Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a California-based dentist specializing in tooth implants, filed a class action complaint against Nobel alleging a defect in the NobelDirect implant. On appeal, Nobel challenges the district court's order awarding class counsel more than $2.3 million in attorneys’ fees. The court concluded that defendants have not waived their due process argument where the record demonstrates that defendants raised the issue with sufficient specificity and vigor. On the merits, the court concluded that the district court’s use over defendants’ objection of ex parte, in camera submissions to support its fee order violated defendants’ due process rights. The court remanded for the district court to allow defendants access to the information at issue, to allow plaintiffs to respond to defendants' objections and for defendants to reply, and then the district court can decide the appropriate fee award. The court concluded that the district court’s discount of the lodestar for lack of success was not erroneous because the district court concisely and clearly explained its reduction of the lodestar, and because there was sufficient support for its finding that plaintiffs' claims were related to a common goal. The court agreed that the district court likely overstated its monetary valuation of the settlement. But where, as here, classwide benefits are not easily monetized, a cross-check is entirely discretionary. The court vacated the fee order and remanded. View "Yamada v. Nobel Biocare Holding AG" on Justia Law

The Almanor Lakeside Villas Owners Association sought to impose fines and related fees of $19,979.97 on the Carsons for alleged rule violations related to the Carsons’ use of their properties as short-term vacation rentals. The Carsons cross-complained for breach of contract, private nuisance, and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. The Carsons had engaged in short-term rental for many years and believed that they were exempt from new regulations and enforcement efforts. The court ruled against the Carsons on their cross-complaint but also rejected many of the fines as unreasonable. The court upheld fines pertaining to the use of Almanor’s boat slips and ordered the Carsons to pay $6,620.00 in damages. The court determined Almanor to be the prevailing party and awarded $101,803.15 in attorney’s fees and costs. The court of appeal affirmed, concluding that the award of attorney’s fees, compared to the “overall relief obtained” by Almanor, was not so disproportionate as to constitute an abuse of discretion. View "Almanor Lakeside Villas Owners Ass'n. v. Carson" on Justia Law

Appellant, a criminal defense attorney practicing in Lafayette, Louisiana, challenged his six-month suspension from the Western District of Louisiana. The suspension was imposed due to his violation of L. Crim. R. 53.5, which operates as a prior restraint against attorney speech during the pendency of a criminal trial. The court concluded that, under the plain language of Rule 53.5, appellant falls within the scope of the rule as an attorney associated with the defense where appellant stressed that, although he was not counsel of record, he was helping the defendant with his case, appellant assisted the defendant with trial preparation, and appellant attended several of the pretrial hearings. The court also concluded that the district court was not required to make a finding of bad faith before sanctioning appellant. Finally, the court held that Rule 53.5 is unconstitutional as applied to appellant and the court need not address appellant's facial challenge. Rule 53.5 does not incorporate either a “substantial likelihood standard” or even a “reasonable likelihood” standard, as required under United States v. Brown. In this case, the Government failed to demonstrate that the prior restraint is narrowly tailored and provides the least restrictive means to achieve the Government's goal. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "In re: William Goode" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the Florida Supreme Court unlawfully denied her application to become a member of the Florida Bar in violation of federal bankruptcy law and her right to due process. The district court dismissed the complaint. The Florida Supreme Court denied plaintiff admission to the Bar based on her lack of candor and refusal to repay her financial obligations. The court concluded that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's 11 U.S.C. 525(a) claim; sovereign immunity bars plaintiff's due process claim because the Florida Supreme Court is a department of the State of Florida; and the Ex Parte Young exception is not applicable in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Uberoi v. Supreme Court of Florida" on Justia Law

Appellant C. Tucker Cheadle, as administrator of the estate of Robert F. Obarr, appealed an order denying his motion to disqualify counsel for respondent DP Pham LLC. Pham made three loans to Obarr totaling nearly $3 million, and Obarr secured each loan by granting Pham a lien on a mobilehome park he owned in Westminster (Property). This action arose when Obarr allegedly agreed to sell the Property to two different buyers. In March 2013, Obarr allegedly contracted to sell the Property to S.C.D. Enterprises (SCD). SCD promptly assigned the purchase agreement to Westminster MHP Associates, LP (Westminster), which allegedly opened escrow on the Property with Obarr. According to Westminster, it satisfied all contingencies for the sale within 10 days of opening escrow. In April 2013, Westminster filed suit alleging contract claims against Obarr. Obarr died unexpectedly in August. The trial court appointed Cheadle as a special administrator for Obarr’s estate and in that capacity substituted Cheadle for Obarr as a party to this action. Cheadle then filed a cross-complaint alleging an interpleader claim against both Westminster and Pham concerning the Property. Based on Pham’s loans to Obarr, Cheadle also alleged claims against Pham for usury, intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, money had and received, unjust enrichment, reformation, and violation of the unfair competition law. Cheadle contended disqualification was required because Pham’s counsel improperly obtained copies of privileged communications between Obarr and his attorney, and used those communications to oppose another party’s summary judgment motion in this case. The trial court denied the disqualification motion because it concluded the communications were not privileged. The Court of Appeal reversed. After reviewing copies of the communications, the trial court concluded they were not privileged based on their content. "A court, however, may not review the contents of a communication to determine whether the attorney-client privilege protects that communication. The attorney-client privilege is an absolute privilege that prevents disclosure, no matter how necessary or relevant to the lawsuit. The privilege attaches to all confidential communications between an attorney and a client regardless of whether the information communicated is in fact privileged. Accordingly, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to review a communication to determine whether the attorney-client privilege protects it." View "DP Pham v. Cheadle" on Justia Law

