Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act prohibits “abusive debt collection practices,” 15 U.S.C. 1692(a)–(d), barring “false, deceptive, or misleading representation[s].” The definition of “debt collectors,” excludes “any officer . . . of . . . any State to the extent that collecting . . . any debt is in the performance of his official duties.” Under Ohio law, overdue debts owed to state-owned agencies and instrumentalities are certified to the State’s Attorney General, who may appoint, as independent contractors, private attorneys, as “special counsel” to act on the Attorney General’s behalf. Special counsel must use the Attorney General’s letterhead in communicating with debtors. Attorneys appointed as special counsel, sent debt collection letters on the Attorney General’s letterhead to debtors, with signature blocks containing the name and address of the signatory as well as the designation “special” or “outside” counsel to the Attorney General. Each letter identified the sender as a debt collector seeking payment for debts to a state institution. Debtors filed a putative class action, alleging violation of FDCPA. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit vacated, concluding that special counsel, as independent contractors, are not entitled to the FDCPA’s state-officer exemption. The Supreme Court reversed. Even if special counsel are not “state officers” under the Act, their use of the Attorney General’s letterhead does not violate Section 1692e. The letterhead identifies the principal—Ohio’s Attorney General—and the signature block names the agent—a private lawyer. A debtor’s impression that a letter from special counsel is a letter from the Attorney General’s Office is “scarcely inaccurate.” View "Sheriff v. Gillie" on Justia Law

Attorney Larry Stoller filed a multicount petition on behalf of NuStar Farms, LLC against Robert and Marcia Zylstra, alleging that the Zylstras agreed to sell NuStar a parcel of farmland but failed to tender the requisite deed and that the Zylstras did not abide by certain terms contained in certain manure easement agreements. The Zylstras filed a motion seeking to disqualify Stoller as the attorney for NuStar based on a conflict of interest. Specifically, the Zylstras alleged that Stoller’s representation of NuStar was a concurrent conflict of interest with his representation of them. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in holding that Stoller could not be disqualified under the substantial relationship test; but (2) abused its discretion in not disqualifying Stoller from representing NuStar in the action because Stoller did have a concurrent conflict of interest. View "NuStar Farms, LLC v. Zylstra" on Justia Law

After the parties reached a settlement, the district court granted $585,000 in fees to Class Counsel, which reflected a reduction of requested fees of approximately 70 percent. It also reduced Class Counsel’s costs reimbursement to $20,588.17. The district court also found that Class Counsel inadequately supported its claim for expert fees, and denied Objectors' fee request in its entirety. Both Plaintiffs and Objectors appealed. The court held that, in a class action, an objector need not establish standing to object to an award of attorney’s fees by the district court; if an objector seeks to appeal an award of fees to class counsel, he must independently satisfy Article III standing; nevertheless, an objector has standing to appeal a denial of his own claim for fees; and, in this case, Objectors are not yet entitled to attorney's fees because the court vacated and remanded the district court's decision reducing Class Counsel's fees. The court concluded that the district court was well within its discretion to use the lodestar method to calculate fees. However, the district court abused its discretion by failing to specifically articulate its reasoning for such a large disparity between the requested fees and the reduction from Class Counsel's computed lodestar fee. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded. On remand, the district court should (1) clearly provide reasons for the factors in its lodestar computation; (2) expressly consider both a risk multiplier and the Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., factors; and (3) base its decision on facts supported by the record. View "Stetson v. Grissom" on Justia Law

Over the past decade, Attorney Novoselsky has filed many lawsuits alleging improprieties by Dorothy Brown, in her capacity as Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. Brown later made statements to private parties, the public, and the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Committee, accusing Novoselsky of being an unscrupulous attorney. Novoselsky sued Brown under state law for defamation and under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for First Amendment retaliation, and he sought to hold Cook County liable for Brown’s actions. Brown unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment, arguing that her communications are protected from liability by immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed. On the state‐law defamation claim, Brown’s communications were all statements reasonably related to her official duties. Illinois state law provides immunity to Brown for claims based on these statements. Brown is also entitled to summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation claim, for all she did to retaliate was criticize Novoselsky, so Cook County is also entitled to summary judgment. View "Novoselsky v. Brown" on Justia Law

OMSJ filed suit against defendant alleging, inter alia, trademark infringement in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq., and the Texas Business and Commerce Code. Defendant created two websites to deconstruct the OMSJ's alleged misrepresentation of the effects of HIV and AIDS and allegedly false research that the OMSJ promulgated on its “HIV Innocence Group” webpage. The district court dismissed the Lanham Act claim, declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state law claims, and denied defendant’s subsequent request for an award of attorney’s fees stemming from the allegedly frivolous trademark claims. In light of recent Supreme Court precedent, Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health and Fitness, Inc., which expanded the standard under which a lawsuit presents an “exceptional case” meriting the award of attorney fees, the court reversed and remanded for reconsideration. The court merged Octane Fitness’s definition of “exceptional” into its interpretation of section 1117(a) of the Lanham Act and construe its meaning as follows: an exceptional case is one where (1) in considering both governing law and the facts of the case, the case stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position; or (2) the unsuccessful party has litigated the case in an “unreasonable manner.” The district court must address this issue “in the case-by-case exercise of their discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances.” View "Baker v. Deshong" on Justia Law

