Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

This case involves a judgment in an interpleader action initiated by Southern California Gas Company against various defendants. After remand, the Gas Co., Andrea L. Murray, and Scott Tepper each filed a motion seeking payment from the interpleader funds on different grounds, and the trial court ultimately granted some portion of the funds sought by each party. Patrick J. Flannery and the Law Offices of Joseph Daneshrad appealed. The court concluded that the interpleader case satisfies the "separate, independent action" requirement for enforcement of an attorney fee lien. The court also concluded that the trial court's factual findings that Tepper withdrew involuntarily and for good cause did not violate due process. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Southern California Gas Co. v. Flannery" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission (JQC) filed a notice of formal changes against Judge John P. Contini of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit for conduct in violation of the Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The JQC did not recommend suspension or removal for the misconduct but, rather, reasoned that a public reprimand plus conditions was appropriate. The Supreme Court approved the JQC’s findings and recommendations of a public reprimand plus conditions, holding that, in light of Judge Contini’s actions, the relevant case law, and the mitigating factors, these sanctions and conditions were fitting and appropriate. View "Inquiry Concerning Judge John P. Contini" on Justia Law

In this opinion authored by Associate Justice Rhonda Wood, Judge Wood considered a motion to disqualify filed by Appellees asking that Wood recuse from hearing an appeal and any case involving Michael Morton or his nursing homes. Appellees argued that Judge Wood for Supreme Court Campaign Committee’s acceptance of contributions retained in 2014 from Michael Morton and his nursing homes created an appearance of bias of impropriety for a case that will be before the Court in 2017. Judge Wood denied the individual motion to recuse, holding that, considering the factors and the surrounding circumstances as well as her duty to sit, it would not be proper to recuse from this case. View "Robinson Nursing & Rehabilitation Center v. Phillips" on Justia Law

The bankruptcy court imposed Rule 9011 sanctions against attorneys stemming from their representation of debtors in an adversary proceeding in which a creditor and the trustee sought denial of discharge. The attorney filed notice of appeal regarding the sanctions order. The bankruptcy court subsequently set the amount of sanctions and, days later, amended that order and imposed additional sanctions under 28 U.S.C. 1927. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel first denied motions to dismiss an appeal, holding that it had jurisdiction because the amount of sanctions was set forth in a final order. Notice of appeal was timely filed. Resolution of the sanctions issue will have no discernable impact on the pending discharge issue. The Panel subsequently vacated the sanctions order. In seeking the sanctions, the creditor did not comply with Rule 9011’s “safe harbor” notice requirement and the exception to that requirement did not apply. The bankruptcy court also erred as a matter of law in concluding that the attorney’s “shadow representation” of the debtors vexatiously and unreasonably multiplied the proceedings. In a separate opinion, the Panel upheld the bankruptcy court's ultimate denial of discharges.. View "In re: Blasingame" on Justia Law

Hannon, an attorney, represented Barber in litigation against the victim, Barber’s former domestic partner, Dr. Magno. In December 2006, the parties agreed that Barber would fund a college trust for their children. Barber paid $27,500.32 to Hannon as the trustee of the children’s funds and authorized Hannon to open a bank account. In February 2011, the victim became aware that the children’s funds had been misappropriated. Hannon may have used the money to cover legal fees owed by Barber. Charged with grand theft by embezzlement by a fiduciary (Pen. Code 487(a), 506), Hannon ultimately pled no contest to misdemeanor theft by embezzlement. The trial court placed him on probation for two years, ordered him to perform 240 hours of community service, and ordered him to pay $40,800 in restitution to the victim: $25,000 in attorney’s fees, $15,000 in lost wages, and $800 in mileage. The court of appeal rejected challenges to the restitution award and held that the victim was entitled to file a victim impact statement on appeal, pursuant to the Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008 (Marsy’s Law, Proposition 9 (2008)), but may not raise present legal issues not raised by Hannon or facts not in the record below View "People v. Hannon" on Justia Law

