Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

In 1985, Terry D. Bemore was arrested and later convicted for the murder of a liquor store clerk. He was sentenced to death in 1989. Bemore's trial counsel was found to have provided ineffective assistance, and evidence of racial bias by his lead counsel was presented. In 2015, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Bemore's death sentence, and he was resentenced to life without parole in 2016. In 2020, the California Legislature enacted the Racial Justice Act (RJA), allowing defendants to challenge convictions based on racial discrimination. Bemore sought to use this new law to challenge his conviction.The trial court appointed the San Diego Office of the Primary Public Defender to represent Bemore in his RJA claim, despite his request to have his previous habeas counsel, Sayasane and Cotterill, appointed. Bemore filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the trial court should have appointed his preferred counsel due to their extensive prior representation and familiarity with his case.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that section 987.2 of the Penal Code governs the selection and assignment of counsel in noncapital postconviction habeas proceedings, including those under the RJA. The court found that the trial court erred in placing the burden on Bemore to demonstrate the Public Defender's unavailability and in failing to recognize the good cause shown for appointing Sayasane and Cotterill. Additionally, the court determined that the Public Defender had created a conflict of interest by opposing Bemore's petition, thus disqualifying itself from representing him.The Court of Appeal granted Bemore's petition, vacated the trial court's order appointing the Public Defender, and directed the trial court to appoint one or both of Bemore's requested attorneys. View "Bemore v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The case involves a real estate dispute where plaintiffs, represented by Kenneth J. Catanzarite, alleged they were defrauded into exchanging their interests in an apartment complex for interests in a limited liability company. The dispute was ordered into arbitration at the plaintiffs' request, and the arbitrator ruled in favor of the defendant, Plantations at Haywood, LLC. Plantations then petitioned the court to confirm the arbitration award.The Superior Court of Orange County confirmed the arbitration award and granted Plantations' motion for sanctions against Catanzarite under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, imposing $37,000 in sanctions. The court found that Catanzarite's opposition to the petition was frivolous and factually unsupported. Catanzarite appealed the sanctions, arguing he was statutorily allowed to file an opposition and contest the arbitrator's award.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that Catanzarite's arguments were without merit and unsupported by existing law or any nonfrivolous extension of existing law. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's sanction award against Catanzarite. Additionally, the court granted Plantations' motion for sanctions on appeal, finding the appeal to be frivolous and without merit. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the appropriate amount of sanctions to be awarded, with the option for Catanzarite to stipulate to the amount requested by Plantations. The order was affirmed, and Plantations was entitled to its costs on appeal. View "Plantations at Haywood 1, LLC v. Plantations at Haywood, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Brian L. Sheehy, as trustee, sued Chicago Title Insurance Company over a dispute involving an easement on his property. Plaintiff designated an attorney, who had previously represented the defendant, as an expert witness to testify about the defendant's handling of the claim. The defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude this expert, arguing that the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct prohibited the attorney from testifying adversely to the defendant. The trial court granted the motion to exclude the expert.Plaintiff then filed a petition for a writ of mandate with the Court of Appeal, which was summarily denied. Concurrently, plaintiff appealed the trial court's ruling, citing Brand v. 20th Century Insurance Company/21st Century Insurance Company (2004) for the proposition that the order was appealable. The Court of Appeal stayed the preparation of the record, considered dismissing the appeal, and requested briefing from the parties. A hearing was subsequently held.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, dismissed the appeal. The court held that it only has jurisdiction over direct appeals from appealable orders or judgments. The court emphasized that, in ordinary civil cases, appeals are generally only permitted from final judgments to prevent piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals. The court distinguished between orders on motions to disqualify counsel, which are appealable, and orders on motions in limine, which are not. The court disagreed with the precedent set in Brand, concluding that orders on motions in limine are not appealable as they are not final collateral orders or injunctions. The court decided that such orders should be reviewed only by writ petition or by appeal from the final judgment. View "Sheehy v. Chicago Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Chris Robles and the California Voting Rights Initiative filed a lawsuit against the City of Ontario, alleging violations of the Voting Rights Act and the California Voting Rights Act by conducting at-large elections for city council members, which they claimed diluted the electoral influence of Latino voters. The parties eventually settled, agreeing to transition to district-based elections by 2024 and included a provision for attorney fees incurred up to that point.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County initially sustained the defendants' demurrer with leave to amend, but the parties settled and submitted a stipulated judgment. The stipulated judgment included a provision for $300,000 in attorney fees and outlined the process for transitioning to district elections. Plaintiffs later filed a motion to enforce the stipulated judgment, alleging the city violated several statutory requirements related to the districting process. The trial court found the city had not complied with the stipulated judgment but denied plaintiffs' request for additional attorney fees, stating the settlement did not provide for fees beyond those already paid.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to seek additional attorney fees under the plain language of the stipulated judgment, which allowed for fees incurred in enforcing its terms. The court reversed the trial court's order denying attorney fees and remanded the case to determine whether plaintiffs were prevailing parties and, if so, the appropriate amount of attorney fees to be awarded. The appellate court clarified that the trial court's assessment of the prevailing party should focus on whether the plaintiffs achieved their litigation objectives. View "Robles v. City of Ontario" on Justia Law

