Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Heraclio Osorio-Arellanes was involved in a firefight with U.S. Customs and Border Patrol agents in Arizona, resulting in the death of Agent Brian Terry. Osorio fled to Mexico, where he was later arrested and interrogated by U.S. officials in a Mexico City prison. During this interrogation, he confessed to key elements of the government's case on the advice of a Mexican attorney, Juan Salvador Pimentel. Osorio's confession was later used against him in court.The District Court for the District of Arizona initially suppressed Osorio's confession on Sixth Amendment grounds but later reversed this decision following a government motion for reconsideration. Consequently, the confession was admitted at trial, leading to Osorio's conviction on multiple charges, including first- and second-degree murder, conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery, and assault on a federal officer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Pimentel's advice during the interrogation was deficient and prejudicial under the framework established in Strickland v. Washington. Specifically, Pimentel erroneously advised Osorio that robbing drug smugglers was not a crime, leading Osorio to confess. The court held that this advice was legally unjustifiable and that there was a reasonable probability that, absent this advice, Osorio would not have been convicted.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order reconsidering the suppression of Osorio's confession, vacated his convictions and sentences, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not address Osorio's Fifth Amendment claim, as the Sixth Amendment claim was sufficient to decide the case. The dissenting judge would have affirmed the conviction and required Osorio to pursue his ineffective assistance of counsel claim through a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion in the district court. View "United States v. Osorio-Arellanes" on Justia Law

Patrick Gordon, an attorney, was suspended from the rosters of the Maine Commission on Public Defense Services, making him ineligible to represent indigent criminal defendants. The suspension followed an investigation into Gordon’s billing practices and representation of a client. The Commission received information suggesting that Gordon had inaccurately billed for a jury trial that was actually a bench trial and that some billed work was performed by others in his firm. Additionally, there were discrepancies regarding Gordon’s client visits.The Superior Court (Kennebec County) affirmed the Commission’s decision. The investigation began after the Commission received information from a post-conviction review counsel. Gordon was asked to provide documents and clarify billing discrepancies but failed to fully comply. Despite multiple requests and extensions, Gordon did not provide the requested documents or satisfactory explanations. The Commission’s Interim Executive Director, Justin Andrus, ultimately suspended Gordon, a decision upheld by the Commission after an intra-agency appeal.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court found that the Commission’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious. The evidence showed that Gordon failed to comply with the Commission’s requests, which were within the Commission’s authority. The investigation and subsequent suspension were justified based on Gordon’s non-compliance with the Commission’s rules. The Court concluded that the Commission’s decision was supported by evidence and did not reflect any abuse of discretion or erroneous findings of fact. View "Gordon v. Maine Commission on Public Defense Services" on Justia Law

A family of six Mexican citizens entered the United States without authorization and were subsequently placed in removal proceedings. They hired an attorney to help them apply for asylum. Despite having nearly fifteen months to prepare, the attorney requested a continuance only eight days before the hearing, citing the government shutdown as a reason for her lack of preparation. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied the continuance and, due to the attorney's unpreparedness, deemed the asylum applications abandoned, ordering the family's removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision.The family appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The court dismissed the cases of two family members due to lack of jurisdiction, as their removal proceedings had been terminated after they received special immigrant status. The remaining four family members argued that the IJ erred in denying the continuance and that their attorney was ineffective. The court found that the IJ did not abuse his discretion in denying the continuance, as the attorney had ample time to prepare and failed to do so. The court also noted that the attorney's unpreparedness did not violate the family's due process rights.Regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court acknowledged the attorney's failure to prepare but noted that the family did not present this claim to the BIA, thus failing to exhaust administrative remedies. Consequently, the court could not consider the ineffective assistance claim. The court suggested that the family could seek to reopen the proceedings through a motion to reopen or by requesting equitable tolling of the deadline.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed the petitions of two family members and denied the petitions for review of the remaining four family members. View "Bustos-Millan v. Garland" on Justia Law

