Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Robert Cooper retained McDonald Carano Wilson LLP (Appellant) to represented him in a personal injury action. Three years into the representation, the district court granted Appellant’s motion to withdraw. Appellant perfected a charging lien for more than $100,000 in attorney fees and costs. Thereafter, Cooper retained another law firm, which obtained a $55,000 settlement for Cooper. The district court concluded that Appellant could not enforce its charging lien because it withdrew before settlement occurred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in its judgment because Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.015’s language unambiguously allows any counsel that worked on a claim to enforce a charging lien against any affirmative recovery. Remanded for additional findings to determine whether Appellant was entitled to a disbursement and, if it is, the amount of that disbursement. View "Wilson v. Bourassa Law Group, LLC" on Justia Law

NOM appealed the district court’s denial of its motion under 26 U.S.C. 7431(c)(3) to collect attorneys’ fees from the IRS. NOM had filed suit against the IRS seeking damages for unlawful inspection and disclosure of confidential tax information by IRS agents. NOM sought statutory damages, actual damages, punitive damages, and costs and attorneys’ fees. the district court concluded that NOM was not a “prevailing party” under section 7430(c)(4)(A) because (1) it did not “substantially prevail[] [in litigation against the IRS] with respect to the amount in controversy, or . . . the most significant . . . issues presented,” and, alternatively, (2) the government’s position in the litigation was “substantially justified” under 7430(c)(4)(B). The court could not say that the government acted unreasonably prior to the summary judgment stage of the litigation by waiting to see what NOM’s evidence was and then challenging its sufficiency. In this case, the government adopted a reasonable strategy in conceding statutory damages, but challenging the existence and amount of both actual and punitive damages. The court agreed with the district court that the government’s litigation position was “substantially justified,” which, by itself, is sufficient to find that NOM was not a “prevailing party” under the statute. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "National Org. for Marriage v. IRS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's award of costs to defendant after the district court dismissed plaintiff's underlying qui tam case against defendant with prejudice based on judicial estoppel. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in awarding excessive costs for expert witness fees and awarding costs for the following: (1) expedited transcripts; (2) shipping, tabbing, and binding costs; and (3) PACER fees. Altogether, these costs amount to $7768.89. Accordingly, the court modified the award of costs by subtracting this amount. View "Long v. GSDMIdea City, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Several Albuquerque residents sued Mayor Richard Berry in his official capacity as Mayor of Albuquerque in state court over the City’s redistricting plan enacted after the 2010 census. This case arose out of an award of attorneys’ fees imposed as a sanction on attorneys who brought a voting-rights lawsuit on the residents' behalf against the Mayor. After dismissing the case, the district court found the attorneys unreasonably multiplied proceedings in what it called a meritless case and sanctioned them under 28 U.S.C. 1927. They argued the award was an abuse of discretion. The Mayor cross-appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion by declining to award fees under several other provisions the Mayor raised as grounds for sanctions. The Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that most of the attorneys’ arguments lacked merit. However, the Court vacated the award of fees and remanded for the trial court to consider whether a different trigger for the imposition of sanctions was appropriate. View "Baca v. Berry" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the company managing the prison he was incarcerated in, and others, for multiple violations of his constitutional rights. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court’s denial of his motion for appointment of counsel to help litigate his civil rights claims against defendants. The district court denied the motion because it had no funding with which to compensate an appointed attorney, and it could find “no attorneys in the area willing or able to take the case pro bono.” Then the district court entered summary judgment against plaintiff. The court vacated and demanded, concluding that federal courts have inherent power to order counsel to accept an uncompensated appointment under the limited factual circumstances here. On remand, the district court must consider whether a compulsory appointment is warranted. View "Naranjo v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., seeking attorneys' fees after she proved in an administrative hearing that a school district had violated her child’s right to a free appropriate public education by repeatedly placing him in isolation during school hours. The court concluded that the district court erred in applying section 1415(i)(2)(B)’s limitations period to this action for attorneys’ fees under the IDEA by a party that prevailed at the administrative level. Because the statute contains no limitations period for such actions, the district court should have borrowed one from state law. The court held that the limitations period for such an action does not begin to run until the time for seeking judicial review of the underlying administrative decision passes, and that plaintiff’s action was timely under any limitations period that could be borrowed. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "D.G. v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Over 25 years ago, a representative of a class of homeless persons, filed a lawsuit against the City of Miami under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The parties subsequently entered into a settlement agreement. In this appeal, plaintiff, on behalf of a class, seeks attorney fees for opposing modifications proposed by the City of Miami to such an agreement. The court affirmed the district court's denial of fees given that modification proceedings do not trigger an award of attorneys’ fees under the agreement. In this case, the parties’ agreement limited future attorneys’ fees to enforcement proceedings. View "Peery v. City of Miami" on Justia Law

A class action complaint alleged that Honeywell engaged in uncompetitive and illegal conduct to increase its market share of round thermostats and to use its dominant market position to overcharge customers. In 2013, the parties reached a settlement and asked the trial court to preliminarily approve it. The court initially declined to do so because it had concerns about the notice proposed to be sent to class members. Those concerns were subsequently addressed to the court’s satisfaction, and on February 4, 2014, the court preliminarily approved the settlement. The notice of settlement was subsequently published and distributed to class members. The long version was distributed and posted on a website, and the short version was published in various print publications. The trial court found that four objectors to the settlement failed to establish they had standing, but rejected one objection on timeliness grounds and rejected the other three on their merits. The court of appeal affirmed, except for the ruling on standing, finding that the court properly approved the distribution of residual settlement funds and awarded class counsel attorney fees that amounted to 37.5 percent of the settlement fund. View "Roos v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

The Judicial Standards Commission entered a recommendation that Respondent James T. Hill, a judge of the General Court of Justice, District Court Division, be publicly reprimanded for conduct in violation of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-376 for engaging in inappropriate conduct while presiding over divorce proceedings. The Supreme Court concluded that the Commission’s findings of fact were supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence in the record and that the Commission’s findings of fact supported its conclusions of law. Based upon these findings and conclusions, which the Court adopted as its own, the Supreme Court concluded and adjudged that Respondent should be publicly reprimanded. View "In re Judge James T. Hill" on Justia Law

The law firm represented Goesel, a minor, and his parents in a personal-injury suit that settled before trial. The law firm needed judicial approval to finalize the settlement. The contingent-fee agreement entitled the firm to one-third of the gross settlement; all litigation expenses would be covered by the Goesels’ share. The court refused to approve the settlement unless litigation expenses were deducted off the top and one-third of the net settlement was allocated to the firm and rejected the firm’s attempt to count the cost of computerized legal research as a separately compensable expense rather than rolling it into the fee recovery. The Goesels declined to participate in an appeal, so the court appointed an amicus to argue in support of the decision. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Though the court enjoys substantial discretion to safeguard the interests of minors in the settlement of litigation, this discretion is not boundless. Here, the judge criticized aspects of the firm’s contingent-fee agreement that have received the express blessing of Illinois courts. Once these improper reasons are stripped away, the only rationale that remains—that “fairness and right reason” require that the Goesels receive 51% of the gross settlement amount rather than 42%—is insufficient to justify discarding a reasonable contingent-fee agreement. View "Williams, Bax & Saltzman, P.C. v. Boley Int'l (H.K.) Ltd" on Justia Law