Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellant George David Gordon was a former securities attorney convicted of multiple criminal charges relating to his alleged participation in a "pump-and-dump" scheme where he (along with others) violated the federal securities laws by artificially inflating the value of various stocks, then turning around and selling them for a substantial profit. The government restrained some of his property before the indictment was handed down and ultimately obtained criminal forfeiture of that property. On appeal, Defendant raised multiple issues relating to the validity of his conviction and sentence, and the propriety of the government’s conduct (both before and after trial) related to the forfeiture of his assets. In the end, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence, as well as the district court’s forfeiture orders. View "United States v. Gordon" on Justia Law

Stone owned STM, which owed Fifth Third about $1 million, secured by liens on business assets and on Stone’s house. Stone’s attorney, Atherton, introduced Stone to Waldman, a potential investor. Stone did not know that Atherton was indebted to Waldman and had given Waldman STM’s proprietary business data. Atherton filed STM’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition to preserve assets so that Waldman could acquire them. Atherton allowed the automatic stay to expire. Fifth Third foreclosed, obtaining judgments and a lien on Stone’s house. Waldman paid Fifth Third $900,000 for the bank’s rights. Waldman and Atherton offered to pay off Stone’s debts and employ him in exchange for STM’s assets and told Stone to sign documents without reading them, to meet a filing deadline. The documents actually transferred all STM assets exchange for a job. Ultimately, Waldman owned all STM assets and Stone’s indebtedness, with no obligation to forgive it. Waldman filed garnishment actions; Stone filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, alleging that Waldman had fraudulently acquired debts and assets. Atherton was disbarred. The bankruptcy court found that Waldman and Atherton had perpetrated “egregious frauds,” invalidated Stone’s obligations, and awarded Stone $1,191,374 in compensatory and $2,000,000 in punitive damages. The district court affirmed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the discharge, but vacated the award of damages as unauthorized. View "Waldman v. Stone" on Justia Law

In 2005, attorneys White and Beaman, assisted securities broker-turned-real estate investor Seybold with a plan to buy, rehabilitate, and then sell, or refinance and rent, residential and commercial properties in Marion, Indiana. That plan involved the creation of two business entities, one partially owned by a group of private investors who contributed more than $1 million. When the plan failed, the investors sued. The district court entered summary judgment on all of the claims against the attorneys: state and federal RICO violations, conversion, federal and state securities fraud, common-law fraud (both actual and constructive), civil conspiracy, and legal malpractice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The plaintiffs failed to establish either that an attorney-client relationship existed or that the attorneys owed them some other legal duty for purposes of the malpractice, constructive fraud, and securities-fraud claims. Plaintiffs relied solely on representations that concerned only future conduct, or on representations of existing intent that were not yet executed, so claims of actual fraud failed, Plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that the lawyers acted in concert with Seybold to commit an unlawful act or to accomplish a lawful purpose through unlawful means. View "Rosenbaum v. White" on Justia Law

In 2000 Go-Best wired $5 million to an account entitled "Morris M. Goldings client account" at Citizens Bank, based on representations made by Morris M. Goldings, who was then a Massachusetts attorney. Goldings later admitted that the representations were false and that he had used the money to pay other debts. Go-Best filed suit against Citizens Bank, bringing claims of misrepresentation, conversion, aiding and abetting a fraud, aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting a conversion, and negligence. Citizens Bank had no knowledge of Goldings's scheme to defraud Go-Best but failed to notify the Board of Bar Overseers of dishonored checks issued on the client account more than six months before Go-Best wired funds into that account. The trial court dismissed, but a divided Appeals Court reversed in part, vacating dismissal of claims of negligence and of aiding and abetting. The Massachusetts Supreme Court reinstated dismissal. Without actual knowledge, the bank's duty to notify the board of dishonored checks from trust accounts arose only from its contractual duty, not from any duty in tort, so the bank could not be liable to Go-Best for any negligence in fulfilling that duty. View "Go-Best Assets Ltd. v. Citizens Bank of MA" on Justia Law

