Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Dat was born in a Kenyan refugee camp in 1993. Admitted to the U.S. around 1994, he became a lawful permanent resident. Dat pled guilty to robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951, and was sentenced to 78 months' imprisonment. Dat’s robbery conviction is a deportable offense, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Dat moved to vacate his guilty plea, claiming that his attorney, Allen, assured him that his immigration status would not be affected by his plea. Allen testified that she repeatedly told Dat the charges were “deportable offenses,” that she never told him, his mother, or his fiancée that he would not be deported. that she encouraged Dat to hire an immigration attorney, and that they reviewed the Plea Petition, which says that non-citizens would be permanently removed from the U.S. if found guilty of most felony offenses. The Plea Agreement refers to immigration consequences. Dat and Allen also reviewed the PSR, which stated that immigration proceedings would commence after his release from custody.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, finding that Dat was not denied effective assistance of counsel. It was objectively reasonable for Allen to tell Dat that he “could” face immigration ramifications that “could” result in deportation. An alien with a deportable conviction may still seek “relief from removal. These “immigration law complexities” should caution any defense attorney not to advise a defendant considering a guilty plea that the result of a post-conviction, contested removal proceeding is certain. View "Dat v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Judicial Conduct Commission finding misconduct on the part of Judge Dawn M. Gentry and ordered that she be removed from office as a circuit judge for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Fifth Division, a Family Court division serving Kenton County, holding that there was no error warranting reversal of the Commission's final order.The Commission brought a twelve-count formal proceeding against Judge Gentry alleging that she had used her judicial role to coerce attorneys who served as guardians ad litem in her court to support her campaign, had asked in the courtroom for a yard sign placement, and had utilized court staff to perform campaign work during work hours. Ultimately, the Commission entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law and final order finding that Judge Gentry had violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and engaged in the misconduct alleged in ten of the twelve counts charged and determining that removal was the appropriate sanction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on Judge Gentry's numerous violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and her misconduct in office, the sanction of removal was appropriate. View "Gentry v. Judicial Conduct Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of fact, conclusions of law and final order issuing a public reprimand against Beth Lewis Maze, Judge of the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit, Second Division, holding that the Judicial Conduct Commission appropriately issued a public reprimand.Judge Maze inappropriately intervened in her ex-husband's criminal case and then self-reported to the Commission. Ultimately, Judge Maze was criminally indicted for two counts of forgery and one count of tampering with public records, and the Commission brought six counts of judicial misconduct against her. After a hearing, the Commission found that Judge Maze violated SCR 4.020(1)(B)(i) and that her acts constituted misconduct in office and violated SCR 4.300, Kentucky's Code of Judicial Conduct. The Supreme Court held that the Commission appropriately issued a public reprimand under the circumstances. View "Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission" on Justia Law

In September 2014, prior to the request for the records at issue in this case, the Abolitionist Law Center published a report which alleged a causal connection between the ill health of inmates at SCI-Fayette, and the facility’s proximity to a fly ash dumpsite. In response to the report, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) coordinated with the Department of Health (DOH) to investigate the allegations (the No Escape Investigation). Reporter Christine Haines of The Herald Standard (Appellees) sent an e-mail Right-to-Know-Law (RTKL) request to the DOC seeking documentation of inmate illnesses. The DOC denied Appellees' request in its entirety, citing several exceptions under Section 708(b) of the RTKL, as well as attorney-client privilege and deliberative process privilege grounds. Then in December 2014, in-house counsel for the DOC disclosed fifteen pages of records to Appellees. Appellees asked DOC to verify that its December disclosure was a complete response. Several additional records were subsequently released, but implicitly, the records released were the DOC's response. In February 2015, Appellees filed a petition for enforcement with the Commonwealth Court, seeking statutory sanctions and attorney fees alleging DOC demonstrated bad faith in responding to the request for records. The court identified records that the DOC should have provided. But because the panel could not discern the full extent of any non-compliance by DOC, the panel directed the parties to file a stipulation as to the disclosure status of court-identified five classes of records. Appellees' motion was thus denied without prejudice, and the court reserved judgment on the issue of bad faith sanctions. