Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Pfister and Evans dealt methamphetamine in Illinois. In 2016, they traveled to Colorado approximately 20 times to buy meth from Wright. After Evans sold several ounces to Heavener, officers searched Heavener’s home and recovered over 50 grams of meth. Heavener knew that Evans got the meth from “Monica” in Colorado.Wright was charged with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of meth and at least 500 grams of a mixture containing meth. She retained Garfinkel. In its opening statement, the government previewed testimony from Evans, Pfister, Heavener, and Deherrera, a Colorado-based middleman. Garfinkle also foreshadowed testimony from Deherrera, referring to him as the government’s witness. During trial, the government alerted the court that Deherrera had stated that Garfinkel had encouraged him to change his testimony. The government referenced Deherrera’s potentially exculpatory testimony but stated that it no longer planned to call him as a witness, noting that if Wright called Deherrera and he testified to being pressured to change his testimony, Garfinkel would have to take the stand to impeach him. Garfinkel denied Deherrera’s allegations. The court questioned Wright, who confirmed she agreed with Garfinkel’s strategy to not call Deherrera, understanding the possibility that Garfinkel was personally motivated. Deherrera did not testify. In closing arguments, Garfinkel described Deherrera’s absence as the missing link—a burden the government had to overcome to convict Wright. Wright was convicted and sentenced to 264 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no conflict of interest and sufficient evidence of conspiracy. View "United States v. Wright" on Justia Law

Two law firms that represented Plaintiffs in this litigation, Schlichter Bogard & Denton LLP (“SBD”) and Schneider Wallace Cottrell Konecky LLP (“SWCK”), appealed the district court’s order imposing sanctions against them under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Plaintiffs’ counsel represented individual shareholders and an employee retirement plan in a lawsuit claiming that the investment company, investment adviser, and recordkeeper (collectively “Empower”) servicing their mutual funds charged excessive fees in violation of its fiduciary duties under § 36(b) of the Investment Company Act. Following denial of Empower’s summary judgment and Daubert motions, the case proceeded to a bench trial where the district court ruled in favor of Empower. Thereafter, the court sanctioned Plaintiffs’ counsel for “recklessly pursu[ing] their claims through trial despite the fact that they were lacking in merit” and held SWCK and SBD jointly and severally liable for $1.5 million in Empower’s trial costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court abused its discretion and therefore reversed the order imposing sanctions. Accordingly, the Court did not reach the issues of SWCK and SBD’s joint and several liability or the court’s denial of SWCK’s motion to amend the judgment. View "Obeslo, et al. v. Empower Capital, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit in federal district court against Judge Goldston and others present at the search. Plaintiff claimed that the warrantless search and seizure of his property violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, that the restrictions on recording the incident violated the First Amendment, and that Judge Goldston’s practice of conducting “home visits” violated the Equal Protection Clause by disadvantaging pro se litigants like himself. He sought compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, as well as attorney’s fees and injunctive and declaratory relief. Judge Goldston moved for summary judgment, claiming she was entitled to absolute judicial immunity. The district court denied her motion. At issue on appeal is whether Judge Goldston is entitled to judicial immunity.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that judicial immunity protects only judicial acts. It does not shield the conduct of judges who step outside their judicial role, as Judge Goldston did when searching Plaintiff’s home. The court explained that while Judge Goldston might have had the authority to order a search, the proper authority to conduct the operation was the local sheriff’s department or some other appropriate law enforcement agency. The court explained that just as “judges do not do double duty as jailers,” so too they do not do double duty as sheriffs. View "Matthew Gibson v. Louise Goldston" on Justia Law

This case arose out of disputes over the propriety and enforceability of amendments to Thomas Tedesco’s living trust, which was conceived of as part of a family estate plan Tedesco created with his late wife, Wanda. The trust came into being following Wanda Tedesco’s death in 2002, and it was later restated. The primary beneficiaries of the restated trust were the cotrustees. For their part, the cotrustees petitioned the court to validate a 2013 amendment, and thus to establish the invalidity of a purported 2020 amendment to the restated trust. The appeal before the Court of Appeal challenged a discovery sanction for $6,000. Counsel attempted to use the sanctions order as a basis for challenging the merits of the trial court’s nonappealable order quashing appellant Debra Wear's document subpoena, and then to further use the trial court’s analysis underlying that discovery ruling into a basis for reviewing a separate order the Court of Appeal already ruled could not be appealed. The Court concluded all of this seemed to be in furtherance of counsel’s broader quest: to again collaterally attack the validity of a conservatorship over the Tedesco estate, which had been rejected by the probate and appellate courts in earlier proceedings. The Court determined its jurisdiction arose here on the limited issue of sanctions, and found Wear failed to challenge the probate court's pertinent determinations, "let alone demonstrate why the court abused its discretion in making them. We find no error in the court’s ruling." The Court affirmed the sanctions order. View "Tedesco v. White" on Justia Law

