Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Attorney Fleisher worked for two affiliated law firms. In 2013 Fleisher filed a written demand with the firms, claiming that when he retired, in 2011, he had accrued more than 90 weeks of unused vacation time and more than 322 days of unused sick leave, and that the firms were required by contract and by the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, to pay him for those accruals. He estimated that he was owed about $950,000. The defendants sent a copy of Fleisher’s complaint to Hartford, seeking coverage under the “Employee Benefits Liability Provision” of their Business Owners Policy. It took five months for Hartford to reply that the matter was under consideration. Two months later Hartford denied coverage and sought a declaration that the insurance policy did not cover Fleisher’s claim, alleging that the failure to pay Fleisher was not the result of any negligent act, error, or omission in the administration of the employee benefits program, which was all that the policy covered. The district judge ruled that Hartford had no duty to defend under Illinois law and granted summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that delay was not a valid ground for estopping Hartford to deny coverage or a duty to defend. View "Hartford Cas. Ins. Co v. Karlin, Fleisher & Falkenberg" on Justia Law

Over the past decade, Attorney Novoselsky has filed many lawsuits alleging improprieties by Dorothy Brown, in her capacity as Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. Brown later made statements to private parties, the public, and the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Committee, accusing Novoselsky of being an unscrupulous attorney. Novoselsky sued Brown under state law for defamation and under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for First Amendment retaliation, and he sought to hold Cook County liable for Brown’s actions. Brown unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment, arguing that her communications are protected from liability by immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed. On the state‐law defamation claim, Brown’s communications were all statements reasonably related to her official duties. Illinois state law provides immunity to Brown for claims based on these statements. Brown is also entitled to summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation claim, for all she did to retaliate was criticize Novoselsky, so Cook County is also entitled to summary judgment. View "Novoselsky v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2004, Bianchi was elected as McHenry County, Illinois State’s Attorney and embarked on reforms. In 2006, a secretary resigned and took sensitive documents with her. Working with an Assistant State’s Attorney, whom Bianchi had demoted, the secretary delivered the documents to the media and to Bianchi’s opponent in the next election. Bianchi learned of the theft and persuaded a judge to appoint a special prosecutor. The secretary was charged with several felonies and eventually pleaded guilty to computer tampering. Bianchi’s opponent and other political enemies obtained the appointment of another special prosecutor, to investigate Bianchi. A grand jury was convened. Bianchi and three colleagues were indicted on multiple counts of official misconduct. All were acquitted. Bianchi and his colleagues sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the court-appointed special prosecutor (Tonigan), the court-appointed assistant special prosecutor (McQueen) and Quest, a firm of private investigators hired by the special prosecutors, and its investigators. They claimed that the defendants fabricated evidence and withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of the Due Process Clause and Fourth Amendment and political retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. Tonigan settled. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal as to McQueen and the investigators, holding that absolute prosecutorial immunity and qualified immunity foreclose the federal constitutional claims. View "Bianchi v. McQueen" on Justia Law

In 2004, Bianchi was elected as McHenry County, Illinois State’s Attorney and embarked on reforms. In 2006, a secretary resigned and took sensitive documents with her. Working with an Assistant State’s Attorney, whom Bianchi had demoted, the secretary delivered the documents to the media and to Bianchi’s opponent in the next election. Bianchi learned of the theft and persuaded a judge to appoint a special prosecutor. The secretary was charged with several felonies and eventually pleaded guilty to computer tampering. Bianchi’s opponent and other political enemies obtained the appointment of another special prosecutor, to investigate Bianchi. A grand jury was convened. Bianchi and three colleagues were indicted on multiple counts of official misconduct. All were acquitted. Bianchi and his colleagues sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the court-appointed special prosecutor (Tonigan), the court-appointed assistant special prosecutor (McQueen) and Quest, a firm of private investigators hired by the special prosecutors, and its investigators. They claimed that the defendants fabricated evidence and withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of the Due Process Clause and Fourth Amendment and political retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. Tonigan settled. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal as to McQueen and the investigators, holding that absolute prosecutorial immunity and qualified immunity foreclose the federal constitutional claims. View "Bianchi v. McQueen" on Justia Law

The Joyce law firm purchased professional liability insurance from Professionals Direct. In 2007 the firm won a large damages award for a class of securities-fraud plaintiffs and hired another law firm to sue to collect the money from the defendant’s insurers. Some class members thought the Joyce firm should have handled enforcement of the judgment itself under the terms of its contingency-fee agreement. They took the firm to arbitration over the extra fees incurred. Professionals Direct paid for the firm’s defense in the arbitration. After the arbitrator found for the clients and ordered the firm to reimburse some of the fees they had paid, the insurer refused a demand for indemnification. The district judge sided with the insurer, concluding that the award was a “sanction” under the policy’s exclusion for “fines, sanctions, penalties, punitive damages or any damages resulting from the multiplication of compensatory damages.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the arbitration award was not functionally a sanction, another provision in the policy excludes “claim[s] for legal fees, costs or disbursements paid or owed to you.” Because the arbitration award adjusted the attorney’s fees owed to the firm in the underlying securities-fraud class action, the “legal fees” exclusion applies. View "Edward T. Joyce & Assocs. v. Prof'ls Direct Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Illinois attorney Jahrling was contacted and paid by attorney Rywak to prepare documents for the sale of 90-year-old Cora’s home. Rywak’s clients paid $35,000 for Cora’s property, which was worth at least $106,000 and was later resold by the purchasers for $145,000. Cora later alleged he understood that he would keep a life estate to live in the upstairs apartment of the home rent-free. Jahrling’s sale documents did not include that life estate. Jahrling and Cora could not communicate directly and privately because Cora spoke only Polish and Jahrling spoke no Polish. Jahrling relied on counsel for the adverse parties for all communication with Cora. After the buyers tried to evict Cora, Cora sued Jahrling in state court for legal malpractice. After a partial settlement with a third party and offsets, the court awarded Cora’s estate $26,000, plus costs. Jahrling filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection. Cora’s estate filed an adversary proceeding alleging that the judgment was not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(4) because the debt was the result of defalcation by the debtor acting as a fiduciary. The bankruptcy court found in favor of the estate. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.Jahrling’s egregious breaches of his fiduciary duty were reckless and the resulting malpractice judgment is not dischargeable. View "Jahrling v. Estate of Cora" on Justia Law

