Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The three underlying legal actions, involving breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, stock valuation, bankruptcy, and appeals, took place in Illinois. Plaintiffs, including attorneys involved in the underlying actions, sought to indemnification in post-trial proceedings. Defendant is a Delaware corporation with offices in Illinois. The Delaware Court of Chancery awarded plaintiffs $79,540.14 for pursuing the post-trial action and $241,492.50 for the Illinois proceedings, plus 20% of the expenses they incurred enforcing their indemnification right through this proceeding. The court cited the corporations’ bylaws, under which the plaintiffs are entitled to mandatory if indemnification would be permitted under the Delaware General Corporation Law and Section 145(a) of that law. View "Dore v. Sweports Ltd." on Justia Law

Myron Yarbrough appealed a circuit court judgment entered against him in his action alleging legal malpractice against Steven Eversole, Richard Perry, Jr., and Eversole Law, LLC ("the firm"). In 2006, Yarbrough was convicted of one count of first-degree rape and two counts of first-degree sodomy. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment for each conviction and ordered that the sentences were to run concurrently. Yarbrough appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed his convictions and sentences in an unpublished memorandum. At the time of the events giving rise to Yarbrough's cause of action, the firm employed both Eversole and Perry. In March 2012, Yarbrough retained the firm to explore the possibility of filing a Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., petition on Yarbrough's behalf. Yarbrough alleged that Eversole and Perry represented to Yarbrough that "there was a basis in fact and law to file a Rule 32 petition." Yarbrough asserted, however, that the two attorneys "knew that there was no 'newly discovered' evidence as defined by Alabama case law and that the statute of limitations would be a complete bar to all claims of newly discovered evidence and for the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel." Yarbrough paid the firm $10,000 to file a Rule 32 petition on his behalf. The claims in that Rule 32 petition were ultimately denied as time-barred. Yarbrough filed this legal malpractice action against the firm, alleging that they misrepresented his chances of success in the Rule 32 petition. After review, the Supreme Court found that circuit court erred in concluding that Yarbrough's legal-malpractice action against the firm and Eversole failed as a matter of law. However, there existed a plain dispute of fact as to what Eversole told Yarbrough about the prospects of a Rule 32 petition and the subsequent appellate filings. Therefore, a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the firm and Eversole was not warranted. The summary judgment in favor of Perry was affirmed, but the judgment on the pleadings in favor of the firm and Eversole was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Yarbrough v. Eversole" on Justia Law

Doe was president and “sole proprietor” of Company A, but a 2008 document purports to memorialize Doe’s sale of all shares to Company B for $10,000. Numerous filings and tax documents suggested that Doe maintained control and ownership of Company A after the transfer. Multiple individuals have sued Doe and his businesses in state courts. Doe and the companies were investigated by a federal grand jury. The government obtained access to Doe’s email. Doe filed an interlocutory appeal to prevent its disclosure. While the appeal was pending, the district court granted permission to present the email to the grand jury, finding that although the email was protected by the work product privilege, the crime-fraud exception applied; in 2016, the grand jury returned an indictment, charging conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, conspiracy, mail fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. The Third Circuit initially dismissed an interlocutory appeal, but, on rehearing, reversed, concluding that, while the grand jury investigation continues, it retains jurisdiction, and that the crime-fraud exception did not apply. The court stripped an attorney’s work product of confidentiality based on evidence suggesting only that the client had thought about using that product to facilitate fraud, not that the client had actually done so. An actual act to further the fraud is required before attorney work product loses its confidentiality. View "In re: Grand Jury Matter #3" on Justia Law

Appellant Michael Molen appealed the district court’s summary judgment dismissal of his legal malpractice action. The malpractice action stems from respondent Ronald Christian’s representation of Molen in a criminal case. The crux of this appeal was whether the statute of limitations on Molen’s malpractice cause of action accrued upon Molen’s initial criminal conviction or when Molen was later exonerated. After review, the Supreme Court held: (1) the statute of limitations for a legal malpractice action does not begin to run until the plaintiff has been exonerated of the underlying criminal conviction; and (2) actual innocence is not an element of a criminal malpractice cause of action. The Court vacated the district court’s summary judgment order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Molen v. Christian" on Justia Law

Waldman defrauded Stone more than a decade ago. In Waldman’s first appeal, the Sixth Circuit found ample evidence that Waldman and attorney Atherton defrauded Stone, but vacated the judgment on grounds unrelated to the merits. The district court entered a new judgment, awarding Stone over $1 million in compensatory damages and $2 million in punitive damages. The Sixth Circuit again affirmed that defendants committed fraud, but reduced Stone’s compensatory damages to $650,776, vacated the determination of joint and several liability, and remanded for the limited purpose of apportioning liability. The district court found defendants each 50% responsible for Stone’s damages and reduced the punitive damages to $1.2 million to retain the 2:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages. In Waldman’s third appeal, the Sixth Circuit granted Stone’s request for $4,157.50 in sanctions (his attorney’s fees in the third appeal). Waldman’s arguments concerning the award of punitive damages and the ratio were “patently beyond the scope of our limited remand and therefore out of bounds in this appeal” and had been waived; they were legally frivolous. Waldman’s arguments concerning apportionment of responsibility essentially argued, for a third time, that he did not commit fraud, and were also frivolous. His argument that Stone bore some fault for his damages because he should have uncovered Waldman’s fraud sooner was plainly meritless. View "Waldman v. Stone" on Justia Law

