Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

James Tierney and Jeffrey Tierney brought an action against Four H Land Company and other defendants to compel them to lower the elevation of a lakeside housing development adjoining the Tierneys' land. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the Tierneys appealed. While their appeal was pending the Tierneys discovered that the district court judge who issued the order harbored a personal prejudice against the Tierneys' attorney. The Supreme Court concluded that the three-factor test set forth in Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp. is the best means of determining when the rulings of a judge who should have recused himself or herself will be vacated and adopted the test. Applying the Liljeberg test to the facts of the case, the Court concluded that the district court judge's order on the summary judgment motions should be vacated.

The Jicarilla Apache Nation's ("Tribe") reservation contained natural resources that were developed pursuant to statutes administered by the Interior Department and proceeds from these resources were held by the United States in trust for the Tribe. The Tribe filed a breach-of-trust action in the Court of Federal Claims ("CFC") seeking monetary damages for the Government's alleged mismanagement of the Tribe's trust funds in violation of 25 U.S.C. 161-162a and other laws. During discovery, the Tribe moved to compel production of certain documents and the Government agreed to the release of some documents but asserted that others were protected by, inter alia, the attorney-client privilege. At issue was whether the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege applied to the general trust relationship between the United States and Indian tribes. The Court held that the fiduciary exception did not apply where the trust obligations of the United States to the Indian tribes were established and governed by statute rather than the common law and, in fulfilling its statutory duties, the Government acted not as a private trustee but pursuant to its sovereign interest in the execution of federal law. The reasons for the fiduciary exception, that the trustee had no independent interest in trust administration, and that the trustee was subject to a general common-law duty of disclosure, did not apply in this context. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Petitioner filed a petition for dissolution in district court and the only contested issue between the parties was the valuation and division of the marital home and surrounding acreage, which was purchased for $45,000 in the mid-1990's. Petitioner had obtained a letter from a realtor stating that the marital home could be worth approximately $250,000-275,000 if the home was in good condition. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied petitioner's M.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) motion, which was filed after the district court found the marital home was valued at $22,423, where petitioner alleged that her attorney grossly neglected her case when she failed to identify the realtor as an expert, or any other qualified real estate expert, and failed to prepare any evidence for trial to reflect petitioner's estimated value of the marital home. The court held that under the unique circumstances, where the district court had a statutory obligation to equitably apportion the marital estate and petitioner's counsel totally failed to present evidence on the issue, the district court abused its discretion in denying her Rule 60(b)(6) motion and should have granted the motion, thereby allowing her to present evidence regarding the value of the marital home so that the district court could make an equitable distribution. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs filed a personal injury slip-and-fall action against defendants and defendants moved to disqualify plaintiffs' attorney. At issue was whether defendants had standing to bring a motion to disqualify plaintiffs' attorney where plaintiffs' attorney's law firm had previously represented defendants' exclusive property manager. Also at issue was whether the circuit court erred as a matter of law in applying an "appearance of impropriety" standard in deciding the motion for disqualification. The court held that defendants had standing to move to disqualify opposing counsel where defendants have shown that plaintiffs' attorney's prior representation was so connected with the current litigation that the prior representation was likely to affect the just and lawful determination of defendants' position. The court also held that the circuit court incorrectly applied the standard of law and should have determined the motion for disqualification based on an attorney's duty to a former client in SCR 20:1.9. Accordingly, the court reversed the order of the circuit court and remanded for further proceedings.

The Real Estate Bar Association of Massachusettes ("REBA") claimed that certain activities undertaken by the National Real Estate Information Services ("NREIS") constituted an unauthorized practice of law. At issue was whether NREIS's activities, either in whole or in part, based on the record and as described in the parties' filings, constituted the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 221, section 46 et seq. Also at issue was whether NREIS's activities, in contracting with Massachusetts attorneys to attend real estate closings, violated Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 221, section 46 et seq. The court held that certain of the real estate settlement activities undertaken by NREIS did not constitute the unauthorized practice of law but the court could not determine based on the record whether the other described settlement activities did. The court also held that the closing or settlement of the types of real estate transactions described in the record required not only the presence but the substantive participation of an attorney on behalf of the mortgage lender and that certain services connected with real property conveyances constituted the practice of law.