Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Sprinkle applied for supplemental social security income. After exhausting administrative remedies, Sprinkle sought judicial review of a final decision that he was not disabled. The district court held that the agency failed to properly evaluate evidence of Sprinkle’s disability and reversed. Sprinkle sought attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. While the EAJA contains a presumptive rate cap of $125 an hour, courts may award enhanced fees if justified because of an increase in the cost of living. The court found that Sprinkle was entitled to fees, but rejected his request for a cost-of-living enhancement. The Seventh Circuit vacated. An EAJA claimant seeking an adjustment need not offer proof of the effects of inflation on the particular attorney’s practice or proof that no competent attorney could be found for less than the requested rate. The claimant may rely on a readily available measure of inflation such as the Consumer Price Index, as well as proof that the requested rate does not exceed the prevailing market rate in the community for similar services by lawyers of comparable skill and experience. An affidavit from a single attorney testifying to the prevailing market rate may suffice to meet that burden. View "Sprinkle v. Colvin" on Justia Law

The district court awarded Naegel, counsel for a prevailing social security disability benefits applicant, significantly reduced attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. 406(b). He claimed that the court should have approved his request for $26,049.73, the 25-percent contingency fee accepted by his client and permitted by statute. The Commissioner of Social Security, representing the interests of the claimant whose benefits pay for the fees, opposed that sum as a “windfall” in light of counsel’s 35.5 hours of work. The district court agreed and awarded $12,780. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that: “Within the 25 percent boundary,” prevailing counsel bears the burden of “show[ing] that the fee sought is reasonable for the services rendered.” View "Lasley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a motion asking the court to approve the contingency fee arrangement he agreed to with his lawyer, following a successful claim for social security benefits. The magistrate judge determined that a fee in the amount of $11,876.65 was reasonable under 42 U.S.C. 406(b)(1). Plaintiff appealed. The court concluded that the magistrate judge correctly started with the fee agreement, and after determining that the early retirement benefits were not past-due benefits "owed," went on to conclude an independent review of the resulting fee for reasonableness. Accordingly, the court affirmed the fee award because the court agreed with the magistrate judge's interpretation of the contract and found no error in his review of the fee.View "Keller v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's order denying his motion for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412. The court concluded that the underlying agency action lacked a reasonable basis in law because the Social Security ALJ disregarded competent lay witness evidence on plaintiff's symptoms without comment. The court concluded that, because the ALJ disregarded competent lay witness evidence without comment, the position of the United States in the underlying action was not substantially justified. Because the government's underlying position was not substantially justified, the court awarded fees, even if the government's litigation position may have been justified. Therefore, plaintiff was entitled to an award of attorney's fees. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Tobeler v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Sneed is the surviving spouse of Reginald, who served on active duty 1964-1968 and suffered service-connected disabilities, including post-traumatic stress syndrome, post-concussion syndrome, degeneration of the vertebrae, narrowing of the spinal column, tinnitus, a perforated tympanic membrane, and scarring of the upper extremities. In 2001, Reginald fell and suffered a spinal cord contusion, rendering him a quadriplegic. In 2003, he was living in a nursing home for paralyzed veterans. There was a fire and all of the residents died of smoke inhalation. Sneed sought dependency and indemnity compensation, 38 U.S.C. 1310, alleging that her husband’s service-connected disabilities were a cause of his death. The VA denied the claim. The Board affirmed. Sneed’s notice of appeal was due by August 3, 2011. Sneed retained attorney Eagle, communicated with Eagle’s office “for a year or longer” and stated that “Eagle knew that there was a deadline.” On August 2, 2011 Sneed received a letter stating that Eagle would not represent Sneed in her appeal. Failing to find new counsel, Sneed filed notice of appeal on September 1, 2011, with a letter explaining her late filing. The Veterans Court dismissed the appeal as untimely. The Federal Circuit vacated, holding that attorney abandonment can justify equitably tolling the deadline for filing an appeal. View "Sneed v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Claimant was awarded benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 30 U.S.C. 901-945. At issue was whether the awards of attorneys' fees properly reflected market-based evidence of counsel's hourly rate, as required by the lodestar analysis in Hensley v. Eckerhart. The court held that neither the ALJ nor the BRB abused its discretion in concluding that counsel provided sufficient market-based evidence of rates, and that the number of hours billed for attorneys' services reasonably reflected the work completed. The court also held that the award of fees for work performed by certain legal assistants was not supported fully by the record, and modified that award accordingly. View "Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. DOWCP" on Justia Law

After the court reversed and remanded for an award of social security disability benefits to plaintiff, plaintiff moved for an award of attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412(d). The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying the fees where the government's underlying action was not substantially justified in this case. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion and remanded for an award of fees and costs. View "Meier v. Colvin" on Justia Law

In 1979, Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, on behalf of present and future recipients, alleging that Tennessee’s Medicaid program violated federal requirements, 42 U.S.C. 1396, and the Due Process Clause. The decades that followed involved intervenors, consent orders, revisions, and creation of a subclass. In 1994, Tennessee converted to a managed care program, TennCare. In 1995, five class members filed motions alleging that TennCare was being administered inconsistent with a 1992 decree and federal law. In 2009, the district court awarded plaintiffs more than$2.57 million for fees and expenses leading up to a 2005 Revised Consent Decree. Plaintiffs had originally requested a lodestar amount of $3,313,458.00, but the court reduced the award by 20 percent on account of plaintiffs’ “limited” success relative to the breadth of defendants’ requests and the scope of the litigation. The court noted that there was “no dispute that Plaintiffs in this case are the prevailing party, and thus entitled to attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988.” The Sixth Circuit vacated parts of the award, noting that section 1988 “is not for the purpose of aiding lawyers and that the original petition for fees included requests for dry cleaning bills, mini blinds, and health insurance. View "Binta B. v. Gordon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the denial of his claim for disability-insurance benefits and supplemental-security-income benefits. The magistrate judge recommended reversing the SSA's denial of benefits and remanded for plaintiff's claim to the SSA for further proceedings. The district court then entered an order adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation and granted plaintiff's counsel's request and award for attorneys' fees. At issue in this appeal was the type of judgment for which a district court could grant attorneys' fees under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 406(b). The court reversed the district court's denial of attorneys' fees, concluding that the district court's construction of section 406(b) unavoidably reduced the likelihood that an attorney who undertook a disability benefits representation would receive reasonable compensation for his work. Section 406(b) fees were authorized in cases where an attorney obtained a favorable decision on remand and the SSA has not opposed such fees for over 25 years. View "Jackson v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Tim Wilborn appealed the reduction of attorneys' fees he earned while representing plaintiff in a Social Security benefits claim. At issue was whether Wilborn received fees for the same work under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412, and the Social Security Act (SSA), 42 U.S.C. 406(b)(1). The court held that the $5,000 award under the EAJA was for the "same work" as the work for which Wilborn received the section 406(b)(1) award, and therefore the district court correctly offset the $5,000 from the 25% award. View "Parrish v. Commissioner Social Security" on Justia Law