Hassebrock hired the Bernhoft Law Firm in 2005 to help with legal problems, including a federal criminal tax investigation, a civil case for investment losses, and a claim against Hassebrock’s previous lawyers for fees withheld from a settlement. Hassebrock was ultimately found guilty, sentenced to 36 months in prison, and ordered to pay a fine and almost $1 million in restitution. In 2008, Hassebrock fired the Bernhoft firm. In a malpractice suit against the Bernhoft attorneys and accountants, Hassebrock waited until after discovery closed to file an expert-witness disclosure, then belatedly moved for an extension. The court denied the motion and disallowed the expert, resulting in summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the judge should have applied the disclosure deadline specified in FRCP 26(a)(2)(D) rather than the discovery deadline set by court order. The disclosure deadline specified in Rule 26(a)(2)(D) is just a default deadline; the court’s scheduling order controls. It was well within the judge’s discretion to reject the excuses offered by Hassebrock to explain the tardy disclosure. Because expert testimony is necessary to prove professional malpractice, summary judgment was proper as to all defendants. View "Hassebrock v. Bernhoft" on Justia Law

In 2007 Pickett, a nursing home housekeeper, filed claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging that residents sexually harassed her and that Sheridan fired her for complaining. Sheridan won summary judgment on the harassment claim, but Pickett was awarded $65,000 on the retaliation claim, which was affirmed. Pickett sought attorney’s fees for work done by her attorney, Rossiello, his associates, and paralegals, but did not request prejudgment interest. The court determined that Rossiello’s market rate was $400 per hour and that 175 hours of 225 hours submitted were proper, excluding hours it found duplicative and hours accumulated while Rossiello was suspended from practice. In 2011, the Seventh Circuit found that the court improperly calculated the rate and erred in declining to award fees to outside counsel. On remand, Pickett sought fees for the life of the case and requested prejudgment interest. Considering his disciplinary history, experience, and prior fee awards, the court ordered payment for the hours approved before Pickett II at $425 per hour, rather than the $540-620 requested; approved the time requested for work on Pickett II, less the time spent on administrative tasks; awarded prejudgment interest as to the Pickett II fees; and determined that the claim to fees for the work done on remand had been waived.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "DPickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr." on Justia Law

Bravo sued Midland for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692. Midland agreed to forgive two of Bravo’s debts (GE/Lowe’s and Citibank/Sears) as part of a settlement agreement. Philipps, an attorney who specializes in consumer litigation, represented Bravo. After the settlement, Midland sent two letters addressed to Bravo at Philipps' office. The letters were received at Philipps’ business office and were basically identical. One requested the payment of the GE/Lowe’s account and the other requested the payment of the Citibank/Sears account. Philipps did not forward the correspondence to his client, but opened and reviewed the content of the letters. Bravo filed another claim, asserting that the letters violated sections 1692c,e of the FDCPA which prohibit contact with a consumer regarding debts once the consumer notifies the debt collector that she is represented by counsel, prohibit a debt collector from continuing to communicate a demand for payment to a consumer once the consumer has refused to pay, and prohibit false and misleading statements. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. The letters were not continued communication to a consumer and would not have deceived a competent attorney who was aware that the debts had been resolved. View "Bravo v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc" on Justia Law

VLM, a Montreal-based supplier, sold frozen potatoes to IT in Illinois. After nine successful transactions, IT encountered financial difficulty and failed to pay for the next nine shipments. Invoices sent after delivery included a provision purporting to make IT liable for collection-related attorney’s fees if it breached the contracts. VLM sued; the deadline for an answer passed. The court entered a default. On defendants' motion, the court vacated the default as to IT’s president only. All three defendants then filed answers, contesting liability for attorney’s fees. The judge applied the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code and found that the fee provision had been incorporated into the contract. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods applied. On remand, the judge applied the Convention and held that the fee provision was not part of the contracts and that IT could benefit from this ruling, despite the prior entry of default. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. IT never expressly assented to the attorney’s fees provision in VLM’s trailing invoices, so under the Convention that term did not become a part of the contracts. VLM waived its right to rely on the default by failing to raise the issue until its reply brief on remand. View "VLM Food Trading Int'l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading Co." on Justia Law