Enrique Sanchez, the petitioner, sought a writ of mandate to vacate a trial court order directing the San Bernardino County Public Defender to assign a new attorney to represent him. This order was issued after evidence suggested that the deputy public defender currently assigned to Sanchez's case made racially charged remarks during plea negotiations, potentially violating the Racial Justice Act (RJA). Sanchez argued that the trial court's decision was an abuse of discretion.The trial court received a motion from the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence and evaluate the deputy public defender's conflict of interest. The motion included a declaration from the prosecutor detailing the deputy public defender's remarks, which implied racial bias. During a closed hearing, the trial court read the prosecutor's declaration to Sanchez and asked if he wanted the current public defender to continue representing him. Sanchez expressed his desire to retain his current counsel. However, the trial court later ordered the public defender's office to assign a new attorney, citing potential RJA issues and the risk of ineffective assistance of counsel.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in removing the deputy public defender. The appellate court noted that the RJA's provisions and the potential for implicit bias created an actual conflict of interest that the deputy public defender could not objectively investigate. Additionally, the trial court's decision to prevent potential future RJA claims and ensure adequate representation was within its discretion. The petition for writ of mandate was denied, and the stay on trial court proceedings was vacated. View "Sanchez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Comedy Store, a stand-up comedy venue in Los Angeles, was forced to close for over a year due to COVID-19 restrictions. In July 2021, the Store hired Moss Adams LLP, an accounting firm, to help apply for a Shuttered Venue Operator Grant from the U.S. Small Business Administration. The parties signed an agreement that included a Washington choice of law provision and a forum selection clause mandating disputes be resolved in Washington state courts. The Store alleges Moss Adams failed to inform it of the grant program's impending expiration, causing the Store to miss the application deadline and lose an $8.5 million grant.The Store initially filed a complaint in the United States District Court in Los Angeles, but the case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Store then refiled in the Los Angeles Superior Court, asserting claims including gross negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. Moss Adams moved to dismiss or stay the action based on the forum selection clause. The trial court granted the motion, contingent on Moss Adams stipulating that the Store could exercise its right to a jury trial in Washington state. Moss Adams provided such a stipulation, and the trial court signed an order to that effect.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in failing to properly allocate the burden of proof to Moss Adams to show that litigating in Washington would not diminish the Store’s unwaivable right to a jury trial. The appellate court concluded that Moss Adams did not meet this burden, as it did not demonstrate that Washington law would provide the same or greater rights to a jury trial or that a Washington court would apply California law. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded with instructions to deny Moss Adams’s motion to dismiss or stay the action. View "The Comedy Store v. Moss Adams LLP" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute among co-trustees of The Pony Tracks Ranch Trust, specifically Allison Littlefield, her brothers David and Scott Littlefield, and her aunt Denise Sobel. Allison filed a petition alleging various grievances, including the removal of co-trustees, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of the Trust. She claimed that the co-trustees misused Trust funds, concealed information, converted her personal property, and restricted her and her husband's use of the Ranch. Additionally, she alleged that the co-trustees failed to address misconduct by an employee, Stacey Limbada, who had been hostile towards her and her husband.The San Mateo County Superior Court denied the appellants' special motion to strike under California's anti-SLAPP statute, which is designed to prevent lawsuits that chill the exercise of free speech and petition rights. The court found that the appellants did not meet their burden of showing that Allison's petition arose from protected activity. The court also denied Allison's request for attorney's fees, concluding that the anti-SLAPP motion was not frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the anti-SLAPP motion, agreeing that the appellants failed to demonstrate that the petition was based on protected activity. However, the appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of Allison's request for attorney's fees. The appellate court found that the anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous because it was entirely without merit, as no reasonable attorney would conclude that the petition sought to impose liability based on protected activity. The case was remanded for a determination of the appropriate award of attorney's fees for Allison. View "Littlefield v. Littlefield" on Justia Law

