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The 555 patent relates to anti-theft tags that are attached to merchandise and deactivated when the goods are purchased. The accused tags are manufactured in Europe and imported into the U.S. Checkpoint brought an infringement suit. A jury found the patent not infringed, invalid, and unenforceable. The court found the case to be “exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. 285 because Checkpoint’s expert witness based his infringement opinion on an examination of tags that were manufactured by All–Tag in Switzerland, although the accused tags were manufactured in Belgium, and awarded the defendants $6.6 million in attorney fees, costs, and interest. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit instructed the district court "that tests or experiments on the actual accused products are not always necessary to prove infringement.” The district court again found the case exceptional, citing the same ground, and found Checkpoint’s pre-suit investigation, based on a European infringement verdict against All–Tag on a 555 patent counterpart and infringement opinions from counsel, inadequate because the opinions “were given years before filing.” The court cited Checkpoint’s “improper motivation.” The Federal Circuit reversed, noting that the tags tested by the expert were produced on the same machines that were transferred to Belgium. The claim of infringement was reasonable and the litigation was not brought in bad faith or with abusive tactics. View "Checkpoint Systems, Inc. v. All-Tag Security S.A." on Justia Law

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Rothschild alleged that ADS’s home security system infringed its 090 patent. Rothschild has filed numerous lawsuits against others alleging infringement of the 090 patent. ADS filed an answer and counterclaims and sent Rothschild an email alleging that the patent covered patent-ineligible subject matter (35 U.S.C. 1011) and that prior art anticipated claim 1 (35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1)). ADS offered to settle if Rothschild paid ADS $43,330 for attorney fees and costs. Rothschild rejected ADS’s offer. ADS moved for judgment on the pleadings, sending Rothschild an FRCP 11(c)(2) Safe Harbor Notice, with copies of a proposed Rule 11(b) motion for sanctions and prior art that purportedly anticipated the claim. Rothschild voluntarily moved to dismiss. ADS opposed and filed a cross-motion for attorney fees, arguing that Rothschild’s suit was objectively unreasonable because Rothschild knew or should have known that claim 1 covers patent-ineligible subject matter and was anticipated. The Federal Circuit reversed the holding that Rothschild had not engaged in conduct sufficient to make the litigation “exceptional” for purposes of section 285 attorney fees. Whether a party avoids or engages in sanctionable conduct under Rule 11(b) is not the appropriate benchmark; a court may award fees in the rare case in which a party’s unreasonable conduct—while not necessarily independently sanctionable—is so exceptional as to justify an award. View "Rothschild Connected Devices Innovations, LLC v. Guardian Protection Services, Inc." on Justia Law

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Appellant, who was convicted of rape, filed a pro se petition to correct an illegal sentence under Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-111. The trial court denied the petition. Appellant appealed. The Supreme Court found good cause to reverse without considering Appellant’s arguments concerning the merits of his petition for relief under the statute. The court held that because the judge who ruled on Appellant’s section 16-90-111 petition was, in fact, the prosecuting attorney at his trial for rape, a serious appearance impropriety was created because the judge did not refrain from presiding over a case in which he might be interested. The court remanded the matter so that a different circuit judge can rule on the petition. View "Latham v. Kelley" on Justia Law

