Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Kerr sought judicial review of the final determination that Kerr’s husband was not disabled and not entitled to any Social Security disability insurance benefits before his death. Kerr was due to receive any payment owed to Mr. Kerr. The parties stipulated to reversal and remand under 42 U.S.C. 405(g). Kerr then sought an award of $3,206.25 in attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d), with any fees awarded “be made payable to Plaintiff’s counsel,” attaching an “Affidavit and Assignment of EAJA Fee.” The Commissioner did not oppose the motion. The district court granted the award, declined to honor Kerr’s assignment, and concluded that it was required to order payment to Kerr as the prevailing party. The court held that it could not “ignore the Anti-Assignment Act,” which prohibits “an assignment of a claim against the United States that is executed before the claim is allowed, before the amount of the claim is decided, and before a warrant for payment of the claim has been issued” but “le[ft] it to the Commissioner’s discretion to determine whether to waive the Anti-Assignment Act and make the fee payable to Mr. Marks.” The Commissioner responded that she would accept [Kerr’s] assignment and suggested that the court deny as moot Kerr’s Rule 59(e) motion. The district court and Sixth Circuit agreed that Kerr’s motion was moot, and did not reconsider the application of the AAA to the EAJA assignment. View "Kerr v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law

Richard Culbertson was counsel for the four plaintiffs in these consolidated Social Security disability benefits cases. At issue in this appeal was the attorney's fees for Culbertson under 42 U.S.C. 406 and the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412(d). The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not err in its interpretation and application of Dawson v. Finch, 425 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1970) and by imposing a 24% cap on section 406 fees; it was necessary for the district court to add the requested section 406(b) fee together with his EAJA award; and the district court did not abuse its discretion and did not exceed its authority. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Wood v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of plaintiff's application for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A), holding that the Commissioner's litigation position was substantially justified. Plaintiff had successfully challenged the Commissioner's denial of her application for disability benefits and obtained a remand of her claim to the agency for further consideration. In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Commissioner's position was substantially justified because the Commissioner's opposition to remand the claim on the merits was reasonable, even though it turned out to be unsuccessful. Finally, plaintiff's new evidence, though sufficient in the end to persuade the district court to remand the case, did not make that the only reasonable result. View "Decker v. Berryhill" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of plaintiff's application for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A). Plaintiff presented new evidence to the Appeals Council after she lost her claim for social security disability benefits before the ALJ. The district court remanded for further consideration and the Commissioner did not appeal. The district court denied plaintiff's request for attorney's fees, concluding that the Commissioner was substantially justified in arguing that the new evidence did not undermine the ALJ's denial of benefits. The issue that was before the district court on the original merits appeal of the ALJ's denial of benefits was not whether there was other evidence that could support a denial of benefits to plaintiff, or whether the Commissioner's denial of benefits might ultimately be sustained. The Ninth Circuit explained that it was whether the actual decision that was made by the ALJ could be affirmed at that time by the district court in light of the new evidence in the record. In this case, it should have been plain that it could not have been affirmed, because the ALJ's decision failed to provide a reason that was still viable for giving the opinion of the treating doctor little weight. The doctor's final report, if credited, would have undermined the ALJ's original finding that plaintiff was not disabled. Even if the Commissioner might have had a legitimate basis for opposing plaintiff's claim, she did not have a basis to oppose remand and to argue that the district court should affirm the existing ALJ opinion. View "Gardner v. Berryhill" on Justia Law

Clark sought attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(2)(A): $6,790.52 in fees for 34.75 attorney hours at an hourly rate of $176.13, plus 6.70 paralegal hours at an hourly rate of $100. The rate exceeded the $125 rate set by the EAJA. Clark argued that her counsel should receive a cost of living adjustment, based on the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index (CPI) for “Midwest Urban Consumers.” The agency requested that the court award fees at no more than $140, "the current reasonable and customary rate for experienced Social Security practitioners in the Western District of Kentucky." In her reply, Clark attached a declaration from her attorney, stating that he had practiced disability law from his Syracuse, New York, office for several years and provided his firm’s non-contingent hourly rate. Clark cited 2014 Sixth Circuit precedent, concluding that the requested rate of $176.13 was modest and appeared to be reasonable; she argued that other courts have held that the CPI alone was sufficient to justify a rate above the statutory cap. The district court awarded fees at an hourly rate of $140. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; there must be some understanding of the rates charged locally before a court can adjust for cost of living or other factors. View "Clark v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law

