Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Law firm Petway Olsen, LLC, petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to set aside its order granting the motion filed by Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC ("MBUSA"), seeking to disqualify the firm from representing the plaintiffs in the underlying case and to enter an order allowing the firm to represent the plaintiffs. In 2017, Valisha Cartwell was driving a 1998 Mercedes ML320. As she was pulling into a parking space in front a dental office operated by Vital Smiles Alabama, P.C., the vehicle suddenly accelerated and crashed into the front of the dental office, killing a six-year-old child and injuring others. Grelinda Lee, as personal representative of the child's estate, sued Cartwell and the owner of the Mercedes ML320 (and other fictitiously named defendants) for wrongful death. An amended complaint added Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC. The second amended complaint was signed by D. Bruce Petway of Petway Olsen and included the names of other attorneys with different law firms who were also representing the plaintiffs. Both Mercedes-Benz U.S. International, Inc. ("MBUSI") and MBUSA asserted as a defense that Petway Olsen was "disqualified [from representing the plaintiffs] because one of its members [was] a former in-house attorney and general counsel for MBUSI." After review, the Supreme Court determined the trial court erred when it granted MBUSA's motion to disqualify Petway Olsen from representing the plaintiffs. The petition for mandamus relief was granted and the trial court directed to vacate its previous order granting MBUSA's motion. View "Ex parte Petway Olsen, LLC." on Justia Law

Automation Support filed suit against its former employees and one employee's new company, Humble Design, under the Texas Theft Liability Act (TTLA). After a year and a half of litigation in the district court, the parties agreed to voluntarily dismiss all claims with prejudice. In the joint stipulation, Defendants Humble Design and Warren Humble reserved the right to seek attorney's fees under the TTLA, which is a "loser pays" law. The magistrate judge awarded the fees.In 2018, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the magistrate judge's decision and remanded for the district court to award appellate attorney's fees. The court also dismissed for lack of jurisdiction Automation Support's appeal. The current appeal concerns Automation Support's most recent motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b), in which Automation Support again argued that the magistrate judge did not have jurisdiction to award attorney's fees. The magistrate judge denied the motion in March 2020, and this appeal is timely only as to the order denying that Rule 60 motion. Automation Support cannot appeal the underlying judgment that issued years ago.To the extent Automation Support argues that defendants were not prevailing parties, the court has already rejected that argument. The court rejected Automation Support's new contention that the Rule 41 joint dismissal deprived the district court of jurisdiction to later award fees. Because Automation Support has inundated the district court and this court with frivolous filings, and because of its bad-faith refusal to recognize what the court held three years ago, defendants may file a motion with this court for appellate attorney's fees under 28 U.S.C. 1927. The court once against affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Automation Support, Inc. v. Humble Design, LLC" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review in this interlocutory appeal was whether the district court abused its discretion in disqualifying the Fourth Judicial District Attorney's office. Erica Arellano was charged with second degree murder for shooting and killing her boyfriend, M.H. Arellano claimed that, during the relationship, M.H. perpetrated domestic violence on her and that self-defense would be a critical issue and the crux of Arellano’s defense. A.H. was an employee of the district attorney’s office and was married to, but separated from, M.H. at the time of his death. A.H. was a potentially significant witness in this case because she had (and already provided to the district attorney’s office) information tending to undermine Arellano’s claim of self-defense. In light of A.H.’s relationship with the district attorney’s office and the significance of her testimony to this case, Arellano filed a motion to disqualify the district attorney’s office under section 20-1-107(2), C.R.S. (2020). The district court held a hearing on this motion and, in a lengthy and detailed bench ruling, found that, on the facts presented, special circumstances existed making it unlikely that Arellano could receive a fair trial. The court thus granted Arellano’s motion to disqualify. The State then filed this interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court determined the district court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying the district attorney's office, thus affirming the court's order and remanding this case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Arellano" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review in this interlocutory appeal was whether the district court abused its discretion in disqualifying the Fifth Judicial District Attorney's office. The district attorney and the elected coroner of Lake County, Colorado, Shannon Kent, did not get along. Brown prosecuted Kent for perjury, a class 4 felony, and second degree official misconduct, a class 1 petty offense. After the case had been pending for approximately nine months, Kent filed a motion to disqualify Brown’s office, arguing that he was unlikely to receive a fair trial based on Brown’s personal interest in the case and the existence of special circumstances. Following briefing and an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted the motion. The trial court determined each special circumstance, “in and of itself,” did not warrant disqualification, but “viewed as a totality,” sufficed for the exceptional remedy sought by Kent. The Supreme Court determined the district attorney's office should not have been disqualified, finding the trial court failed to adequately explain how the circumstances in question, though individually inadequate to warrant disqualification, justified the extraordinary relief requested when considered together. "And the record before us reflects that Kent plainly failed to satisfy his burden of establishing that he would be unlikely to receive a fair trial if Brown’s office continues prosecuting this case. ... Even assuming the circumstances at issue 'may cast doubt' upon Brown’s 'motives and strategies' in this case, 'they do not play a part in whether [Kent] will receive a fair trial.'" View "Colorado v. Kent" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court considered the amended recommendation of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (“Commission”) that now-former District Court Judge Ryan Kamada be sanctioned by public censure for violations of the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct that occurred while he was serving as a judicial officer. The recommendation concludes that then-Judge Kamada’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct: Canon 1, Rule 1.1(A) (requiring a judge to comply with the law), Rule 1.2 (requiring a judge to act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the judiciary), Rule 1.3 (prohibiting abuse of the prestige of judicial office); Canon 2, Rule 2.9 (prohibiting ex parte communications), Rule 2.10 (prohibiting judicial statements on pending cases); and Canon 3, (prohibiting the intentional disclosure of nonpublic judicial information). Having considered the full record, the Supreme Court concluded the Commission properly found that then-Judge Kamada violated numerous provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Had Kamada not already resigned his position, removal from office would have been an appropriate sanction for his misconduct. Because he has resigned, the Court concurred with the Commission’s recommendation that Kamada should have been publicly censured. View "In the Matter of Ryan L. Kamada" on Justia Law

