Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Appellants, with a $594,000 Small Business Administration loan, bought a Harrisburg, Pennsylvania property that became a pub. They executed a note, mortgage, and unconditional guarantees, providing that federal law would control the enforcement of the note and guarantees and that they could not invoke any state or local law to deny their obligations. The Appellants defaulted on the loan and sold the property. The SBA allowed the sale to proceed but declined to release the Appellants from their loan obligations, which were assigned to CBE for collection. The Appellants sued, citing the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681, and the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL). CBE sought sanctions under Federal Rules 11 and 37, arguing that the Appellants brought frivolous claims and disobeyed discovery orders. The Appellants filed an untimely brief opposing sanctions and summary judgment, which did not include the separate responsive statement of material facts required by Local Rule. The district court granted summary judgment and denied the sanctions motions, reasoning that neither FDCPA not UTPCPL applies to commercial debts and the Appellants identified no material facts supporting their other claims. The Third Circuit affirmed and granted CBE FRAP 38 damages. The Appellants filed a brief that was essentially a copy of the one filed in the district court. The substance of their appeal “is as frivolous as its form.” View "Conboy v. United States Small Business Administration" on Justia Law

Now in his sixties, Bridges has been in and out of prison since he was a teenager. After staying out of trouble for eight years, Bridges got involved in drugs again and committed four robberies in two days in 2017. He netted scarcely $700. Charged with four counts of Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951, Bridges agreed to plead guilty, stipulating that he was subject to the career offender enhancement, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, which could apply only if his crimes of conviction were “crimes of violence” under the Guidelines. The enhancement more than doubled his sentencing range. The court imposed a below-guideline sentence of 140 months.Bridges sought postconviction relief, alleging he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his lawyer failed to argue that Hobbs Act robbery did not qualify as a “crime of violence.” At the time, there was no Seventh Circuit precedent on that issue. The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit reversed for an evidentiary hearing on defense counsel’s performance, joining other circuits that have concluded that Hobbs Act robbery is not a Guidelines “crime of violence.” When Bridges pleaded guilty, the building blocks for a successful legal argument were in place. Effective counsel would have considered this important question; minimal research would have uncovered a Tenth Circuit decision holding that Hobbs Act robbery was no longer a crime of violence under a 2016 amendment to the Guideline definition of a crime of violence. View "Bridges v. United States" on Justia Law

Charged in Wisconsin state court with armed robbery and false imprisonment, Saechao retained attorney Kronenwetter. The state charged Alonso-Bermudez and others, based on the same crimes. Those cases proceeded separately. The public defender did not know that Kronenweer was representing Saechao when it appointed him to represent Alonso-Bermudez. Kronenwetter told the judge in Saechao’s prosecution that he was concerned about a potential conflict of interests. After six weeks, he withdrew as Alonso-Bermudez’s lawyer. The public defender named Bachman as his replacement. The Saechao judge wanted an unconditional waiver of any conflict from both defendants. Saechao provided one; Alonso-Bermudez declined. The prosecutor listed Alonso-Bermudez as a potential witness in Saechao’s case; the judge disqualified Kronenwetter. By then Bachman had indicated that Alonso-Bermudez was willing to sign a general waiver but Alonso-Bermudez fired him; the judge thought that Bachman no longer could speak for Alonso-Bermudez. Saechao went to trial with a new lawyer and was convicted. Wisconsin’s appellate court affirmed, rejecting his argument that the judge had violated the Constitution by depriving him of his chosen lawyer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. Wisconsin’s Court of Appeals reasonably applied Supreme Court precedent. The judge had the discretion to disqualify counsel to avoid a serious risk of conflict. and had at least one good reason for disqualification, the fact that Alonso-Bermudez appeared on the prosecution’s witness list. View "Saechao v. Eplett" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's grant of respondents' request for attorney fees under Probate Code section 2640.1, holding that attorney fees are not available where, as here, the matter is resolved without a conservator's appointment. In this case, respondents filed a conservatorship proceeding on their mother's behalf and the case settled before a conservator was appointed. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting respondents' request. View "Brokken v. Brokken" on Justia Law

In 2017, a grand jury indicted Ryan Duke for malice murder and related offenses in connection with the October 2005 death of Tara Grinstead. For approximately 17 months, Duke was represented by a public defender from the Tifton Judicial Circuit’s Public Defender’s Office. Then, in August 2018, Duke’s public defender withdrew from representation and John Merchant and Ashleigh Merchant filed an entry of appearance, indicating that they were representing Duke pro bono. The Georgia Supreme Court granted interlocutory review in this case to determine whether the trial court erred in determining whether Duke had neither a statutory right under the Indigent Defense Act of 2003, nor a constitutional right to state-funded experts and investigators needed to prepare a defense, notwithstanding private counsel as his representation. Contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, the Supreme Court found the IDA allowed an indigent defendant to obtain such ancillary defense services through a contract between pro bono counsel and either the Georgia Public Defender Council (“GPDC”) or the appropriate circuit public defender. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Duke v. Georgia" on Justia Law