In September 2017, Attorney Karolyn Kovtun held a meeting with Jennifer Shenefield and her client Mark Shenefield, despite a criminal protective order prohibiting Mark from contacting Jennifer. During the meeting, Mark and Kovtun verbally and emotionally abused Jennifer, and Kovtun threatened to remove their daughter from Jennifer’s custody if she did not sign a custody agreement. Jennifer signed the agreement under duress and contacted the police. Kovtun continued to represent Mark, who was later convicted of violating the protective order. Kovtun then sued Jennifer for recording the meeting without consent, prompting Jennifer to file a cross-complaint against Kovtun.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Kovtun’s two anti-SLAPP motions and sustained her demurrer to two of Jennifer’s six causes of action. After a bench trial, the court found Kovtun liable for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation, awarding Jennifer $50,000 in damages. Mark did not appear at trial, and the court entered judgment against him, awarding Jennifer $250,000 in damages.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. Kovtun argued that Jennifer’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 and the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). The court concluded that Kovtun waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to timely and properly plead it. Additionally, the court determined that the litigation privilege did not apply to Kovtun’s communications. The judgment against Kovtun was affirmed. View "Shenefield v. Kovtun" on Justia Law

Allison J. Littlefield filed a verified petition against Scott Littlefield, David Littlefield, and Denise Sobel, who are co-trustees of The Pony Tracks Ranch Trust and its sub-trusts. The petition alleged misuse of Trust funds, concealment of information, conversion of Allison’s personal property, wrongful removal of Allison from the board, and imposition of restrictions on her and her husband’s use of the Ranch. Allison sought removal of the co-trustees, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the Trust, and declaratory and injunctive relief, including an order enjoining the co-trustees from harassing, disparaging, or defaming her.The San Mateo County Superior Court denied the co-trustees' special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that the co-trustees failed to show that Allison’s petition arose from protected activity. The court also denied Allison’s request for attorney’s fees, finding that the anti-SLAPP motion was not frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the anti-SLAPP motion, agreeing that the co-trustees did not meet their burden of showing that the petition arose from protected activity. The court found that the co-trustees’ motion was overreaching and did not identify specific allegations of protected activity. The court reversed the trial court’s denial of Allison’s request for attorney’s fees, determining that the anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous because no reasonable attorney would conclude that the motion had merit. The case was remanded for a determination of the appropriate award of attorney’s fees for Allison. View "Littlefield v. Littlefield" on Justia Law

In September 2017, Attorney Karolyn Kovtun held a meeting with Jennifer Shenefield and her client Mark Shenefield, despite a criminal protective order prohibiting Mark from contacting Jennifer. During the meeting, Mark and Kovtun verbally and emotionally abused Jennifer, and Kovtun threatened to remove their daughter from Jennifer’s custody if she did not sign a custody agreement. Jennifer signed the agreement under duress and contacted the police. Kovtun continued to represent Mark, who was later convicted of violating the protective order. Kovtun then sued Jennifer for recording the meeting without consent, prompting Jennifer to file a cross-complaint against Kovtun.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Kovtun’s two anti-SLAPP motions and sustained her demurrer to two of Jennifer’s six causes of action. After a bench trial, the court found Kovtun liable for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation, awarding Jennifer $50,000 in damages. Kovtun appealed, arguing that Jennifer’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations and the litigation privilege.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Kovtun waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to timely and properly plead it. Additionally, the court determined that the litigation privilege did not apply to Kovtun’s communications during the meeting, as they were not made in good faith contemplation of litigation. The court affirmed the judgment against Kovtun, upholding the $50,000 damages award to Jennifer. View "Shenefield v. Kovtun" on Justia Law