Counsel for appellant Martin Frantz hired attorney Merlyn Clark as an expert witness in an unrelated matter in 2009. Clark was a partner with respondent law firm Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP (“Hawley Troxell”). In 2010, Frantz’ creditor, Idaho Independent Bank, hired Hawley Troxell to represent it in a contract action against Frantz. In 2011, while that matter was pending, Frantz filed for bankruptcy. Hawley Troxell continued to represent the Bank as a creditor in the bankruptcy, including in an adversary proceeding the Bank filed against Frantz in 2013. Frantz alleged in the adversary proceeding that Clark’s interactions with Frantz in the 2009 matter created an attorney-client relationship and that it was therefore a conflict of interest for Clark’s firm to represent the Bank against Frantz. Frantz also alleged that Hawley Troxell improperly used confidential information Clark acquired in the 2009 matter. The bankruptcy court concluded that there was no attorney-client relationship between Clark (or Hawley Troxell) and Frantz. The adversary proceeding was later dismissed as moot. Frantz subsequently sued Hawley Troxell in Idaho district court, alleging legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. The district court denied pro hac vice admission to attorney Jeffrey Katz, Frantz’ chosen counsel. The district court also dismissed the complaint on the grounds of judicial estoppel, lack of standing, and abatement. Finally, it awarded Hawley Troxell attorney fees under Idaho Code sections 12-120(3) and 12-121. Frantz appealed the denial of pro hac vice admission, the dismissal of his complaint, and the award of attorney fees. Finding no reversible error after review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Frantz v. Troxell" on Justia Law

After the district court denied attorney Larry Klayman's application to be admitted pro hac vice in the high-profile criminal trial of Cliven Bundy, Bundy sought a writ of mandamus to force the district court to admit Klayman. The court denied relief, concluding that the district court had more than ample cause to turn down Klayman’s application: he is involved in an ethics proceeding before the District of Columbia Bar, and he was not candid with the court about the status of those proceedings; he disclosed that he was twice barred in perpetuity from appearing pro hac vice before judges in the Central District of California and the Southern District of New York, but he failed to list numerous cases—all available on Westlaw or LEXIS—in which he has been reprimanded, denied pro hac vice status, or otherwise sanctioned for violating various local rules; and he has a record of going after judges personally, and shortly after Chief Judge Gloria Navarro denied his application, Bundy filed a frivolous Bivens action against her in her own court. View "Bundy v. US District Court for the District of Nevada, Las Vegas" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this putative class action case, Stacey and Tyler Walker, appealed the trial court's order disqualifying their counsel, Hogue & Belong (the Firm), in this putative class action suit against their former employer, Apple, Inc. The trial court found automatic disqualification was required on the basis the Firm had a conflict of interest arising from its concurrent representation of the putative class in this case and the certified class in another wage-and-hour class action pending against Apple. Specifically, based on the parties' litigation strategies and evidence Apple submitted in support of its disqualification motion, the trial court concluded that to advance the interests of its clients in this case, the Firm would need to cross-examine a client in the Felczer class (the Walkers' store manager) in a manner adverse to that client. After review of plaintiffs' arguments on appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not err in finding the Firm represented the store manager and that a disqualifying conflict existed between her interests and the Walkers' interests. View "Walker v. Apple, Inc." on Justia Law

Contreras sued her landlords (Butterworth) and the Butterworths’ former attorneys based on their allegedly illegal entries into Contreras’s apartment. After attorney Dowling began representing the Butterworths, Contreras named him as a defendant. The trial court denied Dowling’s special motion to strike, ruling that Contreras’s action did not arise out of protected activity because she sought to hold him liable not for his activities as an attorney, but only for the underlying wrongful conduct of the Butterworths. Relying on opinions in the two prior appeals of the case, the court found Contreras had established a probability of prevailing on the merits. Finding Dowling’s motion frivolous, the granted Contreras’s motion for sanctions. The court of appeal reversed. Contreras’s claim against Dowling arises out of protected activity because the only actions Dowling himself is alleged to have taken are communicative acts by an attorney representing clients in litigation. Such acts are protected by Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Bare allegations of aiding and abetting or conspiracy do not suffice to remove such acts from the statute's protection. Contreras cannot demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits because Dowling’s communicative acts are within the scope of the litigation privilege codified in Civil Code section 47(b). View "Contreras v. Dowling" on Justia Law

In 2001, Millview County Water District began diverting substantial flows from the Russian River under a century-old water rights claim leased from Hill and Gomes. In 2009, Millview purchased the claim for $2.1 million, four months after the State Water Resources Control Board proposed a cease and desist order (CDO) to drastically restrict diversion under the claim. After the Board entered the CDO, Millview, Hill, and Gomes jointly prevailed in a mandate action challenging the CDO. After the court of appeal affirmed, they sought an award of attorney fees from the Board under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, arguing they had conferred a substantial public benefit by obtaining a published appellate opinion addressing the issue of water rights forfeiture and that the action had constituted a “financial burden” to them because they stood to gain no money judgment. The trial court awarded plaintiffs attorney fees with respect to the appeal but declined to award fees incurred during the remainder of the legal proceedings. The court of appeal vacated the award and affirmed the trial court’s decision not to award additional fees, concluding plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that the cost of the litigation outweighed its potential financial benefits to them. View "Millview County Water District v. State Water Resources Control Board" on Justia Law