Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order granting respondent attorney fees as the prevailing party pursuant to the terms of a rent guaranty agreement between her and United Grand. The court concluded that respondent is the prevailing party for purposes of attorney fees in light of David S. Karton, A Law Corp. v. Dougherty (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 600, and United Grand has forfeited its claims concerning attorney fees allegedly attributable to UGC's attorney alone. View "United Grand Corporation v. Stollof" on Justia Law

After losing their bids for the November 2019 elections for Quitman County Chancery and Circuit Clerk, Shirley Smith Taylor and Tea “Windless” Keeler, respectively, filed election contests. In July 2020, following a two-day trial of the consolidated contests, the court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dismissing the election contests with prejudice and finding that six enumerated claims brought by Taylor and Keeler were frivolous.Further, the court denied Brenda Wiggs’s and T.H. “Butch” Scipper’s requests that Taylor and Keeler be sanctioned, and that Wiggs and Scipper be awarded attorneys’ fees under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) and the Litigation Accountability Act of 1988 (LAA). The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed in part the circuit court’s denial of an award of attorneys’ fees under Rule 11(b) since the court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded in part the circuit court’s decision to deny the imposition of sanctions and award of attorneys’ fees under the LAA in light of its finding that six of Taylor’s and Keeler’s claims were frivolous. View "In Re: Contest of the November 5, 2019 General Election for the Chancery Clerk of Quitman, Mississippi" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal dismissed plaintiff's appeal of the trial court's order denying attorney fees following her settlement of an action with Westlake Services under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act. The court concluded that plaintiff's appeal is from a nonappealable order, and plaintiff's appeal does not fall within the scope of the collateral order doctrine.The court concluded that the trial court's order concerning fees, costs and prejudgment interest was neither a judgment rendered but not yet entered within the meaning of California Rule of Court 8.104(d)(1) nor an intended ruling subsequently finalized in a judgment or order of dismissal as contemplated by rule 8.104(d)(2). Furthermore, the notice of appeal falls far outside the limited scope of the mandatory provision of rule 8.104(d)(1) and the court's discretion under rule 8.104(d)(2) to treat as appealable an otherwise nonappealable order. Even if the court had discretion to save the appeal, the court would decline to exercise it. Finally, plaintiff's appeal of the order does not fall within the scope of the collateral order doctrine where she contends that the order directs the payment of costs and prejudgment interest but did not attempt to appeal the portion of the trial court's order awarding costs and prejudgment interest. View "Sanchez v. Westlake Services, LLC" on Justia Law

