Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

B.E. sued Facebook for infringement of B.E.’s 314 patent. Approximately a year into the case, Facebook and two other parties B.E. had accused of infringement, Microsoft and Google, filed petitions for inter partes review of the asserted claims. The district court stayed its proceedings. The Patent Board instituted review and held the claims unpatentable. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Facebook then moved in the district court for a dismissal with prejudice and costs under Rule 54(d). B.E. agreed that dismissal was appropriate but argued that the claims should be dismissed for mootness, rather than with prejudice. The district court agreed with B.E., issuing an Order holding that, in light of the cancellation of claims, B.E. no longer had a basis for the lawsuit. The court ultimately awarded costs under Rule 54(d). The Clerk of Court held a hearing and taxed $4,424.20 in costs against B.E.; the court affirmed, holding that, although the case was dismissed for mootness, Facebook “obtained the outcome it sought: rebuffing B.E.’s attempt to alter the parties’ legal relationship.” The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding Facebook to be the prevailing party in B.E.’s lawsuit. View "B.E. Technology, L.L.C. v. Facebook, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a malpractice action against Zbylut, Cox and LPS alleging they had violated their professional duties by undertaking representation of Purposeful Press without her consent, and rendering legal advice in the underlying lawsuits that was adverse to her interests.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of defendants' motions for summary judgment, holding that plaintiff did not dispute that she lacked standing to seek reimbursement of Purposeful Press's funds, and plaintiff failed to present any evidence that would support a finding of an implied attorney-client relationship with the firm. In this case, plaintiff has not identified any harm that defendants' representation of Purposeful Press was alleged to have caused her in her representative capacity as a shareholder. Furthermore, even if there were circumstances under which a corporate attorney might owe such a duty to individual shareholders, no such circumstances were present here. View "Sprengel v. Zbylut" on Justia Law

The dealer had the exclusive right to sell the manufacturer's below-ground storm shelters in Missouri and Arkansas. The dealer created a wordmark—“Life Saver Storm Shelters”— and a logo using that name, which it affixed to the shelters. In 2006, the manufacturer obtained the dealer’s permission to use these marks on shelters marketed in Illinois. The manufacturer violated the limited license by using the marks on products sold throughout the country. The manufacturer's suit for trademark infringement, claiming prior use and ownership of the wordmark, was rejected on summary judgment. The dealer counterclaimed for trademark infringement and false endorsement under the Lanham Act. The district judge found for the dealer on all claims, entered a cease-and-desist order, and awarded $17 million in disgorged profits as damages but denied vexatious-litigation sanctions under 28 U.S.C. 1927 and attorney’s fees under the Lanham Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, rejecting the manufacturer's argument that the logo violated a statute that makes it a crime to use the American Red Cross emblem. The conclusion that the manufacturer engaged in trademark infringement on a vast scale was supported by the evidence. The court granted a limited remanded; although the judge reasonably concluded that section 1927 sanctions were not warranted, his summary denial of Lanham Act fees cannot be squared with his conclusions on the merits concerning infringement. View "4SEMO.COM, Inc. v. Southern Illinois Storm Shelters, Inc." on Justia Law

The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Scott Ledford’s petition for review of the Court of Appeals’ decision to affirm the outcome of a Workers’ Compensation Commission hearing. Ledford was a former lance corporal with the South Carolina Highway Patrol. While employed as a highway patrolman, Ledford was injured in two separate work-related accidents: in July 2010, Ledford sustained injuries to his spine after being tasered during a training exercise; and in March 2012, Ledford was involved in a motorcycle accident while attempting to pursue a motorist. Ledford settled the 2010 claim with Respondents. Following the second accident, Ledford filed two separate claims for workers' compensation benefits. The Workers' Compensation Commission Appellate Panel declined to find Ledford suffered a change of condition; however, she found Ledford was entitled to medical benefits for injuries to his right leg and aggravated pre-existing conditions in his neck and lower back due to the motorcycle accident. Neither party appealed the Commission’s order. Months later, Ledford reached maximum medical improvement ("MMI"). Commissioner Susan Barden held a hearing on Ledford’s Form 21 in August 2014. Following the hearing, but prior to the issuance of a final order, Ledford filed a motion to recuse Commissioner Barden. According to Ledford's motion, Commissioner Barden requested a phone conference with the parties a month after the hearing during which she allegedly threatened criminal proceedings against Ledford if the case was not settled; indicated that she engaged in her own investigation and made findings based on undisclosed materials outside the record; suggested Ledford used "creative accounting" in his tax returns; and questioned Ledford's credibility regarding his claims of neck pain. Ledford contended any one of these grounds was sufficient to warrant recusal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission, finding: (1) Commissioner Barden was not required to recuse herself; (2) substantial evidence supported the Appellate Panel's decision to reverse Commissioner Barden's permanency determination; and (3) substantial evidence supported the Appellate Panel's findings that Ledford was not credible and his landscaping business remained lucrative following the injury. The Supreme Court held the Court of Appeals erred in finding Commissioner Barden was not required to recuse herself. The Court was “deeply concerned” by the Commissioner’s conduct in this matter. “Ledford's counsel provided an opportunity for Commissioner Barden to right her wrong by moving for recusal. Instead of stepping aside, Commissioner Barden became more abusive and strident in both her ruling on the recusal motion and her final order.” The Commission’s orders were vacated and the matter remanded for a new hearing before a different commissioner. View "Ledford v. DPS" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the 28 U.S.C. 1927 sanctions imposed against attorney John Morgan for advancing a meritless, immunity-barred claim against Judge Layne Walker. Morgan represented an attorney in an action alleging that Judge Walker fabricated a perjury accusation against her.The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the sanctions where the district court was best positioned to assess the propriety of Morgan's litigation misconduct. In this case, it could not be seriously disputed that Morgan unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings where he pursued a baseless claim with reckless disregard for his duty to the court. Furthermore, the court upheld the district court's award of Judge Walker's legal expenses. View "Morrison v. Walker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court ordered that Angela C. Foster be censured for conduct in violation of Canons 1, 2A, 3A(3) and 3A(4) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-376.The Judicial Standards Commission counsel filed a statement of charges against District Court Judge Angela C. Foster (Respondent) alleging that she had engaged in conduct inappropriate to her judicial office. Based on its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Commission recommended that the Supreme Court censure Respondent. The Supreme Court concluded that the Commission's recommended censure was appropriate and ordered that Respondent be censured. View "In re Foster" on Justia Law