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted appeal in this matter to consider the assessment of sanctions and fees based on the Commonwealth Court's finding of bad faith and willful and wanton behavior. The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed, finding that Section 1304(a0(1) of the RTKL “permit[s] recovery of attorney fees when the receiving agency determination is reversed, and it deprived a requester of access to records in bad faith.” View "Uniontown Newspaper, et al v. PA Dept of Cor." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a medical malpractice action in which appellees Nancy Raynor, Esq. and Raynor & Associates served as defense counsel for Dr. Jeffrey Gellar and Roxborough Emergency Physician Associates (collectively Roxborough). Rosalind Sutch, executrix of the estate of Rosalind Wilson (decedent), and her counsel in that lawsuit, Messa & Associates, P.C. was plaintiff in the suit. Joseph Messa, Jr., Esq. (collectively, the Messa appellants) were Sutch's counsel. In July 2009, Sutch filed a medical malpractice action alleging, among other things, Roxborough failed to obtain a CT scan and timely diagnose decedent’s lung cancer. The trial court granted Sutch’s pre-trial motion in limine, and defendants were precluded “from presenting any evidence, testimony, and/or argument regarding decedent’s smoking history” at trial. During trial, Sutch’s counsel requested an order from the trial judge directing Raynor to inform witnesses of the ban on testimony regarding decedent’s smoking history before taking the stand. The court did not issue the requested order; upon questioning, the defense expert testified the decedent was a smoker, was hypertensive, and had vascular disease. The witness did not recollect having a discussion with Raynor regarding mentioning the decedent's smoking. Plaintiff's counsel asked for a mistrial and/or sanctions. The trial judge denied the request for a mistrial and instead provided a curative instruction to the jury. At the end of trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Sutch. Appellants filed post-trial motions seeking a new trial as well as an order holding Raynor in contempt and awarding sanctions in the aggregate amount of counsel fees and costs for the first trial ($1,349,063.67). The court granted the motion for a new trial. The court found Raynor to be in civil contempt and issued an order for sanctions in the amount of $946,195.16 to be divided among appellants. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed whether the Superior Court properly determined a request for contempt sanctions against opposing counsel raised in a post-trial motion in a lawsuit where neither counsel was a named party, constituted actionable “civil proceedings” under the Dragonetti Act. The Supreme Court concluded that intra-case filings, such as the subject post-trial motion for contempt and/or sanctions, did not constitute the “procurement, initiation or continuation of civil proceedings” as contemplated under the Dragonetti Act. The Superior Court erred when it held otherwise. View "Raynor v. D'Annunzio" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that defendant—who lost the only cause of action in the case—was the prevailing party. The court rejected both parties' arguments based on the definition of prevailing party in the attorney fees provision in their contract, explaining that any such definition would not trump the definition of prevailing party in Civil Code section 1717. The court also concluded that the trial court's consideration of the parties' settlement offers in determining which party achieved the greater relief under section 1717's definition of prevailing party was contrary to precedent. The court rejected defendant's argument that it prevailed because it admitted it owed plaintiff a portion of the contractual damages plaintiff was seeking, and the jury's lump sum award was for less than plaintiff's damages claim at trial. The court explained that defendant's argument is inconsistent with section 1717, subdivision (b)(2), under which a defendant who owes a debt becomes a prevailing party by tendering to the plaintiff the full amount owed and alleging such tender in the defendant's answer. The court reversed the amended judgment only insofar as it orders plaintiff to pay defendant's attorney fees. The court affirmed in all other respects, remanding for further proceedings. View "Waterwood Enterprises, LLC v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court adopted the recommendations from the Judicial Standards Commission that Edwin D. Clontz, a Judge of the General Court of Justice, District Court Division, Judicial District Twenty-Eight, be publicly reprimanded, holding that the Commission's findings and recommendation of public reprimand were appropriate.After a disciplinary hearing, the Commission made findings of fact and conclusions of law and recommended that the Supreme Court publicly reprimand Judge Clontz for conduct in violation of Canons 2A and 3A(4) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-376. The Supreme Court