Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Attorney filed suit, seeking payment of unpaid fees. Client filed an answer and, one year later, asked for arbitration pursuant to his retainer agreement. The court compelled arbitration that resulted in no recovery by either side. Six days after the award, Client asked the arbitrator to award him costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 because Attorney’s recovery was less favorable than an offer that Client made two months before demanding arbitration. When the arbitrator responded that he no longer had jurisdiction, Client asked the court to confirm the award, with Section 998 costs. The court confirmed the arbitration award but determined that Client failed to make a timely section 998 claim to the arbitrator and denied Client’s request for costs. The court of appeals reversed, rejecting Attorney’s suggestion that Client should have presented his section 998 request for costs to an arbitrator before the arbitration award was rendered. An offer which is not accepted “cannot be given in evidence upon the trial or arbitration.” In his request to confirm the award, Client established that the arbitrator had refused to hear any evidence of Attorney’s rejection of Client’s section 998 offer; Client timely presented his claim to the arbitrator, who should have reached the merits of that claim. View "Heimlich v. Shivji" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant after it attempted to collect debt from plaintiff, alleging that the company violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), the District of Columbia Consumer Protections Procedures Act (CPPA), and the District of Columbia Debt Collection Law (DCDCL). Plaintiff eventually accepted defendant's offer of judgment regarding the FDCPA claim and the district court determined the attorney's fees to which she was entitled for this success. The DC Circuit held that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(D) and 72(b)(3) foreclose the district court from using a "clearly erroneous or contrary to law" standard when evaluating a magistrate judge's proposed disposition of an attorney's fee request. The correct standard of review is de novo. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded to allow the trial judge to reconsider this matter in the first instance applying de novo review. The court affirmed as to the remaining orders challenged on appeal. View "Baylor v. Mitchell Rubenstein & Assoc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Attorney alleging that Attorney failed properly to advertise and conduct non-judicial foreclosure sales of their properties in violation of duties under Plaintiffs’ mortgages, statutory law, common law, and the consumer protection statute. The circuit court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that dismissal was appropriate where (1) the statutory requirements of former Haw. Rev. Stat. 667-5 and 776-7 do not give rise to a private right of action against a foreclosing mortgagee’s attorney; and (2) an unfair or deceptive acts or practices acts or practices claim against Attorney as the foreclosing mortgagee’s attorney was not recognized. View "Sigwart v. Office of David B. Rosen" on Justia Law

Washtech, a labor union that represents American workers, appealed from a fee award it received under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412, for proceedings in which it partially succeeded in challenging a DHS practice allowing student visa holders to remain in the United States after completion of their formal education. The DC Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying fees generally for Washtech's unsuccessful efforts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Washington Alliance of Technology Workers v. DHS" on Justia Law

Davis sued, asserting malpractice and breach of contract claims, and federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) and Civil Rights Act claims, arising out of Fenton’s legal representation of Davis in a mortgage foreclosure action in which Davis lost her home. Davis alleged that Fenton’s representation of her was deficient and that he had targeted her for deficient representation because of her race. Because Fenton’s contract with Davis required the parties to arbitrate any disputes, the district judge ordered the suit “stayed pending arbitration.: Arbitrators awarded Davis $82,528.10 in damages for malpractice but denied her other claims. Fenton sued in Illinois state court to have the award vacated. Davis moved the federal court to reinstate her suit, to confirm the award under 9 U.S.C. 9, and to permit her to file a new FHA claim, accusing Fenton of retaliating against her for having filed her original claim. Fenton failed to appear; the judge entered a default judgment granting the motion. The court refused to vacate the default and remand to state court but dismissed the retaliation claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The federal judge had jurisdiction over the case when it was filed; the order staying the case, subject to reinstatement, retained jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an arbitral award. The court affirmed the dismissal; filing a lawsuit cannot be considered retaliation, except in extraordinary circumstances. View "Davis v. Fenton" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged as unconstitutional certain restrictions imposed upon attorneys who were employed by the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board (Board), and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The Board filed preliminary objections, asserting petitioner lacked standing to pursue her claim, her claim was not yet ripe, and in any event, her claim failed on the merits. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court overruled the Board’s preliminary objections as to standing and ripeness, but nevertheless concluded petitioner was not entitled to relief on the merits as the restrictions included in the Gaming Act were constitutionally sound. View "Yocum v. PA Gaming Control Board" on Justia Law