Coursey’s application for Social Security benefits was denied. He sought judicial review. The district court granted a joint motion to reverse the decision. Coursey sought attorney fees. Although the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412, sets the presumptive maximum hourly rate an attorney may recover at $125. Coursey sought $185.18 per hour. Coursey submitted the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Price Index (CPI), which documents that the statutory amount would, when adjusted for the cost of living in the Midwest in 2015, be the equivalent of $185.18. The court concluded that the CPI and the attorney's affidavit were insufficient to justify the requested rate and approved an award of $140 per hour, consistent with recent cases in the district awarding that amount for EAJA attorney-fee requests in Social Security cases. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A plaintiff seeking an attorney’s fee of greater than $125 per hour must show by competent evidence that the cost of living justifies a higher rate and that the fee is “in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” The court properly relied on evidence, judicial findings in previous cases, that the prevailing market rate for similar services within its venue was $140 per hour. View "Coursey v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Wood plaintiffs, who were recipients of health coverage under Arizona's Medicaid demonstration project, filed suit against the Secretary challenging her approval of a new Arizona project that raised copayments for medical visits and medications and that permitted healthcare providers to refuse non-emergency services based on an inability to pay. At issue on appeal is whether the members of the class action were the prevailing parties for purposes of attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412. The court applied the factors in Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., holding that under the EAJA, the Wood plaintiffs are the prevailing party in their procedural Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A), challenge against the Secretary. The court noted that the dispositive question is not whether the plaintiff ultimately obtained some form of substantive relief, but rather whether there is a lasting alteration in the legal relationship between the parties. The court concluded that there was a material alteration in the legal relationship of the parties, to the benefit of the Wood plaintiffs. Finally, the court concluded that the retention of jurisdiction for practical and equitable reasons did not undermine the reality that the Wood plaintiffs were a prevailing party. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded to the district court to consider whether the government’s position was “substantially justified” under the EAJA. View "Wood v. Burwell" on Justia Law

Minor suffers from migraine headaches, injuries from a serious car accident, fibromyalgia, and depression. Minor previously appealed the Social Security Commissioner’s decision to deny her disability claims; in 2013, the Sixth Circuit remanded with instructions to award benefits. The district court, calculating attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412, substantially reduced Minor’s requested hourly rate and number of hours. While fees awarded under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 406(b) are deducted from a claimant’s award of past-due Social Security benefits, the government must pay fees awarded under the EAJA out of government funds, so the issue was, essentially, whether the government had to reimburse Minor for some or all of the attorney fees to be deducted from her benefit award. The Sixth Circuit vacated, stating that the district court provided little explanation for drastically reducing the requested EAJA fee award. View "Minor v. Comm'r of Social Sec." on Justia Law

Binder, a law firm representing claimants before the SSA, appealed from summary judgment in two related cases where Binder seeks past attorney's fees. When Binder sought to hold the SSA liable for the fees, the district courts granted summary judgment to the SSA on the basis of sovereign immunity. The court affirmed the judgments and held that, regardless of the SSA’s statutory duties to withhold attorney’s fees from payments to successful claimants, there is no waiver of sovereign immunity in 42 U.S.C. 406(a) that would permit Binder’s lawsuits for money damages. View "Binder & Binder v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Petitioner and her son prevailed at both hearings concerning their due process complaint against the District. At issue on appeal is the district court's award of attorney fees, pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1415, to petitioner's attorney, Tania Whiteleather. The district court awarded $7,780 in fees, substantially less than the $66,420 requested. The court concluded that the outcome of the administrative hearing was not more favorable to petitioner than the District's settlement offer and petitioner was not substantially justified in rejecting the settlement offer. The court concluded that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to apply the $400 rate without seeking additional rebuttal evidence from the District. Finally, the court concluded that petitioner's claim for paralegal fees was barred by collateral estoppel because the district court had already concluded that Dr. Susan Burnett was an education consultant in the expedited hearing appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Beauchamp v. Anaheim Union High Sch. Dist." on Justia Law