Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Hargers were Jones’ neighbors. Police reports indicate that there were issues between the neighbors for several years. Grad worked for CarMeds, ostensibly owned by Jones’ mother and run by Jones, occasionally visiting Jones’ home. Grad claimed to have been assaulted after such a meeting. At the police station, Grad identified Harger from a photo line-up. Ultimately, charges were dropped. The Hargers sued Grad and Jones, asserting conspiracy to have Harger falsely arrested. Meanwhile, Jones filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Hoover, the Hargers’ attorney, moved to modify the automatic stay and filed an adversary complaint, alleging that Jones's debt was non-dischargeable and seeking denial of discharge based on the assertion that Jones lied about the ownership of CarMeds. The bankruptcy court later dismissed the adversary proceeding on the Hargers’ motion, and set a hearing sua sponte, directing the Hargers and Hoover to show that they had reasonable grounds for filing. The court found that Hoover violated Rule 9011 by filing without specific evidence and made intentional misrepresentations in his filings; directed him to pay $26,000 in attorneys’ fees; revoked Hoover’s electronic bankruptcy filing authority; and referred the matter for possible prosecution. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Panel reversed, holding that the bankruptcy court relied on clearly erroneous factual findings ;erred as a matter of law in awarding fees on a sua sponte basis; and abused its discretion in imposing any sanctions. View "In re: Jones" on Justia Law

The Commission on Judicial Fitness and Disability filed a formal complaint alleging that respondent Walter Miller, then a circuit court judge, had violated the Oregon Code of Judicial Conduct (Code) in connection with a 2014 voters’ pamphlet statement supporting his judicial candidacy. The commission specifically alleged violations of Rule 2.1(D) (judge shall not engage in “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation”) and Rule 5.1(D) (judicial candidate shall not knowingly or with reckless disregard for truth make any “false statement” concerning qualifications, education, experience, or other material fact relating to judicial campaign). The commission conducted a hearing and recommended that the Supreme Court dismiss the formal complaint. The Supreme Court accepted the commission’s recommendation. View "In re Miller" on Justia Law

Gerald Rowlett and his two companies, Westlake Development Company, Inc., and Westlake Development Group, LLC (plaintiffs), filed an action for malpractice against the law firm Schwabe, Williamson, and Wyatt, PC, (Schwabe) and lawyers David Fagan and James Finn (collectively, defendants), alleging claims for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and claims related to attorney fees. Defendants had represented plaintiffs in an action against plaintiffs’ business partners in Sunrise Partners, LLC (Sunrise). Plaintiffs settled the Sunrise litigation in 2007, and, soon thereafter, initiated the malpractice action, alleging that they would have had a better outcome in the Sunrise litigation but for the mishandling of their case by defendants. A jury ultimately found that defendants were negligent in their representation of plaintiffs, but that defendants’ negligence did not cause plaintiffs any damage. The jury also reached a defense verdict on the breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, and attorney fee claims. Plaintiffs appealed, asserting seven assignments of error. The Court of Appeals reversed as to two of those assignments of error and remanded the case for a new trial. The Supreme Court did not agree with the Court of Appeals' judgment with regard to the two alleged errors, reversed in part, affirmed in part and remanded for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals concluded that defendants’ closing argument to the jury improperly invoked the erroneous date on the verdict form to argue that the jury should use the settlement date as the date to “value” Rowlett’s interest in Sunrise and thus conclude that plaintiffs suffered no damages. In so ruling, the court may have misunderstood defendants’ theory of defense and their causation argument. On this ground, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Rowlett v. Fagan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former law firm and five of its partners, alleging that he had been forced to resign after blowing the whistle on what he considered to be the firm’s unethical litigation conduct. The parties eventually settled the suit and then sought an order directing the clerk of the court to close the file while leaving it permanently sealed. The district court denied the parties' request. The court held that pleadings, even in settled cases, are judicial records subject to a presumption of public access. The court concluded that the district court engaged in a thoughtful analysis of the competing interests at stake and the district court's conclusions were amply supported. Finally, the court concluded that sealing of the complaint is not justified in order to protect “confidential client information.” Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP" on Justia Law

Sarah Jackson and David Thomas retained Persels & Associates, LLC (Persels) to defend them in debt collection cases. Persels retained Kentucky attorneys K. David Bradley and Robert Gillispie to provide limited representation. The limited representation agreements provided that neither lawyer was required to sign pleadings, enter an appearance, or attend court proceedings. The circuit court subsequently ordered the attorneys to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for their failure to enter their appearances and sign documents filed with the court. Persels intervened as a third party. The trial court determined that Parsels and the two attorneys had violated Ky. R. Civ. P. 11 and fined each $1. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that limited-representation counsel is not required to sign the documents prepared as part of the limited representation, and therefore Rule 11 does not apply. Remanded to the trial court to determine whether the limited-representation agreements at issue were reasonable. View "Persels & Assocs., LLC v. Capital One Bank" on Justia Law

