Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The underlying case in this matter concerned a property dispute between BNSF Railway (BNSF) and Roy D. Mercer, LLC (Mercer) and the interpretation of an easement. BNSF claimed a right to construct large berms on Mercer's property (to divert water from railroad tracks) pursuant to a 1936 easement granted to BNSF's predecessor in interest by Mercer's predecessor in interest. BNSF hired Gandy Dancer, LLC to construct the new berms. Mercer objected and threatened to remove them. Relying upon its easement claim, BNSF filed suit in state court against Mercer seeking to enjoin Mercer from removing the berms and requesting damages. Mercer filed a counterclaim against BNSF for tort damages and inverse condemnation, and joined Gandy Dancer as a party defendant for trespass, negligence, and prima facie tort. Once joined as a party, Gandy Dancer, through its attorneys Riley, Shane & Keller, P.C. (Riley Law Firm), removed the matter to federal court. Upon removal, Mercer hired the Wagner Ford Law Firm. At that time, the firm consisted of attorneys Kenneth Wagner and Lisa Ford. Although the firm was named "Wagner Ford," Ford was only an associate. In January 2010, Mercer added another law firm, Law & Resource Planning Associates, P.C. (the LRPA Law Firm) to represent it in the state court proceeding because of water law issues involved in that case. The Wagner Ford Law Firm ceased representing Mercer in late 2010. In late June 2012, while the state court proceeding was ongoing, the LRPA law firm learned via the Riley firm's website that the Riley firm had hired Ford as a new associate. LRPA promptly sent a letter to the Riley firm raising Ford's conflict of interest and stating that the Riley firm could no longer represent Gandy Dancer in the litigation with Mercer, Ford's former client. The Riley firm filed a motion in the state case seeking judicial approval of a Rule 16-110(C) screening process for Ford that Riley believed would allow its continued representation of Gandy Dancer. The court found that Ford had previously represented Mercer in the same or a substantially similar matter, her role was substantial, and she had a conflict of interest. Nevertheless, the district court found that the equities favored Gandy Dancer and declined to disqualify the Riley firm. Mercer appealed the district court's decision not to disqualify the Riley Firm. In interpreting and applying the rule to this case, the Supreme Court held that when an attorney has played a substantial role on one side of a lawsuit and subsequently joins a law firm on the opposing side of that lawsuit, both the lawyer and the new firm are disqualified from any further representation, absent informed consent of the former client. "We also specifically conclude under the same rule that screening the new attorney from any involvement in the lawsuit is not an adequate response to the conflict." View "Mercer v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed suit in superior court claiming that she and her son entered into an oral that granted her a life estate in certain property. Petitioner sought to enforce the oral agreement or, in the alternative, recover of a theory of quantum meruit. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The appeals court remanded for proceedings as to whether Petitioner should recover under a theory of quantum meruit. While the case was pending on remand, Petitioner filed a petition in the county court against the judge assigned to the matter, in both his individual and official capacities, and against the Commonwealth. Petitioner raised a number of claims concerning the judge's rulings and conduct, including an assertion that he had acted in an unlawful and biased manner. The single justice denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner's claims of judicial bias and declaratory judgment claims should have been addressed through the ordinary trial and appellate process; (2) the judge was absolutely immune from Petitioner's request for monetary damages; and (3) Petitioner's allegations of conspiracy were insufficient to overcome the judge's absolute immunity. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant RFT Management Co., L.L.C. (RFT) brought this action against respondents Tinsley & Adams, L.L.P. and attorney Welborn D. Adams (collectively, Law Firm) based on their legal representation of RFT during the closing of its purchase of two real estate investment properties in Greenwood County. RFT alleged claims for (1) professional negligence (legal malpractice), (2) breach of fiduciary duty, (3) violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act1 (UTPA), and (4) aiding and abetting a securities violation in contravention of the South Carolina Uniform Securities Act of 2005 (SCUSA). The trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of Law Firm on RFT's causes of action regarding the UTPA and SCUSA, and it merged RFT's breach of fiduciary claim with its legal malpractice claim. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Law Firm on RFT's remaining claim for legal malpractice. RFT appealed, and the Supreme Court certified the case from the Court of Appeals for its review. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court with respect to all issues brought on appeal. View "RFT Management Co. v. Tinsley & Adams" on Justia Law

In 1990 McCarthy bought land at a mortgage foreclosure sale conducted by defendant, Seamen's, the mortgage holder. The advertisement described the parcel as "at the end of the paved portion of Higgins Hollow Road, Truro." McCarthy obtained a mortgage from Seamen's and retained defendant, Snow, an attorney. Before closing, Snow and issued to Seamen's a certificate of title. McCarthy received a copy. The foreclosure deed and mortgage were recorded. McCarthy purchased the property under the belief that it was in a specific location; it is actually another parcel. Following a land court action concerning a boundary dispute with a neighbor, McCarthy sued those involved in her purchase. During discovery, defendants sought, from the land court action, time sheets, correspondence between or among McCarthy and her attorneys, land surveyors, title abstractors, and title examiners; and all documents concerning the parcels. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the defendants did not establish entitlement to discovery of communications protected by attorney-client privilege under a theory of at issue waiver, but may discover the other information that qualifies as "fact" work product under Mass. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), because they have shown substantial need for the material and cannot without undue hardship obtain it from another source. View "McCarthy v. Slade Assocs., Inc." on Justia Law