Timothy Upchurch engaged in a prolonged campaign of harassment against his neighbors, Timothy and Margaret O’Brien, over a disputed easement on their property. Upchurch was convicted of disorderly conduct, criminal damage to property, and theft after trespassing and stealing a security camera from the O’Briens. In retaliation, Upchurch filed a baseless RICO lawsuit against the O’Briens, their lawyer, the local district attorney, and three sheriff’s deputies, alleging interference with his claimed easement. The lawsuit was frivolous as Upchurch did not own an easement. Facing sanctions motions, Upchurch dropped the case, but the district judge awarded sanctions, ordering Upchurch and his attorney, Timothy Provis, to pay the defendants’ costs and attorney’s fees.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin handled the initial case. The court found Upchurch’s lawsuit to be without merit and filed for the purpose of harassment. The judge imposed sanctions under Rules 11 and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure due to the baseless nature of the claims and Upchurch’s failure to comply with discovery obligations. Upchurch and his attorney were ordered to pay the defendants’ costs and attorney’s fees, and Provis was required to disgorge any fees paid by Upchurch.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed Upchurch’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as the notice of appeal was filed outside the 30-day statutory deadline. The court also found the appeal to be frivolous and granted the defendants’ motion for sanctions under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court held that Upchurch and Provis were jointly and severally liable for the costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in defending the appeal. The court directed the O’Briens and Lucareli to submit an accounting of their fees and costs within 15 days. View "Upchurch v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

Robert Mason Elliott was charged with multiple federal offenses, including possession of firearms, sexual exploitation of a minor, and plotting to murder the minor and her mother. Elliott retained Attorney Brandon Sample for his defense. Over a year into the representation, Sample discovered a controlled substance hidden in documents meant for Elliott and sought to withdraw from the case. The court, however, denied Sample's motion, emphasizing Elliott's right to counsel of his choice. Elliott later reached a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to five counts.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana initially handled the case. After Sample's motion to withdraw was denied, Elliott continued with Sample as his attorney. Elliott later filed a second motion to determine his mental competency, which the court granted, and he was found competent to stand trial. Elliott eventually entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to two counts of murder for hire, two counts of witness tampering, and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The court sentenced him to 520 months of imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Elliott argued that Sample had a conflict of interest and that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right by not informing him of this conflict, rendering his guilty plea involuntary. The appellate court held that Elliott's Sixth Amendment claim was not foreclosed by the appellate waiver in his plea agreement. However, the court concluded that even if Sample had a conflict of interest, Elliott could not demonstrate that he was adversely affected by it. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "USA v. Elliott" on Justia Law

June R. Crow-Johnson, an attorney admitted to practice law in Kansas in 1990, faced disciplinary proceedings for multiple violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC) and Supreme Court Rules. Crow-Johnson was appointed as trustee of a trust in 2019 and failed to perform her fiduciary duties, including failing to communicate with beneficiaries, safeguard trust property, and file necessary tax returns. Additionally, she misrepresented her actions to the court and failed to cooperate with disciplinary investigations. Crow-Johnson also neglected to file tax returns for the Topeka Bar Association (TBA) and misled them about the status of these filings.The Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys conducted an evidentiary hearing and found that Crow-Johnson violated several KRPC rules, including diligence, communication, safekeeping property, candor toward the tribunal, and misconduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The Board recommended disbarment based on these findings.The Supreme Court of Kansas reviewed the case and found clear and convincing evidence supporting the Board's findings. The court noted Crow-Johnson's failure to appear at oral arguments and her lack of cooperation throughout the disciplinary process. The court agreed with the Board's recommendation and ordered Crow-Johnson's disbarment, effective immediately. The court also ordered her name to be stricken from the roll of attorneys licensed to practice law in Kansas and assessed the costs of the proceedings to her. View "In re Crow-Johnson" on Justia Law

James M. Briggs, Jr. was charged with two counts of second-degree assault for attacking two employees at the Lincoln Correctional Center (LCC) on April 21, 2021. The charges were based on allegations that Briggs punched one employee, Parwiz Masoodi, multiple times and kicked another employee, Desaray Kerns, in the face while they were trying to restrain him. Both employees sustained bruising and received emergency medical care.The District Court for Lancaster County held a jury trial in May 2023, where both victims testified, and security footage of the incident was presented. Briggs moved to dismiss the charges at the close of the State’s evidence, arguing insufficient evidence, but the court denied the motion. The jury found Briggs guilty on both counts. At sentencing, the court found Briggs to be a habitual criminal and sentenced him to two consecutive terms of 10 to 12 years’ imprisonment, with a 10-year mandatory minimum for each count.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. Briggs argued that the jury instructions were incorrect because they did not include "unlawful" as an element of the offense and that his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to this omission. The court found that the instructions, when read as a whole, correctly stated the law and encompassed all material elements of the charged crime. Therefore, Briggs' counsel was not deficient.Briggs also contended that his counsel was ineffective for not informing the court of amendments to the habitual criminal statute that reduced the mandatory minimum sentence. The court noted that the amendments were not in effect at the time of sentencing, so counsel was not deficient. However, applying the rule from State v. Randolph, the court vacated Briggs' sentences and remanded for resentencing under the amended statute, which mitigated the punishment. The convictions were affirmed, but the sentences were vacated and remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Briggs" on Justia Law

