Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court found that the Honorable Dean A. Young, a circuit court judge, engaged in judicial misconduct and ordered that Judge Young be suspended from office without pay for six days.The matter was before the Supreme Court on the report of the Special Masters appointed to hear evidence on the Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications’ notice of statement of charges against Judge Young. The allegations of judicial misconduct stemmed from a temporary restraining order that the judge heard and issued without adequate notice to the responding party or witnesses and while the judge had a specific interest in the matter. The Special Masters recommended, and the parties agreed, that the appropriate discipline was to suspend Judge Young for six days without pay. View "In re Honorable Dean A. Young" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court found that the Honorable Dean A. Young, a circuit court judge, engaged in judicial misconduct and ordered that Judge Young be suspended from office without pay for six days.The matter was before the Supreme Court on the report of the Special Masters appointed to hear evidence on the Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications’ notice of statement of charges against Judge Young. The allegations of judicial misconduct stemmed from a temporary restraining order that the judge heard and issued without adequate notice to the responding party or witnesses and while the judge had a specific interest in the matter. The Special Masters recommended, and the parties agreed, that the appropriate discipline was to suspend Judge Young for six days without pay. View "In re Honorable Dean A. Young" on Justia Law

This disciplinary proceeding was instituted by the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (“Commission”) against respondent, Justice of the Peace Jeff Sachse, Ward 1, Livingston Parish. The matter arose out of an anonymous complaint lodged against respondent in April 2013, alleging that he was arrested on several occasions for domestic abuse and simple battery of his now ex-wife, Lisa Rabalais. The Commission alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Canons 1 and 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Respondent was not a lawyer, and was elected to office in 1996. In August 2012, Ms. Rabalais moved out of the matrimonial home. While packing her belongings into the car, the police were summoned to the home in response to complaints by Ms. Rabalais that respondent had grabbed her by the shirt to prevent her from leaving. Ms. Rabalais filed a Petition for Protection from Domestic Abuse citing the August 10th incident. She also alleged that respondent repeatedly contacted her after the incident “by phone[,] email and 3rd parties to get [her] to talk to him” and that he also made “threats” through her places of employment “trying to find [her] to talk.” The Louisiana Supreme Court found respondent violated the aforementioned Canons as alleged by the Commission, and suspended respondent without pay for six months, and ordered him to reimburse and pay to the Commission $3,040.02 in costs. View "In re: Justice of the Peace Jeff Sachse, Ward 1, Livingston Parish" on Justia Law

This disciplinary proceeding was instituted by the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (“Commission”) against respondent, Justice of the Peace Jeff Sachse, Ward 1, Livingston Parish. The matter arose out of an anonymous complaint lodged against respondent in April 2013, alleging that he was arrested on several occasions for domestic abuse and simple battery of his now ex-wife, Lisa Rabalais. The Commission alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Canons 1 and 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Respondent was not a lawyer, and was elected to office in 1996. In August 2012, Ms. Rabalais moved out of the matrimonial home. While packing her belongings into the car, the police were summoned to the home in response to complaints by Ms. Rabalais that respondent had grabbed her by the shirt to prevent her from leaving. Ms. Rabalais filed a Petition for Protection from Domestic Abuse citing the August 10th incident. She also alleged that respondent repeatedly contacted her after the incident “by phone[,] email and 3rd parties to get [her] to talk to him” and that he also made “threats” through her places of employment “trying to find [her] to talk.” The Louisiana Supreme Court found respondent violated the aforementioned Canons as alleged by the Commission, and suspended respondent without pay for six months, and ordered him to reimburse and pay to the Commission $3,040.02 in costs. View "In re: Justice of the Peace Jeff Sachse, Ward 1, Livingston Parish" on Justia Law

