Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

In 2003, Dumville met with attorney Thorsen to prepare her will. Thorsen understood that Dumville wanted a will that would, upon her death, convey all of her property to her mother if her mother survived her, and, if her mother predeceased her, to the Richmond Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA). Dumville was 43 and lived with three cats, which she desired to go to the RSPCA upon her death. Thorsen prepared, and Dumville executed, the will. She died in 2008, her mother having predeceased her. Thorsen, as co-executor of the estate, notified the RSPCA that it was the sole beneficiary of Dumville’s estate. Thorsen was informed that, in the opinion of the title insurance company, the will left only the tangible estate, not real estate, to the RSPCA. Thorsen brought suit in a collateral proceeding to correct this “scrivener’s error” based on Dumville’s clear original intent. The court found the language unambiguously limited the RSPCA bequest to tangible personal property, while the intangible estate passed intestate to Dumville’s heirs at law. The RSPCA received $72,015.60, but the bequest, less expenses, would have totaled $675,425.50 absent the error. RSPCA sued Thorsen for negligence, as a third-party beneficiary of his contract with Dumville. The court found for the RSPCA. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed: RSPCA was a clearly and definitely identified third-party beneficiary. View "Thorsen v. Richmond Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals" on Justia Law

This case stems from an investigation into improprieties in the Court-Supervised Settlement Program (CSSP) responsible for a class of claims related to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Movants Glen Lerner and Jonathan Andry appeal the district court’s sanction order disqualifying them from further participation in the CSSP related to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and Andry Lerner, L.L.C. appeals the denial of its motion to alter or amend the restrictions imposed on related attorneys’ fees that were escrowed in connection with the sanction. The district court found that Andry and Lerner had violated multiple rules under the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct. The court affirmed the district court's sanction order because that court acted within its inherent authority to supervise the settlement program and did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sanction. The court held that, in light of the Special Master’s representation that the parties intend to agree to appropriate amendments to the restrictions on the escrowed fees, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Andry Lerner, L.L.C.’s motion to alter or amend. The court left open to the district court the possibility of amending its orders upon submission of a properly supported motion. View "Lake Eugenie Land & Dev. v. BP" on Justia Law

William E. Rice and others filed suit against Attorney Gary P. Downs for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of a written agreement Downs drafted to govern a limited liability corporation he formed with Rice and others. Both parties appealed after arbitration. The court concluded that Rice’s malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and rescission claims do not arise out of the operating agreements. Accordingly, the court reversed with respect to the court’s order compelling arbitration of Rice’s legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and rescission causes of action and otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "Rice v. Downs" on Justia Law

O.F. Mossberg & Sons, Inc., and Burns Auction & Appraisal, LLC (collectively “Mossberg”), appealed a District Court order granting Luke and Stephanie Keuffers’ motion to disqualify Mossberg’s counsel. The District Court disqualified Mossberg’s out-of-state counsel, Renzulli Law Firm, and its local counsel, Tarlow & Stonecipher, pursuant to Rule 1.20(c) of the Montana Rules of Professional Conduct. The basis for the court’s disqualification order was a prospective client consultation that Luke Keuffer had with an attorney from Tarlow & Stonecipher, which was later used in a deposition of Stephanie Keuffer by John Renzulli of the Renzulli Law Firm. The court found that the continued involvement in the case by Mossberg’s counsel gave the Keuffers reason to question whether their case could proceed fairly and cause to question what they may have disclosed in the consultation to Tarlow & Stonecipher that may later be used against them in the current litigation. The court also found that Mossberg’s counsel’s actions undermine the public’s trust in the legal profession. Finding no reversible error in the District Court's disqualification order, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed. View "Keuffers v. O.F. Mossberg & Sons" on Justia Law

In 2004, Linegar, an Australian, formed KeyOvation, which eventually merged with Saflink and became IdentiPHI, in which Linegar was a major stockholder. DLA Piper law firm represented Saflink in the merger. Following the merger, DLA Piper represented IdentiPHI as corporate counsel. During the merger, IdentiPHI needed a short-term loan. Linegar then served as Chairman, Director, and majority shareholder of Zaychan, the corporate trustee of the Linegar Fund, an Australian self-managed retirement trust with Linegar and his ex-wife as the sole beneficiaries. Linegar arranged for the Fund to lend IdentiPHI $1.67million. DLA Piper represented IdentiPHI in the transaction and worked directly with Linegar. IdentiPHI executed a promissory note to Zaychan, which was accepted by Linegar as Chairman and Director, and which granted Zaychan a security interest in IdentiPHI’s assets. The note was payable by June 29, 2008. Timely payment was essential for the Fund's compliance with Australian law. When it became apparent that IdentiPHI was going to default, Linegar took several actions, but ultimately the debt was subject to challenge under 11 U.S.C. 547(b) because the security interest had not been perfected. KeyOvation, the holder of the assigned note, settled its claim for $150,000, which it paid to Linegar. Linegar, Zaychan, and KeyOvation sued DLA Piper for legal malpractice, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and deceptive trade practices. They claimed that the firm gave assurances that the lien would be perfected. Linegar’s individual claims resulted in an award of $1,293,606. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed, holding that Linegar, as an individual, had standing. View "Linegar v. DLA Piper LLP" on Justia Law

