Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

This case came before the Supreme Court on recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana, which recommended Justice of the Peace Herbert Williams (Parish of Plaquemines) be publicly censured and ordered to reimburse costs incurred in the Commission's investigation and prosecution of this case for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. In his capacity as an ex officio notary public, JP Williams notarized a document "purporting to transfer" ownership of a parcel of land to his son and daughter-in-law. The donation was not recorded right away. Upon discovering the "purported donation" in 2009, the purported Donor filed a complaint in Louisiana federal district court to clear title to the property at issue. In light of an article that appeared in the local newspaper concerning the complaint, the Commission opened an investigation, and alleged JP Williams engaged in judicial misconduct by notarizing the donation of land to his relatives, which was beyond his limited ex officio notarial powers, and without witnessing the Donor's signature. After a thorough review of the facts and law in this matter, the Supreme Court agreed with the Commission's disciplinary recommendation. View "In re JP Williams, Jr." on Justia Law

This case came before the Supreme Court on recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana, which recommended District Judge Robert Burgess (of the 42nd Judicial District, Parish of DeSoto) be publicly censured for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The disciplinary proceedings arose from a divorce proceeding between Tad Russell VanZile and Judge Burgess' niece, Jenifer Colvin VanZile. The Judge intervened in his niece's divorce and restraining order proceedings by phoning other judges as to the status and disposition of his niece's case. The Supreme Court adopted the recommendation of the Judiciary Commission and publicly censured Judge Burgess, and ordered him to pay costs. View "In re Burgess" on Justia Law

This case was before the court on appeal and cross-appeal from the judgment of the district court ordering attorney Leonard Suchanek to pay his former client, Kevin So, an amount representing a portion of the legal fees Suchanek collected from So, plus interest. Suchanek began representing So and So's agent, Lucy Yan Lu, in July 2006 despite the fact that he was already representing Land Base, a California entity that had entered into an agreement with So that was signed by Lu, to make investments on So's behalf. The court concluded that Suchanek violated Rule 1.7 by simultaneously representing So and Land Base in July and August of 2006; the district court's analysis of the second conflict period, between August 2007 and January 2008, was also sound; and the district court's order requiring Suchanek to deposit the trust funds in the registry was proper in light of Suchanek's history of moving So's money, without authorization, into other bank accounts - sometimes spending it rather than returning it to So or to So's trust account. Accordingly, the court affirmed the rulings as they pertained to Suchanek's appeal. In regard to So's contention that the district court erred in ordering disgorgement of only some of the fees Suchanek collected, the court concluded that the district court's error in assessing the conflict between Lu and So influenced the scope of the remedy it selected. The district court should have awarded a larger sum if it had correctly found a conflict during other parts of the representation. Accordingly, the court remanded the case for further review and issuance of a supplemental remedy, greater than the amount already ordered. View "So v. Suchanek" on Justia Law

The attorney, admitted to practice in Illinois in 1969, was the subject of a 2004 Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission complaint following convictions relating to driving under the influence of alcohol and driving while his license was revoked. The state Supreme Court issued an order suspending him from the practice of law for a period of 18 months, and ordering him to reimburse the Disciplinary Fund for any client protection payments arising from his conduct. In 2007 the ARDC charged him with misrepresentation to a tribunal and engaging in the unauthorized practice of law during his suspension. The Hearing Board found proven misconduct and recommended suspension for two years, but the Review Board recommended dismissal of the charges. The Supreme Court suspended him for one year. While the violations primarily involved representation of the attorney's own bankrupt company and occurred within days of the suspension, the attorney attempted to conceal the misconduct and refused to admit wrongdoing. View "In re: Thomas" on Justia Law