The case involves a petitioner who filed a miscellaneous petition in Family Court concerning a child whose parents are the respondent and the late Christine Hasselbrock. The petitioner, who had a long-standing platonic relationship with Ms. Hasselbrock, provided financial and emotional support to her and her child. After Ms. Hasselbrock's death, the petitioner sought to be declared a de facto parent or to have other parental rights recognized, but the respondent denied him access to the child.Initially, the petitioner filed an amended verified petition in Family Court, asserting both statutory and common law claims for de facto parentage. The first hearing justice dismissed the statutory claim due to lack of standing, as the petitioner had never resided with the child. The justice indicated that the petitioner could pursue his common law claims on the miscellaneous calendar. Consequently, the petitioner filed a new miscellaneous petition asserting various common law claims, including de facto parentage, in loco parentis, and visitation rights.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Family Court's orders. The Court held that the Rhode Island Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) supersedes common law de facto parentage claims, as the statute explicitly outlines the criteria for establishing de facto parentage. The Court also found that the petitioner lacked standing to pursue claims for visitation based on being an "unrelated caregiver" or "de facto relative," as there is no statutory authority granting such rights. Additionally, the Court affirmed the denial of the respondent's motion for attorneys' fees, finding no basis for such an award. View "De Vries v. Gaudiana" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Shandor S. Badaruddin, was sanctioned by the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Lincoln County, for his conduct as defense counsel in a criminal trial involving his client, Kip Hartman, who faced multiple felony charges related to securities and insurance fraud. The trial was conducted under strict time constraints due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the court allocated equal time for both the prosecution and defense. Badaruddin was accused of mismanaging his allotted time, leading to a mistrial declaration by the District Court.The District Court found that Badaruddin had deliberately delayed the trial, which led to the mistrial. Consequently, the court imposed monetary sanctions amounting to $51,923.61 against Badaruddin for the costs associated with the trial. Badaruddin appealed the sanctions, arguing that he was not given adequate notice of the court's concerns and that his actions were not deliberate but rather a result of the challenging circumstances.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and noted that the U.S. District Court had previously ruled that the mistrial declaration was erroneous. The U.S. District Court found that Badaruddin's actions did not constitute deliberate delay and that his efforts to manage the trial time were competent. The U.S. District Court's ruling was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held that Hartman could not be retried due to double jeopardy protections.Given the federal court's findings, the Supreme Court of Montana concluded that there was no basis for the sanctions under § 37-61-421, MCA, as there was no multiplication of proceedings. The court reversed the District Court's sanction order, determining that the costs incurred were not "excess costs" as defined by the statute. View "Badaruddin v. 19th Judicial District" on Justia Law

Stephen Stanko appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition challenging one of his two South Carolina capital convictions and sentences. Stanko argued that his trial counsel, William Diggs, had a conflict of interest due to a pending ineffective assistance claim from a previous trial. Despite this, Stanko insisted on retaining Diggs for his second trial. The trial court held several hearings to ensure Stanko’s waiver of any conflict was knowing and voluntary. Stanko was convicted and sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the conviction and sentence, finding Stanko’s waiver valid.In his state post-conviction relief (PCR) petition, Stanko raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that Diggs’s conflict of interest and his performance during the penalty phase were constitutionally deficient. The PCR court rejected these claims, finding that Stanko had knowingly waived any conflict and that Diggs’s performance was within professional norms. Stanko’s petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of South Carolina was denied.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina reviewed Stanko’s federal habeas petition and applied the deferential standard of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The court found that Stanko’s claims were either procedurally barred or meritless under AEDPA’s standards. The court also addressed Stanko’s complaints about docket management decisions, finding no merit in one and lacking jurisdiction over the other. The district court granted summary judgment for the state and denied Stanko a certificate of appealability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Stanko’s waiver of conflict-free counsel was valid and that the state court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of federal law. The court also found that Stanko’s ineffective assistance claims related to the penalty phase were procedurally barred and that Martinez v. Ryan did not apply to overcome the default. The court dismissed Stanko’s appeal regarding the district court’s denial of his Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration, as it lacked jurisdiction without a certificate of appealability. View "Stanko v. Stirling" on Justia Law