Draughon was admitted to the Florida Bar in 1987. In 1993, he formed NLMC to purchase property for $315,000, and lease it to a client. The seller, Onusic, received a $7,500 down payment and accepted a promissory note which required NLMC to make monthly payments. Onusic signed the deed with the understanding that Draughon would hold the deed in escrow and not record it until she received full payment. In 1997, Draughon recorded the deed. In 2001, Draughon transferred the property from NLMC to himself, took out a mortgage of $274,975, and used the money to pay personal tax liabilities; none of the funds were used to pay the $110,000 owed Onusic. In 2003 Onusic filed suit, but Draughon filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court found actual intent to defraud. A referee recommended that Draughon be found guilty of violating Bar Rule 3-4.3: commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice, whether committed in the course of the attorney’s relations as an attorney or otherwise. The referee recommended that Draughon be found not guilty of violating Rule 4-4.3(a) concerning dealings with persons not represented by counsel, and recommended public reprimand. The supreme court imposed a one-year suspension. View "FL Bar v. Draughon" on Justia Law

Mitchell was a partner in the Cleveland law firm from the early 1980s until 2006. There was no formal partnership agreement; each partner practiced in a different area of law, and each represented his clients with essentially no oversight, but shared evenly in the firm's profits. Mitchell was indicted for his involvement in a long-running scheme to bribe the auditor of Cuyahoga County into awarding overvalued contracts for appraisal work to a company formed by his law partners. The indictment charged conspiracy to commit bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds, 18 U.S.C. 371; bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(2); and conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951. The district court granted Mitchell acquittal on the Hobbs Act charge, but a jury convicted him of the remaining two counts. He was sentenced to 97 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the jury instruction that deliberate ignorance, in some instances, can constitute knowledge, and a challenge to the sentence. View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Defendants, two of three lawyers who represented several hundred Kentucky clients in a mass-tort action against the manufacturer of the defective diet drug "fen-phen," settled the case for $200 million, which entitled them under their retainer agreements to approximately $22 million each in attorney fees. By visiting clients and obtaining their signatures on "confidential settlements," for lesser amounts, the two actually disbursed slightly more than $45 million, less than 23 percent of the total settlement. The lawyers kept the remainder for themselves and associated counsel, transferring much of it from the escrow account to various other accounts, including out-of-state accounts. The scheme was discovered; the lawyers were disbarred and convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, 1349. One was sentenced to 240 months, the other to 300 months. They were ordered to pay more than $127 million in restitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a variety of challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and trial procedures. View "United States v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

Hardesty, a resident of Utah, solicited Schneider, a physician and resident of Ohio, for an investment involving purchase of medical-malpractice insurance from Hardesty's foreign-based company. The investment was to provide federal-tax benefits and make him a partial owner of an insurance company. Hardesty's $500,000 was transferred and eventually frozen because of SEC proceedings against a Ponzi scheme involving more than $100,000,000. Hardesty hired Nelson, a Utah attorney, to recover the funds. Nelson corresponded with Schneider and the defendants, but did not recover the money. Schneider sued multiple defendants, including Hardesty and Nelson, alleging fraud and misrepresentation. Schneider alleged that letters written by Nelson contained false statements by which Nelson furthered the scheme to defraud Schneider. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court improperly applied the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, as opposed to the prima facie standard, in determining whether Schneider pleaded facts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over Nelson, but the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process and is proper under Ohio's long-arm statute even under the more demanding standard. View "Schneider v. Hardesty" on Justia Law

Defendant, a state court judge and former criminal defense attorney, was convicted of two counts of wire fraud and one count of making false statements, stemming from defendant's use of his position as a state judge to obtain money and sexual favors in exchange for assisting a criminal defendant. Defendant subsequently appealed his conviction and his 60-month concurrent sentences. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a new trial; based on the record, the court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict would have been the same absent any error in the jury instructions and the indictment; and defendant's sufficiency of the evidence challenged failed. The court also held that the district court properly applied the specific offense characteristic; the second uncharged bribe could be used to increase the offense level for defendant's bribery conviction; and any monies rendered for legitimate legal services could not be subtracted from the loss value under U.S.S.G. 2C1.1(b)(2) because defendant and his colleague provided these services after the offense was detected. Therefore, none of defendant's several challenges required a new trial, reversal of conviction, or resentencing.

Defendant, convicted under 18 U.S.C. 371 of conspiracy to defraud the United States while serving as in-house general counsel to the company involving the company's filing of false tax returns with the IRS. He was sentenced to 41 months of imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release, and ordered to pay restitution to the IRS. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The jury instructions adequately addressed the elements of conspiracy. There was no need for mention of the attorney-client privilege or of an attorney's potential obligation to report illegal activity. The government’s theory of liability was not dependent on whether defendant had an affirmative duty to inform, yet failed to do so; conviction did not turn on whether defendant's actions were governed by the attorney-client privilege. There was sufficient evidence to support the conviction.