held (1) the Commission's findings of fact were supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and there was no error in the Commission's conclusions; and (2) Judge Clontz must be publicly reprimanded. View "In re Clontz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court ordered that Court of Appeals Judge Hunter Murphy should be censured for violations of Canons 1, 2B, 3A(3), and 3B(2) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct amounting to conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-376(b), holding that censure was appropriate.The Judicial Standards Commission recommended that Judge Murphy be censured based on its findings of fact and conclusions of law. After reviewing the record and transcript, the Supreme Court concluded that the Commission's findings of fact and conclusions of law were supported by clear and convincing evidence and that the judge's conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice and denigrated the reputation and integrity of the judiciary as a whole. Therefore, the Supreme Court ordered that Judge Murphy be censured. View "In re Murphy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of first degree murder and sentence of life imprisonment, holding that the per se improper political activity of the prosecutor campaigning for a judicial position during trial so infected the integrity of the proceeding as to warrant a new trial.This was Defendant's third trial for the murder of Jesse Hamilton. The first conviction was reversed on appeal, and a mistrial occurred on remand. After a third trial, Defendant was again convicted of murder. Prosecutor Stephanie Barrett prosecuted the case, and at the time of the third trial, Barrett was campaigning for a position in the Arkansas Court of Appeals. Defendant moved for a mistrial based on an appearance of impropriety. The motion was denied. Following his conviction, Defendant appealed the circuit court's decisions related to the prosecutor's campaigning and solicitation of signatures at the courthouse. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the prosecutor's improper political activity and the failure of the trial court to resolve the situation so compromised the integrity of Defendant's trial as to warrant a new trial. The Court remanded the case for a fourth trial. View "Stanton v. State" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, Michael Mitchell, Chief Indigent Defender for the Office of Public Defender for East Baton Rouge Parish, filed a “Motion to Withdraw from Current Appointments and to Decline Future Appointments” in 2018 in each of these Nineteenth Judicial District Court (“19th JDC”), Section VI cases. Mitchell alleged that long term chronic underfunding of the public defender’s office had necessitated the implementation of “service restriction protocols,” pursuant to La. Administrative Code, Title 22, Section 1701 et seq., and led to the elimination of a number of attorney and support staff positions. Mitchell asserted that the consequent increase in the workloads of the remaining attorneys could potentially create conflicts of interest, as counsel might have to allot more time to one case over another, and could potentially cause ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct. In response (which were confined to 19th JDC, Section VI cases), the State filed motions for dismissal of the motions for withdrawal and Daubert objections to expert testimony relative to the La. Project since it was based on the “Delphi Method,” contending, inter alia, that the Delphi Method produced unreliable generalized conclusions about the Louisiana public defender system and, further, that Louisiana v. Peart, 621 So.2d 780 (La. 1993), required individualized findings as to whether there has been ineffective assistance of counsel in each specific case. The district court ruled in favor of the State, implicitly finding that any remedy related to chronic underfunding of the public defender system was within the exclusive purview of the Louisiana Legislature and was outside the parameters of what the court had the authority to fashion; however, the court stated that it would consider any individual motions to withdraw from, or to decline, representation on a case-by-case basis. Thereafter, the appellate court granted the district public defender’s writ application, in part, to reverse the district court’s denial of the motions to withdraw, to vacate the district court orders appointing the public defender in the remaining ongoing consolidated cases, and to grant the request to allow the named public defenders to withdraw from future representation of indigent defendants “until the caseloads are no greater than 100% of his or her annual capacity.” The Louisiana Supreme Court found the appellate court's conclusion was reached without evidence of the specific factual details surrounding the work performance of the individual assistant public defenders: "the question of whether assistance of counsel has been constitutionally ineffective cannot be answered without a detailed examination of the specific facts and circumstances of the representation provided by counsel to the individual defendant. Therefore, the appellate court erred in reversing the district court and ruling in favor of Mr. Mitchell." The district court's rulings were reinstated. View "Louisiana v. Covington" on Justia Law