Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Commission on Judicial Qualifications charged Gregory Schatz, a district judge, with misconduct for improperly intervening in a case involving his friend by ordering him released from jail on Schatz’s own recognizance before arraignment. An appointed special master found that Schatz had violated several provisions of the judicial code and the Nebraska Constitution and recommended a public reprimand. The Commission adopted the special master’s factual findings and likewise recommended a public reprimand. Considering the nature of the misconduct and the presence of several mitigating circumstances, the Supreme Court agreed that a public reprimand was an appropriate sanction and publicly reprimanded Schatz.View "In re Complaint Against Schatz" on Justia Law

Greg Bell and his attorney, Philip Cramer, were party and counsel in court proceedings originating from an appropriation action filed by the Madison County Board of Commissioners against Bell and his wife to acquire a sewer easement on Bell’s property. The court of common pleas held that the Board was entitled to an easement. Thereafter, Bell, through Cramer, filed a complaint asserting various causes of action related to the appropriation case. The case was dismissed the case based on res judicata. Thereafter, Bell, represented by Cramer, filed an action for a writ of mandamus requesting that the court of appeals order the Board to provide him with due process in the taking of his real property rights and to comply with a consent agreement. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Thereafter, the Board filed a motion for sanctions against Bell and Cramer. The court of appeals granted the motion for sanctions in the amount of $21,137, concluding that Bell and Cramer had engaged in frivolous conduct. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the mandamus action was clearly frivolous and adversely affected the Board, and the fees awarded were reasonable. View "State ex rel. Bell v. Madison County Bd. of Comm’rs" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of sixteen federal felony offenses arising from actions he took while acting as the mayor of Bridgeport. After his release from prison, Defendant applied for reinstatement to the bar. The local standing committee issued a report in which it concluded that Defendant was fit to practice law and recommended that he be reinstated. The trial court denied Defendant’s application, concluding that the record did not substantiate a finding of good moral character and fitness to practice law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly concluded that the standing committee abused its discretion when it determined that Defendant was presently fit to practice law and recommended his reinstatement.View "State Grievance Comm. v. Ganim" on Justia Law

This case involves the payment of attorney's fees and expenses to attorneys, Appellant Tara Dawn Shurling and co-counsel, who were court-appointed to represent an indigent charged with multiple criminal offenses. Shurling was appointed to represent an indigent defendant in a criminal prosecution for murder, assault with intent to kill, criminal conspiracy, possession of a weapon during a violent crime, and possession of marijuana. Shurling sought approval for her fees and expenses to exceed the statutory caps provided by the South Carolina Indigent Defense Act. The trial court determined that the initial funding order precluded an award for the fees and expenses sought by appointed counsel, which total $46,388.66. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "South Carolina v. Hackshaw" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this action for attorney deceit against Defendants. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the lawsuit was precluded by the three-year limitations period in N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214(2). Plaintiff argued that his action was timely because the applicable statute of limitations was the six-year period in N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213(1). Supreme Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the applicable statute of limitations was the three-year period in section 214(2) but that Defendants were equitably estopped from asserting this defense. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed Plaintiff’s amended complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that claims for attorney deceit are subject to the six-year statute of limitations in section 213(1).View "Melcher v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP" on Justia Law

A client sued his lawyer for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, and professional negligence in a fee agreement dispute. After a jury found in favor of the lawyer and judgment was entered, the client appealed, arguing that the superior court erred by issuing certain jury instructions regarding contract interpretation and by denying the client's motion for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that any error in the superior court's jury instructions was not prejudicial, and affirmed the superior court's decision to deny the client's post-trial motions because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find for the lawyer on each of the claims. View "Zamarello v. Reges" on Justia Law

The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) petitioned for the interim suspension of Wayne Circuit Court Judge Wade H. McCree without pay. With respect to Count I, an appointed special master concluded that respondent should have disqualified himself from a felony nonsupport case as soon as he began a sexual relationship with the complaining witness in the case. With respect to Count II, the master found that respondent had lied to the prosecuting attorney’s office when he reported that the witness was stalking him and trying to extort money from him. With respect to Count III, the master concluded that respondent had improperly acted in another criminal case, one that involved the witness' uncle. With respect to Count IV, the master found that although many of the text messages that respondent exchanged with the witness while he was on the bench were inappropriate, they were used in a private context and did not rise to the level of judicial misconduct. Finally, the master found that the misrepresentations alleged in Count V did not warrant action by the JTC. The JTC recommended that respondent be removed from office, and conditionally suspended without pay for six years. The Supreme Court granted the petition. View "In re McCree" on Justia Law

In 1991, a group of flight attendants initiated a class action suit against several tobacco companies. The suit resulted in a settlement agreement. Subsequently, the Flight Attendant Medical Research Institute (FAMRI) was formed, and several of the flight attendants who were part of the class action became members of FAMRI’s board, including Patricia Young and Alani Blissard. Thereafter, several flight attendants filed individual suits against the tobacco companies. Steve Hunter and Philip Gerson were among the attorneys who represented the flight attendants. In 2010, a group of attorneys, including Gerson and Hunter, filed a petition against FAMRI on behalf of some of the flight attendants who were part of the original class, seeking an accounting of FAMRI’s funds and requesting that the settlement funds be dispersed directly to their clients. Young, Blissard and FAMRI moved to disqualify the attorneys on the ground of conflict of interest. The trial court entered an order disqualifying several attorneys, including Hunter and Gerson. The Third District Court of Appeals quashed the trial court’s order. The Supreme Court quashed the Third District’s decision and reinstated the trial court’s disqualification order, holding that disqualification was warranted in this case.View "Young v. Achenbauch" on Justia Law

The State charged real party in interest Jihad Zogheib with several crimes. Steven Wolfson, who was a criminal defense attorney before being appointed to the elective office he currently held, was appointed district attorney. Zogheib moved to disqualify the district attorney’s office based on a conflict of interest because an attorney in Wolfson’s former law firm represented Zogheib in the instant case. The district court disqualified the district attorney’s office, concluding that there was a conflict of interest between Wolfson and Zogheib and that the conflict should be imputed to the office because the appearance of impropriety warranted vicarious disqualification even though Wolfson had been screened from participating in the case. The Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for writ of mandamus, holding (1) the appearance-of-impropriety was the incorrect standard to apply, and the more appropriate standard was whether Wolfson’s conflict of interest would render it unlikely that Defendant would receive a fair trial unless the conflict was imputed to the prosecutor’s office; and (2) regardless of which standard is applied, the district court acted arbitrarily or capriciously in granting Zogheib’s motion to disqualify the district attorney’s office.View "State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Respondent Wickham Corwin, judge in the East Central Judicial District, objected to the Judicial Conduct Commission's findings that he violated provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct and its recommendation that he be suspended for two months, without net pay, and be assessed the costs and expenses of the disciplinary proceedings. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded there was clear and convincing evidence Judge Corwin violated N.D. Code Jud. Conduct Canons 3(C)(1), and N.D. Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3(C)(2). The Court ordered Judge Corwin be suspended from his position as district judge for one month without pay effective December 1, 2014, and that he be assessed costs and expenses of the disciplinary proceedings. View "Judicial Conduct Commission v. Corwin" on Justia Law