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Roger and Carrie Peters and Draggin’ Y Cattle Company (collectively, Peters) entered into a stipulated settlement with Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. and Larry Addink (collectively, Junkermier). Judge George Huss, the presiding judge, determined that the stipulated settlement was reasonable and entered judgment against New York Marine and General Insurance Company, Junkermier’s insurer. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Judge Huss improperly failed to disclose a potential conflict of interest. On remand, the district court determined that Judge Huss was required to recuse himself and should have been disqualified and vacated Judge Huss’s orders issued after he should have been disqualified. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) correctly held that Judge Huss was required to disqualify himself pursuant to Montana Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.12(A); and (2) did not err in vacating Judge Huss’s orders issued after he should have disqualified himself. View "Draggin Cattle Co. v. New York Marine & General Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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Attorney filed suit, seeking payment of unpaid fees. Client filed an answer and, one year later, asked for arbitration pursuant to his retainer agreement. The court compelled arbitration that resulted in no recovery by either side. Six days after the award, Client asked the arbitrator to award him costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 because Attorney’s recovery was less favorable than an offer that Client made two months before demanding arbitration. When the arbitrator responded that he no longer had jurisdiction, Client asked the court to confirm the award, with Section 998 costs. The court confirmed the arbitration award but determined that Client failed to make a timely section 998 claim to the arbitrator and denied Client’s request for costs. The court of appeals reversed, rejecting Attorney’s suggestion that Client should have presented his section 998 request for costs to an arbitrator before the arbitration award was rendered. An offer which is not accepted “cannot be given in evidence upon the trial or arbitration.” In his request to confirm the award, Client established that the arbitrator had refused to hear any evidence of Attorney’s rejection of Client’s section 998 offer; Client timely presented his claim to the arbitrator, who should have reached the merits of that claim. View "Heimlich v. Shivji" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against defendant after it attempted to collect debt from plaintiff, alleging that the company violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), the District of Columbia Consumer Protections Procedures Act (CPPA), and the District of Columbia Debt Collection Law (DCDCL). Plaintiff eventually accepted defendant's offer of judgment regarding the FDCPA claim and the district court determined the attorney's fees to which she was entitled for this success. The DC Circuit held that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(D) and 72(b)(3) foreclose the district court from using a "clearly erroneous or contrary to law" standard when evaluating a magistrate judge's proposed disposition of an attorney's fee request. The correct standard of review is de novo. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded to allow the trial judge to reconsider this matter in the first instance applying de novo review. The court affirmed as to the remaining orders challenged on appeal. View "Baylor v. Mitchell Rubenstein & Assoc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Attorney alleging that Attorney failed properly to advertise and conduct non-judicial foreclosure sales of their properties in violation of duties under Plaintiffs’ mortgages, statutory law, common law, and the consumer protection statute. The circuit court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that dismissal was appropriate where (1) the statutory requirements of former Haw. Rev. Stat. 667-5 and 776-7 do not give rise to a private right of action against a foreclosing mortgagee’s attorney; and (2) an unfair or deceptive acts or practices acts or practices claim against Attorney as the foreclosing mortgagee’s attorney was not recognized. View "Sigwart v. Office of David B. Rosen" on Justia Law

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Washtech, a labor union that represents American workers, appealed from a fee award it received under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412, for proceedings in which it partially succeeded in challenging a DHS practice allowing student visa holders to remain in the United States after completion of their formal education. The DC Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying fees generally for Washtech's unsuccessful efforts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Washington Alliance of Technology Workers v. DHS" on Justia Law

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Davis sued, asserting malpractice and breach of contract claims, and federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) and Civil Rights Act claims, arising out of Fenton’s legal representation of Davis in a mortgage foreclosure action in which Davis lost her home. Davis alleged that Fenton’s representation of her was deficient and that he had targeted her for deficient representation because of her race. Because Fenton’s contract with Davis required the parties to arbitrate any disputes, the district judge ordered the suit “stayed pending arbitration.: Arbitrators awarded Davis $82,528.10 in damages for malpractice but denied her other claims. Fenton sued in Illinois state court to have the award vacated. Davis moved the federal court to reinstate her suit, to confirm the award under 9 U.S.C. 9, and to permit her to file a new FHA claim, accusing Fenton of retaliating against her for having filed her original claim. Fenton failed to appear; the judge entered a default judgment granting the motion. The court refused to vacate the default and remand to state court but dismissed the retaliation claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The federal judge had jurisdiction over the case when it was filed; the order staying the case, subject to reinstatement, retained jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an arbitral award. The court affirmed the dismissal; filing a lawsuit cannot be considered retaliation, except in extraordinary circumstances. View "Davis v. Fenton" on Justia Law

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Petitioner challenged as unconstitutional certain restrictions imposed upon attorneys who were employed by the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board (Board), and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The Board filed preliminary objections, asserting petitioner lacked standing to pursue her claim, her claim was not yet ripe, and in any event, her claim failed on the merits. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court overruled the Board’s preliminary objections as to standing and ripeness, but nevertheless concluded petitioner was not entitled to relief on the merits as the restrictions included in the Gaming Act were constitutionally sound. View "Yocum v. PA Gaming Control Board" on Justia Law