Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

On August 26, 2015, the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance found that former Municipal Court Judge Latisha Nicole Clinkscales had engaged in judicial misconduct constituting willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute, in violation of Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution. Clinkscales served as Municipal Court Judge for the City of Columbus from 2010 until her resignation on June 23, 2015. While serving as a Municipal Court Judge, she also served as the Columbus Drug Court Judge until her resignation on February 6, 2014, following a meeting with the Administrative Office of Courts concerning irregularities in her operation of the Drug Court program. The misconduct to which Clinkscales admitted involves four separate areas: her statements on social media, her operation of the Columbus Drug Court program, her statements in a newspaper interview, and her conduct in the courtroom. The Commission entered a recommendation that Clinkscales be publicly reprimanded and assessed costs of the proceeding, and the Commission and Clinkscales filed a joint motion requesting the Supreme Court to approve the Commission’s recommendation. The Supreme Court accepted the recommendation, imposed a public reprimand and assessed Clinkscales the costs of the proceeding. View "Mississippi Comm'n on Jud. Perf. v. Clinkscales" on Justia Law

Williams was convicted of a 1984 murder and sentenced to death. Philadelphia District Attorney Castille approved a request to seek the death penalty. Williams’s conviction and sentence were upheld on direct appeal, state post-conviction review, and federal habeas review. In 2012, Williams filed a successive petition under Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), arguing that the prosecutor had obtained false testimony from his codefendant and suppressed exculpatory evidence. Finding that the prosecutor had committed Brady violations, the court stayed Williams’s execution. The Commonwealth asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, whose chief justice was former District Attorney Castille, to vacate the stay. Without explanation, Castille denied Williams’s motion for recusal and request for referral to the full court; Castille joined an opinion vacating PCRA relief and reinstating Williams’s death sentence. Two weeks later, Castille retired. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated, holding that Castille’s participation violated the Due Process Clause. There is an impermissible risk of actual bias when a judge earlier had significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical decision regarding the defendant’s case. No attorney is more integral to the accusatory process than a prosecutor who participates in a major adversary decision; the decision to pursue the death penalty is a critical choice. Neither the involvement of multiple actors nor the passage of time relieves the former prosecutor of the duty to withdraw. An unconstitutional failure to recuse constitutes structural error, “not amenable” to harmless-error review, regardless of whether the judge’s vote was dispositive. The Court noted that many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania, have statutes and professional codes that already require recusal under these circumstances. View "Williams v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

Attorney Hassell obtained a judgment holding Bird liable for defamation and requiring her to remove defamatory reviews she posted about Hassell on Yelp.com. The judgment contained an order requiring Yelp to remove Bird’s defamatory reviews from its site. Yelp, who was not a party in the defamation action, moved to vacate the judgment. The court of appeal affirmed denial of that motion, but remanded. The court concluded that Yelp is not “aggrieved” by the defamation judgment against Bird, but is “aggrieved” by the removal order; Yelp’s motion to vacate was not cognizable under Code of Civil Procedure section 6632; Yelp has standing to challenge the validity of the removal order as an “aggrieved party,” having brought a nonstatutory motion to vacate; Yelp’s due process rights were not violated by its lack of prior notice and a hearing on the removal order request; the removal order does not violate Yelp’s First Amendment rights to the extent that it requires Yelp to remove Bird’s defamatory reviews; to the extent it purports to cover statements other than Bird’s defamatory reviews, the removal order is an overbroad unconstitutional prior restraint on speech; and Yelp’s immunity from suit under the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 230, does not extend to the removal order. View "Hassell v. Bird" on Justia Law

New Mexico Rule of Professional Conduct 16-308(E) prohibited a prosecutor from subpoenaing a lawyer to present evidence about a past or present client in a grand-jury or other criminal proceeding unless such evidence was “essential” and “there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information.” In a lawsuit brought against the New Mexico Supreme Court and the state’s Disciplinary Board and Office of Disciplinary Counsel, the United States claimed that the enforcement of this rule against federal prosecutors licensed in New Mexico violated the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court concluded that Rule 16-308(E) was preempted with respect to federal prosecutors practicing before grand juries, but was not preempted outside of the grand-jury context. With this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. NM Supreme Court" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit held, in Irish v. BNSF (2012), that the plaintiffs, injured by a 2007 flood in Bagley, Wisconsin, had forfeited an argument concerning the scope of Wis. Stat. 88.87. The statute concerns liability for negligent design and maintenance of a railroad grade that causes an obstruction to a waterway or drainage course. Plaintiffs’ counsel assembled a new group of plaintiffs and refiled the same litigation in Arkansas state court to pursue that argument. The new suit was removed and transferred to the Western District of Wisconsin, which dismissed it for failure to state a claim. The defendant asked the court to sanction plaintiffs’ counsel under FRCP 11 or 28 U.S.C. 1927 for pursuing frivolous claims and engaging in abusive litigation tactics. The court denied that request, reasoning that although the claims were all but foreclosed by the decision in Irish, they were not frivolous. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint but reversed the denial of sanctions. The record indicated that counsel unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings by filing suit in Arkansas, which had no connection to the case. Pursuant to section 1927, the defendant is entitled to its fees and costs for removing the case and successfully seeking its transfer. View "Boyer v. BNSF Ry. Co." on Justia Law

