Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The district court certified a class in a suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005), 47 U.S.C. 227. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for the court re-evaluate the gravity of class counsel’s misconduct and its implications for the likelihood that class counsel will adequately represent the class. The district court concluded that "only the most egregious misconduct" by the law firm representing the class "could ever arguably justify denial of class status." The court must weigh the firm's misleading statements and the risk that the firm is in this case purely for itself and not for the benefits that the suit if successful might confer on the class. View "Creative Montessori Learning Centers v. Ashford Gear LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit, pro se, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging arrest without probably cause and assault. The judge allowed him to proceed in forma pauperis. After plaintiff delayed in responding to a draft pretrial order, the judge imposed a sanction of $9,055 against the plaintiff and an attorney who had agreed to represent him. Plaintiff was unable to pay and the judge rejected his offer of $25 per month. When plaintiff did not pay within the 30 day period set by the court, it dismissed his suit. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the fine was actually paid by the attorney after plaintiff complained to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. The attorney admitted being unfamiliar with the federal rules and that he had never before filed a pretrial order.

The owner of an outdoor amphitheater in a rural area claimed that the sheriff forced him to hire off-duty deputies as a private security force for events and threatened to close the road leading to his property if he did not comply. After giving plaintiff's attorney three tries at producing a complaint that complied with Rules 8 and 10(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that each iteration of the complaint was generally incomprehensible and riddled with errors, making it impossible for the defendants to know what wrongs they were accused of committing. The Seventh Circuit ordered plaintiff's attorney to show cause why he should not be suspended from the bar of the court or otherwise disciplined under Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and directed that a copy be sent to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.

The parties agree that the company attempted to collect an overdue hospital bill in a way that violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692 and that plaintiff is entitled to statutory damages of $1,000. Plaintiff's lawyer endeavored to transform the case into a class action, and the district court, frustrated by the effort, dismissed the whole action. The Seventh Circuit held that dismissal for want of prosecution was an abuse of discretion. All of the errors at issue were the fault of the lawyer and had nothing to do with the claim. The court should have considered other alternatives before dismissal.

After plaintiff filed suit in state court, Inc., alleging overbillings in excess of $100,000, defendant removed to federal court. The parties are of diverse citizenship. More than a year and a half after the lawsuit commenced, plaintiff produced a document showing that its damages were actually less than $40,000. Defendant waited 10 months, until after an unsuccessful settlement conference, to move for remand and attorney's fees and costs (28 U.S.C. 1447(c) and 1927). The district court remanded to state court without an award of fees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in taking defendant's delay into account in denying an award.

A Polish citizen, who entered the U.S. on a visitor's visa in 1994, overstayed, and allegedly tried to bribe an immigration officer in a 1999 sting operation. Before her removal proceedings began, she married a U.S. citizen, who filed a petition for an alien relative visa. In 2006, after the petition was approved, she applied to adjust her status under 8 U.S.C. 1255. The IJ found her removable, denied her motion to suppress evidence collected in the sting, and decided that she was not entitled to adjust her status. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed an appeal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal and forwarded information about petitioner's attorney to the state disciplinary board. The petition included a single, underdeveloped legal argument: that evidence gathered during the sting should have been suppressed because the operation was an egregious violation of petitioner's right to due process, an argument foreclosed by an earlier case. The court noted its jurisdictional limitations, but stated that the agency's evaluation of the equities was not particularly persuasive and that it would have required more than weak circumstantial evidence that an alien had bribed a federal immigration official.

After prevailing in a suit for social security disability benefits, plaintiff asked for attorney's fees of $25,200 under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(2)(A). The district judge awarded $6,625, cutting the hours from 112 or 116 to 53, adopting objections made by Social Security Administration lawyer, and the hourly rate from $225 to the rate specified in the statute $ 125. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, noting that the Social Security Act provides for awarding a "reasonable fee" for representation in the administrative proceeding and in a successful appeal, 42 U.S.C. 406(a)(1), but the EJA does not provide for "market rate" and creates a presumptive ceiling of $125. The district court did not consider the special circumstances and factors that may be considered under the Act.

Plaintiff suffered a stroke and claimed that the VA hospital failed to properly diagnose and take appropriate measures. He and his wife sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671-80, and also sued their attorney for malpractice. The district court ruled in favor of the government and the attorney. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal as forfeited because plaintiff had supplied only a transcript of the testimony of the government's expert witness Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(3) and had failed to supplement. The district court properly refused to sanction plaintiff's attorney for ex parte communication with treating physicians. The court also properly credited the government expert and held that the hospital's actions were not the proximate cause of the stroke.

Charged with conspiracy to possess and distribute at least five kilograms of cocaine and at least fifty grams of crack cocaine (21 U.S.C. 841), and for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense (18 U.S.C. 924), defendant retained private counsel. After receiving notice of a potential conflict of interests based on the possibility that the attorney could be called as a witness with respect to how he received payment, the court disqualified the attorney and appointed counsel. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment on the cocaine offenses and to 60 months for the firearm. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a Sixth Amendment claim. The disqualification of counsel was not plain error. The prosecutor's closing argument did not amount to an impermissible "once a drug dealer always a drug dealer" statement, but simply questioned the defendant's credibility and character.

Plaintiff first sued tennis star Connors in 1997; the suit settled with payment of $10.5 million by Connors and an agreement that provided mutual promises of indemnification. In 2010, plaintiff's former law partner sued plaintiff, claiming fraud and concealment with respect to the money from Connors. Plaintiff sought indemnification. The district court dismissed, holding that the indemnity provision created an infinitely repeating loop of liability and failed by its terms; Illinois public policy generally prohibits contractual indemnification for intentional misconduct; and the indemnity provision was not specific enough to exempt it from the general rule. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the indemnity provision does not apply to this matter, and, if it did, would be unenforceable under Illinois public policy.