When an attorney sues a client for breach of a valid and enforceable fee agreement, the amount of recoverable fees must be determined under the terms of the fee agreement, even if the agreed upon fee exceeds what otherwise would constitute a reasonable fee under the familiar lodestar analysis. To be enforceable, the fee agreement cannot be unconscionable. And, as with every contract, the attorney's performance under the fee agreement must be consistent with the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.The Court of Appeal explained that this requires a court adjudicating a fee dispute to determine, among other things, whether the attorney used reasonable care, skill, and diligence in performing his or her contractual obligations. This standard applies in determining the probable validity of an attorney's claim for breach of an enforceable fee agreement under the attachment statutes. In this case, the court affirmed the trial court's finding that the fee agreements here were valid and that plaintiff had established the probable validity of his claims based on his billing statements, correspondence with defendants, and unrebutted evidence showing defendants disputed only a handful of the billing statements. The court concluded that this evidence was sufficient to support the attachment orders under the standard the court articulated. View "Pech v. Morgan" on Justia Law

This case arose from a two-car accident in Mississippi in which a Hyundai Excel was traveling southbound at a closing speed of 68 to 78 mph and, for reasons unknown, crossed the center line into the oncoming lane of traffic, striking a Lincoln Continental passenger car traveling northbound. None of the three Excel occupants survived the collision. This case made it to the Mississippi Supreme Court after an earlier appeal and remand for a new trial. During the remand proceedings, multiple discovery disputes ensued before the trial court ultimately held two 606(b) hearings on October 30, 2018, and January 23, 2019 (nearly four years after the trial court’s original denial of relief). The trial court expressly found that one of Applewhite’s counsel, Dennis Sweet, III, misrepresented his relationship with a witness, Carey Sparks, during the April 2015 hearing. It was not until a January 25, 2018 hearing, that Sweet admitted that he had paid Sparks to perform services during the Applewhite trial. This admission was made only after documents evidencing multiple payments to Sparks by Sweet surfaced in the discovery ordered by the Supreme Court. During discovery, multiple witnesses, including six attorneys, testified that Sparks stated that he had knowledge of discussions of the jurors during the trial. Following the 606(b) hearings, the trial court issued a one-paragraph order, finding that the posttrial testimony of the jurors offered no evidence supporting Defendants’ allegations. Reviewing the trial court proceedings, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded "a fair and impartial trial was not had." The Court found "overwhelming evidence of actual impropriety, which destroys any confidence in the jury verdict. The facts developed in this record threaten the public’s confidence in our system of justice. We find that this case is permeated by actual deception upon the trial court, which led to Plaintiffs’ obtaining a favorable ruling. Such improper acts of misconduct leave a indelible stain on these proceedings. We are loathe to overturn jury verdicts, yet justice dictates a reversal and a retrial, unencumbered by extraneous assaults on our justice system. We considered the ultimate sanction of dismissal of this case with prejudice. We decline to impose such a severe sanction, for no evidence suggests that any Plaintiff employed Sparks or had knowledge of Sparks’s actions. But the judgment must be reversed." This case was remanded for a new trial. View "Hyundai Motor America, et al. v. Applewhite, et al." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit granted panel rehearing; denied rehearing en banc; withdrew its prior opinion; and substituted the following opinion.Frank Williams, Jr. filed suit in Louisiana state court against his former employer, Lockheed Martin, seeking to recover damages for asbestos-related injuries. After Williams passed away, his children were substituted as plaintiffs. Lockheed Martin removed the case under federal officer removal jurisdiction and the district court granted summary judgment for Lockheed Martin, issuing sanctions against plaintiffs' counsel for improper ex parte communications.The court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the district court properly considered the full state-court record as it existed at the time of removal and Lockheed Martin has met the requirements for federal officer removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(2)(1). In this case, Lockheed Martin alleged the requisite nexus and has stated sufficient facts to make out a colorable Boyle defense. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion with respect to any of the challenged discovery orders.The court applied Louisiana law and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Lockheed Martin on plaintiffs' survival and wrongful death claims. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not err by imposing sanctions on plaintiffs' attorney and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $10,000 in attorney's fees. View "Williams v. Lockheed Martin Corp." on Justia Law

After plaintiff filed suit against defendant and won a judgment for $133,792.11 plus postjudgment interest, plaintiff sought attorney fees of $271,530, which were later increased to $287,640 in the trial court and now to $292,140 in this court. The trial court awarded $90,000 in attorney fees.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's award of attorney fees, concluding that the trial court used sound discretion to limit the attorney fees to $90,000. The trial court began with the conventional lodestar calculation and gave good reasons for concluding that 600 plus hours was reasonable. However, the court reversed the trial court's ruling that plaintiff had no basis to collect the $90,000 award from an insurance company called Wesco that had posted a surety bond for defendant. Rather, the court concluded that the liability of the surety is commensurate with the liability of its principal. In this case, by statute, the court concluded that defendant must pay the attorney fees as a matter of costs and so too must Wesco. Accordingly, the court remanded for the trial court to amend the judgment to make surety Wesco liable for the $90,000 fee award as an item of costs. View "Karton v. Ari Design & Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Azarax filed suit against defendant and his law firm, alleging legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. Azarax claimed that defendant and his firm were negligent in their representation of Convey Mexico and that Azarax had claims against defendant and his firm as a successor by merger to Convey Mexico.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint and agreed with the district court that Azarax was not a valid successor in interest to Convey Mexico. In this case, the summary judgment record established that the shareholders of Convey Mexico did not unanimously provide written consent for the merger with Azarax Holding, so the merger was not valid. Therefore, Azarax lacked standing to sue defendant and his law firm. The court modified the judgment to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. View "Azarax, Inc. v. Syverson" on Justia Law