Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Blatt firm filed a collection lawsuit against Oliva in the first municipal district of the Circuit Court of Cook County. Oliva resided in Cook County. Under the Seventh Circuit’s 1996 “Newsom” decision, interpreting the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) venue provision, debt collectors were allowed to file suit in any of Cook County’s municipal districts if the debtor resided in Cook County or signed the underlying contract there. While the Oliva suit was pending, the Seventh Circuit overruled Newsom, with retroactive effect (Suesz, 2014). Blatt voluntarily dismissed the suit. Oliva sued Blatt for violating the FDCPA as newly interpreted by Suesz. The district court granted Blatt summary judgment, finding that it relied on Newsom in good faith and was immune from liability under the FDCPA’s bona fide error defense, 15 U.S.C. 1692k(c). The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed. On rehearing, en banc, the Seventh Circuit vacated. The holding in Suesz was required by the 2010 Supreme Court decision in Jerman v. Carlisle, that the FDCPA’s statutory safe harbor for bona fide mistakes does not apply to mistakes of law. Under Suesz and Jerman, the defendant cannot avoid liability for a violation based on its reliance on circuit precedent or any other bona fide mistake of law. View "Oliva v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC" on Justia Law

To vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the award was fraudulently procured, the petitioner must demonstrate the fraud was material to the award. There must be a nexus between the alleged fraud and the decision made by the arbitrators. The petitioner, however, need not demonstrate that the arbitrators would have reached a different result. In this case, Odeon brought a petition to vacate an arbitral award involving claims arising out of the termination of one of its employees. Odeon alleged that the arbitrators engaged in misconduct and acted in manifest disregard of the law, and then sought to amend its petition to assert fraud as an additional ground for vacatur. The Second Circuit held that Odeon failed to establish that the employee's alleged perjury had any impact on the arbitration award. The court also held that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in denying the employee's request for attorneys' fees where New York law provided statutory authority for the fee request. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Odeon Capital Group LLC v. Ackerman" on Justia Law

PPKM sought and obtained a permanent injunction against DHSS after DHSS attempted to revoke PPKM's license to provide abortion services. PPKM's license expired before the district court granted its motion for attorney's fees. The Eighth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding PPKM attorney's fees or its work at all stages of this litigation, and PPKM's recovery in this case was not so technical as to render the award an abuse of discretion. In this case, PPKM was the prevailing party and DHSS offered no additional reason to conclude that PPKM was not entitled to the attorney's fees awarded by the district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Planned Parenthood Great Plans v. Dr. Randall Williams" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed the case filed by the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission against Rudolph Bumgardner, III, Senior Judge of the Court of Appeals and Humes J. Franklin, Jr., Retired Judge of the Twenty-Fifth Judicial Circuit. The Commission asserted the Judge Bumgardner and Judge Franklin violated the Canons of Judicial Conduct as set out in Part 6, Section III of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia and that the violations were “of sufficient gravity to constitute the basis for censure or removal” by the Supreme Court. Upon consideration of the entire record, the Supreme Court held that there was not clear and convincing evidence showing that the judges violated the specified Canons as charged. View "Judicial Inquiry & Review Commission v. Bumgardner" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Supreme Court accepted a declaratory judgment matter in its original jurisdiction to determine if Respondents-Petitioners Quicken Loans, Inc. and Title Source, Inc. engaged in the unauthorized practice of law (UPL). Petitioners-Respondents (collectively "Homeowners"), alleged the residential mortgage refinancing model implemented by Quicken Loans and Title Source in refinancing the Homeowners' mortgage loans constituted UPL. In addition to seeking declaratory relief, Homeowners' complaint also sought class certification and requested class relief. The Supreme Court found the record in this case showed licensed South Carolina attorneys were involved at every critical step of these refinancing transactions, and that requiring more attorney involvement would not effectively further the Court’s stated goal of protecting the public from the dangers of UPL. The Court therefore reject the Special Referee's conclusion that Quicken Loans and Title Source committed UPL. View "Boone v. Quicken Loans" on Justia Law