In 2012, Dobbs hired McLaughlin to represent him in a products liability suit against DePuy for a 35% contingency fee agreement. The attorney filed Dobbs’s complaint in the DePuy Hip Implant Multidistrict Litigation in the Northern District of Ohio. In 2013, DePuy proposed a settlement, offering parties represented by counsel on a certain date $250,000 and parties not represented $177,500. Dobbs stated that he did not want to settle. McLaughlin advised Dobbs to accept the settlement due to the costs of going to trial. Dobbs moved to remove McLaughlin as his counsel. The motion was granted in January 2015, leaving Dobbs unrepresented. In February 2015, Dobbs decided to accept the settlement offer. Though he was then unrepresented, he was considered a represented party under the settlement terms, entitling him to a base award of $250,000. McLaughlin asserted a lien on Dobbs’s award and sought attorneys’ fees under quantum meruit. The fee dispute was transferred to the Northern District of Illinois, which awarded McLaughlin 35% of Dobbs’s base settlement award, $87,500. Following a remand, the court considered evidence, addressed each quantum meruit factor, and again awarded $87,500. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court considered all of the relevant evidence and engaged in a thoughtful analysis of the factors required by Illinois law, given that it was not the court that presided over the underlying litigation. View "Dobbs v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2012, Dobbs hired McLaughlin to represent him in a products liability suit against DePuy for a 35% contingency fee agreement. The attorney filed Dobbs’s complaint in the DePuy Hip Implant Multidistrict Litigation in the Northern District of Ohio. In 2013, DePuy proposed a settlement, offering parties represented by counsel on a certain date $250,000 and parties not represented $177,500. Dobbs stated that he did not want to settle. McLaughlin advised Dobbs to accept the settlement due to the costs of going to trial. Dobbs moved to remove McLaughlin as his counsel. The motion was granted in January 2015, leaving Dobbs unrepresented. In February 2015, Dobbs decided to accept the settlement offer. Though he was then unrepresented, he was considered a represented party under the settlement terms, entitling him to a base award of $250,000. McLaughlin asserted a lien on Dobbs’s award and sought attorneys’ fees under quantum meruit. The fee dispute was transferred to the Northern District of Illinois, which awarded McLaughlin 35% of Dobbs’s base settlement award, $87,500. Following a remand, the court considered evidence, addressed each quantum meruit factor, and again awarded $87,500. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court considered all of the relevant evidence and engaged in a thoughtful analysis of the factors required by Illinois law, given that it was not the court that presided over the underlying litigation. View "Dobbs v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and appellants Antonio and Imelda Aranda and their son-in-law, Heriberto Ponce, (together, Ponce and Aranda) appeal from the trial court’s entry of a judgment of dismissal following an order imposing both terminating and monetary sanctions against them and their attorneys under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7. 1 The trial court found that Ponce and Aranda’s complaint was presented primarily for an improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation. Ponce and Aranda received a permanent loan modification under the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). Ultimately they defaulted on the loan when the error-filled modification agreement called for higher payments they could not afford. Wells Fargo transferred the note and deed of trust to Consumer Solutions 3, LLC in November 2010. Defendant and respondent Specialized Loan Services, LLC (Specialized) serviced the loan on behalf of Consumer Solutions. In the meantime, Ponce and Aranda were still trying to work things out with Wells Fargo. One Wells Fargo representative told Ponce’s wife, Alma, that they should not make further payments until the mistakes were corrected. Other representatives called Ponce demanding payment. Wells Fargo refused to accept any reduced payment, and ultimately invited Ponce and Aranda to apply for another loan modification. Specialized recorded a notice of trustee’s sale in December 2010, while Ponce and Aranda’s second application was pending. A Wells Fargo representative told Ponce “not to worry about the notice because the trustee sale was scheduled by mistake.” Over the next several weeks, other Wells Fargo representatives reassured Ponce and Aranda that the property would not be sold because they had been approved for a loan modification. Despite these assurances, a trustee’s sale was held on January 18, 2011, at which Residential Investments LLC acquired title to the property. Residential Investments filed a complaint in unlawful detainer against plaintiffs. The trial court found that Ponce and Aranda’s complaint responding to Residential Investments’ was presented primarily for an improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation. On appeal, Ponce and Aranda argued the claims asserted in their complaint were not frivolous and therefore, could not have been asserted for an improper purpose. The Court of Appeal agreed, and reversed the trial court’s entry of judgment based on terminating sanctions against Ponce and Aranda and entry of monetary sanctions against Ponce and Aranda and their attorneys. View "Ponce v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and appellants Antonio and Imelda Aranda and their son-in-law, Heriberto Ponce, (together, Ponce and Aranda) appeal from the trial court’s entry of a judgment of dismissal following an order imposing both terminating and monetary sanctions against them and their attorneys under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7. 