The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) filed a formal three-count complaint against Third Circuit Court Judge Bruce Morrow, arising from comments he made to two female prosecutors during a murder trial. The JTC unanimously recommended that respondent be sanctioned with a public censure and a 12-month suspension without pay. Respondent petitioned the Michigan Supreme Court, requesting that the Court reject or modify the JTC’s recommendation. The Supreme Court found the JTC correctly found that respondent committed misconduct in office, and that public censure and suspension were appropriate. However, the Court determined a 6-month rather than the JTC’s recommended 12-month suspension was proportionate. View "In Re Morrow " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Richard Daniels appealed a trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants Attorney James Goss, Attorney Matthew Hart, and law firm Facey Goss & McPhee P.C. (FGM), arguing the court erred when it concluded he could not prove defendants caused his injury as a matter of law. Defendants represented plaintiff in a state environmental enforcement action where he was found liable for a hazardous-waste contamination on his property. On appeal, plaintiff claimed defendants failed to properly raise two dispositive defenses: the statute of limitations and proportional liability. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded plaintiff would not have prevailed on either defense if raised and therefore affirmed the grant of judgment to defendants. View "The Estate of Richard S. Daniels, by and through Julie Lyford in her capacity as Executor et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that the bail schedule set by the San Francisco Superior Court, an arm of the state, violated their equal protection and due process rights, 42 U.S.C. 1983 because it failed to take into account pre-arraignment detainees’ inability to pay pre-set mandatory bail amounts. Following years of litigation, the district court enjoined the Sheriff, who had Eleventh Amendment immunity from damages, from enforcing the bail schedule and any other state determination that made the existence or duration of pre-trial detention dependent on the detainee’s ability to pay. The court then awarded a reduced lodestar amount of attorney’s fees ($1,950,000.00) to the class and held California responsible for payment.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the award, rejecting arguments that the state was not liable for fees because it was dismissed from the case on the ground of Eleventh Amendment immunity and did not otherwise participate in the litigation. Despite Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Sheriff could be sued in her capacity as a state official for injunctive relief, and the state could be assessed a reasonable attorney’s fee under 42 U.S.C. 1988. The state had the necessary notice and an opportunity to respond to claims that the official-capacity suit against the Sheriff could properly be treated as a suit against California. View "Buffin v. City & County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Two months after Covert filed a lawsuit for breach of warranty under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, FCA (an automaker) served Covert with a settlement offer under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 for $51,000, plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Covert filed objections to that offer. Covert with a second section 998 offer, 15 months later, for $145,000 with identical terms. A jury awarded Covert $48,416 in damages and penalties.On appeal, FCA argued both of its section 998 offers were valid, and because the jury awarded Covert less than the amount of either offer, the trial court erred in awarding Covert attorneys’ fees and costs and denying FCA its costs.The court of appeal agreed that both offers were valid; the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider whether the first offer was made in good faith. Covert did not meet his burden to show the second offer was not in good faith. If the trial court finds the first offer was made in good faith, it shall award FCA its costs reasonably incurred after the first offer was served and deny Covert his attorneys’ fees and costs. If the court finds the first offer was not made in good faith, it shall award Covert his attorneys’ fees and costs reasonably incurred before the date the second offer was served and award FCA its costs, including expert witness fees, reasonably incurred thereafter. View "Covert v. FCA USA, LLC" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's award of fees to class counsel in a class action settlement involving consumers who purchased defective toilet tanks against defendants. The court agreed with Porcelana that the district court erred in calculating the lodestar and refusing to decrease it. In this case, the district court abused its discretion by failing to make any factual findings regarding the nature of the class's unsuccessful claims and an unsupported assertion is insufficient to permit the district court to bypass the proper lodestar calculation and only consider the unsuccessful claims under the eighth Johnson factor. Nor is this a case where the record supports such a conclusion in the absence of an explicit finding by the district court. Even assuming the district court had adequately supported its conclusion that unsuccessful claims were intertwined with those that proved successful, the court stated that the district court still failed to properly analyze the award in relation to the results obtained. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Fessler v. Porcelana Corona de Mexico, S.A. de C.V." on Justia Law

Coley fraudulently procured satellite television programming from DIRECTV, then sold and distributed that programming to unwitting customers. On a cross-complaint against Coley under the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 605(a), the district court found that Coley was liable for 2,393 violations, and awarded DIRECTV a $2,393,000 judgment plus $236,000 in attorneys’ fees. Coley attempted to thwart DIRECTV’s recovery, failing to participate in post-judgment discovery, engaging in extensive dilatory litigation to prevent recovery against his shell companies, failing to comply with court orders, and other fraudulent acts.The district court amended the damages award to specify that it could be enforced against Coley and the related companies the court found were Coley’s alter egos, with joint and several liability, and later appointed a receiver to aid in the execution of the judgment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. DIRECTV then sought attorneys’ fees related to the appeal and all post-judgment enforcement proceedings. Coley filed a suggestion of bankruptcy that resulted in an automatic stay of court proceedings. DIRECTV obtained relief from the automatic stay and renewed its motion for $57,295 in fees and $1,403.03 in costs not covered by prior order. The Fourth Circuit granted the motion. Attorneys’ fees and costs incurred while pursuing post-judgment collection and enforcement litigation, including appeals, qualify for compensation under the mandatory fee-shifting provision of the Act. View "Coley v. DIRECTV, Inc." on Justia Law

Nichols prevailed in a discrimination action against his employer. The district court awarded Nichols $300,000 in compensatory damages and various forms of equitable relief, including back pay and pension contributions as well as reinstatement. Two years later, the district court awarded his attorney (Longo) $774,645.50 on a post‐trial motion for statutory attorney’s fees. While Longo’s appeal proceeded, Nichols filed a district court motion to adjudicate attorney’s fees and for other relief. He had executed a contingency fee agreement before filing the underlying discrimination action, and he challenged Longo’s assertion that he had a right to 45% of the entire relief, including the total monetary award and all equitable relief. Longo contended that he was entitled to that amount under the contingency fee arrangement in addition to the entire statutory attorney fees award. Nichols argued that Longo’s fee demand is excessive and violates Illinois Supreme Court Rule 1.5 because the contingency agreement itself was unconscionable.The district court, while expressing concern about Longo’s position, determined that its jurisdiction did not extend to attorney fee disputes after the case has been dismissed and jurisdiction has been relinquished. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the statutory attorney fee award. The district court correctly determined that the contingency contract dispute is not within its jurisdiction. View "Nichols v. Longo" on Justia Law