Defendant State of Louisiana, ex rel. Jeff Landry (“the State”) sought to dissolve a consent decree that pertains to the method of selecting justices for the Louisiana Supreme Court. The State attempted to dissolve the consent judgment under the first and third clauses of Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The State contended that the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged because the State has substantially complied with the decree for more than thirty years and the decree was intended to terminate at a defined milestone. The State further contended that it is no longer equitable to enforce the consent judgment prospectively because of widespread malapportionment in Louisiana’s supreme court election districts. The district court denied the State’s motion to dissolve.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the dissolution motion, as the State has failed to meet its evidentiary burdens under both the first and third clauses of Rule 60(b)(5). The court explained that the State did not meet the evidentiary burden associated with Rufo’s first prong, which requires a showing of changed factual or legal circumstances that warrant reexamination of a consent decree. The State only makes very general claims about malapportionment and asserts that “new policy concerns” have arisen which satisfy Rufo. But the State offers almost no evidentiary support for this argument. Further, the court wrote that the State’s argument that continued enforcement of the Consent Judgment is detrimental to the public interest is unavailing. View "Chisom v. State of Louisiana" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the district court in favor of Baldwin, Crocker & Rudd, P.C. and Kelly Rudd (collectively, BCR) in this action brought by the Northern Arapaho Tribe and the Wind River Hotel & Casino (collectively, the Tribe), holding that the district court's order imposing sanctions on the Tribe was erroneous.The Tribe brought this action seeking injunctions for the return of tribal funds and documents, an accounting, and damages for conversion and civil theft. The district court granted summary judgment for BCR on the accounting and injunctions claims and, after a jury trial, entered final judgment on the conversion and civil theft claim. The Tribe appealed, arguing, among other things, that the district court erred by awarding sanctions under Wyo. R. Civ. P. 11. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that (1) the district court erred in imposing sanctions because BCR failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 11; (2) the district court did not err when it granted summary judgment for BCR on the Tribe's accounting claim; and (3) the Tribe failed to show the verdict would have been more favorable if racially charged evidence had not been admitted. View "Northern Arapaho Tribe v. Baldwin, Crocker & Rudd, P.C." on Justia Law

In Louisiana v. Bartie, 14th Judicial District Court Case Number 12615-16, Div. G, Judge Michael Canaday presided over multiple hearings relating to the defendant’s indigency and his request for ancillary funding for defense experts. Because the hearings involved the disclosure of defense strategy, they were conducted without the district attorney, and the transcripts were sealed. Judge Canaday found the defendant was not indigent and denied his request for funding. The defense filed a writ application with the Third Circuit Court of Appeal challenging the indigency ruling. To facilitate filing the application, Judge Canaday granted defense counsel’s request for transcripts of the hearings. After defense counsel moved to obtain a missing transcript, Judge Canaday ordered the transcript be given to defense counsel and handwrote that it be “release[d] from seal.” Judge Canaday then received an email from the district attorney’s office asking whether his order gave the district attorney’s office access to the transcripts, or only defense counsel and the Third Circuit. Defense counsel was not copied with this email. Judge Canaday replied: “Since I don’t believe the state could appeal my granting relief to the defense on funding, I don’t think they can support the courts [sic] position to deny. The courts [sic] reasons will be sufficient for the 3rd to review. If the 3rd requests a states [sic] response obviously they could access the record.” Defense counsel was not included in these communications. The district attorney’s office then filed a “Motion to Unseal All Documents and Transcripts in Regards to Determining Indigency of the Defendant.” This motion was styled neither ex parte nor unopposed. Without a hearing, Judge Canaday signed an order granting the district attorney’s office the requested relief. Defense counsel did not have an opportunity to respond. The materials released by Judge Canaday included a transcript of a closed hearing where defense strategy specific to Bartie was discussed, including experts and their expected testimony. Defense counsel successfully argued for Judge Canaday’s recusal from the Bartie case. Writ applications seeking reversal of the recusal were denied by both the Third Circuit and the Louisiana Supreme Court. The recusal and subsequent related writ applications resulted in the expenditure of significant time, effort, and funds by both the state and defense counsel. There were negative media reports concerning Judge Canaday’s actions. Media reports prompted a Judiciary Commission investigation. The Commission found Judge Canaday engaged in improper ex parte communications and inappropriately granted a state motion to release documents from seal without holding a hearing or otherwise allowing defense counsel the opportunity to respond. The Commission recommended that he be publicly censured and pay costs. The Louisiana Supreme Court concurred with the censure recommendation. View "In re: JUDGE G. Michael Canaday" on Justia Law