1 The trial court found that Ponce and Aranda’s complaint was presented primarily for an improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation. Ponce and Aranda received a permanent loan modification under the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). Ultimately they defaulted on the loan when the error-filled modification agreement called for higher payments they could not afford. Wells Fargo transferred the note and deed of trust to Consumer Solutions 3, LLC in November 2010. Defendant and respondent Specialized Loan Services, LLC (Specialized) serviced the loan on behalf of Consumer Solutions. In the meantime, Ponce and Aranda were still trying to work things out with Wells Fargo. One Wells Fargo representative told Ponce’s wife, Alma, that they should not make further payments until the mistakes were corrected. Other representatives called Ponce demanding payment. Wells Fargo refused to accept any reduced payment, and ultimately invited Ponce and Aranda to apply for another loan modification. Specialized recorded a notice of trustee’s sale in December 2010, while Ponce and Aranda’s second application was pending. A Wells Fargo representative told Ponce “not to worry about the notice because the trustee sale was scheduled by mistake.” Over the next several weeks, other Wells Fargo representatives reassured Ponce and Aranda that the property would not be sold because they had been approved for a loan modification. Despite these assurances, a trustee’s sale was held on January 18, 2011, at which Residential Investments LLC acquired title to the property. Residential Investments filed a complaint in unlawful detainer against plaintiffs. The trial court found that Ponce and Aranda’s complaint responding to Residential Investments’ was presented primarily for an improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation. On appeal, Ponce and Aranda argued the claims asserted in their complaint were not frivolous and therefore, could not have been asserted for an improper purpose. The Court of Appeal agreed, and reversed the trial court’s entry of judgment based on terminating sanctions against Ponce and Aranda and entry of monetary sanctions against Ponce and Aranda and their attorneys. View "Ponce v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs MMM Holdings, Inc. (MMM), and MSO of Puerto Rico, Inc. (MSO), sued defendant Marc Reich, the attorney who represented their adversary in a whistleblower qui tam action filed against plaintiffs federal district court. Plaintiffs alleged claim and delivery, conversion, civil theft, unjust enrichment, and unfair competition, and contended Reich received, wrongfully possessed, and refused to turn over, some 26,000 electronically stored documents his client, Jose “Josh” Valdez, took with him in 2010 when he was terminated by MSO for his allegedly “vocal opposition to what he perceived as Plaintiffs’ fraudulent practices.” Reich filed a special motion to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. The court granted the motion, concluding the claims asserted by plaintiffs against Reich involved Reich’s petitioning activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, and that plaintiffs had not shown, and could not show, a probability they would prevail on any of their claims. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed that order. View "MMM Holdings, Inc. v. Reich" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs MMM Holdings, Inc. (MMM), and MSO of Puerto Rico, Inc. (MSO), sued defendant Marc Reich, the attorney who represented their adversary in a whistleblower qui tam action filed against plaintiffs federal district court. Plaintiffs alleged claim and delivery, conversion, civil theft, unjust enrichment, and unfair competition, and contended Reich received, wrongfully possessed, and refused to turn over, some 26,000 electronically stored documents his client, Jose “Josh” Valdez, took with him in 2010 when he was terminated by MSO for his allegedly “vocal opposition to what he perceived as Plaintiffs’ fraudulent practices.” Reich filed a special motion to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. The court granted the motion, concluding the claims asserted by plaintiffs against Reich involved Reich’s petitioning activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, and that plaintiffs had not shown, and could not show, a probability they would prevail on any of their claims. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed that order. View "MMM Holdings, Inc. v. Reich" on Justia Law