and later as Chief Deputy District Attorney in Bucks County. From 2005 to 2008, he also served as a Youth Fellowship Group Leader at a Methodist Church. During this period, he engaged in misconduct by providing alcohol and marijuana to minors and engaging in a consensual sexual relationship with a 16-year-old boy from the church youth group. This led to his arrest in 2008, and he subsequently pled guilty to multiple charges, including endangering the welfare of children and corruption of minors. He was sentenced to incarceration and probation.Following his conviction, the attorney was placed on temporary suspension in 2009, and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) filed a Petition for Discipline. A disciplinary hearing was held, and the Hearing Committee recommended disbarment, which the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania initially recommended as a five-year suspension. However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ultimately disbarred him in 2012.In 2016, the attorney filed his first petition for reinstatement, which was denied by the Board, citing the need for more time to pass. He accepted this decision and did not seek further review. In 2022, he filed a second petition for reinstatement. The Hearing Committee recommended reinstatement, but the Board disagreed, finding his misconduct too egregious for reinstatement.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case de novo and determined that the attorney's misconduct, while severe, did not preclude consideration of his reinstatement. The Court found that he had demonstrated significant rehabilitation, remorse, and compliance with all probationary requirements. Consequently, the Court granted his petition for reinstatement, concluding that he met the criteria under Pa.R.D.E. 218(c)(3) and that his resumption of practice would not be detrimental to the integrity of the bar or the public interest. View "In re Cappuccio" on Justia Law

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In 2021, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York implemented a policy requiring all employees to be vaccinated against Covid-19, with exemptions for religious or medical reasons. Lori Gardner-Alfred and Jeanette Diaz, employees of the Federal Reserve, applied for religious exemptions, claiming that the vaccine conflicted with their religious beliefs. The Federal Reserve denied their requests and subsequently terminated their employment for non-compliance with the vaccination policy. Gardner-Alfred and Diaz filed a lawsuit, alleging that the Federal Reserve's actions violated their religious liberties under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and various federal statutes.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the Federal Reserve on all federal claims. The court found no genuine dispute of fact regarding the sincerity of Gardner-Alfred's religious objections and concluded that the vaccination policy did not conflict with Diaz's professed religious beliefs. Additionally, the district court imposed discovery sanctions on Gardner-Alfred and Diaz for repeatedly neglecting their discovery obligations, withholding relevant documents, and violating court orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment on Gardner-Alfred's claims, agreeing that she failed to provide sufficient evidence of sincerely held religious beliefs. However, the court vacated the summary judgment on Diaz's claims, finding that there were disputed issues of material fact regarding the sincerity of her religious beliefs and whether the vaccination policy burdened those beliefs. The court also upheld the district court's imposition of discovery sanctions, finding no abuse of discretion. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Gardner-Alfred v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York" on Justia Law