After respondent received a judgment for child support arrears and penalties against appellant in Nevada, as well as an award of attorney fees, appellant appealed the order. Under NRS 125.040(1)(c), a district court has discretion in a divorce suit to require one party to pay an amount of money necessary to assist the other party in carrying on or defending the suit. The court held that a district court has jurisdiction to award attorney fees pendente lite for the costs of an appeal pursuant to NRS 125.040. In this case, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding such fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order. View "Griffith v. Gonzales-Alpizar" on Justia Law

Attorney Baxter and his former clients, the Bocks, participated in arbitration under the Mandatory Fee Arbitration Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, 6200), stipulating to be bound by the result. In his decision, the arbitrator concluded the services provided by Baxter should be valued at the amount already paid by the Bocks and awarded Baxter nothing. The parties acknowledge that the arbitrator erred in stating the amount of fees paid by the Bocks. When the error was brought to his attention, the arbitrator declined to correct his award. Later, Baxter discovered the arbitrator was in the business of auditing attorney bills and had written extensively about attorney overbilling. Baxter argued unsuccessfully that the arbitration award should be vacated because the arbitrator erred in stating the amount paid and failed to disclose matters relating to bias. The court of appeal affirmed confirmation of the arbitration award, finding that the arbitrator was not obligated to disclose the nature of his practice and that Baxter was not prejudiced by the arbitrator’s handling of the evidence. The amount of the court’s award of attorney fees to the Bocks was vacated and remanded to the for reconsideration of a lodestar compensation rate assigned to an attorney. View "Baxter v. Bock" on Justia Law

Whiteside represented the County of Camden in a lawsuit brought by Anderson, which resulted in a jury award paid, in part, by the County’s excess insurer, National. According to National, the County did not notify it of the lawsuit until several months after it was filed. Whiteside initially informed National that the case was meritless and valued it at $50,000. During trial, Whiteside changed her valuation and requested the full $10 million policy limit to settle Anderson’s claims. National conducted an independent review and denied that request. The jury awarded Anderson $31 million, which was remitted to $19 million. Days later, National sought a declaratory judgment that it was not obligated to provide coverage because the County had breached the policy contract by failing to timely notify National of the case and by failing to mount an adequate investigation and defense. National also asserted claims against Whiteside for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract. The court dismissed those claims because National could not demonstrate that Whiteside’s actions proximately caused it to suffer any damages. The Third Circuit dismissed and appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding National’s notice of appeal untimely under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1), View "State Nat'l Ins. Co v. County of Camden" on Justia Law

As part of a malicious prosecution lawsuit against Chicago, the plaintiffs sought by subpoena to discover documents from the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office. Lawyers representing the Office, including McClellan, stated that the files no longer existed. A year later, the Presiding Judge ordered the Office to allow the plaintiffs’ lawyers to inspect 181 boxes of documents stored in a warehouse. The documents at issue were quickly found. Plaintiffs moved to sanction McClellan and others for obstructing discovery. After the tort suit ended in the plaintiffs’ acceptance of an offer of judgment, the judge granted the motion and ordered McClellan and the State’s Attorney’s Office to pay fees and costs ($35,522.94) that their misconduct had imposed on the plaintiffs, based on a finding of attorney misconduct under 28 U.S.C. 1927 and the inherent authority of a federal court to punish attorney misconduct in a case before it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing the criticisms of McClellan as “apt and accurate” and, because the sanction had been paid, holding that a district court order imposing a sanction on a lawyer for misconduct in a case before the court can be appealed even if the sanction lacks a monetary component. View "Martinez v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

White, a member of the Bar of Maryland, represented Fleming and Sewell, while under a Conditional Diversion Agreement (CDA) with Bar Counsel for prior misconduct involving mismanagement of her attorney trust account. The CDA was amended, then subsequently revoked due to non-compliance. The Attorney Grievance Commission filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, based upon White’s representation of Fleming and Sewell, non-compliance with the CDA, and the mishandling of her trust account. Bar Counsel alleged that White violated Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 1.1 (Competence), Rule 1.3 (Diligence), Rule 1.4(a) and (b) (Communication), Rule 1.15(a) and (d) (Safekeeping Property); 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating Representation); 8.1(a) and (b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters); and Rule 8.4(a), (c), and (d) (Misconduct). Bar Counsel also alleged that she violated Maryland Rules 16-606.1 (Attorney Trust Account Record-Keeping), 16-607 (Commingling of Funds), 16-609 (Prohibited Transactions), and Md. Code 10-306 of the Business Occupations & Professions Article (Misuse of Trust Money). White attributed her actions to illness, recuperation after surgery, and difficulties experienced as caretaker of her mother until her death. A hearing judge found multiple violations. Bar Counsel requested indefinite suspension with the right to apply for readmission after six months. The Maryland Court of Appeals agreed. View "Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. White" on Justia Law