Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

This action arose from a complaint filed in 2006 with the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance against a then Mississippi Supreme Court Justice. The justice was ultimately acquitted of various criminal charges and his wife plead guilty to tax evasion. After the cessation of the criminal prosecution, the prosecuting U.S. Attorney, relative to plaintiff, filed a complaint with the Commission. Accordingly to the justice and his wife, the U.S. Attorney unlawfully attached their tax and other financial records obtained during the criminal investigation to the complaint. Plaintiff served as a member of the Commission and participated in the Commission's investigation of the justice. Although the Commission dismissed the complaint, counsel to the justice and his wife sent plaintiff two letters threatening legal action based on his role in the investigation. Plaintiff responded by filing a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment of immunity from suit for conduct arising out of his duties with the Commission. The justice's wife subsequently filed counterclaims against plaintiff, asserting various federal and state law causes of action arising, in relevant part, from plaintiff's alleged disclosure of the Commission's confidential investigation. The court held that the judgment of the district court, insofar as it denied immunity to plaintiff for his filing of the declaratory relief action, was reversed, and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Lampton v. Diaz, Jr., et al." on Justia Law

Defendant, a state court judge and former criminal defense attorney, was convicted of two counts of wire fraud and one count of making false statements, stemming from defendant's use of his position as a state judge to obtain money and sexual favors in exchange for assisting a criminal defendant. Defendant subsequently appealed his conviction and his 60-month concurrent sentences. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a new trial; based on the record, the court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict would have been the same absent any error in the jury instructions and the indictment; and defendant's sufficiency of the evidence challenged failed. The court also held that the district court properly applied the specific offense characteristic; the second uncharged bribe could be used to increase the offense level for defendant's bribery conviction; and any monies rendered for legitimate legal services could not be subtracted from the loss value under U.S.S.G. 2C1.1(b)(2) because defendant and his colleague provided these services after the offense was detected. Therefore, none of defendant's several challenges required a new trial, reversal of conviction, or resentencing.

Plaintiff was a secretary of G. Thomas Porteous, Jr. during his service as a district judge until Porteous was impeached and the Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit suspended Porteous's authority to employ staff, which resulted in plaintiff's termination. Plaintiff sued the Judicial Council and fifteen of its members seeking declaratory relief, reinstatement to her position, monetary relief, and attorney's fees and costs. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's order insofar as it dismissed her claims against the members of the Judicial Council. The court held that plaintiff lacked prudential standing to bring her constitutional challenge to the Judicial Council's action. The court rejected plaintiff's claim that the ultra vires exception applied to sovereign immunity where her claims for injunctive relief were moot in light of Porteous's removal from office; claims for back pay and retirement credits were barred by sovereign immunity; and plaintiff lacked the necessary injury-in-fact to pursue declaratory relief. The court also held that even if plaintiff had standing to seek declaratory relief, she had not pleaded a sufficient claim of ultra vires action by the Judicial Council to overcome the jurisdictional bar of sovereign immunity. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

After multiple appeals to the court and extensive trial and other proceedings, plaintiffs' Title VII class action for employment discrimination against Lufkin Industries, Inc. (Lufkin) culminated in a favorable multimillion dollar judgment and injunctive relief. Both parties subsequently challenged the district court's attorneys' fee award and Lufkin's complaint that back pay damages were erroneously authorized in an earlier appeal. The court affirmed as to the back pay damages but vacated and remanded as to the attorneys' fees. In particular, given the unrebutted evidence in the record that it was necessary for plaintiffs to retain counsel from outside the Eastern District of Texas, the district court abused its discretion in failing to use the rate counsel charged in their home district as the starting point in the lodestar calculation.

Plaintiff sued defendant, a county judge in Mississippi, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for allegedly causing plaintiff to be prosecuted without probable cause. At issue was whether the district court properly denied defendant's motion, concluding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. The court held that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity where the district court did not explain the constitutional right that he had purportedly violated and, under the circumstances of the case, plaintiff had not shown that defendant's actions tainted the deliberations of the magistrate who issued the arrest warrant or the grand jury that returned the indictment. The court also held that, because the appeal was resolved on grounds of qualified immunity, the court need not address whether defendant was entitled to judicial immunity. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment.

Donald McKinley and Christopher Villasana sued the Texas Attorney General seeking a declaratory judgment that Texas Penal Code 38.12(d)(2)(A) and 38.12(d)(2)(C) (collectively, "Barratry Statute"), violated the Texas and United States Constitutions. At issue was whether the district court erred when it failed to dismiss the state law claims on Eleventh Amendment grounds; whether the district court should have dismissed both McKinley's and Villasana's claims for lack of standing; and whether the Barratry Statute violated the United State's Constitution's First Amendment guarantee to free speech. The court dismissed the state law claims and held that the Eleventh Amendment barred suit where Greg Abbott was sued in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Texas for violations of the Texas Constitution. The court also held that, because Villasana was a resident of Harris County and had not alleged that he practiced outside of the counties affected by the injunction, his claims were dismissed as moot. The court held, however, that McKinley had standing where his actions might violate the Barratry Statute and he had also established the necessary causal link and redressability. Because the Barratry Statute regulated speech that was lawful and not misleading, the court used the three-prong inquiry set forth in Central Hudson and held that the Barratry Statute did not violate the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech.

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit against defendant seeking to sue on behalf of themselves and all other individuals who were exposed to the petroleum coke dust released from defendant's refinery. At issue was whether the district court's order certifying a class was an abuse of discretion. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in determining that common issues predominated and in certifying the class where the district court had not seriously considered the administration of the trial when it failed to adequately analyze and balance the common issues against the individual issues.