Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Defendant Michael Addison moved to disqualify the New Hampshire Attorney General’s Office from further participation in his case, and moved for the appointment of a special prosecutor. Defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in 2008. In August 2009, Attorney Lisa Wolford, who had been employed by the New Hampshire Public Defender for approximately seven years, began working with the New Hampshire Appellate Defender. When Wolford began her rotation, the appellate defender office was preparing a brief regarding the standards applicable to our mandatory review of the defendant’s sentence. In early 2010, Wolford was reassigned from the defendant’s defense team. In March 2012, she submitted her resume to the attorney general’s office, requesting consideration for a position with the criminal justice bureau’s appeals division. Wolford was offered a position with the attorney general’s office; she began employment there in early July 2012. The defendant argued to the Supreme Court that it should "follow a line of cases that requires per se disqualification of an entire prosecutor’s office from a defendant’s case when (a) the defendant’s attorney switches sides and joins the prosecutor’s office in the middle of the case and (b) the defendant does not waive the conflict." The Supreme Court found Wolford had no involvement in the defendant’s case at the pre-trial or trial stages and participated in a limited aspect at one preliminary phase of the defendant’s multi-phased appeal approximately three years before joining the attorney general’s office. As such, the Court rejected defendant's per se argument, and further concluded defendant suffered no prejudice as a result in Wolford's change of employment. Accordingly, the Court denied defendant's motion to disqualify the Attorney General's office.View "New Hampshire v. Addison" on Justia Law

From 2002 through 2008, Respondent Kimberly J. Brown served as judge of a small claims court. In 2009, Respondent began serving as judge of the superior court. In 2013, the Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications charged Respondent with violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and acts of willful misconduct. The charged alleged, among other things, dereliction of judicial duties on cases, creation of a hostile environment for attorneys and others working in the court, and failures to complete necessary paperwork, which resulted in delayed releases of defendants from jail. Three Special Masters appointed by the Supreme Court found that Respondent committed judicial misconduct alleged in forty-six of the forty-seven counts for which Respondent was charged. The Commission concurred in the Masters’ recommendation that Respondent be removed from office. The Supreme Court removed Respondent from the office of judge of the superior court, concluding that the Commission demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent engaged in significant judicial misconduct and that the misconduct warranted her removal from office.View "In re Brown" on Justia Law

Herbert Lee Jr., the attorney who handled the 2001 settlement of thirteen diet-drug claims (for approximately $32 million), agreed that six percent of the gross settlement would be used to pay for “common benefit” discovery materials generated in the federal multi-district litigation (MDL) of the claims. Lee billed the MDL fee to the plaintiffs. After the settlement, the MDL court ordered a partial refund of the fee. Two of the plaintiffs, Gloria Thompson and Deborah Dixon, sued Lee, alleging that his attorney’s fee had exceeded the amount set out in the retainer agreement and that he had failed to accurately refund their portions of the MDL fee. The trial court granted summary judgment to Lee on the contract issue and to the plaintiffs on the MDL fee issue. Both Lee and the plaintiffs appealed, and in "Lee I)," the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a trial on the contract issue. The Court affirmed summary judgment on the MDL fee issue, but remanded for the trial court to “determine if the MDL fees were paid in accordance a MDL Pre-Trial Order . . . and if not, to order such distribution.” On remand, the jury found in favor of Lee. The trial court determined that the MDL fees had not been paid in accordance with the MDL pretrial order, and ordered that Lee pay Thompson $420,000 and Dixon $180,000. Lee appealed, arguing: (1) the Supreme Court erred in "Lee I" by finding that the MDL order required him to pay the entire MDL fee from his attorney’s fees; (2) the plaintiffs were entitled to only $140,000 and $60,000 based on a prior representation of their attorney as to the amount owed; and (3) the plaintiffs’ warranted dismissal with prejudice due to their wrongful conduct. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Lee’s assertion that the pretrial orders did not require to him to pay the entire MDL fee was decided in the first appeal and was barred by the law of the case doctrine. Furthermore, the Court found that the plaintiffs’ letter brief did not constitute a binding admission on the amount of damages and that Lee’s assertion that the plaintiffs should have been sanctioned for misconduct was procedurally barred. View "Lee v. Thompson" on Justia Law

The Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline issued a verified statement of complaint against the Honorable Steven E. Jones, a family court judge, alleging that he may have violated the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct by his alleged involvement in two particular incidents of domestic battery and a resulting temporary protective order violation. An investigation was subsequently conducted into Judge Jones’s conduct. Judge Jones filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to halt and dismiss the disciplinary proceedings against him, asserting that the investigation upon which the proposed charges were based resulted from a defective complaint, was conducted by a biased party in an untimely manner, and included an improper scope. The Supreme Court denied writ relief, holding that the issues Judge Jones raised were not yet ripe for review.View "Jones v. Nev. Comm'n on Judicial Discipline" on Justia Law