Seventh Circuit Rules 3(c)(1) and 28(a) require the same jurisdictional information for docketing and briefing. With an exception for pro se submissions, the court screens all filed briefs to ensure that they include all required information about the jurisdiction of both the district court (or agency) and the court of appeals. FRAP 28(b) allows the appellee to omit the jurisdictional statement “unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the appellant’s statement.” In consolidated appeals, the Seventh Circuit found the jurisdictional statements inadequate and stated that the appellee cannot simply assume that the appellant has provided a jurisdictional statement that complies with the rules. The appellee must review the appellant’s jurisdictional statement to see if it is both complete and correct. If the appellant’s statement is not complete, or not correct, the appellee must file a “complete jurisdictional summary.” It is not enough simply to correct the misstatement or omission and “accept” the balance of the appellant’s statement. In one case, the Attorney General stated: “Mr. Baez‐Sanchez’s jurisdictional statement is correct,” saying nothing about completeness, so the brief must be returned to the Department of Justice. The other jurisdictional statement states “Appellants’ jurisdictional statement provides a complete jurisdictional summary.” The court stated: Fine, but what about correctness? View "Bishop v. Air Line Pilots Association, International" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit filed an amended opinion affirming the denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment. The panel held that Infinity's attorney, who sued for violation of a bankruptcy automatic stay, was not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for acts other than drafting the order at the judge's request—an issue the court need not reach because the order was never filed. View "Burton v. Infinity Capital Management" on Justia Law

Petitioner Stevens Law Office appealed a trial court decision denying assignment of a future structured settlement payment from a fund administered by Symetra Assigned Benefits Service Company for legal services rendered by petitioner on behalf of beneficiary Shane Larock. Shane Larock retained petitioner to represent him in a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS) proceeding which he expected to follow the birth of his daughter in early 2016. As payment, petitioner asked Larock for a $16,000 nonrefundable retainer which would be paid through assignment of that sum from a $125,000 structured settlement payment due to Larock in 2022. Under this arrangement, the structured settlement payment issuer, Symetra Assigned Benefits Service Company, would pay petitioner $16,000 directly when the 2022 periodic payment became due under the original terms of the settlement. Larock agreed to the fee arrangement and the assignment. The trial court issued a written order concluding that it could not find that the fee arrangement was reasonable because, given petitioner’s ongoing representation of Larock, such a determination would be speculative. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed and remanded so that the trial court can conduct the best-interest analysis required by statute before determining whether to deny or approve assignment of a structured settlement payment. View "In re Stevens Law Office" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's order denying plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in litigating an appeal and cross-appeal under 42 U.S.C. 1988. After the court affirmed on the merits, the district court awarded a reduced award of attorneys' fees. The court affirmed the award in a summary order, stating that each side was to bear its own costs. The district court then denied plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees. The court held that its reference to "costs" in the context of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39 did not include attorneys' fees. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Hines v. City of Albany" on Justia Law

AdjustaCam’s patent, which issued in 1999, discloses a camera clip that supports a camera both on a flat surface and when attached to a computer monitor. AdjutaCam’s infringement litigation against Newegg included a Markman order, indicating that AdjustaCam's suit was baseless, and extended expert discovery. Just before summary judgment briefing, AdjustaCam voluntarily dismissed its infringement claims against Newegg with prejudice. Newegg then sought attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. 285. Following a remand in light of intervening Supreme Court precedent clarifying what constitutes an exceptional case, the district court again denied Newegg’s motion for fees. The Federal Circuit reversed. Based on the circumstances presented here, the wholesale reliance on the previous judge’s fact-finding was an abuse of discretion. The record points to this case as standing out from others with respect to the substantive strength of AdjustaCam’s litigating position. Where AdjustaCam may have filed a weak infringement lawsuit, accusing Newegg’s products of infringing the patent, AdjustaCam’s suit became baseless after the district court’s Markman order. View "AdjustaCam, LLC v. Newegg, Inc." on Justia Law