At issue in this certification request was the correct interpretation of Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct Canons 5A(1)(a), 5A(1)(b), and 5B(1)(c), which were promulgated by the Supreme Court with the objective of complying with Section 117 of the Kentucky Constitution requiring that all justices of the Supreme Court and judges of the court of appeals, circuit and district court shall be elected from their respective districts or circuits on a nonpartisan basis. In response to questions of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, the Supreme Court answered (1) under Canon 5A(1)(a), judicial candidates may affiliate themselves as members of a political party without restriction but may not portray themselves as the official nominee of a political party; (2) as applied to this case, hosting events for a political party would violate Canon 5A(1)(b); and (3) Canon 5B(1)(c) prohibits a judge who holds her office by way of a gubernatorial appointment from asserting that she seeks to be re-elected. View "Winter v. Hon. Stephen D. Wolnitzek" on Justia Law

In 2007 Pickett, a nursing home housekeeper, filed claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging that residents sexually harassed her and that Sheridan fired her for complaining. Sheridan won summary judgment on the harassment claim, but Pickett was awarded $65,000 on the retaliation claim, which was affirmed. Pickett sought attorney’s fees for work done by her attorney, Rossiello, his associates, and paralegals, but did not request prejudgment interest. The court determined that Rossiello’s market rate was $400 per hour and that 175 hours of 225 hours submitted were proper, excluding hours it found duplicative and hours accumulated while Rossiello was suspended from practice. In 2011, the Seventh Circuit found that the court improperly calculated the rate and erred in declining to award fees to outside counsel. On remand, Pickett sought fees for the life of the case and requested prejudgment interest. Considering his disciplinary history, experience, and prior fee awards, the court ordered payment for the hours approved before Pickett II at $425 per hour, rather than the $540-620 requested; approved the time requested for work on Pickett II, less the time spent on administrative tasks; awarded prejudgment interest as to the Pickett II fees; and determined that the claim to fees for the work done on remand had been waived.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "DPickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a compliant against Defendants in order to enforce a mechanics lien. Wells Fargo was named in the complaint because it was the trustee and secured party of certain property. Wells Fargo filed a motion for leave to file answer out of time and requested its fees and costs incurred with regard to the motion. The trial court granted Wells Fargo’s motion and ordered Plaintiff’s counsel to reimburse Wells Fargo’s counsel $1200 for fees and costs incurred regarding the motion for leave to file answer out of time. The trial court also granted Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against Defendants. In its final order, the trial court stated that the mechanics lien had been released and that it had issued the $1200 sanctions award against Plaintiff’s counsel for its failure to voluntarily extend the time in which Wells Fargo might file its answer. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment regarding sanctions, as Plaintiff’s counsel did not engage in behavior that could be characterized as unprofessional, an ethics violation or behavior that is subject to statutory sanctions. View "Env’t Specialist, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and resisting arrest. Robert Fisher, an attorney employed by New York County Defender Services (NYCDS), was assigned to represent defendant. It was later revealed that a different attorney from NYCDS had represented another person, Toi Stephens, who was involved in the incident forming the basis of Defendant’s charges. Based on a potential conflict of interest, the court relieved Fisher as Defendant’s attorney and assigned a new attorney, who represented Defendant at trial. The Appellate Division reversed on the ground that the trial court had abused its discretion in relieving Fisher because Fisher did not represent Stephens, and the relationship between NYCDS and Stephens did not constitute a conflict. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion by relieving Defendant’s assigned counsel and appointing conflict-free counsel to represent him. View "People v. Watson" on Justia Law

3M and TransWeb manufacture respirator filters, consisting of “nonwoven fibrous webs.” 3M sued Transweb for infringement of several patents. TransWeb sought a declaratory judgment of invalidity and non-infringement. A jury found the patents to be invalid based on TransWeb’s prior public use of the patented method. In accordance with an advisory verdict from the jury, the district court found the patents unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. An inventor for the patents and a 3M in-house attorney acted with specific intent to deceive the patent office as to the TransWeb materials. The district court awarded approximately $26 million to TransWeb, including trebled attorney fees as antitrust damages. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding sufficient corroborating evidence to support the finding of prior public use by TransWeb, and that attorney fees are an appropriate basis for damages under the antitrust laws in this context. TransWeb’s attorney fees appropriately flow from the unlawful aspect of 3M’s antitrust violation and are an antitrust injury that can properly serve as the basis for antitrust damages. View "Transweb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Props. Co." on Justia Law