Two attorneys (together, “defense counsel”) were sanctioned $200 each during the course of their representation of Client, who was the defendant in a wrongful death suit. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, asserting that defense counsels’ “misconduct” in submitting a jury instruction with an error tainted the jury. The trial judge denied the motion, concluding that counsel’s representation was not a deliberate act to mislead the court. The court, however, concluded that counsels’ inadvertence rose to the level of a sanctionable act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in sanctioning defense counsel for a mutual mistake when the error was inadvertent and, upon its discovery, was timely noted. View "Ragland v. Soggin" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance issued a Formal Complaint against Chancellor David Shoemake, alleging judicial misconduct. The Complaint contained allegations that Judge Shoemake had contributed to the mismanagement of the conservatorship of Victoria Denise Newsome. After a formal hearing on March 12, 2015, the Commission recommended to the Supreme Court that Judge Shoemake be removed from office, fined $2,500, and assessed costs in the amount of $5,882.67. Judge Shoemake disputes the Commission’s findings and recommendation. After review, the Supreme Court held that Judge Shoemake improperly signed ex parte orders and contributed to the mismanagement of a ward’s estate. However, the Commission did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Shoemake gave testimony that he knew or should have known would be misleading. The Court ordered that Judge Shoemake be publicly reprimanded, be suspended from office for thirty days without pay, pay a fine of $2,500, and pay costs in the amount of $5,882.67. View "Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Shoemake" on Justia Law

The Iowa Commission on Judicial Qualifications filed an application for imposition of discipline against Joseph Sevcik, a part-time magistrate who also practiced law. The Commission found Magistrate Sevcik violated two of the canons of judicial conduct by requesting and receiving two confidential court files from a clerk of court and then using one of the files during his cross-examination of a witness in a hearing before the district court in which he represented a party in the case. The Supreme Court held that Magistrate Sevcik violated Canons 1 and 3 of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, along with Rules 51:1.2 and 51:3.5, and agreed with the Commission that a public reprimand was the appropriate sanction. View "In re Inquiry Concerning Joseph Sevcik" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were Ken Blevins, who was elected as Sebastian County Circuit Clerk in 2011, and David Hudson, who served as the county judge for Sebastian County. Hudson appointed a grievance committee to hear a complaint filed by several deputy clerks working for Blevins alleging that Blevins was sexually harassing them. When Blevins sought to terminate two of those deputy clerks, Hudson appointed a new grievance committee to hear the clerks’ complaints and ultimately ordered Blevins to retain the employees. Blevins filed suit, alleging that Hudson abused the grievance process and made statements during the grievance hearings that placed Blevins in a false light and contributed to his defeat in the next election. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Hudson. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was proper because Hudson was entitled to immunity on all claims raised by Blevins. View "Blevins v. Hudson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a lawyer in California, filed suit challenging California’s procedures for attorney discipline. Plaintiff alleged that California violated her constitutional rights by not providing her meaningful judicial review in a fee dispute between herself and a client, and that the rules governing the California State Bar’s disciplinary procedures are facially unconstitutional. The court agreed with the State Bar that plaintiff's as-applied challenges are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. However, the court concluded that the State Bar misreads this Court’s statute-of-limitations decision in Action Apartment Ass’n, Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board, which only applies to facial challenges involving property rights. In this case, plaintiff's facial claims are not time-barred because she filed her claim well within the two-year statute of limitations. On the merits, the court concluded that plaintiff's facial claims based on California’s state constitution fail because they have already been rejected by the Supreme Court of California. The court concluded that, contrary to plaintiff's contentions, People v. Kelly did not overrule In re Rose, which stated that it is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by the federal courts in interpreting their state constitutions. Plaintiff's First Amendment claims are unsupported because the court was aware of no case holding that the First Amendment provides a freestanding right for an individual to have a state court hear her dispute in the absence of some asserted state or federal cause of action, statutory or judge-made. Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection claims also fail where California's change in its attorney discipline procedures are not so significant as to create a due process violation. While the regulation of lawyers in California is unlike California’s regulation of any other professionals, plaintiff has not demonstrated that this regulatory scheme violates Equal Protection. California’s decision to regulate lawyers principally via a judicially supervised administrative body attached to the State Bar of California, the organization of all state-licensed lawyers, is rational and so constitutional. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Scheer v. Kelly" on Justia Law