Appellants received less than $6,000 in damages from their employers for unpaid overtime wages after eight years of litigation. In this appeal, appellants challenge the district court's fee award as too low, while the employers challenge it as too high. The court concluded that, while appellants’ fee petition originally was untimely, the court’s entry of an amended judgment created “[a] new period for filing” and cured that untimeliness, notwithstanding the fact that the petition was filed before entry of the new judgment. Therefore, appellants satisfied Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B)’s dictates, leaving no ground on which to deny appellants’ fee petition in its entirety for lack of timeliness. On the merits, the court concluded that there is no support in the record for the district court’s finding that appellants failed to promptly provide a damages calculation that could have facilitated early settlement. This clear factual error requires remand. Additionally, because the court cannot ascertain whether or how significantly this mistaken factual finding impacted other aspects of the district court’s fee reasonability assessment, the court vacated the entire decision and remanded. View "Radtke v. Caschetta" on Justia Law

The Judiciary Commission of Louisiana recommended that Justice of the Peace Stacie Myers, Pointe Coupee Parish District 4 be removed from office. This recommendation stemmed from the justice of the peace failing to comply with a Supreme Court order to pay a civil penalty for violation of the financial reporting requirements imposed by law, and totally disregarding the actions and legal proceedings connected therewith. The Supreme Court found the record established by clear and convincing evidence that the conduct of the justice of the peace, which was willful and deliberate, violated Canons 1 and 2(A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, as well as the constitutional standard in La. Const. art. V, sec. 25(C). The Court ordered that she be removed from office, her office be declared vacant, and she be ordered to reimburse and pay the Commission $288 in costs incurred in the investigation and prosecution of this case in addition to any costs and penalties previously imposed. View "In re: Justice of the Peace Stacie P. Myers, Pointe Coupee Paris, District 4" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a personal injury suit after she was hurt in a hay bale accident. In this case, the trial court dismissed with prejudice the complaint for personal injuries during jury trial as a sanction for repeated violations of its orders excluding hearsay and opinion testimony. Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in granting the terminating sanction and erred when it granted respondents' motions in limine. Because the orders in limine did not have the effect of granting a nonsuit or judgment on the pleadings, the court determined that the abuse of discretion standard of review applies. In this case, the court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it made orders excluding evidence that were tantamount to a nonsuit and when it granted the terminating sanction where appellant could not, and did not, demonstrate her opinions about the appearance of hay bales had any rational basis. The trial court also correctly granted respondents' Motion in Limine No. 4, to exclude hearsay regarding the source of the hay bales. The trial court also correctly excluded appellant's proffered testimony that she saw Todd's delivery person with a delivery "ticket" or receipt identifying Berrington as the source of the hay bale. The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in issuing the terminating sanction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Osborne v. Todd Farm Serv." on Justia Law

Li is a 78-year-old Chinese-American, with limited English and experience with the legal system. Attorney Yan became a member of the bar in 2008. Ignoring blatant conflicts of interest, beginning in 2007, Yan advised and represented Li in a matter involving a contract in which Yan was the obligor and Li was the assignee. In 2010 Li sued, alleging professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, unlawful business practices, breach of contract, and fraud. The court awarded $254,411.06, plus prejudgment interest. Following posttrial proceedings, during which the California Bar began disciplinary proceedings, the judge filed an amended judgment awarding Li $552,412.30, including $149,667.29 in prejudgment interest. After an unsuccessful appeal by Yan, Li’s new attorney began efforts to collect the judgment. During examination of Yan, as a judgment debtor, the court upheld service of a subpoena duces tecum by mail (Yan was unable to be located for personal service) and denied Yan’s claim of privilege with respect to his tax returns. The court of appeal affirmed, stating that “enough is enough” and awarding Li costs. View "Li v. Yan" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of forcing women into prostitution and sentenced to life in prison. On remand, a different judge sentenced petitioner to 35 months of imprisonment. Three years after the trial, the United States disclosed that the judge who presided over petitioner's trial and sentenced him to life in prison, Jack Camp, had bipolar disorder and had suffered a brain injury. The investigation also disclosed allegations of racial bias. The court concluded that petitioner sufficiently alleged that Camp was actually biased against him where he proffered evidence that Camp had a difficult time adjudicating African-American men's cases and specifically disliked petitioner based on the fact that petitioner was a black man who pimped white women. Petitioner also alleged that Camp wanted to give all black offenders who pimped white women the maximum possible penalty, and Camp gave petitioner the maximum penalty. The government concedes that denial of an impartial judge is structural error that demands reversal. The court concluded that the district court must allow petitioner on remand an evidentiary hearing to prove that Camp was actually biased against him. The court concluded, however, that the district court correctly denied petitioner's claim that Camp was mentally incompetent without an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Norris v. United States" on Justia Law