UC Davis students Doe and Roe were having consensual sex in Doe’s room, when Doe made a one-second video recording of his own face. Roe asked Doe to delete it, which he did. Months later, she made a formal complaint. Doe initially lied to the investigator but ultimately admitted to taking the recording. UC Davis imposed a one-year suspension for violations of its Sexual Violence and Sexual Harassment Policy and a policy that generally bars nonconsensual recordings that violate another person’s privacy. The trial court found UC Davis’s Title IX procedure “consistent with due process standards” but found the suspension “objectively excessive and punitive,” stating that the college must do more to explain its Title IX discipline. UC Davis then imposed a shorter suspension.Doe unsuccessfully sought $142,387.48 attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure 1021.5 and $7,500 under Government Code 800. The court of appeal held that Doe was not entitled to attorney fees under section 1021.5 because the litigation did not confer a significant benefit “on the general public or a large class of persons.” However, section 800 authorizes an award of up to $7,500 if the challenged administrative determination “was the result of arbitrary or capricious action or conduct.” All aspects of an administrative proceeding need not be arbitrary or capricious to justify section 800 fees. The court remanded for consideration of whether UC Davis engaged in sufficient arbitrary or capricious conduct to warrant an award. View "Doe v. Atkinson" on Justia Law

The matter underlying this mandamus proceeding was a legal malpractice action brought by Plaintiff-relator Thomas Hill against his former attorney, defendant Ronald Johnson, who had represented Hill in a marriage dissolution proceeding. Hill alleged that, at the conclusion of his dissolution proceeding, Johnson signed a stipulated supplemental judgment on his behalf without his knowledge or permission. According to Hill, the stipulated supplemental judgment provided Hill’s ex-wife certain proceeds out of his pension plan that exceeded the amount to which he had previously agreed. Hill alleged that, months later, when he learned that the stipulated supplemental judgment included the disputed pension proceeds, he asked Johnson to correct it. When that was not done to Hill’s satisfaction, he hired new trial counsel, Fowler, to repair Johnson’s alleged error. Fowler moved the trial court to invalidate the supplemental judgment. The trial court denied that motion. Hill then hired appellate counsel, Daniels, to repair Johnson’s alleged error by challenging the trial court’s order on appeal. In response to Hill’s complaint, Johnson issued Hill discovery requests seeking the production of documents. Those requests sought, among other things, the complete files of Fowler and Daniels related to their representations of Hill in the dissolution matter as well as documents related to any other attorney whom Hill had contacted to represent him in the dissolution proceeding, regardless of whether Hill had retained the contacted attorney. The issue presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review was to define one boundary to the breach-of-duty exception to attorney-client privilege. Based on the text, context, and legislative history of OEC 503(4)(c), the Court concluded the breach-of-duty exception applied only to communications between the parties directly involved in the alleged breach. The trial court therefore erred when it applied the breach-of-duty exception to communications beyond that scope. View "Hill v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the charges against Petitioner, a Justice of the Whitehall Town Court and Whitehall Village Court, Washington County, were sustained by the evidence and that the sanction of removal from office for his acts of misconduct was appropriate.The State Commission on Judicial Misconduct served Petitioner with formal written complaints charging him with with judicial misconduct for brandishing a loaded firearm at a litigant during a case and engaging in improper fundraising. The Court of Appeals upheld the sanction of removal, holding (1) the investigation was procedurally proper; (2) there was no reason to set aside the Commission's finding of racial bias; and (3) the record supported the conclusion that Petitioner's misconduct transcended poor judgment and warranted removal. View "In re Putorti" on Justia Law