Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court suspended Respondent, Judge Paul M. Sushchyk, without pay for a reasonable time or until further order of this court for Respondent's non-consensual touching of a trial court employee and misconduct during an ensuing investigation, holding that a sanction was warranted.After an evidentiary hearing and the receipt of a hearing officer's report, the Commission on Judicial Conduct concluded that Respondent had engaged in an intentional and unwelcome touching of an employee while at a court-sponsored event and then providing inconsistent and knowingly false statements during the resulting investigation and hearing. The Supreme Court accepted the Commission's recommendation that Respondent by censured publicly and suspended without pay for a reasonable time to permit the executive and legislative branches to consider whether Respondent should retain his judicial office. View "In re Sushchyk" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees, concluding that attorney fee awards against a holder are not capped if a separate state law so provides. The court explained that the term "recovery," as used in the Holder Rule provision, is sufficiently broad to include attorney fees. The court also concluded that Civil Code section 1459.5 is not preempted and plaintiffs are entitled to its benefit. In this case, there is no bar to application of section 1459.5 to the matter before the court even though it had not taken effect when the trial court initially ruled on plaintiffs' fee motion. The court further concluded that certain causes of action asserted by plaintiffs fall within the scope of section 1717 whereas others do not. Finally, plaintiffs waived the argument that section 2983.4 entitles them to an award of attorney fees by failing to raise it below in its motion for attorney fees. The court remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Reyes v. Beneficial State Bank" on Justia Law

About seven weeks after the 2020 presidential election, Republican state legislators, individual voters, and organizations representing voters from Wisconsin, Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, and Pennsylvania—all states carried by Joseph R. Biden Jr.—sued to prevent Congress from certifying their states’ electoral results. The district court denied their motion to enjoin the counting of electoral votes, and, after the Senate certified Biden as the winner, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their case. In a post-dismissal order cataloging the suit’s “numerous shortcomings,” the district court referred plaintiffs’ counsel, Kaardal, to the Committee on Grievances for possible discipline. “When any counsel seeks to target processes at the heart of our democracy,” the district court reasoned, “the Committee may well conclude that they are required to act with far more diligence and good faith than existed here.”The D.C. Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The district court’s referral is not a final order. Rather than fixing Kaardal’s rights and liabilities, the challenged order merely initiated disciplinary proceedings. View "Wisconsin Voters Alliance v. Harris" on Justia Law

In 2020, the Ninth Circuit vacated the EPA’s conditional registrations for three dicamba-based herbicides as violating the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. 136n(b). The court found that the EPA substantially understated risks that it acknowledged and failed entirely to acknowledge other risks. In a subsequent petition, seeking attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A), the plaintiffs in the underlying action argued that their requested attorneys’ fees should be calculated based on the market rates in San Francisco, where their petition for review was calendared for oral argument. Only one of their four attorneys is located in San Francisco. The other three are located in Portland.The Ninth Circuit disagreed. Where, as here, attorneys’ fees are incurred in connection with a petition for review in a court of appeals under FIFRA, the presumptive relevant community for calculating market rates is the legal community where counsel are located and where they do the bulk of their work. View "National Family Farm Coalition v. United States Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court has discretion to deny attorney fees under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) in some circumstances and held that the minimal or insignificant standard is applicable when the requester obtains only partial relief under the CPRA. In this case, the Association contends the trial court erred in concluding it had no discretion under the CPRA to deny attorney fees. The court reversed and remanded for the trial court to exercise the discretion it believed it lacked. View "Riskin v. Downtown L.A. Property Owners Assn." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction seeking to prohibit the Harris County District Attorney (DA) from enforcing a Texas anti-barratry law. The court concluded that plaintiff has not shown that his First Amendment claim is likely to succeed on the merits where the anti-barratry law is likely narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest in preventing confusion that damages relationships between appointed counsel and indigent defendants. The court declined plaintiff's request to assign the case to a different district judge on remand, concluding that this case does not merit reassignment under either of the two relevant tests. View "Willey v. Harris County District Attorney" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the law firm in a legal malpractice action brought by Gerber, alleging that the firm disclosed privileged documents. Applying the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, the court concluded that Gerber will have to show that the attorneys' negligence led, in a natural and continuous sequence, to the extra fees paid, and that it would not have incurred the fees in the absence of the firm's negligence. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. The court also concluded that corrective fees are available, even without an underlying judgment. The court agreed with the district court that the action was not barred by the applicable statute of limitations. View "Gerber Products Co. v. Mitchell Williams Selig Gates & Woodyard, PLLC" on Justia Law