At issue before the Michigan Supreme Court in this case was whether defendant, Troy Antonio Brown, was entitled to a new trial because the detective who conducted defendant’s police interview testified falsely against him. The Court concluded: (1) the detective’s testimony against defendant was false; (2) the prosecutor failed to correct the false testimony; and (3) there was a reasonable likelihood that the uncorrected false testimony affected the judgment of the jury. Therefore, judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, defendant’s conviction was vacated, and the matter remanded to the trial court for a new trial. View "Michigan v. Brown" on Justia Law

This case involved a fee dispute between two attorneys arising from a purported fee-sharing agreement. The underlying case involved an airman in the U.S. Air Force who was injured while driving through Idaho on his way to a posting in Alaska. The airman hired an Alaska attorney, Stephen Merrill, to represent him in pursuit of his personal-injury claims in Idaho. Merrill associated Erik Smith, an Idaho attorney, to act as local counsel in the airman’s suits. At a point in the proceedings, the airman terminated Merrill’s representation. Smith ultimately settled the case and retained the entire attorney fee. Merrill then sued Smith seeking his proportionate share of the fee. Smith moved for summary judgment which was granted by the district court. Merrill appeals. After review of the trial court record, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Smith: Smith failed to meet his burden as the moving party on summary judgment. "When Smith filed his motion for summary judgment, he alleged that it was undisputed that there was no agreement reached between the parties, written or oral. This bald assertion contradicted the crux of Merrill’s complaint that the agreement about fee sharing had been reached over the course of the email correspondence. However, Smith did not support this assertion by presenting evidence or by citing to any admissible evidence in this record." View "Merrill v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the Estate's motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(1)(A). This action stemmed from a legal malpractice action against DLG, alleging that DLG had failed to fully advise the deceased of the consequences of filing for judicial dissolution.The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting defendant's expert's responses to defense counsel's hypothetical questions regarding standard of care. The court explained that the expert's testimony did not add factual bases to support his opinion beyond what his supplemental expert opinion disclosed. Furthermore, any error in admitting the testimony was harmless in light of its minimal prejudice. View "Estate of Douglas M. West v. Domina Law Group, PC LLO" on Justia Law

In this original action involving a dispute between two judges who sit on the Sandusky County Court the Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ of prohibition that vacated Judge John Kolesar's judgment entry vacating Judge Mary Elizabeth Fiser's judgment entries granting pay raises to certain personnel, holding that Judge Kolesar's vacating entry arose from an exercise of judicial power that he patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to exercise.Shortly after Judge Fiser issued entries granting pay raises to court personnel Judge Kolesar, who serves as the court's administrative judge, issued a judgment entry vacating Judge Fiser's entries and forbidding pay raises and the expenditure of court resources that did not have his approval. Judge Fiser sought a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Kolesar from enforcing his entry, and Judge Kolesar sought a writ of prohibition to prohibit Judge Fiser from making future entries that infringe on his powers as administrative judge. The Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ of prohibition that vacated Judge Kolesar's vacating entry, holding that Judge Kolesar patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to issue his vacating entry. View "State ex rel. Fiser v. Kolesar" on Justia Law

VeriPic, and its CEO, Kwan, sued a competitor, Foray, and affiliated individuals, including Foray’s president, Hennings, alleging business disparagement. Before trial, Foray and Hennings moved for sanctions against the plaintiffs’ former counsel, the Grellas law firm, seeking monetary sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030(a), for misuse of the discovery process. The trial court sua sponte issued an order to show cause ordering the plaintiffs and Grellas to show why sanctions should not issue for “egregious and deliberate” “litigation abuse” in their filings. All the defendants subsequently moved for sanctions. The court ultimately ordered various sanctions against Kwan and VeriPic, including dismissal with prejudice of VeriPic’s remaining claims, for plaintiffs’ fraud on the court. However, the court denied the defendants’ motion for monetary sanctions against plaintiffs and Grellas for misuse of the discovery process.The court of appeal reversed in part, finding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the request for monetary sanctions against VeriPic and Kwan. The defendants have not carried their burden of showing error by the trial court in declining to impose sanctions on Grellas. There is no substantial evidence that Grellas advised the plaintiffs to engage in the misuse of the discovery process. View "Kwan Software Engineering, Inc. v. Hennings" on Justia Law