A 2007 conveyance of commercial property in Milton was characterized by mistakes, starting with an error-filled purchase offer, so that the deed ultimately conveyed a residential parcel that was not owned by the seller at the time of conveyance and that the seller did not intend to convey. In an opinion characterized as “unpleasant to write,” the chancellor declared the purported conveyance a nullity and noted that the “matter has been litigated far beyond what a rational evaluation of its costs and potential benefits would dictate.” The chancellor found that the deed, purporting to transfer the residential parcel, was altered by the buyer’s attorney, to the detriment of the seller and without the effective consent of the seller and was ineffective to convey any property. The actual deed signed by the parties contained a reference to the residential parcel by tax number, but omitted that property from the metes and bounds description. View "Point Mgmt., LLC v. MacLaren, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioners Club Vista Financial Services and others (Club Vista) entered into a real estate development project with real parties in interest Scott Financial Corporation and others (Scott Financial). When a loan guaranteed by some of the Petitioners went into default, Club Vista filed an action against Scott Financial. During discovery, Scott Financial obtained a deposition subpoena for Club Vista's attorney, K. Layne Morrill. An Arizona court granted Morrill's motion to quash the subpoena. The Nevada district court, however, denied Morrill's motion for a protective order and permitted Scott Financial to depose Morrill as to the factual matters supporting the allegations in the complaint. The Supreme Court granted Morrill's petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition in part after adopting the framework espoused by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Shelton v. American Motors Corp., which states that the party seeking to depose opposing counsel must demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by other means, is relevant and nonprivileged, and is crucial to the preparation of the case. Because the district court did not analyze the Shelton factors, the Court directed the district court to evaluate whether, applying the Shelton factors, Scott Financial may depose Morrill. View "Club Vista Fin. Servs., LLC v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

This case arose as an interpleader action to settle the rights to one-half of a brokerage commission resulting from a residential real estate transaction. Reece & Nicholas Realtors, Inc. (RAN), the listing broker, refused to split the brokerage commission with Patrick McGrath, who acted as the broker for the buyer. McGrath was a licensed Kansas attorney but was not licensed under the Kansas Real Estate Brokers' and Salespersons' License Act (KREBSLA). RAN contended it was statutorily prohibited from paying a commission to any person not licensed under the KREBSLA. McGrath maintained that, as an attorney, he was exempt from the requirements of the KREBSLA. The district court granted RAN's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an attorney is exempt from the provisions of the KREBLA, including the prohibition against splitting a fee with a nonlicensee, only to the extent he or she is performing activities that are encompassed within or incidental to the practice of law; (2) this attorney exemption does not create an exception to the commission-splitting prohibition of KREBSLA; and (3) consequently, an attorney who is not licensed under the KREBSLA cannot share in a real estate brokerage commission. View "Stewart Title of the Midwest v. Reece & Nichols Realtors" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs defaulted on a loan that they had secured by giving the lender a mortgage on their property. A law firm representing the lender sent plaintiffs a letter and documents demanding payment of the debt and threatening to foreclose on the property if they did not pay it. Plaintiffs then filed a putative class action lawsuit against the law firm alleging that the communication violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692e. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court held, however, that the complaint contained enough factual content to allow inference that the law firm was a "debt collector" because it regularly attempted to collect debts. The complaint also alleged that the law firm was "engaged in the business of collecting debts owed to others incurred for personal, family[,] or household purposes" and that in the year before the complaint was filed, the firm had sent more than 500 people "dunning notice[s]" containing "the same or substantially similar language" to that found in the letter and documents attached to the complaint in this case. Further, the complaint alleged enough to constitute regular debt collection within the meaning of 1692a(6). Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Reese, et al. v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree, & Adams, LLP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued defendants in Missouri state court, on behalf of a putative class of similarly situated borrowers, alleging that defendants engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Mo. Rev. State 484.020 when they charged certain fees in the course of refinancing plaintiff's mortgage. Defendants moved the suit to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d) and plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's judgment. The court held that plaintiff failed to show that she was charged any fees, directly or indirectly, for legal work performed by non-lawyers. Therefore, plaintiff had not shown injury and did not have standing to bring her claim. In light of plaintiff's lack of standing, the district court should have dismissed for lack of jurisdiction rather than reaching the merits of the summary judgment motion. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions that the action be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Hargis v. Access Capital Funding, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner, an attorney, brought this action pro se seeking reformation of a mortgage. Petitioner was not a party to the mortgage or the loan it secured; he had no interest in the underlying party; sued on his own name and not on behalf of either the borrower or the lender; and there were no defendants. Petitioner sought an order reforming a mortgage by substituting the correct legal description for the property, asserting that his potential exposure for negligence gave him a sufficient interest to bring the action. The court held that petitioner was a non-party to the contract and therefore, he lacked standing to seek reformation. View "In re Mortgage between Pamela S. Pantalone, as Borrower, and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Lender" on Justia Law