In a construction-defect matter filed by a homeowners’ association (HOA) against several developers, an attorney for the HOA previously represented one of the developers. The developers moved to disqualify that attorney under Rules 1.9 and 1.10 of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. The trial court denied the motion, without what the Colorado Supreme Court described as “meaningfully analyzing for purposes” of Rule 1.9 whether this case was “substantially related” to the prior matters in which the attorney represented the developer. Instead, the Court found the trial court relied on issue preclusion, and found that in this situation, the attorney was not disqualified to represent the developer. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred by not analyzing the facts of this case under Rule 1.9, and therefore vacated the denial of the developers’ motion, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Villas at Highland Park Homeowners Assoc. v. Villas at Highland Park, LLC" on Justia Law

Galveston County Commissioners Court may set a salary range for a county judicial employee while letting Galveston County district judges decide if compensation within that range is reasonable. While the judicial branch may direct the Commissioners Court to set a new range, it cannot dictate a specific salary outside that range.The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment in this long-running dispute over who has the authority to set the compensation of a county judicial employee, holding that, in this case, the trial court lacked the authority to require a county judge to reinstate a county judicial employee at a specific salary, thus encroaching on the county’s legislative branch - the Commissioners Court. View "Honorable Mark Henry v. Honorable Lonnie Cox" on Justia Law

Fee-sharing provisions in otherwise valid retainer agreements between clients and two separate law firms are not unenforceable simply because the primary service performed by one firm is the referral of the clients to the other and the agreements fail to specifically notify clients that each firm has assumed joint financial responsibility for the representation.In 2007-2010, Plaintiff, a Gurnee law firm, was retained by 10 clients for representation under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Plaintiff contracted with attorney Esposito for assistance in representing the clients before the Workers’ Compensation Commission. A letter of understanding was drafted by defendant, confirming that the cases had been referred to defendant by plaintiff, outlining the parties’ respective responsibilities regarding representation of the clients, and specifying that the attorney fees obtained in each case would be split between Plaintiff and Esposito. The agreements did not specifically notify the clients that the lawyers in each firm had assumed joint financial responsibility for the representation. Plaintiff’s breach of contract suit against Esposito was dismissed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s reversal, rejecting an argument that the agreements’ lack of an express statement that the attorneys assumed joint financial responsibility violated Rule 1.5(e) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct and thereby rendered the agreements invalid. View "Ferris, Thompson & Zweig, Ltd. v. Esposito" on Justia Law

Based on the facts of this case, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found that the superior court erred in granting summary judgment, because the superior court gave no explanation for denying plaintiff’s contractual lien claim. Plaintiff Harvey Garod appealed a superior court order dismissing his conversion action against defendants R. James Steiner and Steiner Law Offices, PLLC. Plaintiff was retained by a client to pursue a personal injury action. In connection with the representation, the client signed plaintiff’s standard engagement contract. Plaintiff worked for the client for two years before being discharged without cause. The client subsequently hired defendants, who filed an action (underlying action) on behalf of the client. Defendants ultimately settled the underlying action on the client’s behalf. After the settlement of the underlying action, the client filed a motion to order that the settlement check be made “payable solely to [the client] and her counsel, R. James Steiner. On the same day, the plaintiff filed a series of motions in the underlying action, including a second motion to intervene wherein he asserted that he possessed a contractual lien, a motion for interpleader, and a motion to foreclose lien. The client objected to all these motions, and the court denied all of them without explanation. Plaintiff then filed suit against defendants, again alleging that he had an enforceable contractual lien for fees against the defendants. Defendants moved to dismiss the action, which was ultimately granted. In reversing the superior court’s order, the Supreme Court was persuaded by plaintiff’s argument that he may have had a valid lien, and the contract signed by the client was enforceable against defendants because defendants were aware of his lien at the time they were retained, and because the client should not be required to pay both lawyers’ fees. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Garod v. Steiner Law Office, PLLC" on Justia Law