Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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In this case, Andre Pugh appealed his conviction for the murder of his wife and the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Pugh challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained via a search warrant for his cell phone records. He also alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging the search warrant's specificity and that his counsel during his motion for a new trial was ineffective in various respects.The Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed with Pugh's claims and affirmed his conviction. The court found that the search warrant in question was supported by probable cause. The warrant was based on Pugh's unusual behavior at the crime scene, his relationship with the victim, inconsistencies between his statements and the evidence at the scene, and evidence suggesting that the crime was committed by someone familiar with the residence.The court also rejected Pugh's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. It found that the claims Pugh wanted his trial counsel to raise would not have been successful. Additionally, it determined that Pugh's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during his motion for a new trial were procedurally barred. View "PUGH v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a federal habeas corpus petition by Raymond Anthony Lewis, who was sentenced to death in 1991 after a California jury convicted him of the first-degree murder of Sandra Simms. Lewis argued that the state trial court's admission of his juvenile confession to a prior murder was unconstitutional and that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present evidence of his innocence of the prior murder. The court concluded that the California Supreme Court's affirmance of the trial court's admission of Lewis's juvenile confession was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law and that Lewis's trial counsel’s litigation of the evidence of the prior murder did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.Lewis also contended that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to investigate, develop, and present certain mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of the trial. The court found that Lewis failed to show that his trial counsel’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard. His counsel made reasonable strategic decisions to ask for the jury’s mercy and to appeal to any lingering doubt the jurors may have had about Lewis’s guilt. The court also concluded that much of the evidence Lewis argued his trial counsel was ineffective in not introducing would have been cumulative of evidence his counsel did introduce.Lewis also raised uncertified claims on appeal, but the court denied a certificate of appealability on these claims. View "LEWIS V. ANDES" on Justia Law

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Claude P. Lacombe appealed the United States District Court for the District of Delaware's denial of habeas relief, arguing that the Delaware Supreme Court wrongfully denied his claims that the State breached its plea agreement and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to demand specific performance of the plea agreement. Lacombe had pleaded guilty to several counts, including second-degree murder, in exchange for the State's agreement to recommend a sentence of 22 years. Instead, Lacombe received a life sentence. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's denial of habeas relief. The Court held that even if the State breached its plea agreement and Lacombe's counsel was ineffective, any constitutional error was harmless under Brecht, Strickland, and Puckett v. United States, as Lacombe could not establish that he suffered "actual prejudice" as a result of the State's rhetoric and his counsel's failure to object. The court did not decide whether the State actually breached the plea agreement, citing that a failure to show either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats an ineffectiveness claim. View "Lacombe v. Warden" on Justia Law

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In the case of Robert Wharton, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office conceded that Wharton's death sentence should be vacated without conducting a comprehensive investigation into evidence against Wharton’s habeas claim. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that the office did not disclose key facts about the claim, leading the District Court to find misconduct and impose mild sanctions.Wharton had been sentenced to death for terrorizing and ultimately murdering a family over a disputed debt. On appeal, the Third Circuit ordered an evidentiary hearing on whether Wharton's counsel was ineffective for not investigating prison records or presenting evidence showing that Wharton had adjusted well to prison life. However, before this hearing could take place, the District Attorney’s Office filed a notice of concession. The District Court did not accept the concession and appointed the Pennsylvania Attorney General as amicus curiae to investigate Wharton’s prison adjustment.The court found that the District Attorney’s Office violated Rule 11(b)(3) by failing to investigate the facts of Wharton's case reasonably and by failing to communicate adequately with the victims' family. Consequently, the court ordered District Attorney Larry Krasner to apologize in writing to the victims' family members and to provide a "full, balanced explanation" of the facts when conceding federal habeas cases in the future. This case highlights the importance of conducting thorough investigations and maintaining honesty and forthrightness in court procedures. View "Wharton v. Graterford" on Justia Law

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This case involves an appeal from a judgment of conviction for second-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon. The appellant, Jamel Gibbs, was convicted following a trial during which a recorded phone call between him and a defense investigator was admitted as evidence. Gibbs was in pretrial detention at the time of the call, which was made on a recorded line using another inmate's phone access code and a three-way calling system.Gibbs argued that the recorded phone call was protected by attorney-client privilege and should not have been admitted into evidence. The district court ruled against him, reasoning that the conversation was not privileged because Gibbs violated jail policy by using another inmate's phone access code and making a three-way call.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada disagreed with the district court's ruling. The court held that a defendant’s call to a defense investigator, even if made through a three-way call, does not, on its own, amount to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege unless it can be shown that the third party remained present during the conversation. The court also found that violating jail telephone policies does not automatically result in a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. As such, the district court erred in admitting the recorded phone call into evidence.Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded that this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the recorded phone call directly undermined Gibbs's planned defense strategy and necessitated a change in strategy at the start of trial. Therefore, the judgment of conviction was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial. View "Gibbs v. State" on Justia Law