This matter arose from a recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (“Commission”) that Judge Darryl Derbigny be publicly censured, ordered to reimburse the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court Judicial Expense Fund (“JEF”) $57,359.96, and ordered to reimburse and pay to the Commission $8,150.24 in hard costs. The recommendation stems from Judge Derbigny’s participation in the district court’s supplemental insurance program and charges that he accepted insurance coverage and benefits beyond those allowed by law or available to all other court employees, the premiums for which were paid from the JEF. The Supreme Court concluded the Office of Special Counsel (“OSC”) failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Judge Derbigny’s participation in the district court’s supplemental insurance program rose to the level of sanctionable misconduct under either the Code of Judicial Conduct or Article V, Section 25(C) of the Louisiana Constitution. However, the Court agreed with the Commission that Judge Derbigny was not entitled to the benefits of any whole life insurance policies or the Exec-U-Care program under the plain language of La. R.S. 13:691. Because Judge Derbigny already surrendered the cash value of the whole life policies to the JEF, the Court ordered him to reimburse the JEF $10,002.58, representing the out-of-pocket reimbursements paid to Judge Derbigny under the Exec-U-Care program. The Court declined to impose Judge Derbigny with hard costs incurred by the Commission. View "In re: Judge Darryl Derbigny" on Justia Law

Attorney Susan Thiem represented Ann Thomas, an allegedly incapacitated person, during this action for appointment of a guardian and conservator. During the proceedings, the probate court issued an order imposing sanctions against Thiem based on a finding that she had “unreasonably interfered” with the discovery process. The sanctions order required Thiem to pay reasonable expenses, including attorney fees. Thiem appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the appeal as interlocutory without reaching the merits, holding that because the court had not yet quantified the amount of any attorney fees and expenses to be paid by Thiem as a sanction, the sanctions order was not a final judgment suitable for appellate review. View "Conservatorship & Guardianship of Ann B. Thomas" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants, lawyers and their law firms, alleging defamation and other causes of action. The action arose from statements two lawyers made on television and radio programs about a pending lawsuit involving bribery and kickbacks in connection with Pacific Hospital of Long Beach. The court granted defendants' special motion to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP), Code Civ. Proc., 425.16. The court, reviewing de novo, concluded that the action arose out of activity protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court also concluded that plaintiffs have not established a probability of success on the merits of their claims because the challenged statements are protected under the fair report privilege. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Healthsmart Pacific v. Kabateck" on Justia Law

In 1993, Joan Oggiani, a judicial secretary, was designated as the deputy assistant register when that position was created. In 2015, the register requested approval to remove Aggiani’s designation. The Chief Justice of the Probate and Family Court approved the register’s request. Oggiani requested review, but Oggiani was told that the decision was final. Oggiani then filed a petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 217, 29D. The county court denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice did not abuse his discretion or commit an error of law by denying Oggiani’s petition for relief under the circumstances. View "Oggiani v. Chief Justice of the Trial Court" on Justia Law

Walker filed suit in December 2012, alleging patent infringement. In May 2014, Walker and HSN, both represented by counsel, entered into a Mediated Settlement Agreement, requiring that HSN pay Walker $200,000; Walker was to deliver a release and the parties were to stipulate to dismissal. On May 9, HSN moved to stay deadlines based on the Agreement “that resolves all claims.” Walker opposed the motion, stating that “significant issues” remained. The court denied HSN’s motion. On May 12, HSN sought reconsideration, filing the Agreement and a memorandum arguing that all claims were resolved. During May, Walker moved to file a Third Amended Complaint, moved to set a Markman Hearing, and opposed the filing of the Agreement. On May 29, HSN moved to enforce the Agreement, attaching correspondence from Walker’s counsel acknowledging that the case was settled, but requesting additional discovery. Walker delivered a general release and HSN forwarded the $200,000 payment. Walker filed motions opposing enforcement and attorneys’ fees for HSN. HSN sought sanctions based on Walker’s “meritless filings … on a matter that has been fully resolved.” At a status conference, both parties agreed the case should be dismissed, but disagreed about over what the court retained jurisdiction. The court dismissed and awarded HSN “reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs resulting from Plaintiff’s vexatious actions after the filing of the Notice of Settlement.” Walker unsuccessfully sought reconsideration, then filed an unsuccessful objection to fees. In April 2015, the court entered final judgment awarding HSN $20,511.50 in attorneys’ fees. The Federal Circuit affirmed and, finding Walker’s appeal frivolous, awarded damages and double costs under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38. View "Walker v. Health International Corp." on Justia Law