John Dilks filed a pro se petition to recover damages he suffered as a result of a flood. The “Plaintiffs” identified in the allegations of the petition were Dilks, individually, and Naylor Senior Citizens Housing, LP and Naylor Senior Citizens Housing II, LP (collectively, “Partnerships”), both of which were Missouri statutory limited partnerships. The trial court dismissed the Partnerships’ claims on the ground that, because Dilks was not a licensed attorney and he attempted to assert claims on behalf of the Partnerships, the petition was a nullity and had no legal effect for purposes of asserting claims on behalf of the Partnerships. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, as statutory entities, the Partnerships may not appear in Missouri court except through a licensed attorney, and because Dilks was not a licensed attorney, his attempt to assert claims on behalf of the Partnerships constituted the unauthorized practice of law and may not be given effect.View "Naylor Senior Citizens Housing, LP v. Sides Constr. Co." on Justia Law

Wife and Husband married in 2003. In 2005 and 2008, Wife and Husband executed marital settlement agreements. In 2009, Husband filed a complaint for divorce, alleging that the separation agreements were voidable at his demand. In support of his demand, Husband argued that the attorney, who earlier assisted the Wife in obtaining permanent resident status and in the United States and largely served as scrivener to the settlement agreements, violated the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to obtain Husband’s informed consent to her representation of Wife in connection with the two settlement agreements. The circuit court held that the separation agreements were not voidable and entered a judgment of absolute divorce in which the separation agreements were incorporated. The intermediate appellate court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that sufficient grounds to render the agreements voidable were not present in this case.View "Li v. Lee" on Justia Law

Richard L. Hagar, judge of the district court for the North Central Judicial District, filed exceptions to the Judicial Conduct Commission's recommended findings that he violated provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct by failing to diligently and promptly decide judicial matters assigned to him. He also objected to the Commission's recommended sanctions. The Supreme Court adopted the Commission's findings of fact and ordered that Judge Hagar be suspended from his position as district judge for one month without pay commencing April 1, 2014. Moreover, the Court assessed $3,710.49 for the costs and attorney fees necessary for the prosecution of these proceedings. View "Judicial Conduct Commission v. Hagar" on Justia Law

The Honorable Robert Rand was publicly censured for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Colorado Rules of Judicial Discipline. The Supreme Court found that Judge Rand engaged in undignified conduct (making inappropriate jokes about the appearance of certain people that appeared before him in proceedings), engaged in ex parte communications with attorneys and witnesses in trials that appeared before him, and failed to promote confidence in the judiciary by engaging in off-the-record conversations with persons in the courtroom, described as "advice or pep talks." View "In the Matter of: Robert A. Rand" on Justia Law

Stephen Glass, the infamous journalist from the late 1990s who fabricated material for more than forty articles for The New Republic magazine and other publications, passed the California bar examination in 2006 and applied to join the bar. The Committee of Bar Examiners denied the application, determining that Glass did not satisfy California’s moral fitness test. The State Bar Court’s hearing department, however, found that Glass had established the good moral character to be admitted as an attorney. The Supreme Court granted review. After detailing Glass’s history of dishonesty, professional misconduct, lack of integrity, and tendency to advance his own agenda rather than to serve others in the community, the Court concluded that Glass failed to “carry his heavy burden of demonstrating rehabilitation and fitness for the practice of law” and declined to admit Glass to the practice of law. View "In re Glass" on Justia Law

After the Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards issued a formal complaint against Judge George Perez, a former judge of the Minnesota Tax Court, a three-member fact-finding panel found that Judge Perez had violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and Minnesota law by failing to issue decisions in a timely manner, making false certifications, and making false statements in his decisions. Shortly after the panel issued its findings, the Minnesota Senate refused to confirm Judge Perez’s appointment, thereby immediately ending his judgeship. Both Judge Perez and the Board appealed the panel’s decision. The Supreme Court (1) denied Judge Perez’s motion to dismiss; (2) upheld the panel’s finding that the Board proved that Judge Perez committed misconduct; and (3) concluded that the appropriate discipline was public censure, referral to the Wisconsin Office of Lawyer Regulation, and supervision by the Court of any application for admission to the Minnesota Bar that Judge Perez may file in the future.View "Inquiry into the Conduct of Judge Perez" on Justia Law