Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

After an injury trial, plaintiff's attorney called jurors to ask about the award of damages and assignment of fault between the parties, apparently believing that there had been a clerical error on the verdict form. After a juror informed the magistrate judge, the judge concluded that the attorney had violated ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 3.5 by initiating post-verdict contact with a juror. The Third Circuit vacated, first holding that the attorney had standing to appeal. The judge abused his discretion and denied the attorney's due process rights by not following the disciplinary procedures outlined in Local Rule 83.2(b) of the District Court of the Virgin Islands and by failing to give sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to finding misconduct and imposing sanctions.

Petitioner, convicted of a non-fatal shooting, was sentenced as a habitual offender to 29-1/2 to 60 years for assault with intent to commit murder, to run concurrently with a sentence of 40 to 60 months for a felon-in-possession conviction, and a consecutive term of two years for a felony firearm conviction. He claims that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because his attorney fell asleep while he was being cross-examined. Michigan state courts rejected appeals. The district court denied habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. At most, the attorney was asleep for part of a single cross-examination; a petitioner must show that his attorney slept through a substantial portion of the trial for the "Cronic" presumption of prejudice to attach. Noting the overwhelming evidence, the court stated that petition did not show a reasonable probability that counsel could have prevented prejudicial events from occurring had he been awake, much less that it would have affected the outcome of the trial. Although the attorney was later arrested for cocaine use, there was no evidence that he was using cocaine during the trial..

Plaintiff suffered a stroke and claimed that the VA hospital failed to properly diagnose and take appropriate measures. He and his wife sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671-80, and also sued their attorney for malpractice. The district court ruled in favor of the government and the attorney. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal as forfeited because plaintiff had supplied only a transcript of the testimony of the government's expert witness Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(3) and had failed to supplement. The district court properly refused to sanction plaintiff's attorney for ex parte communication with treating physicians. The court also properly credited the government expert and held that the hospital's actions were not the proximate cause of the stroke.

Defendants engaged in discovery misconduct that was sufficiently egregious to cause the district court to enter an order of default against them. Although defendants subsequently challenged the default order as erroneous, defendants did not challenge the order of default by way of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c) or 60(b). At issue was whether Judge Real, a district court judge, had the power to impose default as a sanction for discovery misconduct and assuming such power, whether Judge Real abused his discretion by imposing default rather than lesser sanctions. The court held that defendants' failures to comply with orders of the court provided Judge Real with the power under Rule 37(b) to impose sanctions sua sponte, up to and including default and that Judge Wilson appropriately revisited previous orders of the court when he replaced Judge Real after Judge Real recused himself. The court also held that the district court possessed the power to impose the sanction of default and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by doing so. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

The willful judicial misconduct at issue in this case arose by Judge Robert Schwartz's untimely recusal after initiating a romantic relationship with an assistant public defender that had cases pending before him and making dishonest statements from the bench concerning his reasons for recusing. In the spring of 2009, a female assistant public defender regularly appeared in his courtroom. Although Judge Schwartz doubted that a romantic relationship would develop given the difference in their ages, he was open to the possibility. At some point during a lunch with the assistant public defender, Judge Schwartz gave the assistant public defender a gift of a pair of purple latex gloves and a book written by an author with the same name as Judge Schwartz entitled "The One Hour Orgasm." The gift was intended by Judge Schwartz and understood by the assistant public defender to be a self-deprecating joke because the author and Judge Schwartz shared the same name. Before he became a judge, Judge Schwartz had given this book to others, whose common reaction was to burst out laughing. When the assistant public defender returned to work, she showed her supervisor the joke gift. After Judge Schwartz announced that he would recuse in two of the assistant public defender's cases, he provided dishonest reasons for his recusal and entered rulings in those cases. There was no evidence of any adverse impact on these cases from the recusals. Both cases were resolved in a timely manner. The relationship with the assistant public defender ended, and following a trial in August 2009, Judge Schwartz took voluntary medical leave while the Ethics Commission obtained an independent medical examination of his condition. The Commission found that although his reasons for recusal were not credible, Judge Schwartz had been forthcoming and candid with the Commission, apologized for his conduct, and expressed a desire and willingness to learn from his mistakes. Based on these facts, the Commission concluded that Judge Schwartz violated ethics rules. The Judge challenged the Commission's findings to the Supreme Court. The Court adopted the Commission's recommendation that Judge Schwartz receive a formal reprimand. The Court also adopted the recommendations that he take appropriate leave during any future transitions in medical treatment, and that he receive training on the nature of sexual harassment. The Court rejected the Commission's recommendations that Judge Schwartz be suspended without pay and, instead, ordered him to pay a $6,000 fine.

The Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (Commission) recommended that Judge Reginald Badeaux, III be publicly censured and ordered to reimburse the Commission for costs incurred in the investigation and prosecution of his case. This matter stems from a 2006 divorce petition. Mary Sinclair sought to divorce her husband Cayman Sinclair. The case was randomly allotted to Judge Badeaux, who was a personal friend of the parties. Nevertheless, Judge Badeaux did not recuse himself from hearing the case. Moreover, during the sixteen months Judge Badeaux presided over the Sinclair case, he continued to socialize with Mr. Sinclair. The Supreme Court adopted the Commission’s findings and ordered that Judge Badeaux be publicly censured for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct. Furthermore, he was ordered to reimburse the Commission for costs.

The Judiciary Commission (Commission) found that Justice of the Peace Charles Flaherty failed to file his 2009 financial disclosure statement in a timely manner. The Commission deemed Justice of the Peace Flaherty to have acted willfully and knowingly in failing to comply with the rule. Thus, the Commission recommended that Justice of the Peace Flaherty be ordered to pay a penalty and to reimburse the Commission for costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record evidence supported the Commission's determination that the Justice of the Peace failed to comply with the reporting rule, but not that his failure was willful and knowing. After considering the facts and the applicable law, the Court ordered Justice of the Peace Flaherty to pay a penalty.

The Judiciary Commission (Commission) found that Justice of the Peace Kevin Hoffman failed to file his 2009 financial disclosure statement in a timely manner. The Commission deemed Justice of the Peace Hoffman to have acted willfully and knowingly in failing to comply with the rule. Thus, the Commission recommended that Justice of the Peace Hoffman be ordered to pay a penalty and to reimburse the Commission for costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record evidence supported the Commission's determination that the Justice of the Peace failed to comply with the reporting rule, but not that his failure was willful and knowing. After considering the facts and the applicable law, the Court ordered Justice of the Peace Hoffman to pay a penalty.

The Judiciary Commission (Commission) found that Justice of the Peace Randy Thomas, Jr. failed to file his 2009 financial disclosure statement in a timely manner. The Commission deemed Justice of the Peace Thomas to have acted willfully and knowingly in failing to comply with the rule. Thus, the Commission recommended that Justice of the Peace Thomas be ordered to pay a penalty and to reimburse the Commission for costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record evidence supported the Commission's determination that the Justice of the Peace failed to comply with the reporting rule, but not that his failure was willful and knowing. After considering the facts and the applicable law, the Court ordered Justice of the Peace Thomas to pay a penalty.

After a violation report was filed against defendant Ramondo Howard alleging defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation, defendant filed a pro se motion indicating that he wished to release his attorney and wanted new counsel to be appointed, confirming on the record he had filed a complaint against his attorney with the court's disciplinary board. The hearing justice excused defendant's attorney. Defendant then filed motions to recuse and change venues, both of which the hearing justice denied. At the violation hearing, the hearing justice found defendant to be a violator of the terms and conditions of his probation. Before the hearing began, however, the hearing justice expressed his belief that defendant needed to be "warehoused" and was "beyond rehabilitation." Defendant appealed, arguing the hearing justice erred by failing to recuse himself from the case because the justice lacked the objectivity and impartiality to fairly hear and render judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that because the hearing justice chose to express his opinions prior to the commencement of the violation hearing, the justice displayed a clear inability to render fair judgment and erred by declining to recuse under the circumstances. Remanded.