The Judicial Conduct Commission recommended that Northwest District Court judge Richard Hagar be censured for violating Canon 3(B)(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. In 2011, Judge Hagar was served formal charges for allegedly not promptly deciding "Ringuette v. Ringuette" when a trial was held in his court in 2010. Upon review, the Supreme Court accepted the Affidavit of Consent and Agreement agreed to by the parties, censured Judge Hagar for his conduct, and ordered him to pay $500 in costs for the disciplinary proceeding. View "Judicial Conduct Commission v. Hagar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an employment discrimination suit, alleging race discrimination and retaliation, 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 42 U.S.C. 2000e. She failed to file a timely response to her employer's motion for summary judgment and the court granted the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court was within its discretion in denying an extension. Plaintiff's counsel offered no explanation for missing the filing date by more than a month. There was no direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation; there was evidence of legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for any salary differences among workers in plaintiff's position. Plaintiff never complained to her employer that any actions taken against her by co-workers or by anyone at the company were related to race and nothing about cited incidents gave any hint that race was at issue. View "Keeton v. Morningstar, Inc." on Justia Law

Patricia Shelton filed suit alleging breach of contract a legal malpractice against her former attorneys Defendants-Appellants R. Bruce Owens, Jeffrey Crandall, and Owens and Crandall, PLLC (Owens). During the pendency of her action, Ms. Shelton passed away. Plaintiff-Appellee Lois Bishop sought to assert Ms. Shelton's claims as her personal representative. Owens unsuccessfully argued that the legal malpractice claim abated upon Ms. Shelton's death, and that her breach of contract claim did not state a claim. Owens appealed. Because Patricia Shelton’s legal malpractice claim sounds in tort and abated upon her death, and her breach of contract claim fails to state a claim, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in denying Owens’s motion for summary judgment and in granting Bishop’s motion to substitute as plaintiff. View "Owen v. Bishop" on Justia Law

Retired district judge M. John Steensland, Jr. appealed a judgment of the Alabama Court of the Judiciary (COJ) that publicly censured him for misconduct that preceeded his retirement. In 2008, Judge Steensland had begun to serve a six-year term when the Judicial Inquiry Commission (JIC) began an investigation based on complaints of his courtroom conduct and demeanor filed by several parties that had come before the judge in prior cases. In 2010 while the JIC's investigation was ongoing, the Judge voluntarily retired from office. On appeal, Judge Steensland did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence or the nature of the discipline imposed. He merely renewed the grounds he originally asserted in his motion to dismiss the complaint: the absence of jurisdiction and the application of the doctrine of condonation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the COJ did not err in entering its judgment against Judge Steensland, and accordingly affirmed that decision. View "Steensland, Jr. v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Comm'n" on Justia Law

Petitioners, citizens of Mexico, entered the U.S. unlawfully in 1993 and 1998, respectively. Since 2000, husband has been seeking employment-based permanent residency. An individual who would not ordinarily qualify for lawful permanent residency because he entered without inspection, may apply as the beneficiary of a labor certification application or a visa petition filed on or before April 30, 2001, 8 U.S.C. 1255(i). According to the court, petitioners' former attorney provided incompetent, and at times ethically questionable, representation throughout the visa petition process, missing filing deadlines and sending associates to hearings without adequate information about the case, so that an IJ granted voluntary departure and the BIA affirmed denial of a motion to reopen. The Third Circuit denied review. The Due Process Clause does not guarantee an alien effective assistance of counsel in preparing, filing, and appealing a labor certification application and a visa petition before the start of removal proceedings. By the time removal proceedings began, petitioners had accrued more than one year of unlawful presence and would have been ordered removed regardless of counsel's actions.View "Contreras v. Attorney Gen. of U.S." on Justia Law

This case was before the court on a petition to review the opinion and order of the Commission permanently denying petitioner, an attorney admitted to practice in New York state, the privilege of appearing or practicing before the Commission, pursuant to rule 102(3)(1)(ii) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, and Section 4C of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (Act), 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq. On appeal, petitioner contended that the procedure employed by the Commission was unconstitutional. The court held that the Commission acted within its authority in sanctioning him; petitioner was on notice of his duty to comply with the New York Bar disciplinary rules and the standard of conduct proscribed by Rule 102(3)(1)(ii) and Section 4C of the Act; there was substantial evidence for the Commission's finding that petitioner engaged in intentional improper professional conduct; and the Commission did not abuse its discretion in its choice of sanctioning petitioner. Accordingly, the petition for review was denied. View "Altman v. SEC" on Justia Law