In 2001, the decedent presented to the Wetzel County Hospital Emergency Room in New Martinsville and came under the care of Dr. Murthy, a surgeon; she slipped into shock and died the next day. Her estate filed a medical negligence action, alleging that Murthy failed to perform exploratory surgery to identify, diagnose and correct the decedent’s “intraabdominal condition.” A jury awarded $4,000,000 in compensatory damages. After the trial, the circuit court allowed amendment of the complaint to add Murthy’s insurance carrier, Woodbrook, alleging that Woodbrook made all relevant decisions for Murthy’s defense and acted vexatiously and in bad faith. Following a remand, Murthy paid a reduced judgment, plus interest, in the total amount of $1,162,741.60 and filed motions in limine to preclude certain matters from consideration on the issue of attorney fees and costs, including an unrelated case that resulted in a $5,764,214.75 verdict against Dr. Murthy in March 2007. The court dismissed Woodbrook as a party-defendant and awarded the estate attorney fees and costs. The precise calculation was to be later determined. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed, concluding that the lower court’s reliance on certain conduct by Murthy did not justify the award. View "Murthy v. Karpacs-Brown" on Justia Law

The court issued a post-trial opinion holding that the loan agreement between plaintiff and National was unconscionable and that National violated the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. At issue is the court's award of attorneys' fees and costs to plaintiff. The court concluded that, because plaintiff prevailed on her TILA claims, and because plaintiff's other claims arose out of the same common core of facts as her TILA claims, the fee award extends to all of plaintiff's attorneys' fees and costs. The court also concluded that the bad faith with which National and its counsel acted throughout the litigation provides an independent basis for awarding plaintiff her attorneys' fees. Finally, the court rejected National's various procedural arguments. Therefore, plaintiff is entitled to the full amount sought and, given the seriousness of the misconduct in which National and its counsel engaged, they are jointly and severally liable for the fee award. View "James v. National Financial, LLC" on Justia Law

Heinz was the victim of a 2011 home invasion. One burglar entered, punched Heinz and locked him in a closet, then was joined by a second burglar. They stole Heinz’s possessions, including his car. Police arrested Jackson. After he was acquitted, Jackson sued the police under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that there was probable cause for the arrest. Heinz identified Jackson’s picture in a photo spread; Heinz’s neighbor identified Jackson as one of two people he saw loitering outside Heinz’s house near the time of the burglary. Jackson’s son told the police that his father had committed some burglaries recently. Jackson had no evidence for his claim that the photo spreads were conducted improperly. A search of Jackson’s home was authorized by a warrant. Jackson claimed that he was mistreated during this custody by being held incommunicado and without food for several days, but did not sue any of the guards. The court characterized Jackson’s claims as irresponsible and stated that his attorney “should count himself lucky that the appellees have not requested sanctions under Fed. R. App. P. 38.” View "Jackson v. City of Peoria" on Justia Law

Richard Watters petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Mobile Circuit Court to vacate its order denying his motion for a summary judgment as to count one of an amended complaint filed by Michael Gamble, in Gamble's capacity as administrator of the Estate of Barbara Ruth Findley Long ("Long"), deceased. Count one asserted a legal-malpractice claim against Watters under the Alabama Legal Services Liability Act ("the ALSLA"), alleging breach of a fiduciary duty. This proceeding involved title to real property located in Conecuh County, which was owned by Robert Findley at the time of his death. Long retained Watters & Associates, of which Watters was a partner, to represent her "in obtaining estate assets" of Findley, her deceased father. Watters filed suit seeking a declaration of Long's ownership in family property located in Conecuh County. The Circuit Court declaring that Long owned a one-sixth interest (approximately 30 acres) in the Conecuh County property Shortly thereafter, Long discharged Watters from any further representation in the declaratory-judgment action. Watters filed an attorney's lien against the Conecuh property to secure the payment of his attorney fees. Family members eventually quitclaimed their interests to Long. Taxes for 2006 weren't paid on the property, and Long's cousin Larry Findley purchased the property at a tax sale. According to Watters, Long asked him for a loan to redeem the property from the tax sale. Watters told Long that Langley would not record the quitclaim deed if Long repaid the loan within 30 days of redeeming the property; that, in the event the deed was recorded, any claim Watters might have against Long for services rendered regarding her deceased father's estate would be satisfied; and that Watters and Long agreed to terms concerning the loan arrangement. This arrangement was never reduced to writing. Long executed a quitclaim deed prepared by Watters, conveying title to the Conecuh property to "Langley & Watters, LLP." In 2010, Watters submitted to the Conecuh Probate Court a letter, enclosing "his client's" application for redemption of the Conecuh property. Long died on April 2, 2013, and a few months later, the Conecuh Probate Court appointed Gamble as administrator of Long's estate. Gamble filed a complaint against Watters, asserting claims of legal malpractice among other things. After review of this case, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that Watters had another adequate remedy (i.e., an appeal) other than a writ of mandamus. Therefore, the Court denied relief. View "Ex parte Richard L. Watters." on Justia Law

G&V received settlement funds from a personal injury claim without first filing perfection notices. NRS 18.015(3) requires an attorney to perfect a lien by serving notice "upon the party against whom the client has a cause of action, claiming the lien and stating the amount of the lien." NRS 18.015(4) provides that the lien attaches to recovery "from the time of service of the notices required." The court held that in order to comply with both subsections of the statute, attorneys must, prior to recovery, perfect their liens by serving notice that states both the attorney's percentage of the recovery and that the lien will include court costs and out-of-pocket costs advanced by the attorney in an amount to be determined. In this case, the court affirmed the district court's decision to order a pro-rata distribution because G&V did not perfect its lien until well after it recovered funds in the personal injury settlement. The court affirmed the denial of costs. The court clarified that an attorney need not deposit funds with the court in an interpleader action so long as the attorney keeps the funds in his or her client trust account for the duration of the interpleader action. View "Golightly & Vannah, PLLC v. TJ Allen, LLC" on Justia Law