Beane, formerly an Air Force electrical engineer, became involved in a conspiracy theory that the government creates for each citizen a "straw man" and that the Federal Reserve holds in trust that citizen’s inherent “unlimited value.” Proponents believe that by filing the correct paperwork, they can use those funds. Beane, deeply in debt, became involved with Tucci-Jarraf, a former attorney who ran a website, contributed to talk shows, and produced faux-legal documents that purported to allow individuals to access their secret accounts. Beane found a Facebook video that purported to teach viewers how to access their accounts; it actually taught them how to commit wire fraud by exploiting a deficiency in the “Automated Clearing House” bank network. With Tucci-Jarraf's support, Beane logged onto his bank’s website, followed those instructions, and made fraudulent payments on his debts and bought $31 million in certificates of deposit with Federal Reserve funds. He started cashing the certificates and spending money. A bank froze his account. Tucci-Jarraf advised Beane to place his new assets in trust; she prepared pseudo-legal documents and made calls. Agents arrested Beane as he was driving off the dealership lot in a new motor home. Officers arrested Tucci-Jarraf in Washington, D.C., where she was requesting a meeting with the President. Beane and Tucci-Jarraf filed multiple frivolous motions and asked to represent themselves. The judge concluded that they had knowingly and intelligently waived their right to counsel but appointed standby counsel. A jury convicted Beane of bank and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and both of conspiracy to commit money laundering, section 1956(h). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court should have forced them to accept counsel. They knowingly and intelligently made their choice; self-lawyering does not require the individual to subscribe to conventional legal strategies or orthodox behavior. View "United States v. Beane" on Justia Law

Antoinette Belle, as personal representative of the estate of Edith Mitchell, deceased, sued various health-care providers that treated Mitchell while she was hospitalized in April 2009. Belle eventually reached settlements with all of those health-care providers except two physicians. The trial court entered a summary judgment against Belle and in favor of the two physicians, bringing the medical-malpractice action to a close. Belle then filed a legal-malpractice case against four attorneys and three law firms that had represented her at varying times in the medical-malpractice action, alleging they had been negligent in representing her. Belle later brought an additional claim of fraudulent concealment. The attorneys and law firms denied the allegations against them, arguing that Belle's claims were untimely and that they had no factual or legal basis. The trial court agreed and entered judgments in favor of the attorneys and law firms. Belle appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed judgment in the attorneys and law firms. View "Belle v. Goldasich, Jr., et al." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's award of attorney's fees after the settlement of a civil rights action. The panel held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to apply the correct legal standard for awarding legal fees and thus remanded for the application of the correct legal standard. In this case, the district court's wholesale rejection of the relevant attorney declarations, and the district court's singular reliance on the hourly rates previously awarded to counsel in unrelated cases departed from the correct legal standard and constituted legal error. The panel also remanded for the district court to make a specific finding regarding when the settlement agreement became final. View "Roberts v. City and County of Honolulu" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief seeking reinstatement of his earned-release supervision (ERS) and trusty time. The district court dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust state remedies and denied Montalto's unopposed motions for sanctions and contempt, as well as criticized MDOC and its counsel for disregarding orders for production and not properly investigating the circumstances of Montalto's revocations.The Fifth Circuit held that judicial criticism amounting to an actual finding of attorney misconduct is directly appealable. Because the court was unable to determine whether the district court made actual findings of professional misconduct, the court remanded with instructions for the district court to clarify its findings regarding counsel's professional misconduct. View "Montalto v. Mississippi Department of Corrections" on Justia Law