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In South Dakota, defendant Tashina Abraham-Medved was charged with unauthorized ingestion of a controlled substance. After pleading guilty, her attorney requested to withdraw from the case due to a "serious breakdown of communication" between him and Abraham-Medved. The circuit court denied the request, arguing that as the case was set for sentencing there was little communication left to do.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota found that the circuit court erred in denying the motion to withdraw without allowing Abraham-Medved or her attorney an opportunity to establish good cause for the request. The court held that when there is a request for substitute counsel, the circuit court must at least inquire about the reasons for such requests. By failing to do so, the court abused its discretion.Furthermore, the court found that the defendant was prejudiced by this decision as her attorney did not present any sentencing recommendation or argument. Instead, Abraham-Medved spoke on her own behalf. Given the lack of engagement from the attorney, the court found there was a reasonable probability that a different sentence might have been imposed had the attorney properly advocated on Abraham-Medved's behalf.As a result, the court reversed Abraham-Medved’s sentence and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing. View "State V. Abraham-Medved" on Justia Law

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This case originates from the Supreme Court of Ohio and concerns a defendant, Tyler Wilson, who was charged with attempted murder and felonious assault. The charges stemmed from an altercation at a gas station where Wilson fired a gun out his car window to scare off the other party involved in the dispute. Wilson claimed he acted in self-defense, but the trial court determined that he was not entitled to a self-defense jury instruction because he did not intend to harm or kill the other party. Wilson was found guilty of felonious assault, but not attempted murder.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the lower court’s decision, ruling that an individual does not need to intend to harm or kill another person to be entitled to a self-defense jury instruction in a criminal trial. The court found that Wilson’s testimony supported the intent element for self-defense and that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to request a self-defense jury instruction. As such, the court vacated Wilson’s conviction and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

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In this case, a Georgia Supreme Court decision, the defendant, Remond Sinkfield, was convicted of felony murder and other crimes related to the death of Levi Atkinson. Atkinson died after either jumping or being pushed out of a moving vehicle during an altercation with Sinkfield. The vehicle was then struck by another car.Sinkfield appealed the convictions arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for felony murder and theft, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress a pretrial interview by police, and that the trial court committed plain error in several ways. Moreover, Sinkfield claimed that he was denied effective assistance of counsel due to his trial counsel's deficiencies, including by failing to retain a medical expert to testify as to the cause of Atkinson's death.The Supreme Court of Georgia rejected all of these claims and affirmed the convictions. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support Sinkfield's convictions, that the trial court did not commit plain error, and that Sinkfield was not denied effective assistance of counsel. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in various evidentiary rulings. View "SINKFIELD v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

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This case involves two appeals from rulings in a pretrial order related to the indictment of John Ledbetter for two separate murders. The State appeals the trial court's decision to grant Ledbetter’s motion to suppress evidence provided by Ledbetter’s former attorney, Dennis Scheib, to law enforcement, asserting the information was protected by attorney-client privilege. Ledbetter cross-appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress cell phone records obtained through two search warrants.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed both orders. The court found that the trial court properly granted Ledbetter's motion to suppress evidence provided by Scheib, holding that Ledbetter’s attorney-client privilege had been violated by Scheib’s disclosures to Detective Leonpacher. The court also held that the trial court order did not suppress physical evidence provided by Scheib or "derivative evidence", but rather prohibited the State from presenting evidence to the jury that Scheib, Ledbetter’s attorney, was the source of the physical evidence given to law enforcement.Regarding Ledbetter's cross-appeal, the court concluded that the trial court correctly denied Ledbetter’s motion to suppress his cell phone records. The court found that the search warrants were supported by probable cause and rejected Ledbetter's various challenges to the warrants. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court's pretrial order in its entirety. View "THE STATE v. LEDBETTER" on Justia Law

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In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the petitioner, Monta Anderson, sought to vacate his guilty plea for conspiring to distribute heroin, claiming that his plea was not knowing and voluntary due to his counsel's alleged ineffective assistance. Anderson argued that his counsel advised him to plead guilty without first consulting a toxicology expert on whether the heroin he distributed was a but-for cause of a user's death. Previously, the court had remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing, concluding that Anderson had articulated a viable claim of attorney ineffectiveness.On remand, Anderson presented evidence that consultation with a toxicology expert would have revealed the government's inability to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the heroin he supplied was a but-for cause of the user's death. However, the government argued that even without the death-results enhancement, Anderson would have faced a mandatory life term due to his prior felony drug convictions and the fact that two individuals suffered serious bodily injuries from overdosing on heroin supplied by Anderson.Having considered the evidence and arguments, the court concluded that Anderson was not prejudiced by any alleged ineffectiveness of his counsel. Even if the death-results enhancement were discounted, Anderson still faced a mandatory life term due to his prior felony drug conviction and the serious bodily injuries caused by his heroin distribution. As such, his decision to plead guilty and accept a 20-year sentence was reasonable. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment denying Anderson's motion to vacate his guilty plea. View "Anderson v. United States" on Justia Law