Bell, Hernandez, and Rayas, fraudulently promised victims that they could save their homes from foreclosure or lower their mortgage payments. They targeted monolingual Spanish‐speakers. They charged a $5,000-$10,000 "membership fee" and spent the fees on personal expenses. Their fraudulent entity never prevented a foreclosure. More than 60 homeowners joined, losing almost $260,000.Bell, Hernandez, and Rayas were charged with mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341. Although Bell consistently refused legal representation, the district court assigned an experienced stand-by attorney. On the eve of trial, Bell moved to retain Joyce, who was newly admitted to the Illinois bar, had never tried a case, and had met Bell at the Metropolitan Correctional Center days earlier, at the behest of Eliades, co‐defendant Rayas’s counsel. Later, Eliades and Joyce denied that Eliades asked Joyce to visit Bell. Conflict attorneys from the Federal Public Defender’s Office discussed the situation with Bell and Rayas separately and held a conflict hearing for Hernandez. Rayas and Hernandez chose new attorneys. Bell insisted on Joyce, signing a waiver in which he acknowledged his right to conflict‐free counsel and the potential conflicts associated with Joyce.Convicted, Bell was sentenced to 150 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay $259,211 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Bell’s waiver was knowing and voluntary; he has not demonstrated actual or serious potential for conflict that would have obliged the court to disregard his waiver. View "United States v. Bell" on Justia Law

The Judicial Qualifications Commission (JQC) sought approval of the discipline by consent agreement between the Director of the JQC and JaDawnya Baker, Judge of the Municipal Court of Atlanta, to resolve the formal charges brought against Judge Baker with the issuance of a public reprimand. The agreement, entered into between the JQC Director and Judge Baker, was submitted to the JQC’s Hearing Panel, which approved the agreement and filed it with the Supreme Court for approval. Because Judge Baker’s admitted violations of periodically dismissing cases without the legal authority to do so justified the recommended, and agreed-to, discipline of a public reprimand, the Court approved the agreement. The Court approved the agreement with reservations "about whether, based on the substance of the allegations within the consent agreement, all of the agreed-to violations constitute violations of the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct." View "Inquiry concerning Judge JaDawnya Baker" on Justia Law

Burkhart, the CEO of ASC, a private company that operates Indiana nursing homes and long-term care facilities, orchestrated an extensive conspiracy exploiting the company’s operations and business relationships for personal gain. Most of the funds involved in the scheme came from Medicare and Medicaid. After other defendants pled guilty and Burkhart’s brother agreed to testify against him, Burkhart pled guilty to conspiracy to commit mail, wire, and healthcare fraud (18 U.S.C. 1349); conspiracy to violate the AntiKickback Statute (18 U.S.C. 371); and money laundering (18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)). With a Guidelines range of 121-151 months, Burkhart was sentenced to 114 months’ imprisonment.Burkhart later filed a habeas action, contending that his defense counsel, Barnes & Thornburg provided constitutionally deficient representation because the firm also represented Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County, a victim of the fraudulent scheme. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. While the firm labored under an actual conflict of interest, that conflict did not adversely affect Burkhart’s representation. Nothing in the record shows that the firm improperly shaded its advice to induce Burkhart to plead guilty; the advice reflected a reasonable response to the “dire circumstances” facing Burkhart. The evidence of Burkhart’s guilt was overwhelming. View "Burkhart v. United States" on Justia Law